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Initially, Defendant seeks to claim that New Jersey precedent governs this outcome [Defendant’s Brief, pp.10-15]. Defendant cites two cases as the purported “precedent” requiring that this clause be enforced. Defendant cites the Supreme Court’s decision in *Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris*, 189 N.J. 28 (2006). This is an example of the first great mistake. In *Delta Funding*, the Supreme Court permitted a secured lender to file legal action for foreclosure remedies, not available through arbitration, even though the borrower was required to arbitrate all of his claims. That narrow holding does not govern the much broader clause before this Court. Second, Defendant cites to *Kalman Floor Co. v. Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc.*, 196 N.J. Super. 16, 23 (App. Div. 1984), *aff’d o.b., Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc.*, 98 N.J. 266 (1985). This is an example of the second great mistake. *Kalman* is off-point because it concerned a one-sided arbitration clause negotiated in a commercial contract between two business entities. The *Kalman* agreement was not one “between the rabbits and the foxes. ” *Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp.*, 511 S.E.2d 854, 862 (W. Va. 1998). A commercial agreement,, or an agreement “between a fox and a fox,” is not before this Court. Moreover, a claim for money is the only claim Defendant could possibly have under the agreement. Defendant suggests otherwise but the single example it cites – a claim for property damage arising from Plaintiff’s entering the worksite and damaging Defendant’s equipment – is an independent tort claim. Tort claims for property damages are not “arising out of or relating in any way to this agreement or its breach. ” Such a claim would be resolved under tort law. Defendant asserts further that a secured lender could never possess other claims against the borrower except for foreclosure remedies. That is clearly incorrect. In fact, the principal remedy sought by a secured lender is payment in full of the underlying promissory note. The lender’s claim under the Promissory Note can always be pursued outside of a foreclosure proceeding in New Jersey. The Promissory Note and the Mortgage are distinct agreements -- the mortgage merely being security for payment of the Promissory Note.
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However, in each case, the party seeking the protection of the statute of limitations must be the party who induced the reliance by the plaintiff. Trinity Church v. Lawson–Bell, 394 N.J. Super. 159, 171 (App. Div. 2007) (“[A] defendant may be denied the benefit of a statute of limitations where, by its inequitable conduct, it has caused a plaintiff to withhold filing a complaint until after the statute has run. ” Emphasis added); Konopka v. Foster, 356 N.J. Super. 223, 232 (App. Div. 2002) (party seeking to apply equitable estoppel must prove “conduct on the part of the defendant occurring intentionally or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that the conduct would induce inaction, together with reasonable detrimental reliance on plaintiff’s part. ” Emphasis added.); Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J. Super. 38, 50 (App. Div. 2001) (“Typically the doctrine [of equitable tolling] is applied ‘where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass. ” Emphasis added.) In this case, because Plaintiff did not allege nor demonstrate that Amore indicated that no other party may be responsible, it cannot be said that Amore committed any inequitable conduct sufficient to bar the application of the statute of limitations under any of these equitable theories. Consequently, Judge Covello erred in not dismissing the complaint for failure to file within the statute limitations. Therefore, in the event this Court somehow finds that Judge Citrino erred in dismissing the complaint against Amore for lack of a duty, Amore is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, based upon Plaintiff’s failure to commence suit within the two-year statute of limitations.
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CCMC Appendix, Da138. The waiver of a jury trial set forth in Allstate’s policies could hardly be clearer. In a recent precedential case that is indistinguishable from this one, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit persuasively predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would compel arbitration where the insurer’s own contracts required it. GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, PA, Consol. Case Nos. 23-1378, 23-2019 & 23-2053 (April 15, 2024). CCMC Appendix, Da158.
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DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212, 228 (2023). And under Rule 4:10-2, the answer is simple: the “scope of discovery” is limited to documents—including “electronically stored information”—that are “relevant. ” R. 4:10-2. The trial court disregarded Rule 4:10-2(a)’s relevancy limitation because, as it stated repeatedly, it believed that “ESI is different. ” T24:18; see T20:23-21:2. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, these comments were not merely “some general statements about ESI. ” Pb21 n.11. That rationale was essential to the trial court’s ruling.
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See also, Report of Eminent Domain Revisions Commission, pp. 24-28 (April 15, 1965), citing Wilson v. Long Branch, 27 NJ 360 (App. Div. 1958). 3 See Pemberton Township v Berardi 378 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 2005) letter and appraisal (Da13;Da18;Da20) to point out that the purpose of the appraisal and the "property rights appraised" clearly stated that the opinion was of the leased fee in order to comply with the ethics requirement of the Appraisal Institute. Defendants' motion to bar Plaintiff's expert from using the Acme Contract rent in his income approach and sales of "the leased fee" of shopping centers was denied by the Honorable Aimee R. Belgard, P.J.C.V. October 14, 2020. (Da108) (2T 32-34) Because of covid restrictions, the parties agreed to arbitration.
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71 Page offender an or offense an pertaining to circumstance or fact specific every identify to attempt not pose. would release defendant's a that risks the presenting in relevant be might that Circumstances. and Facts Relevant
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Unpub. BER-L-7752-17, LEXIS 1069, at *28 (Law Div. 2019) (“[T]he burden was on Plaintiffs to satisfy themselves as to what information they needed to confirm before finalizing the [contract]. . . . Plaintiffs cannot now be --- 6
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Preciose, 129 N.J. at 464. B. Trial Counsel Failed to Have a Forensic Expert Testify Regarding the Viability of Testing the Tire Iron for Fingerprints and DNA. (Da 113 to 115) As referenced in POINT A, the State’s case was reliant upon defendant's having weaponized a tire iron to assault and rob Eric Webb. Consequently, the identity of the individual who employed the tire iron was essential to the State’s case. In this regard, Detective Thackston did not “process” the tire iron for fingerprints, because he had been “told” that if an item was dusted for fingerprints, it could not be submitted for DNA analysis due to contamination. (5T 152-20 to 155-9; 5T 184-23 to 185-7). Detective Brining understood that fingerprint and DNA analyses could be conducted on the same piece of evidence. (8T 43-14 to 20). He requested that the tire iron be tested for DNA, but that it was not done, nor was it tested for fingerprints, Brining testified, because the authorities wanted it tested for DNA and were concerned the fingerprint powder would “contaminate it. ” (8T 47-19 to 49-20). In support of defendant's PCR petition, Charlotte J. Word, having a Ph.D. in microbiology, submitted a report with an extensive C.V. (Da 56 to 84).
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(8T103:11). Bucci also extensively used the MDT which was in his police car as an essential tool to conduct necessary police procedures. (8T104:2). Bucci never just turned off the MDT and the policy was that the MDT was never to be turned off. (8T104:18; 21). Prychka instructed the officers that it was mandatory to use the MDT and if there was a malfunction or the MDT did not work for some reason there was a written mandate to let a supervisor know. (8T104:21 - 105:2). In Bucci's initial IA interview, Bucci repeatedly indicated that, since the interview was taking place more than a year after the day of the alleged event, that Bucci could not remember everything with specificity.
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RETROACTIVELY Paterson contends in its complaint that the effective date of the COVID Statute was June 29, 2020, which is actually the date of the Statute’s amendment, where the Legislature added a “belt and suspenders” clause, reiterating that contracted service providers receiving payments pursuant to its provisions are required to pay their employees as if the schools had remained open. Paterson makes an argument that boils down to this: Until this language was added, the Statute’s requirement that school districts pay their service providers during health-related closures was of no force and effect, and that to require otherwise is to apply the COVID Statute retroactively.
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In the event Plaintiffs are successful on appeal, they should still not be allowed to recovery attorneys’ fees and costs expended. New Jersey “has a strong policy disfavoring the shifting of attorneys’ fees.
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The Trial Court properly ruled that the Plaintiff was not qualified to provide testimony regarding the paint or the slipperiness of said paint as it falls within the purview of an expert.
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(4T:16-7 to 17-15). In August 2021, defendant was tried on the first three counts of the indictment before Judge Pereksta and a jury. The jury convicted defendant of all three counts.
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In a similar case seeking to oust other Rutgers’ BOG members, the Law Division determined that such members do not hold “office” (or State employment or position) and cannot be ousted on residency grounds pursuant to the New Jersey First Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14-7. In a published opinion authored by former Assignment Judge Mary Jacobson, the court closely examined the New Jersey First Act’s statutory language, purpose and legislative history. The court concluded that volunteer members of the Rutgers BOG do not hold office. Kratovil v. Angelson, 473 N.J. Super. 484, 520 (Law Div. 2020). That holding should apply with equal force here. That is so because, even though the statute in Kratovil is different, both that case and the present one deal with the same concept (removing a BOG member on residency grounds) and contain the same specific reference to “office.
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We discern that the trial judge recognized the unfairness in barring the State from introducing the evidence of Williams's belated identification of defendant as his assailant. Barring that evidence would have been unfair to the State and indeed to Williams himself. Under these circumstances, the only fair thing to have done would have been to grant a mistrial and thereby afford defendant and his attorney the opportunity to adjust their trial strategy and make an orderly determination of how to proceed in light of the new evidence. We recognize that ultimately the State, apparently sensing the appellate issues that could be presented if defendant were to be convicted after such an egregious discovery violation had occurred, told defendant and his attorney that it had reconsidered and did not plan to introduce evidence of Williams's identification of defendant. We further recognize that at that point defendant and his attorney were restored to the status quo ante, in that they were at that juncture in no worse position than they were before the assistant prosecutor revealed that Williams could now make an in-court identification. Although defense counsel could, at that point, have decided not to pursue the issue of Williams's ability to identify defendant, and could have refrained from asking for the Rule 104(a) hearing, we view her decisions in an indulgent light. We do so because of the inherent unfairness that resulted from forcing a defense attorney to constantly readjust her strategy in the middle of the trial. It would be unfair to conclude under the extreme circumstances presented here that this was “induced error” that should cause a defendant to forfeit his right to any relief. *State v. Corsaro*, 107 N.J. 339, 346 (1987).
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Zucker, K.J., *The myth of persistence: Response to “A Critical Commentary on Follow-Up Studies and Desistance Theories about Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming Children” by Temple Newhook et al.*, International Journal of Transgenderism, 19 (2018).................................................................12
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A. That's a broad – I'll characterize it this way, is that we conduct annual drills, transmission safety drills, with local OEM. Holmdel may have been one of the participating groups, OEM, prior PB in one of our drills in the past, but I don't have that in front of me. But we do regularly interact by way of drill as part of our safety program with the state. And also part of our federal requirements is that we have an annual transmission drill where we talk about incidents that can occur along a transmission line. Q. Okay. That's good to know. The first passage I asked you to read involved the possibility of equipment failures as well as feeding high pressure gas into homes. Would you agree with me that that's a pretty significant risk?
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THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT PLACED THE BURDEN ON PETITIONER TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE In its opposition, the Respondent contends that the Petitioner had the burden of proving undue influence using the "clear and convincing" standard. Respondent's opposition overlooks the shifting burdens associated with claims of undue influence and how that impacts the burdens of proof. It is well settled that even a will, which on its face appears to have been validly executed, can be overturned upon a demonstration of undue influence. Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank of N.J., 87 N.J. 163, 175-76, 432 A.2d 890 (1981). In Haynes v. First National Bank of New Jersey, 87 N.J. at 175-76, the Supreme Court set forth the standard to be applied to rebut a presumption of undue influence (1) a confidential relationship and (2) "suspicious circumstance" that "need only be slight."
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CRIMINAL ACTION On Appeal From a Denial of a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County. Ind. No. 13-05001446-I Sat Below: Hon. Edward J. McBride, Jr., P.J.Cr.
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Plaintiff filed its complaint (Pa 6) and Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer. (Pa 13) Plaintiff opposed the motion with the certification of its Executive Vice President who had firsthand knowledge of interaction between the parties and actively participated in communications to resolve the matter without the necessity of a lawsuit. Defendant's motion was premised exclusively on the certification of counsel, who attached records of his client.
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The decision was based upon the court's assessment of whether there was an exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches because defendant gave third-party consent to the police to search the house. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990). The court found the police officers' belief that defendant had the authority to consent to a search was objectively reasonable in view of the attendant facts and circumstances. Id. at 188-89; State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219, 221 (1983). The court held: Based on all the testimony presented ..., the facts establish that [defendant] opened the door in response to the police knocking; he did not object to police entry or state in any way, shape, or form that the police were not allowed to come in; police asked about Bradley's presence and [defendant] stepped aside in response to the question. The act of stepping aside by [defendant] can fairly be interpreted as granting permission to enter the premises. The reasonableness of that inference is also buttressed by [defendant's] failure to verbalize any objection to the officer's search into the residence.[ ] Based on these circumstances, the court finds that the police had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that [defendant] possessed common authority over the property to be searched and that his actions and inactions granted the officers consent to enter the residence.
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N.J.R.E. 404(b) sharply limits the admission of evidence of other crimes or wrongs. This limitation is essential to guard against the risk “that the jury may convict the defendant because he is a ‘bad’ person in general” rather than because of the evidence adduced at trial. State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336 (1992).
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1. A criminal complaint may be filed against the defendant in locations indicated in Paragraph B3 above. 2. A criminal complaint filed pursuant to Paragraph C.1 above shall be investigated and prosecuted in the jurisdiction where the offense is alleged to have occurred. 3. A domestic violence complaint may be filed pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph B above.
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(188a) Thereafter, Plaintiffs discovered an Affidavit of Title executed by Menas as sole member of TNM. 622a. In addition, and most importantly, Plaintiffs discovered checks showing that Menas, four months prior to May 7, 2008, had already been repaid the alleged $250,000.00 loan for which Teddy Menas allegedly gave him the Collateral Assignment. 625a–627a; 645a–650a. Thus, Plaintiffs discovered that at the time Menas signed the Mortgage, the Collateral Assignment had already been extinguished since the loan had been repaid. Thus, the only reason Menas signed the Mortgage as sole member of TNM was because Menas was in fact sole member of TNM, as he certified and was notarized, notwithstanding self-serving and perjurious testimonies of co-conspirator --- ² Pursuant to Rule 2:6-1(a)(2), Mr. Slimm’s brief is permissible content for Appellants’ Appendix as it raises an issue which is germane to the appeal.
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HAD Application – Highlands Exemption Request – Aug. 2020 (CONT.) d. Section 4 – Narrative Report in Support of HAD – Highlands Exemption Request (CONT.) xiv. Exhibit N – Feb. 11, 2010 – DEP Agency Determination: Highlands Act – Exempt, Exemption 11, re: 300 Line Project – from Lawrence J. Baier, Director, Division of Watershed Management, DEP, to C. Susan King, State Government Affairs Manager, TGP.
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(Pa002231). When questioned as to his understanding of when his client actually acquired the development rights, Mr. Bellin testified that his client acquired the development rights to the Property when it “signed a lease with the property owner. ” (Pa002250). Furthermore, Mr. Bellin testified that the land use approvals under consideration by the Planning Board “ran with the property, so we were obligated to finish those[.]” (Pa002236). Mr. Bellin further described his letter: “[u]nder the Municipal Land Use act, I wrote this letter to the Planning Board Secretary and I am speaking about the preliminary and final site plan approval, which is all I can do. What I am saying to her is that we have the right to continue. We have the right to continue the application. ” (Pa002250). So, Milford acquired the development rights to the Property because it entered into a lease and assumed “the obligation to complete the project. ” (Id.). The lease gave Bellin’s client, Milford, “exclusive possession and control” of the Property and left Milford to “complete the project.
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While a trial court would be well within its right to cut off further litigation of a motion once the court has decided the motion and finds there is no legal basis for any further litigation, the court in this case allowed further briefing to be filed by defense counsel. It violates principles of due process and fundamental fairness to allow as consciousness of guilt an event that transpires in the course of litigating a motion.
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THE PLAINTIFF SYNAGOGUE AND THE ZONING BOARD ATTORNEY (NOT THE ZONING BOARD ITSELF) ERRONEOUSLY ASSERTED BELOW THAT THE CHANCERY COURT DETERMINATION --- THAT A PARKING EASEMENT ON LOT 5 WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE 1963 AGREEMENT --- WAS DETERMINATIVE AS TO THE N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 DETERMINATION OF THE ZONING BOARD. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADOPTED THAT ANALYSIS/ POSITION (RAISED BEFORE ZONING BOARD Da68, Da1 AND BEFORE TRIAL COURT Da270; APPEAL TRIAL COURT OPINION/ORDER Da270)
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Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 12-14. Specifically, the State argues that the definition of “final judgment” used by the Restatement of Judgments is controlling for these purposes. Id. (citing Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J. Super. 558, 566 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 659 (1996)). “[F]or the purposes of issue preclusion… ‘final judgment’ includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. ” Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 12-13 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982). However, the State mistakenly relies on comments to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, and the text of the Restatement itself, as binding.
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Docket No. in The Court Below: ATL-L-002790-23 Sat Below: Hon. Michael J. Blee, A.J.S.C. RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON APPEAL CHIESA SHAHINIAN & GIANTOMASI PC 105 Eisenhower Parkway Roseland, NJ 07068 T: 973.325. 1500 Attorneys for Respondents/Defendants CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NEW JERSEY
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(FDU’s document production, Bates stamp D02132-D02134 at Pa. 65-67.) In addition, El-Helw admitted that when he was admitted into the Pharmacy Program that he signed the University admission form that said: It is agreed and understood that the signing of this application constitutes an agreement on the part of the student to abide by all rules and regulations of the University. (Plaintiff Dep. T63:21-24 at Pa.155). The University admission form continued: Students who accept enrollment at the University agree to abide by all the rules and regulations now or hereinafter promulgated by the University. Any student failing to comply with such rules and regulations may be dismissed by the University. (Plaintiff Dep. T64:12-24 at Pa.155; FDU’s document production, Bates stamps D02393, D02394, D02485 at Pa.66) (emphasis added).
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BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS KEVIN KERVENG TUNG, P.C. AND KEVIN TUNG, ESQ. DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Kevin K. Tung, Esq., Pro Se Attorney ID#039111998 for KEVIN K. TUNG, ESQ. 136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 3D Flushing, NY 11354 Tel: (718) 939-4633 ktung@kktlawfirm. com DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Kevin K. Tung, Esq. Attorney ID#039111998 for KEVIN KERVENG TUNG, P.C. 136-20 38th Avenue, Suite 3D Flushing, NY 11354 Tel: (718) 939-4633 ktung@kktlawfirm. com TABLE OF CONTENTS
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I I I I of Review the sale seized vehicles and other property: . . I a. Verify deposit of sale to treasury records b. Review records on sale, agrees to description - and amount - xi Trace receipts from the cash book to the County - Law Enforcement Trust Fund report select I adequate sample
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directive
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The FTC has also stated that “[a] debt collector may contact an employee of a telephone or telegraph company in order to contact the consumer, without violating the prohibition on communication to third parties. ” Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the FDCPA, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,104 (Dec. 13, 1988).
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Appellants nonetheless contend that the “trial court failed to recognize or address this Court’s ruling” in County of Passaic v. Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 498 (App. Div. Feb. 8, 2023). (Pb at 29.) However, as explained in greater detail in Section IV.A below, County of Passaic supports affirming the trial court’s holding because Appellants and Sapporo USA are sophisticated commercial parties who clearly understood that they were agreeing to arbitrate their claims.
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Among other issues it resolved, the PSA (DA 282) provided for the equitable distribution of any proceeds from the sale of the only real property at issue in the divorce, specifically, the famed Olga's Diner, formerly of Marlton, NJ. The PSA refers to any proceeds of the “sale” of Olga’s Diner only. It does not state that Plaintiff should share in any monies from the sale of the land that the diner was situated on. No sale of the land ever took place as it was foreclosed upon in 2014.
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3.7.4 CEDs must be capable of making a digital recording of the encounter each time the device is utilized, unless the officer carrying the CED is equipped with a body worn camera (BWC) as defined in Attorney General Directive 2015-1. The officer shall activate the BWC prior to utilization of the CED, unless exigent circumstances make it unsafe or not feasible for the officer to do so. 3.7.5 CED spark displays shall be considered constructive authority, but must be reported as a Show of Force in the Attorney General’s Use of Force Reporting Portal. 3.7.6 Police administrators and officers authorized to utilize CEDs and other authorized less- lethal devices and ammunition are also required to adhere to the instructions contained in Addendum A to this Policy. 3.8
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A litany of New Jersey statutes and regulations use the phrase “principally engaged” without specifically defining it which signifies that the phrase does not require a special definition. A litany of other New Jersey statutes and regulations use the phrase “principally engaged” without specifically defining it. See e.g. N.J.S.A. 52:17B-41.11 (“[A]ll applicants who have been principally engaged as an ophthalmic technician . . . shall be issued a license”); N.J.S.A. 34:1B-243 (“Mega project” means . . . a qualified business facility primarily used by a business principally engaged in research, development, or manufacture of a drug or device . . . ); N.J.S.A. 34:1B-185 and N.J.A.C. 19:31–16.2 (“Life sciences business” means a business engaged principally in the production of medical equipment, ophthalmic goods, medical or dental instruments, diagnostic substances, biopharmaceutical products; or physical and biological research; or biotechnology”); N.J.S.A. 44:5-2a (defining “health care facility” as a “private facility or institution, engaged principally in providing services for health maintenance organizations.
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Fernandez v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. A-6466-06T1, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 46 (App. Div. Jan. 8, 2009) (employer’s decision to not tolerate theft of any kind was a legitimate business reason for termination) (Da364-370). “To prove pretext, however, a plaintiff must do more than simply show that the employer’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason was false; he or she must also demonstrate that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent. ” Fulton v. Sunhillo Corp., 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2770, at *20-22 (App. Div., Nov. 18, 2013), quoting Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 14 (2002); Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185, 194 (2002) (sham affidavit allegations contrary to prior testimony do not create a fact issue to withstand summary judgment). Stated differently, retaliatory discharge claims must be dismissed unless there is competent evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that unlawful animus “played a role in the decision-making process and that it had a determinative influence on the outcome of that process.
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The property stolen is a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-2 and the quantity is in excess of one kilogram; (d) The property stolen is a person’s benefits under federal or State law, or from any other source, which the Department of Human Services or an agency acting on its behalf has budgeted for the person’s health care and the amount involved is $75,000.00 or more; or (e)
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SINCE DEFENDANT NEVER PLED ANY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE PREDICATED ON THE TCA, THE DEFENSE WAS WAIVED (931a-954a) Defendant was obliged to plead in its answer plaintiff’s alleged failure to comply with the TCA's notice requirements\(^1\) and a defense based on the TCA's notice requirements is subject to waiver. \(^2\) Defendant is unapologetic about failing to plead any TCA defenses in its answer or any statement of facts as mandated by R. 4:5-4 supporting such defenses. 377a-414a; defense brief, p. 41.
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However, Dr. Powell did locate and highlight a significant piece of financial information found in an Exhibit 13 titled “Home Building Income Statement Summary by Plan” in Lennar’s exemption application. Pa593 The exhibit indicates that the ‘Unleveraged IRR’ produced by the project would be a remarkably high 67.9% on the developer’s invested equity capital’. (emphasis added) Dr. Powell explained that “IRR” is an abbreviation for Internal Rate of Return. “Unleveraged IRR” is a term used widely in the real estate capital markets to assess the financial attractiveness and feasibility of a proposed equity investment in a real estate project. Based on his professional experience, he concluded that “a well-conceived and sponsored project needs to demonstrate an unleveraged IRR in the range of 10% - 12% in order to attract the equity capital needed as a source of funds. By the developer’s own calculation. . . . the subject project is expected to produce an unleveraged IRR [internal rate of return] of 67.9%, more than five times this benchmark standard. This extraordinarily profitable return is projected despite these so-called ‘extraordinary costs,’ and with a very modest short-term PILOT agreement. ” (emphasis added) From defendant Lennar’s own financial disclosure, Dr. Powell further concluded that the “project would be financially viable if it were subject to full taxes. ” The PILOT agreement, he said, provided minimal property tax relief over the life of the exemption,\(^{14}\) with a structure providing that the PILOT is 99.5% of taxes (essentially full taxes) for most of the term of the Agreement. He reasoned \(^{14}\) The relief from full taxes within this 30-year agreement is quite modest and short term. The multi-family rental apartments will pay 66% of full taxes in years 1–5, then 75% of taxes in year 6-10, and then 99.5% of taxes (essentially full taxes) for the last 20 years of the Agreement. For the for-sale homes, the tax relief is even more modest and short term for the developer. The PILOT would be 75% of full taxes for just five years (years 1-5), and thereafter, for the remaining 25 year term of the Agreement, the PILOT is 99.5% of taxes (essentially full taxes for most of the term of the Agreement). that the project would have been constructed even at full taxes since even a reduced unleveraged IRR would have been at least two or three times the IRR level needed to confirm the project as financially feasible. ” (emphasis added) Dr. Powell also questioned the 30-year term of the tax exemption, finding no basis whatsoever related to financial need for the term of this Financial agreement to extend for 30 years. ” Pa706, par 23.
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McCormack’s argument -- that the Correction of Errors statute, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-54 should allow her to purchase service credit (Pb18-19) -- should also fail because there is no longer an error to correct. The Board acted in compliance with the governing statute and regulation and found the equitable principles are not warranted in McCormack’s favor as discussed above. (Pa93-96). McCormack also argues that the Board’s denial of her request for an administrative hearing deprived her right of due process.
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43
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The Authority’s suggestion that FSA would have rejected financing because of insufficient parking demand lacks credibility for two reasons. First, the Authority \textit{never} conducted any study or analysis of parking demand that would have led it to believe, at any point prior to 2009, that the Project would not generate sufficient parking demand. 2T90:15-22; see also Sections G-H, supra. Second, there is \textit{no} evidence in the record to suggest that, after execution of the Redevelopment Agreement in 2005, which included the FSA representation in Section 8.7(b), the projected parking demand for the Project would not justify construction of the Authority Garage by 2009. In his testimony, Mr. Perez \textit{never} identified any change in circumstances surrounding the Project, and so the Authority’s supposed inability to obtain FSA approval of financing for the Authority Garage, if true, can only be blamed on the Authority itself. Moreover, even if FSA had actually rejected financial approval for the Authority Garage, the Redevelopment Agreement required the Authority to seek alternative financing. Specifically, Section 8.7(d) of the Redevelopment Agreement provided that “[i]n the event that FSA does not agree to insure the Authority’s bonds or other obligations expected to be issued to finance the Authority Garage, the parties agree to negotiate other financial alternatives in good faith for a period of 90 days after FSA’s determination. ” Da112 (§ 8.7(d)). Thus, had the Authority submitted an application to finance the Authority Garage and FSA denied that application, the Authority was required to negotiate with Center City to attempt alternative financing. Ibid. Because the Authority never actually sought FSA approval to issue bonds to finance the Authority Garage and never explored alternate financing options, the Authority’s assertion that the Authority Garage could not be built due to an inability to obtain financing was not credible. **J.
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brief
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44
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(Pa000017-18, 26-29) The State first assumed the powers under N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5 to modify, amend or terminate current CNAs, act as the City’s bargaining representative, and change conditions of employment on November 9, 2016 and was prevented by Court Order from making any changes until June 7, 2017. \(^4\) The MSRA is silent on whether this power extends to wages and terms of employment accrued prior to the trigger date. Both the Trial Court and Defendants’ position is that the MSRA permits the State to claw back wages and benefits earned prior to the Implementation Memo. Under this logic, the State could modify wages and benefits accrued and paid by the City prior to June 7, 2017 and then pursue these employees for reimbursement. This is clearly not the intention of the New Jersey Legislature. A more expansive interpretation is that the MSRA permits changes to wages and terms and conditions of employment, whether contractual or not, when the powers pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:27BBBB-5 are triggered. There are no powers for the --- \(^4\) The Trial Court identified Vadel, et al. v. City of Atlantic City, et al. where the Hon. John C. Porto P.J.Cv., determined that the State was permitted to eliminate terminal leave payments accrued prior to the MSRA takeover. PA0000026. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs in that matter have filed an appeal which is pending. For the reasons discussed herein, the MSRA does not permit the elimination of accrued earned wages. State to reach back for prior paid or owed wages or benefits. Earned wages cannot be divested absent a knowing and intentional waiver by each person adversely affected. Matter of Morris School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 310 N.J. Super. 332 (App. Div. 1998). None of Plaintiffs’ members have executed any such knowing and intentional waiver. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently discussed accumulated sick leave as a vested right in Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 601 (2020). In that case, the Supreme Court found that a modification to terminal leave was effective because those benefits do not vest until a triggering event, such as retirement or separation from employment. Id. at 601. In this matter, the event triggering the payment of accumulated sick leave was the July 1, 2016 promotion, because the contractual right to wage increases was "a present fixed interest which […] should be protected against arbitrary state action." Phillips v. Curiale, 128 N.J. 608, 620 (1992) (quoting Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 384 (1954)). Under no reasonable interpretation of the MSRA is the State permitted to eliminate earned wages that were fully vested prior to the State acquiring the authority to modify those terms on June 7, 2017. The Trial Court’s March 4, 2024 Order must, therefore, be reversed. CONCLUSION
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brief
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45
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This Addendum to the Use of Force Policy is not intended to constitute a comprehensive document addressing all of the complicated issues involved in law enforcement responses to barricaded individuals. Rather, it is designed to ensure that every agency is utilizing best practices, including integrating mental health professionals into the response. Mental health professionals, with appropriate education, requisite experience and familiarity with law enforcement response procedures, can bring unique perspective, expertise in dealing with a person experiencing a mental health crisis, and input informed by access to patient information to the incident leadership team. Their input will provide additional tools and resources to maximize opportunities to successfully resolve delicate encounters with barricaded individuals. 1.4
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directive
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46
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HEARING Refuting and Appeal of Superior Court Rulings 1. Judge ruled that all parties’ Motions going back to my Reconsideration Motion of Oct. ’22 Order “express dissatisfaction w/previous rulings”.
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brief
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47
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U.S. Const. amend. XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶¶ 1, 9, and 10. In the alternative, the failure to properly instruct the jury that an agreement to aid someone after a murder does not constitute a conspiracy to commit murder requires reversal of Venable’s conspiracy conviction.
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brief
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48
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The model jury charge is “often helpful to trial courts performing this important function[,]” but in some cases, as here, the trial court must “mold the instruction in a manner that explains the law to the jury in the context of the material facts of the case. ” *State v. Concepcion*, 111 N.J. 376, 379 (1988). Here, the Court read an incorrect charge to the jury with respect to Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose. (15T:242-8 to 245-8). The charge as it was originally read to the jury stated “a weapon is anything readily capable of lethal use or of inflicting serious bodily injury. ” (15T:242-8 to 9). However, on the verdict sheet, there was a sentencing enhancer pursuant to *N.J.S.A.* 2C:43-6(c), which requires Scott Kologi to possess a firearm while in the course of or attempting to commit the foregoing crime. (Da9-15). When the charge was initially read to the jury, the Court never defined what a firearm was. (15T:242-8 to 9). Similarly, the charge did not define what possession meant. (15T:242-8 to 9). On February 24, 2022, the day after charge was initially read, the Court reread the charge on Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose to include the definition of a firearm and the definitions of actual and constructive possession. (16T:7-23 to 16-1). The erroneous charge couple with the rereading an additional charge the following day was confusing and warrants the Court granting the defendant’s motion or a new trial. (16T:11-6 to 20). POINT VIII
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brief
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49
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To explain further, the “Conditions” section of the resolution in question states (emphasis added): ... the Board hereby grants the requested relief from the Zone requirements associated with the Property, subject to the following conditions:" (26a) Paragraph 21 of the list of conditions of this resolution states:
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brief
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50
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The revised Guidelines recognize a prosecutor’s authority to withhold ! tendering an authorized plea offer where to do otherwise could compromise or jeopardize the investigation or prosecution of the defendant or any other person for a more serious offense. See Section 1.1.
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directive
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51
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*State v. Carey*, 168 N.J. 413, 422 (2001) (quoting *State v. Yarbough*, 100 N.J. 627, 643 (1985)). To that end, the court should consider the extent to which: (a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous. [Id. at 422-23 (quoting *Yarbough*, supra, 100 N.J. at 644). ] "[T]he *Yarbough* guidelines are just that—guidelines. They were intended to promote uniformity in sentencing while retaining a fair degree of discretion in the sentencing courts.
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brief
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52
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This requirement is also echoed specifically in the CBD 15 Zone, wherein the Ordinance provides, "All development must be approved by the Borough Land Use Board and shall be submitted through the normal site plan and subdivision procedures as identified by *N.J.S.A.* 40:55D et seq., and the Borough Land Development Regulations." (BTG Cert. Ex. "P") The Trial Court confirmed the Subject Property not being mentioned in ANY document over the span of eight (8) years, stating: The Off-Site Property is not identified in the Settlement Agreement, or in the Order of Conditional Judgment of Compliance and Repose. The court finds no basis to grant automatic site approval where the Off-Site Project undeniably would require multiple variances which have not been properly reviewed or approved by the Local Land Use Board. There is nothing in the record which compels approval of the Off-Site Project when other avenues of compliance are available to the Redeveloper. ERUR's main cited legal authority for Court intervention are both factually inapposite to those presented here.
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brief
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53
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W ap oblije pije 85% santans ke yo enpoze w an pou zak sa a ( sa yo) anvan pou w ta elijib pou libète kondisyonèl pou zak sa a (sa yo)? you will be required to serve 85% of the sentence imposed for that offense(s) before you will be eligible for parole on that offense(s)? [Wi/Yes] [Non/No] 2. Èske w konprann ke le fèt dèske ou plede koupab de akizasyon sa yo tribinal la oblije enpoze yon tèm de lane de libète sou sipèvizyon ka va komanse osito ou finn pije santans la nan prizon? Premye Degre Tèm Libète Kondisyonèl sou Sipèvizyon - 5 lane Dezyèm Degre Tèm Libète Kondisyonèl sou Sipèvizyon - 3 lane Fòm Kreye pa Direktif #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Haitian paj 1 nan 2 Form Promulgated by Directive #01-18, (02/23/2018), CN 11170-Haitian page 1 of 2 Do you understand that because you have pled guilty to these charges the court must impose a year term of parole supervision and that term will begin as soon as you complete the sentence of incarceration?
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directive
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54
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The police identified the number for "Tommy" on Fazzio's phone as belonging to co-defendant Thomas Bergholz (24T32-19 to 24). They located Bergholz on March 14, 2017, at a gas station in Monroeville (20T111-4 to 25). He was in a pickup truck with the truck's owner, Michael Lair (20T11-17 to 25;20T135-21 to 20T136-1;24T34-5 to 10). Bergholz was wearing a green sweatshirt similar to the one seen on the bank surveillance video (24T34-18 to 25). There was also what appeared to be blood on his sweatshirt, pants and boots, and cuts on top of his head (20T138-1 to 5;24T34-22 to 25). The police took Bergholz to the Prosecutor's Office for questioning (20T136-2 to 10). He claimed that he had nothing to do with what happened to Fazzio (16T148-1 to 13). Bergholz's phone records showed that he searched the victim's name on the internet March 11, 2017, at 7:53 a.m. (24T68-18 to 24T69-16;24T105-1 to 18). The phone records also showed that on Thursday, March 9, 2017, he called defendant numerous times, that there were calls between them on March 10, and that Bergholz had made numerous unanswered calls to defendant's phone on March 12, 13, and 14, 2017 (24T59-12 to 24T77-21). On March 11, 2017, Bergholz sent two text messages to defendant's phone at approximately 4:46 a.m. and 4:47 a.m: "Get everything out of your truck that I we or 'cause them clothes are dirty" and "You know what I mean" (21T226-6 to 18;24T83-7 to 22). On March 12, 2017, Bergholz sent several texts asking defendant to respond (24T84-7 to 24T85-15). Defendant was interviewed at the Gloucester County Prosecutor's Office, on March 14, 2017, after the police had spoken to Bergholz (24T46-12 to 18;24T50-3 to 7). Defendant had a pair of gloves in his sweatshirt pocket that were similar to the gloves seen on the Fulton Bank surveillance video (20T115-2 to 17). The police took his gloves and his cellphone (20T115-18 to 20T117-19).
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brief
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55
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The accident occurred in the morning and it was undisputed that a thin layer of snow covered the roads in the area causing them to be slippery. Plaintiff Mockler stopped her car in the intersection and was prepared to turn left into her employer’s parking lot at the time of the accident. Her turn signal was operating and she was awaiting a break in the southbound traffic on Washington Avenue before making her turn. While stopped, she observed through her rearview mirror the Defendant’s bus as it approached and struck her car in the rear. There was evidence in the case that the school bus was going about 15 to 20 miles per hour. The Defendant driver testified that he had been driving the school bus since 7:00 a.m. and that he knew the roads were slippery due to the covering of a thin layer of snow. He testified that he had not skidded when he had stopped previously and that he was driving at a speed of about 10 miles per hour. When he reached the point of about 50 feet from the rear of the Plaintiff’s vehicle, he applied his brakes, but the bus skidded. He turned his wheel to the right in an attempt to avoid the Mockler vehicle, but the bus kept going straight and struck Plaintiff Mockler’s vehicle in the rear. As in the Mockler case, the Appellant here was aware of the precipitation and wet roads, but had not previously encountered any loss of control or slippery conditions.
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brief
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56
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(Pa 209, at 44:16-23) Director Kenneth Childress further testified in his deposition that Defendant Martino admitted to him it was a squint: Q: “Did he [Martino] admit to making the squinting eye gesture?” A: “Yes. ” Q: “Did he [Martino] deny that he was squinting and say he was just closing his eyes? A: No. (Pa 90, at 44:21 – 45:1) On April 6, 2020, Plaintiff had a meeting with Director Childress, his union representatives, Jason Armstead, and Deputy Chief Franklin.
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brief
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57
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When Raheem and Nashon got shot, Brett Carmen was inside the Akbar, so he did not hear gunshots, however, he became aware shots had been fired from his radio.
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brief
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58
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Defendant Has Ample Comparable Evidence Available to Him and Will Receive the Benefit of an Adverse-Inference Charge. Defendant has the ability to recreate the profile during his trial and any harm remaining from the loss of it would be eliminated by providing the jury with an adverse-inference charge. Judge Kazlau nevertheless determined defendant was irreparably prejudiced and the only possible remedy was a dismissal of his indictment. Where a defendant cannot prove either bad faith on the part of the State or the obvious exculpatory nature of the lost evidence, he is not entitled to relief unless he can make a “showing of manifest prejudice or harm arising from the failure to preserve evidence” as required under the third Hollander factor.
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brief
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59
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And that explains the low coverage limit for single-family uses in the R-20A Zone compared to conditional uses in the R-20A Zone that must obtain site plan approval under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-67(b). The Board’s commentary that it could not mitigate the impacts to the MPA through the imposition of conditions is at odds with the requirements of Sica. The third prong of Sica requires land use boards to mitigate detrimental effects of the variance.
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brief
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60
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In order to limit unnecessary expenditure of time and effort, we incorporate the Procedural History and Statement of Facts set forth in Defendant’s Brief, with the understanding that the arguments set forth therein are of course not accepted by the Respondent and should be disregarded by this Honorable Court.
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brief
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61
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V. The Commission failed to properly apply its own standards and precedents when considering violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) (Pa16) In its decision to dismiss the proposed violations of 18A:12-24.1(g) of specific Board members, the Commission indicated: “Although it is clear that the named Respondents, in the circumstances described, advocated for a matter or issue of public importance which they felt was in the best interests of the District, Complainant has not pled sufficient facts evidencing unethical behavior by each of the named Respondents. As with the violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) by the “Board,” the claimed violations of N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24.1(g) by Respondent Hengst, Respondent Braun-Strumfels, Respondent Warner, and Respondent Todd-Marino are equally unsupported by specific evidence of unethical behavior”. (Decision on Motion to Dismiss, Pa16).
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brief
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62
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The audio is probative of exactly what was going on in the Plaintiff’s mind and body in terms of pain immediately upon police arrival at the scene of the crash on -- back in December of 2019. That’s four years earlier than this Plaintiff will have an opportunity to testify at trial, and memories sometimes fade. The video’s audio is the best evidence of what the Plaintiff was feeling in terms of pain immediately at the crash. It’s the best evidence of her conscious pain and suffering at that time and really perhaps the only evidence that could accurately reflect in realtime her pain and discomfort and distress at that moment.
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brief
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63
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Filed 11/09/18 ........................................................................ Da26 Exhibit A (legal description) .............................................. Da11 Exhibit B (map) .................................................................. Da13 Exhibit C (unreported opinion of Minke Family Trust v. Tp. of Long Beach, etc. App. Div. decided 08/20/18 Docket Nos. A-2660-15 T3; A-4036-15T3) Not provided. Peter H. Wegener’s Letter Withdrawing Defendant’s Opposition to Order for Judgment and Appointing Commissioners Filed 11/13/18 ........................................................................ Da28 Order for Judgment and Appointing Commissioners Filed 11/21/18 ........................................................................ Da29 Report of Commissioners Filed 06/21/19 ................................ Da31 Defendant Tsakiris’ Notice of Appeal From Award of Commissioners and Jury Demand Filed 06/26/19 ..................
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brief
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64
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On October 13, 2021, a Union County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. 21-10-6461 charging defendant-appellant Akeem M. Barptelus and codefendants B.B., J.B., and M.P. with second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count one), and fourth-degree possession of a large capacity ammunition magazine, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(j) (count two). (Da1 to 2). Defendant also was charged in a disorderly persons complaint for possession of a controlled dangerous substance, less than fifty grams of marijuana, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4). (Da3) On February 28, 2022, co-defendant J.B. filed a Motion to Suppress evidence seized by police following a warrantless search of M.P.’s vehicle. (Da11). On March 5, 2022, defendant joined the motion. (Da15) On July 12, 2022, the Honorable Candido Rodriguez, Jr., J.S.C. held an --- 1 Da refers to defendant’s confidential appendix. 1T refers to the motion to suppress hearing dated July 12, 2022. 2T refers to the motion to compel buccal swab hearing dated July 6, 2023. 3T refers to the plea hearing dated December 11, 2023. 4T refers to the sentence hearing dated April 12, 2024. 2 The co-defendants are referred to by their initials because it appears their charges were dismissed and records related to the incident expunged. See R. 2:6-1(a)(3); R. 1:38-3(c)(7). evidentiary hearing. (1T). On August 23, 2022, the court issued a written opinion and order denying defendants’ Motion to Suppress. (Da13; Da14 to 40). On January 13, 2023, the State filed a Motion to Compel buccal swabs from defendants. (Da41 to 58). On July 6, 2023, the court heard oral argument and then granted the State’s motion. (2T; Da59 to 68). On December 11, 2023, defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count one). (3T; Da6 to 12). On April 12, 2024, defendant was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement to a term of five years imprisonment with forty-two months of parole ineligibility. (4T; Da3 to 5). Count two of the indictment and the disorderly persons complaint were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. (Da3 to 5; Da9). On May 16, 2024, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on May 16, 2024. (Da69 to 73). This appeal follows. COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS
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brief
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65
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” (Pb14). But this is a misinterpretation that contradicts the Legislature’s actual intent, as explicitly stated in the statute it enacted. “The Court’s obligation when interpreting a law is to determine and carry out the Legislature’s intent.
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brief
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66
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When he reviewed Michelle’s January 2, 2018, statement to the police on, Dr. Dietz did so with “a skeptical and hopefully discerning eye” as he would any statement made by anyone that he reviewed. (13T52-22 to 53-4). Dr. Dietz understood “that not everything that people are quoted as saying is quoted accurately. Not everything that they’re saying is true. Of course. And so I’m trying to weigh the likelihood of various events being true or not true. ” (13T53-4 to 9). Dr. Dietz was explaining the approach he applied generally in reviewing every witness statement provided to him.
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brief
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67
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On August 4, 2022, Special Master Orlofsky issued a robust, sixty-four page Report and Recommendations (“Remand R&R 1”), which framed the “question posed on remand by the parties [as] whether the Appellate Division’s decision to limit the statute of limitations on RICO damages should change [the Special Master’s] and the Trial Court’s prior analysis that Plaintiffs’ RICO and non-RICO claims arose from the same common core of facts, making the majority of Plaintiffs’ fees compensable. ” (Da39056-57.) Based on a meticulous review of the panel’s decision and the record, the Special Master recommended that “the Appellate Division’s decision does not alter that prior holding. ” (Da39057.) The Special Master then described in detail the specific bases for his findings and recommendations, all of which properly followed the Appellate Division’s mandate on remand. (Da39057-89.) The Special Master recommended an award to Jarwick in the amount of $10,666,468 for the work Jarwick’s counsel performed at the trial court level. (Da39089.) The Special Master requested, however, that the parties submit for review certain documents related to the work counsel performed before the Appellate Division and New Jersey Supreme Court. (Da39029.) After the parties submitted the requested documentation, on August 25, 2022, the Special Master issued a sixty-five page Supplemental Report and Recommendations (“Remand R&R 2”), which completed his recommendations to the trial court. In Remand R&R 2, the Special Master provided a thorough analysis of his findings with respect to Plaintiffs’ applications for costs and fees associated with the work their counsel performed before the Appellate Division and the Supreme Court. The Special Master recommended an award to Jarwick for that work totaling $937,912.76. (Da39176.) The Wilfs filed objections to Remand R&Rs 1 and 2, which Plaintiffs opposed. On November 16, 2022, the Honorable Frank J. DeAngelis, P.J.Ch.,\(^2\) issued an Order and corresponding thirty-eight page Statement of Reasons, addressing each issued remanded by the Appellate Division and adopting Special Master Orlofsky’s recommendations for Plaintiffs’ fee applications in full. (Da39964-40004.)
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brief
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68
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ADULT An individual who is 18 years of age or older. ADOLESCENT An individual who is at least 13 years of age but less than 18 years of age. Adolescents are eligible for a full range of services by the SART. Current New Jersey law requires that before any sexual assault medical forensic examination of an adolescent is performed, parental notification is required, unless it is determined it is not in the best interest of the victim. See N.J.S.A. 9:17A-4. CHILD An individual who is under the age of 13 years old. A child is not eligible for services of the SART, however, children aged 12 and under may receive an emergent sexual assault medical forensic examination. CONFIDENTIAL SEXUAL VIOLENCE ADVOCATE (CSVA)
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directive
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69
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In this case, Defendants never even asked the Board members to compile a log or otherwise explain the parameters of their private email use for government business. From there it can be evaluated if the --- \(^6\) For example, the OPRA statute renders the municipal clerk the custodian for a municipal body but the municipal clerk typically has no control or involvement over police reports or building permits. The “record custodian” is merely the person “on point” and the vessel through which the ultimate responsive records will flow. The Paff certification mechanism clearly facilitates this practical constraint. individual Board members must be subject to subpoena or other processes to compel compliance. There is no defense for the government to simply assert that “in theory” it does not have access to the records, particularly without even trying to obtain access and possession. The trial court’s Order bars any exploration or explanation of the private email account usage simply because the Board does not control it. **CONCLUSION**
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brief
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70
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D. date. This Directive shall take effect immediately. The provisions of this Effective Directive shall remain in force and effect unless and until it is repealed, amended, or superseded by Order of the Attorney General.
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directive
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71
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In case otherwise not case the and is offense disorderly petty or offense, persons disorderly crime, indictable (presumption 4.5 Section or complaint-warrant) charging by (mandatory 4.4 Section under covered 33 Page unless acomplaint-summons issue shall agency enforcement law a bycomplaint-warrant), ofcharging this of 3.2 Section with in accordance consulted general attorney or prosecutor deputy an assistant the authorized by and 3.3.2 subsection to pursuant officer designated supervisory or Directive, a that determines this Directive, of 4 Section under presumptions overcome Prosecutor to County the or victim a of safety the protect necessary to reasonably is acomplaint-warrant for application the or prevent to required, when court in appearance defendant's reasonably the assure to community, further and process, criminal justice the attempting obstruct to or obstructing from defendant as Rule 3:3-1(d) to pursuant acomplaint-warrant for apply lawful to basis there a is that determines by charging of presumption the overcome decision to the that anticipated is It recently amended.13 13 complaint- by charging of presumption the overcome judge to a authorizes amended, recently 3:3-1(d), as Rule that: finds judge the where summons appear; to failed offense has indictable and prior any for summons a with served been defendant has (1) the any of the danger safety to will a pose or self, to dangerous is that defendant believe the reason to (2) is there a on summons; released if community the or person other defendant; the for warrants outstanding more or one are there (3) the to defendant the subject to necessary warrant and is known a not is address or identity defendant's the (4) court; the of jurisdiction criminal process justice the obstruct to attempt or obsU~uct will defendant the that believe to reason is there (5) summons; a on released if or summons; a to response in appear will not defendant the that reason believe is to there (6) program services pretrial the by conditions release pretrial of monitoring the that reason believe to is there (7) specified other witness, victim, any protect to necessary is 2A:162-25 N.J.S.A. pursuantto established community. the or person, heard offenses persons disorderly to apply would which practice, court municipal governing VII rules Part The judge a authorizes amended, recently as Rule Specifically, 7:2-2(e), comparable provisions. include municipal court, in following the considering after bycomplaint-summons ofcharging presumption the overcome to officer judicial other or factors: appear; to failed has and offense indictable prior any f'or summons with a served been has defendant the (1) of danger safety the to a pose will or self to dangerous is defendant the that believe to reason is there (2) summons; a on if released community or the person other any defendant; the for warrants outstanding more or one is there (3) to defendant the subject to necessary is warrant a and known not is address or identity defendants the (4) of court; the jurisdiction the criminal justice the obstruct to attempt or will obstruct defendant the that believe to reason is there (5) 34 Page charge serious when most the will overcome be subsection not in established complaint-summons this high that risk suggesting a circumstances extraordinary offense absent disorderly persons petty a is or when required, in appear court to fail new offense, a would commit if released, defendant, the obstruct justice. to o'r attempt obstruct Complaint- by Charging of Presumption Overcoming for Specifying Reasons 4.3.2
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directive
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72
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The trial court held, among other things, that (i) pay-when-able loans are enforceable under New Jersey law; (ii) Plaintiff’s claims were not barred by *N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1*; (iii) Sweeney breached the parties’ April 26, 2013 pay-when-able loan agreement; and (iv) Plaintiff had not discharged Defendants’ prior loan obligation by signing a Discharge of Mortgage which, in fact, served only to discharge the collateral (i.e., the real property encumbered by the mortgage) that secured LeRegazzi’s guarantee of that prior loan. Da1-66. The trial court also found overwhelmingly that Sweeney was not a credible witness.\textsuperscript{2} The trial court awarded Plaintiff the sum of $274,260.64, plus post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum in accordance with the terms of the parties’ loan agreement. Da62-63, 68. On September 20, 2023, Defendants sought reconsideration of the trial court’s award of post-judgment interest at the contract rate of 10%, its finding that the discharge of mortgage was not a satisfaction of a prior loan, and its imposition of liability against LeRegazzi.
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brief
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73
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*(See* 38842a-38871a (50-State Survey)). Further, this Court has specifically applied the *Code of Judicial Conduct*’s conflict-of-interest rules to Special Masters in the context of *Mount Laurel* litigation. *See Deland v. Twp. of Berkeley*, 361 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2003). In rejecting disqualification here, the Special Master and the trial judge referenced the differences between Special Masters and ordinary judges. The Special Master stated that “[s]pecial masters are most often attorneys in private practice who would be reluctant to take on appointments that would disqualify them from large swatches [sic] of potential work.
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brief
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74
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NHA maintains the absolute right to set the standards of performance for its employees. It is beyond dispute that Sims could not perform the essential functions of her carpentry position when she was terminated from her employment on January 6, 2020. NHA based its decision on the only information it had before it at the time; a single doctor’s note stating that Sims could not perform numerous tasks integral to her position for at least six months. Based on that information, NHA exercised its right to terminate her employment because she could not perform her essential job functions. The Arbitrator infringed upon the NHA’s authority by creating an ultra vires work rule that adds a restriction upon NHA’s authority found nowhere in the CBA. In essence, his award rewrites Article III of the CBA to state that NHA has the exclusive right “[t]o hire all employees, and subject to the provisions of law, to determine their qualifications and conditions of continued employment, or assignment,” except for employees on temporary disability. The case law on the issue is unequivocal that an arbitrator cannot add any such qualification; as the Supreme Court stated in County College of Morris, an arbitrator cannot “read in” an additional term over which the parties did not collectively bargain.
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brief
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75
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Stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to Cosima Cassese and Cassese Enterprises, Inc.-filed May 16, 2023.................................3a Doe v. Roe, 2023 WL 2542566 (App. Div.)...........................................5a Moore v. Croatian American Bocci Club, 2008 WL 2548541 (App. Div.)..................................................................................11a Ricco v. Walmart, 2013 WL 5232496 (D.N.J.)........................................16a Spano v. Supervalu, Inc., 2016 WL 3943360 (Law Div.)............................26a Tchikindas v. Basser-Kaufman Management Corp., 2021 WL 1749961 (App. Div.).............................................................................30a McCann v. Borough of Washington, 2006 WL 2726818 (App. Div.).......37a Siegel v. County of Monmouth, 2007 WL 1628141 (App. Div.) certif. denied 192 N.J. 477 (2007).........................................................40a R. 1:36-3 certification of Murray A. Klayman, Esq.................................46a TABLE OF ORDERS, JUDGMENTS AND RULINGS ON THE CROSS APPEAL
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76
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Lasisi submitted discovery evidence to the trial court, Burlington Superior Court, documenting her medical state, issues of jurisdiction and challenges within the elements plaintiff must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of her whereabouts and vehicle information; the plaintiff agreed with Lasisi. On April 13, 2022, defendant submits a motion to dismiss to the initial trial court, Burlington Superior, on the basis for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient service of process, or failure to state a claim via NJ JEDS.
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”). Yet, despite the court’s recognition that multiple guidelines supported concurrent terms, it imposed consecutive sentences. The inescapable conclusion is that its misunderstanding of the no-free crimes guideline was dispositive, and it imposed consecutive terms based on the mistaken belief that unless it imposed consecutive terms,” Harriott would have committed a crime “without being punished.
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78
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Prior custodial sentence of 30 days or more Prior custodial sentence: The final disposition for an offense committed by the Defendant, handed down before the Index Assault. ✔The sentence itself must be for at least 30 days. ✔The Defendant must have been admitted to an adult or juvenile correctional facility, prison, or jail, but the Defendant need not have been in custody for the entire 30 days. Count the sentence, not the time spent in custody.
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79
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Indeed, Trupiano concedes that Amaconn did make various improvements to his Unit. See Db14; 1T:74:8 (Agreeing that new sink and kitchen cabinets were installed); 1T:78:11-12 (Agreeing that water heater was replaced); 5T:64:7-8 (Agreeing that he vacated the Unit so that it could be --- \(^1\) Mr. Metzger’s Certification (as well as the other exhibits to Amaconn’s application for a rent increase) were not included in Trupiano’s Appendix.
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80
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In *Superior Integrated Sols. V. Mercer Ins. Co. of N.J.*, No. A-1027-18T4, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147 (App. Div. Nov. 10, 2020), the Appellate Division analyzed a policy exclusion nearly identical to the exclusion in the instant matter. In that regard, the policy in *Superior Integrated Solutions* excluded an injury “arising out of oral or written publication of material, done by or at the direction of any insured with knowledge that such is false or such would violate the rights of another and would inflict the injury. ” The Appellate Division held that to enforce such an exclusion, the insurer could not merely rely on the allegations in the complaint, but instead, had to prove, among other things, that the insured intended to cause the injury at issue. *Superior Integrated Sols. V. Mercer Ins. Co. of N.J.*, No. A-1027-18T4, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147, at *22. The Appellate Division held that the insurer failed to show that the insured intended the injury and, therefore, was obligated to cover the costs of the insured’s defense. Id. at *23-24. Here, the language of the exclusion in Superior Integrated Solutions is nearly identical to the exclusion in Dr. Hole’s Policy. The exclusion at issue here excludes injuries either “[c]aused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict ‘personal and advertising injury’” or “[a]rising out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity. ” (Da182). Based on the holding in Superior Integrated Solutions, in order to deny coverage, State Farm must show not only that Dr. Hole intended to violate the rights of another, but also, that Dr. Hole intended to cause the particular injury alleged. It is not sufficient to merely accept the allegations of the Underlying Action as plead because New Jersey precedent requires more than “mere allegations. ” See, e.g., Superior Integrated Sols., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2147, at *23 (“A claimant’s mere allegation of intentional harm does not alone justify an insurer’s refusal to provide a defense. In order to bring the insured’s conduct within the exclusion there must be evidence that the insured subjectively intended to injure the claimant. ” (citing SL Indus. V. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 128 N.J. 188, 212 (1992)). Notwithstanding, State Farm based its entire motion on the mere allegations raised by the claimant in the Underlying Action, and the trial court granted summary judgment based on its review of the allegations in the Underlying Action. (See 1T at 22:20-23 (“You take the complaint - - the allegations in the complaint and you take the policy and you look at each other and see whether it falls within it . . . .”). By granting State Farm’s motion for summary judgment based on the mere allegations in the Underlying Action and failing to conduct any analysis regarding subjective intent, the trial court erred as a matter of law. Dr. Hole therefore respectfully requests this Court reverse the summary judgment order dated March 17, 2023.
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81
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Notably, Defendant failed to address the numerous misrepresentations by FDU staff that Plaintiff was able to select and/or opt-in to the dual degree program at a time after the end of Plaintiff’s first year. Defendant also failed to address the August 1, 2024 internal emails between Dr. Almeida, Dr. Michael Avaltroni, FDU School of Pharmacy Dean, and Dr. Chris Capuano (“Dr. Capuano”), University Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs, which demonstrate a student was able to matriculate into the master’s pathway at times other than after the end of their first year, and that Plaintiff was authorized to take master’s track courses once he got off academic probation. More importantly, Defendant failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff was provided with any program or course related material indicating that he was only able to select or opt-out of the master’s pathway at the end of his first academic year, and could not select the pathway when his GPA rose above a 3.0, whenever that occurred. Plaintiff was not afforded the “opportunity” to pursue degrees in both the Pharmacy and master’s program (the “dual degree program”, a unique program which initially led him to enroll at the school, and therefore, the Defendant failed to provide what it promised in line with what was advertised and set forth in FDU’s course materials provided to the inaugural class. Before and after Plaintiff’s enrollment at FDU, Defendant misrepresented the requirements of the dual degree program, including its GPA requirements and the selection/opt-out period for the dual degree program. Subsequently, Defendant fraudulently induced Plaintiff to remain at FDU, based upon the multiple misrepresentations that he would be able to opt-in the dual degree program at any time after his first year in the Pharm.D program. It was not until August 29, 2016 that Plaintiff learned he was not able to opt-in to the dual degree program, when Dr. Avaltroni advised Plaintiff that he was allegedly required to have achieved a 3.00 GPA at the end of his first academic year of Pharmacy courses to have opted in to the dual degree program and could not opt-in at any time thereafter. This was contrary to the representations from FDU staff that Plaintiff was able to opt-in to the program upon achieving a 3.0 GPA, whenever that occurred. Thus, this was a severe deviation from Defendant’s own rules and regulations. Defendant relies on the Accreditation Counsel for Pharmacy Education’s (“ACPE”) condition that the 3.0 GPA requirement be added to permit the dual degree offering by FDU, yet fails to explain why the guideline requirements, set forth in an internal proposed Concurrent Degree Enrollment Program Guidelines and Overview packet, were not provided to its inaugural class. There is no evidence that this admission requirement was set forth in any course materials provided to students. This was a significant omission of material fact by FDU. Nor does Defendant explain why the GPA requirement, which was added to the FDU website after Plaintiff commenced classes, was not immediately made known to the inaugural class. It was not until Plaintiff utilized the “Wayback” machine years later that he first saw the FDU website was changed. Plaintiff did not see the change at the time it occurred. Plaintiff was not afforded the opportunity to achieve a master’s degree upon reaching the requisite GPA requirements, and therefore breached its contract with Plaintiff. Defendant misrepresented that Plaintiff was able to opt-in to the program after his first year upon achieving a 3.0 GPA, and thereby fraudulently induced Plaintiff into remaining at FDU. STATEMENT OF FACTS
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82
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The new policy singles out transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students for differential treatment, as it requires school staff to inform parents only about those students who request a “public name/identity/pronoun change, bathroom/locker room accommodation, or club/sports accommodations, or the like. ” (Da169-70). In other words, the new policy categorically and facially treats transgender students (subject to blanket notification) differently than it treats cisgender students (subject to no parental notification). Although Appellants below argued that the Amended Policy could apply to cisgender students who requested a social transition, as the court aptly noted, “who but transgender, gender non-conforming, and non-binary students would request public and social accommodations or express a change in gender identity or expression?” (Da128). Appellants no longer seriously argue that the Amended Policy applies equally to cisgender students. Other evidence of differential treatment abounds. The Amended Policy’s title—“Transgender Students”—underscores that it does not apply to cisgender students, and the remainder of its language eliminates any doubt.
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83
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Nevertheless, plaintiffs’s argument is without merit as the Notice of Appeal was filed within 45 days of the entry of the final order dealing with the most important issue on the remand—the turn-over of the fund in court. It is fundamental that only a final order or judgment may be appealed as of right. R. 2:2-3. It is also fundamental that a final judgment or order is the last decision from a court that resolves all issues in dispute & settles the parties’ rights with respect to those issues. A final judgment leaves nothing to be decided. At issue below was which party was entitled to the turn-over of the fund in court & the correct turn-over order.
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brief
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84
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The defense had enough fodder for cross examination in what they claim were prior inconsistent statements of the plaintiff concerning the altercation itself; and which were relevant in the liability phase. There was no need to delve into plaintiff’s physical activities. In any event, the fact that plaintiff can ride an ATV and climb a ladder is not necessarily inconsistent with his inability to work in a competitive job market, and the defense offered no expert testimony to say otherwise. In Redvanly v. ADP, Inc., 407 N.J.Super. 395 (A.D. 2009), cert. denied, 200 N.J. 367, this Court ordered a new trial after a defense verdict because evidence relevant only to damages but impacting plaintiff's credibility, and which could have unduly prejudiced the plaintiff, should only have been admitted in the damages phase of a bifurcated trial: "The after-acquired evidence is relevant and admissible only on the issue of damages. Here, evidence of the 'NYNEX issue' was admitted before the jury determined defendants' liability.
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85
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He was Crew Supervisor, but he was on childcare leave during reactionary mode. He testified he never called Mr. Bartos (T. P. 124, L1-15). Janice Nelson testified for NJDOT. She stated she did not know of any instance where Mr. Bartos was called and asked to come in to work under Reactionary Mode (T. P. 73, L4-8). Kujtim Ismailovski testified for the NJDOT. He was assistant crew foreman (T. P. 80, L10-18). During Reactionary Mode one of his jobs was to call the guys three times a day to make sure they were home and if there was an emergency, to have the workers respond (T. P. 80, L16 to P. 81, L3). Mr. Ismailovski testified he only called Mr. Bartos once (T. P. 101, L22 to P. 102, L5). Christopher Feinthel testified for NJDOT.
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86
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” (Da373) She found “[t]he verdict relied upon the identifications at the scene by eyewitnesses, not the failure of Petitioner to establish an alibi,” and concluded, without support, that failing to call Johnson was a strategic decision. (Da373-74) The PCR judge again applied an improperly onerous standard. Also, the need for further investigation into Johnson’s statement, and presenting her testimony at trial, should have been obvious to competent counsel since it was essential to fortifying the alibi defense.
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87
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100 N.J. at 647; see also State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 373 (2019). For example, "[c]rimes involving multiple deaths or victims who have sustained serious bodily injuries represent especially suitable circumstances for the imposition of consecutive sentences." Carey, 168 N.J. at 428. And because the five "facts relating to the crimes" set forth in Yarbough's third criteria are "applied qualitatively, not quantitatively," consecutive sentences may be imposed "even though a majority of the Yarbough factors support concurrent sentences." Carey, 168 N.J. at 427-28. Ultimately, "in determining whether the terms should be concurrent or consecutive, the focus of the court should be on the fairness of the overall sentence."
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88
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Our Supreme Court, interpreting R. 1:12-1(g) (formerly R. 1:12-1(f)), has set forth the standard as follows: “Would a reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge’s impartiality? ” See DeNike, 195 N.J. at 517. “However, before the court may be disqualified on the ground of an appearance of bias, the belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable. ” State v. Presley, 436 N.J. Super. 440, 448 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997)). Thus, the standard is objective reasonableness and not matters of appearance.
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89
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The passage from *Culver* cited by Judge Goodzeit was excerpted from this more in-depth analysis in *United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc.*, 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984): This court has on more than one occasion grappled with the difficult question of identity of causes of action for purposes of claim preclusion, see, e.g., *Davis v. United States Steel Supply*, [688 F.2d 166, 171-72 (3d Cir. 1982), certiorari den., 460 U.S. 1014 (1983); *Donegal Steel Foundry Co. v. Accurate Products Co.*, 516 F.2d 583, 587-88 (3d Cir. 1975), and it bears repeating that the term “‘[c]ause of action’ cannot be precisely defined, nor can a simple test be cited for use in determining what constitutes a cause of action for res judicata purposes.
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90
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Counsel for Kline did not attempt to ask Trooper Morenski to offer an opinion about who was at fault or who caused the accident. The nature of the evidence offered by Kline’s counsel in this case is entirely different than the opinion testimony that was excluded in Neno. Kline simply sought to offer a diagram that showed the points of impact of the vehicles and their respective direction of travel. The diagram does not suggest who entered the intersection first or how fast the vehicles were traveling. Da140. The primary basis of the diagram is Trooper Morenski’s personal observations of the damage to the vehicles and where they came to rest at the scene. 2T:98-19 to 99-2. Without this diagram the jury could have easily been confused about the direction of the three different vehicles and where each vehicle was located in proximity to the intersection at the time of the impact. This error, in combination with the exclusion of evidence of Stengel’s prior criminal convictions led directly to an unjust result and a grave miscarriage of justice.
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91
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...............Pa157 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Plaintiff-Appellant Scott Diana submits his Reply to the Brief collectively submitted by Defendant-Respondents LVNV Funding LLC ("LVNV"), Sherman Originator LLC ("Sherman") and Sherman Originator III LLC ("Sherman III") (collectively, "LVNV Defendants") and to the Brief collectively submitted by Defendant-Respondents MHC Receivables, LLC ("MHC"), and FNBM, LLC ("FNBM").
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92
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(Pa437-Pa438) On that date, according to a Memo to File prepared by Rigg's office, an employee named "Steve" from AKR called Rigg's office to inquire why Rigg's cut sheets did not match AKR's current plans. (Pa437) Rigg's employee wrote in the Memo: "I explained to him that the plans that we were given [by AKR] to provide the layout was (sic) the original set dated 4/11/05. We only recently received a newer set because we have been asked to do additional work onsite. He now understood." (Pa437, emphasis added).
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93
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ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE NO. 2022-11 TO: All County Prosecutors Director, Division of Criminal Justice FROM: Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General DATE: October 21, 2022 SUBJECT: Rescission of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2020-03, Directive Regarding Non-Prosecution of Healthcare Facilities and Professionals Adhering to Triage Protocols During COVID-19 Pandemic As the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic pushed healthcare systems towards the limits of their capacity in March and April 2020, healthcare providers across the country considered how they would allocate scarce medical resources (such as ventilators) among their patients in the event that the need for those resources exceeded the supply. Among the questions asked by healthcare providers confronting this weighty dilemma was whether they might face civil or criminal liability for triage judgments made as the pandemic bore down. In New Jersey, this question was addressed through legislation and executive actions conferring a degree of immunity on healthcare facilities and professionals for certain acts or omissions relating to the pandemic response.
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directive
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94
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ORDERS (3T, p. 5, line 13, to p. 7, line 5) (4T, p. 44, line 13, to p. 46, line 14) SECTION J SUMMARY OF CONTRADICTIONS & ERRORS IN COURT’S OCT. 6, 2022, MARCH 7, 2023, & SEPT. 6, 2023
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95
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’ ” Jeter v. Sam’s Club, 250 N.J. 240, 252 (2022) (quoting Nisivoccia, supra, 175 N.J. at 559). As such, this rule gives rise to a rebuttable inference that defendant is negligent and eliminates the need for plaintiff to prove actual or constructive notice. Prioleau v. Kentucky Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 N.J. 245, 258 (2015); See Nisivoccia, supra, 175 N.J. at 563-65; Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426, 429 (2015); Bozza v. Vornado, Inc., 42 N.J. 355, 359-60 (1964).
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96
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“Video-recorded evidence is reviewed under the same standard. ” Hagans, 233 N.J. at 38 (citing State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017)). Here, defendant provides nothing to set aside the judge’s determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, that his consent was valid.
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97
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To the extent the court found the issues are not identical because “the scope of the evidence sought to be suppressed is different,” this has no bearing on the constitutionality of the officers’ seizure of defendant and the evidence. Whether defendant seeks to suppress all or some of the evidence seized as a result of officers’ pursuit and arrest of defendant does not affect the analysis of whether that pursuit and arrest was lawful. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the fact that defendant may seek to suppress statements he made during the course of his arrest does not alter this conclusion because “[t]he admission of a defendant’s statement against him at a criminal trial should not be the subject of a ‘motion to suppress.
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98
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The Division on Civil Rights (DCR), as part of the Department of Law and Public Safety, under the authority of the Attorney General, is responsible for enforcing New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. Among other things and with some exceptions, the LAD makes it unlawful to discriminate against or harass a person based on race, color, creed/religion, sex/gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, nationality and ancestry. The LAD also prohibits discrimination and harassment based on age, pregnancy, breastfeeding, marital status, familial status, domestic partnership status, civil union status, and service in the U.S. armed forces. DCR’s jurisdiction is limited to addressing acts of bias, prejudice, discrimination, and harassment in: Employment; Housing and real estate; Credit and contracting; and Places of public accommodation, including schools, government buildings, restaurants, hotels, stores, hospitals, theaters, and other places open to the public. Where it appears that there may have been discrimination or harassment based on any of the characteristics listed above, DCR has jurisdiction to accept complaints from individuals and to investigate those complaints. Individuals need not be represented by Page 13 of 16 counsel to file a complaint with DCR; they simply must file a complaint within 180 days of the most recent act of discrimination or harassment. DCR can also open its own investigation into discrimination or harassment without an individual filing a complaint. This is called a Director-Initiated Investigation. Where DCR’s investigation shows probable cause to believe prohibited discrimination or harassment has occurred, DCR will prosecute the violation either in the Office of Administrative Law or in Court. After an administrative hearing, if DCR’s Director finds that the LAD has been violated, the Director has the power to order appropriate remedies, including money damages to the victim, injunctive relief, changes in policies, anti-bias or anti-discrimination training, and statutory penalties. In some cases, a Bias Incident may also constitute a violation of the LAD.
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directive
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99
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Indeed, the folly of Trupiano’s argument reveals itself if more than one unit was tenant-protected and not sold upon the conversion. Suppose, for example, 6 of 11 units ended up being tenant-protected and not sold. Does that mean that Amaconn’s return is limited to only the 5 units that were sold, despite that the Property has 11 units? Amaconn’s investment in the entire 11-unit Property does not vanish simply because the Property was converted into a condominium property, with certain units being sold. \(^3\) The Property purchased in 1993 was an apartment building. That investment pre-dated (by several years) the conversion of the Property to a condominium property in 2003. Trupiano’s focus regarding the purchase price of his Unit at the time of conversion (and the value of his Unit relative to the other units) is improper. All 11 units of the Property purchased by Amaconn were apartments, not condominium units, at the time of purchase. That Amaconn made a return on 10 units is a non sequitur. It does not negate that it is also entitled to a “fair return” on the unsold Unit. Amaconn is hardly seeking to “get out of the deal early so it can escape the regulations to which it agreed. ” (Db26). Pursuant to the Ordinance, Amaconn merely seeks to obtain a “fair return” relating to its ownership of the Unit—rather than continue to subsidize it and suffer mounting losses. In short, Trupiano cannot claim a protected tenancy for his Unit while also asserting that the Unit is excepted from a rent increase for a “fair return” simply due to the prior sale of other units in 2003. Trupiano cannot selectively cherry-pick. If he invokes protection under rent control laws, his Unit is not immune from a rent increase under those same laws. The proverb “you can’t have your cake and eat it too” resonates here.
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End of preview. Expand
in Data Studio
Public Defender Retrieval Dataset.
Load with
from datasets import load_dataset
test = load_dataset("ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset", data_files={"test": "queries_and_targets.csv"})["test"]
corpus = load_dataset("ai-law-society-lab/PublicDefenseDataset", data_files="corpus.jsonl")["train"]
To run evaluation with SentenceTransformers
from sentence_transformers.evaluation import InformationRetrievalEvaluator
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer
from collections import defaultdict
queries = {i:j for i,j in zip(test["query_idx"], test["query"])}
corpus = {int(i):j for i,j in zip(corpus["id"], corpus["contents"])}
relevant_docs = defaultdict(set)
for example in test:
relevant_docs[example["query_idx"]].add(example["gold_idx"])
model = SentenceTransformer("intfloat/e5-base-v2")
ir_evaluator = InformationRetrievalEvaluator(
queries=queries,
corpus=corpus,
relevant_docs=relevant_docs)
results = ir_evaluator(model)
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