Daily Papers

How does language inform our downstream thinking? In particular, how do humans make meaning from language -- and how can we leverage a theory of linguistic meaning to build machines that think in more human-like ways? In this paper, we propose rational meaning construction, a computational framework for language-informed thinking that combines neural models of language with probabilistic models for rational inference. We frame linguistic meaning as a context-sensitive mapping from natural language into a probabilistic language of thought (PLoT) -- a general-purpose symbolic substrate for probabilistic, generative world modeling. Our architecture integrates two powerful computational tools that have not previously come together: we model thinking with probabilistic programs, an expressive representation for flexible commonsense reasoning; and we model meaning construction with large language models (LLMs), which support broad-coverage translation from natural language utterances to code expressions in a probabilistic programming language. We illustrate our framework in action through examples covering four core domains from cognitive science: probabilistic reasoning, logical and relational reasoning, visual and physical reasoning, and social reasoning about agents and their plans. In each, we show that LLMs can generate context-sensitive translations that capture pragmatically-appropriate linguistic meanings, while Bayesian inference with the generated programs supports coherent and robust commonsense reasoning. We extend our framework to integrate cognitively-motivated symbolic modules to provide a unified commonsense thinking interface from language. Finally, we explore how language can drive the construction of world models themselves.

Numerous applications of large language models (LLMs) rely on their ability to perform step-by-step reasoning. However, the reasoning behavior of LLMs remains poorly understood, posing challenges to research, development, and safety. To address this gap, we introduce landscape of thoughts-the first visualization tool for users to inspect the reasoning paths of chain-of-thought and its derivatives on any multi-choice dataset. Specifically, we represent the states in a reasoning path as feature vectors that quantify their distances to all answer choices. These features are then visualized in two-dimensional plots using t-SNE. Qualitative and quantitative analysis with the landscape of thoughts effectively distinguishes between strong and weak models, correct and incorrect answers, as well as different reasoning tasks. It also uncovers undesirable reasoning patterns, such as low consistency and high uncertainty. Additionally, users can adapt our tool to a model that predicts the property they observe. We showcase this advantage by adapting our tool to a lightweight verifier that evaluates the correctness of reasoning paths. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/tmlr-group/landscape-of-thoughts.

Probabilistic models of language understanding are valuable tools for investigating human language use. However, they need to be hand-designed for a particular domain. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) are trained on text that spans a wide array of domains, but they lack the structure and interpretability of probabilistic models. In this paper, we use chain-of-thought prompts to introduce structures from probabilistic models into LLMs. We explore this approach in the case of metaphor understanding. Our chain-of-thought prompts lead language models to infer latent variables and reason about their relationships in order to choose appropriate paraphrases for metaphors. The latent variables and relationships chosen are informed by theories of metaphor understanding from cognitive psychology. We apply these prompts to the two largest versions of GPT-3 and show that they can improve performance in a paraphrase selection task.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Today's probabilistic language generators fall short when it comes to producing coherent and fluent text despite the fact that the underlying models perform well under standard metrics, e.g., perplexity. This discrepancy has puzzled the language generation community for the last few years. In this work, we posit that the abstraction of natural language generation as a discrete stochastic process--which allows for an information-theoretic analysis--can provide new insights into the behavior of probabilistic language generators, e.g., why high-probability texts can be dull or repetitive. Humans use language as a means of communicating information, aiming to do so in a simultaneously efficient and error-minimizing manner; in fact, psycholinguistics research suggests humans choose each word in a string with this subconscious goal in mind. We formally define the set of strings that meet this criterion: those for which each word has an information content close to the expected information content, i.e., the conditional entropy of our model. We then propose a simple and efficient procedure for enforcing this criterion when generating from probabilistic models, which we call locally typical sampling. Automatic and human evaluations show that, in comparison to nucleus and top-k sampling, locally typical sampling offers competitive performance (in both abstractive summarization and story generation) in terms of quality while consistently reducing degenerate repetitions.

In this paper, we present a novel framework for the analysis of Riemann Hypothesis [27], which is composed of three key components: a) probabilistic modeling with cross entropy optimization and reasoning; b) the application of the law of large numbers; c) the application of mathematical inductions. The analysis is mainly conducted by virtue of probabilistic modeling of cross entropy optimization and reasoning with rare event simulation techniques. The application of the law of large numbers [2, 3, 6] and the application of mathematical inductions make the analysis of Riemann Hypothesis self-contained and complete to make sure that the whole complex plane is covered as conjectured in Riemann Hypothesis. We also discuss the method of enhanced top-p sampling with large language models (LLMs) for reasoning, where next token prediction is not just based on the estimated probabilities of each possible token in the current round but also based on accumulated path probabilities among multiple top-k chain of thoughts (CoTs) paths. The probabilistic modeling of cross entropy optimization and reasoning may suit well with the analysis of Riemann Hypothesis as Riemann Zeta functions are inherently dealing with the sums of infinite components of a complex number series. We hope that our analysis in this paper could shed some light on some of the insights of Riemann Hypothesis. The framework and techniques presented in this paper, coupled with recent developments with chain of thought (CoT) or diagram of thought (DoT) reasoning in large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL) [1, 7, 18, 21, 24, 34, 39-41], could pave the way for eventual proof of Riemann Hypothesis [27].

Language models (LM) are capable of remarkably complex linguistic tasks; however, numerical reasoning is an area in which they frequently struggle. An important but rarely evaluated form of reasoning is understanding probability distributions. In this paper, we focus on evaluating the probabilistic reasoning capabilities of LMs using idealized and real-world statistical distributions. We perform a systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art LMs on three tasks: estimating percentiles, drawing samples, and calculating probabilities. We evaluate three ways to provide context to LMs 1) anchoring examples from within a distribution or family of distributions, 2) real-world context, 3) summary statistics on which to base a Normal approximation. Models can make inferences about distributions, and can be further aided by the incorporation of real-world context, example shots and simplified assumptions, even if these assumptions are incorrect or misspecified. To conduct this work, we developed a comprehensive benchmark distribution dataset with associated question-answer pairs that we will release publicly.

We introduce the Probabilistic Worldbuilding Model (PWM), a new fully-symbolic Bayesian model of semantic parsing and reasoning, as a first step in a research program toward more domain- and task-general NLU and AI. Humans create internal mental models of their observations which greatly aid in their ability to understand and reason about a large variety of problems. In PWM, the meanings of sentences, acquired facts about the world, and intermediate steps in reasoning are all expressed in a human-readable formal language, with the design goal of interpretability. PWM is Bayesian, designed specifically to be able to generalize to new domains and new tasks. We derive and implement an inference algorithm that reads sentences by parsing and abducing updates to its latent world model that capture the semantics of those sentences, and evaluate it on two out-of-domain question-answering datasets: (1) ProofWriter and (2) a new dataset we call FictionalGeoQA, designed to be more representative of real language but still simple enough to focus on evaluating reasoning ability, while being robust against heuristics. Our method outperforms baselines on both, thereby demonstrating its value as a proof-of-concept.

Automated plot generation is the challenge of generating a sequence of events that will be perceived by readers as the plot of a coherent story. Traditional symbolic planners plan a story from a goal state and guarantee logical causal plot coherence but rely on a library of hand-crafted actions with their preconditions and effects. This closed world setting limits the length and diversity of what symbolic planners can generate. On the other hand, pre-trained neural language models can generate stories with great diversity, while being generally incapable of ending a story in a specified manner and can have trouble maintaining coherence. In this paper, we present an approach to story plot generation that unifies causal planning with neural language models. We propose to use commonsense knowledge extracted from large language models to recursively expand a story plot in a backward chaining fashion. Specifically, our system infers the preconditions for events in the story and then events that will cause those conditions to become true. We performed automatic evaluation to measure narrative coherence as indicated by the ability to answer questions about whether different events in the story are causally related to other events. Results indicate that our proposed method produces more coherent plotlines than several strong baselines.

Human cognition excels at transcending sensory input and forming latent representations that structure our understanding of the world. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce chain-of-thought reasoning, they lack a principled framework to capture latent structures and model uncertainty, especially in compositional reasoning tasks. We propose Verbalized Probabilistic Graphical Modeling (vPGM), a Bayesian prompting framework that guides LLMs to simulate key principles of Probabilistic Graphical Models (PGMs) in natural language. Unlike many traditional probabilistic methods requiring substantial domain expertise or specialized training, vPGM bypasses expert-driven model design, making it well-suited for scenarios with limited assumptions or scarce data. We evaluated our model on several compositional reasoning tasks, both close-ended and open-ended. Our results indicate that the model effectively enhances confidence calibration and text generation quality.

Accurately predicting the future would be an important milestone in the capabilities of artificial intelligence. However, research on the ability of large language models to provide probabilistic predictions about future events remains nascent. To empirically test this ability, we enrolled OpenAI's state-of-the-art large language model, GPT-4, in a three-month forecasting tournament hosted on the Metaculus platform. The tournament, running from July to October 2023, attracted 843 participants and covered diverse topics including Big Tech, U.S. politics, viral outbreaks, and the Ukraine conflict. Focusing on binary forecasts, we show that GPT-4's probabilistic forecasts are significantly less accurate than the median human-crowd forecasts. We find that GPT-4's forecasts did not significantly differ from the no-information forecasting strategy of assigning a 50% probability to every question. We explore a potential explanation, that GPT-4 might be predisposed to predict probabilities close to the midpoint of the scale, but our data do not support this hypothesis. Overall, we find that GPT-4 significantly underperforms in real-world predictive tasks compared to median human-crowd forecasts. A potential explanation for this underperformance is that in real-world forecasting tournaments, the true answers are genuinely unknown at the time of prediction; unlike in other benchmark tasks like professional exams or time series forecasting, where strong performance may at least partly be due to the answers being memorized from the training data. This makes real-world forecasting tournaments an ideal environment for testing the generalized reasoning and prediction capabilities of artificial intelligence going forward.

Clinical dialogue represents a complex duality requiring both the empathetic fluency of natural conversation and the rigorous precision of evidence-based medicine. While Large Language Models possess unprecedented linguistic capabilities, their architectural reliance on reactive and stateless processing often favors probabilistic plausibility over factual veracity. This structural limitation has catalyzed a paradigm shift in medical AI from generative text prediction to agentic autonomy, where the model functions as a central reasoning engine capable of deliberate planning and persistent memory. Moving beyond existing reviews that primarily catalog downstream applications, this survey provides a first-principles analysis of the cognitive architecture underpinning this shift. We introduce a novel taxonomy structured along the orthogonal axes of knowledge source and agency objective to delineate the provenance of clinical knowledge against the system's operational scope. This framework facilitates a systematic analysis of the intrinsic trade-offs between creativity and reliability by categorizing methods into four archetypes: Latent Space Clinicians, Emergent Planners, Grounded Synthesizers, and Verifiable Workflow Automators. For each paradigm, we deconstruct the technical realization across the entire cognitive pipeline, encompassing strategic planning, memory management, action execution, collaboration, and evolution to reveal how distinct architectural choices balance the tension between autonomy and safety.

Large Language Models achieve next-token prediction by transporting a vectorized piece of text (prompt) across an accompanying embedding space under the action of successive transformer layers. The resulting high-dimensional trajectories realize different contextualization, or 'thinking', steps, and fully determine the output probability distribution. We aim to characterize the statistical properties of ensembles of these 'lines of thought.' We observe that independent trajectories cluster along a low-dimensional, non-Euclidean manifold, and that their path can be well approximated by a stochastic equation with few parameters extracted from data. We find it remarkable that the vast complexity of such large models can be reduced to a much simpler form, and we reflect on implications.

Prompted models have demonstrated impressive few-shot learning abilities. Repeated interactions at test-time with a single model, or the composition of multiple models together, further expands capabilities. These compositions are probabilistic models, and may be expressed in the language of graphical models with random variables whose values are complex data types such as strings. Cases with control flow and dynamic structure require techniques from probabilistic programming, which allow implementing disparate model structures and inference strategies in a unified language. We formalize several existing techniques from this perspective, including scratchpads / chain of thought, verifiers, STaR, selection-inference, and tool use. We refer to the resulting programs as language model cascades.

When a language model generates text, the selection of individual tokens might lead it down very different reasoning paths, making uncertainty difficult to quantify. In this work, we consider whether reasoning language models represent the alternate paths that they could take during generation. To test this hypothesis, we use hidden activations to control and predict a language model's uncertainty during chain-of-thought reasoning. In our experiments, we find a clear correlation between how uncertain a model is at different tokens, and how easily the model can be steered by controlling its activations. This suggests that activation interventions are most effective when there are alternate paths available to the model -- in other words, when it has not yet committed to a particular final answer. We also find that hidden activations can predict a model's future outcome distribution, demonstrating that models implicitly represent the space of possible paths.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

This work stems from prior complementary observations on the dynamics of Chain-of-Thought (CoT): Large Language Models (LLMs) is shown latent planning of subsequent reasoning prior to CoT emergence, thereby diminishing the significance of explicit CoT; whereas CoT remains critical for tasks requiring multi-step reasoning. To deepen the understanding between LLM's internal states and its verbalized reasoning trajectories, we investigate the latent planning strength of LLMs, through our probing method, Tele-Lens, applying to hidden states across diverse task domains. Our empirical results indicate that LLMs exhibit a myopic horizon, primarily conducting incremental transitions without precise global planning. Leveraging this characteristic, we propose a hypothesis on enhancing uncertainty estimation of CoT, which we validate that a small subset of CoT positions can effectively represent the uncertainty of the entire path. We further underscore the significance of exploiting CoT dynamics, and demonstrate that automatic recognition of CoT bypass can be achieved without performance degradation. Our code, data and models are released at https://github.com/lxucs/tele-lens.

We present a state-of-the-art model for fine-grained probability estimation of propositions conditioned on context. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities, particularly on well-defined tasks with complete information. However, LLMs continue to struggle with making accurate and well-calibrated probabilistic predictions under uncertainty or partial information. While incorporating uncertainty into model predictions often boosts performance, obtaining reliable estimates of that uncertainty remains understudied. In particular, LLM probability estimates tend to be coarse and biased towards more frequent numbers. Through a combination of human and synthetic data creation and assessment, scaling to larger models, and better supervision, we propose a set of strong and precise probability estimation models. We conduct systematic evaluations across tasks that rely on conditional probability estimation and show that our approach consistently outperforms existing fine-tuned and prompting-based methods by a large margin.

Predictive models often need to work with incomplete information in real-world tasks. Consequently, they must provide reliable probability or confidence estimation, especially in large-scale decision-making and planning tasks. Current large language models (LLMs) are insufficient for accurate estimations, but they can generate relevant factors that may affect the probabilities, produce coarse-grained probabilities when the information is more complete, and help determine which factors are relevant to specific downstream contexts. In this paper, we make use of these capabilities of LLMs to provide a significantly more accurate probabilistic estimation. We propose BIRD, a novel probabilistic inference framework that aligns a Bayesian network with LLM abductions and then estimates more accurate probabilities in a deduction step. We show BIRD provides reliable probability estimations that are 30% better than those provided directly by LLM baselines. These estimates further contribute to better and more trustworthy decision making.

Language use is shaped by pragmatics -- i.e., reasoning about communicative goals and norms in context. As language models (LMs) are increasingly used as conversational agents, it becomes ever more important to understand their pragmatic reasoning abilities. We propose an evaluation framework derived from Wavelength, a popular communication game where a speaker and a listener communicate about a broad range of concepts in a granular manner. We study a range of LMs on both language comprehension and language production using direct and Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, and further explore a Rational Speech Act (RSA) approach to incorporating Bayesian pragmatic reasoning into LM inference. We find that state-of-the-art LMs, but not smaller ones, achieve strong performance on language comprehension, obtaining similar-to-human accuracy and exhibiting high correlations with human judgments even without CoT prompting or RSA. On language production, CoT can outperform direct prompting, and using RSA provides significant improvements over both approaches. Our study helps identify the strengths and limitations in LMs' pragmatic reasoning abilities and demonstrates the potential for improving them with RSA, opening up future avenues for understanding conceptual representation, language understanding, and social reasoning in LMs and humans.

Large language models (LLMs) have a substantial capacity for high-level analogical reasoning: reproducing patterns in linear text that occur in their training data (zero-shot evaluation) or in the provided context (few-shot in-context learning). However, recent studies show that even the more advanced LLMs fail in scenarios that require reasoning over multiple objects or facts and making sequences of logical deductions. We propose a two-stage probabilistic inference paradigm, ThinkSum, which reasons over sets of objects or facts in a structured manner. In the first stage (Think - retrieval of associations), a LLM is queried in parallel over a set of phrases extracted from the prompt or an auxiliary model call. In the second stage (Sum - probabilistic inference or reasoning), the results of these queries are aggregated to make the final prediction. We demonstrate the possibilities and advantages of ThinkSum on the BIG-bench suite of LLM evaluation tasks, achieving improvements over the state of the art using GPT-family models on thirteen difficult tasks, often with far smaller model variants. We also compare and contrast ThinkSum with other proposed modifications to direct prompting of LLMs, such as variants of chain-of-thought prompting. Our results suggest that because the probabilistic inference in ThinkSum is performed outside of calls to the LLM, ThinkSum is less sensitive to prompt design, yields more interpretable predictions, and can be flexibly combined with latent variable models to extract structured knowledge from LLMs. Overall, our proposed paradigm represents a promising approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

High-stakes decision making involves reasoning under uncertainty about the future. In this work, we train language models to make predictions on open-ended forecasting questions. To scale up training data, we synthesize novel forecasting questions from global events reported in daily news, using a fully automated, careful curation recipe. We train the Qwen3 thinking models on our dataset, OpenForesight. To prevent leakage of future information during training and evaluation, we use an offline news corpus, both for data generation and retrieval in our forecasting system. Guided by a small validation set, we show the benefits of retrieval, and an improved reward function for reinforcement learning (RL). Once we obtain our final forecasting system, we perform held-out testing between May to August 2025. Our specialized model, OpenForecaster 8B, matches much larger proprietary models, with our training improving the accuracy, calibration, and consistency of predictions. We find calibration improvements from forecasting training generalize across popular benchmarks. We open-source all our models, code, and data to make research on language model forecasting broadly accessible.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

Language models are increasingly being deployed for general problem solving across a wide range of tasks, but are still confined to token-level, left-to-right decision-making processes during inference. This means they can fall short in tasks that require exploration, strategic lookahead, or where initial decisions play a pivotal role. To surmount these challenges, we introduce a new framework for language model inference, Tree of Thoughts (ToT), which generalizes over the popular Chain of Thought approach to prompting language models, and enables exploration over coherent units of text (thoughts) that serve as intermediate steps toward problem solving. ToT allows LMs to perform deliberate decision making by considering multiple different reasoning paths and self-evaluating choices to decide the next course of action, as well as looking ahead or backtracking when necessary to make global choices. Our experiments show that ToT significantly enhances language models' problem-solving abilities on three novel tasks requiring non-trivial planning or search: Game of 24, Creative Writing, and Mini Crosswords. For instance, in Game of 24, while GPT-4 with chain-of-thought prompting only solved 4% of tasks, our method achieved a success rate of 74%. Code repo with all prompts: https://github.com/ysymyth/tree-of-thought-llm.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

Program-of-Thought (PoT) replaces natural language-based Chain-of-Thought (CoT) as the most popular method in Large Language Models (LLMs) mathematical reasoning tasks by utilizing external tool calls to circumvent computational errors. However, our evaluation of the GPT-4 and Llama series reveals that using PoT introduces more reasoning errors, such as incorrect formulas or flawed logic, compared to CoT. To address this issue, we propose Human-Think Language (HTL), which leverages a suite of strategies that help integrate PoT and CoT, encompassing: (1) a new generation paradigm that uses full CoT reasoning to control code generation. (2) Focus Attention, that directs model attention to the CoT reasoning during PoT to generate more logical code. (3) reinforcement learning that utilizes the accuracy of both CoT and PoT responses as rewards to prevent repetitive reasoning steps in LLMs when solving difficult math problems. Our method achieves an average improvement of 6.5% on the Llama-Base model and 4.3% on the Mistral-Base model across 8 mathematical calculation datasets. It also shows significant effectiveness on five out-of-domain datasets by controlling the model's information flow, exhibiting strong transferability. Additionally, HTL shows the most significant improvement in non-mathematical natural language inference task, contributing to a unified reasoning task framework

We introduce Diagram of Thought (DoT), a framework that models iterative reasoning in large language models (LLMs) as the construction of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) within a single model. Unlike traditional approaches that represent reasoning as linear chains or trees, DoT organizes propositions, critiques, refinements, and verifications into a cohesive DAG structure, allowing the model to explore complex reasoning pathways while maintaining logical consistency. Each node in the diagram corresponds to a proposition that has been proposed, critiqued, refined, or verified, enabling the LLM to iteratively improve its reasoning through natural language feedback. By leveraging auto-regressive next-token prediction with role-specific tokens, DoT facilitates seamless transitions between proposing ideas and critically evaluating them, providing richer feedback than binary signals. Furthermore, we formalize the DoT framework using Topos Theory, providing a mathematical foundation that ensures logical consistency and soundness in the reasoning process. This approach enhances both the training and inference processes within a single LLM, eliminating the need for multiple models or external control mechanisms. DoT offers a conceptual framework for designing next-generation reasoning-specialized models, emphasizing training efficiency, robust reasoning capabilities, and theoretical grounding. The code is available at https://github.com/diagram-of-thought/diagram-of-thought.

Modeling semantic plausibility requires commonsense knowledge about the world and has been used as a testbed for exploring various knowledge representations. Previous work has focused specifically on modeling physical plausibility and shown that distributional methods fail when tested in a supervised setting. At the same time, distributional models, namely large pretrained language models, have led to improved results for many natural language understanding tasks. In this work, we show that these pretrained language models are in fact effective at modeling physical plausibility in the supervised setting. We therefore present the more difficult problem of learning to model physical plausibility directly from text. We create a training set by extracting attested events from a large corpus, and we provide a baseline for training on these attested events in a self-supervised manner and testing on a physical plausibility task. We believe results could be further improved by injecting explicit commonsense knowledge into a distributional model.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive performance in language comprehension and various reasoning tasks. However, their abilities in spatial reasoning, a crucial aspect of human cognition, remain relatively unexplored. Human possess a remarkable ability to create mental images of unseen objects and actions through a process known as the Mind's Eye, enabling the imagination of the unseen world. Inspired by this cognitive capacity, we propose Visualization-of-Thought (VoT) prompting. VoT aims to elicit spatial reasoning of LLMs by visualizing their reasoning traces, thereby guiding subsequent reasoning steps. We employed VoT for multi-hop spatial reasoning tasks, including natural language navigation, visual navigation, and visual tiling in 2D grid worlds. Experimental results demonstrated that VoT significantly enhances the spatial reasoning abilities of LLMs. Notably, VoT outperformed existing multimodal large language models (MLLMs) in these tasks. While VoT works surprisingly well on LLMs, the ability to generate mental images to facilitate spatial reasoning resembles the mind's eye process, suggesting its potential viability in MLLMs.

Recently, there has been significant progress in teaching language models to perform step-by-step reasoning to solve complex numerical reasoning tasks. Chain-of-thoughts prompting (CoT) is by far the state-of-art method for these tasks. CoT uses language models to perform both reasoning and computation in the multi-step `thought' process. To disentangle computation from reasoning, we propose `Program of Thoughts' (PoT), which uses language models (mainly Codex) to express the reasoning process as a program. The computation is relegated to an external computer, which executes the generated programs to derive the answer. We evaluate PoT on five math word problem datasets (GSM, AQuA, SVAMP, TabMWP, MultiArith) and three financial-QA datasets (FinQA, ConvFinQA, TATQA) for both few-shot and zero-shot setups. Under both few-shot and zero-shot settings, PoT can show an average performance gain over CoT by around 12\% across all the evaluated datasets. By combining PoT with self-consistency decoding, we can achieve SoTA performance on all math problem datasets and near-SoTA performance on financial datasets. All of our data and code are released in Github\url{https://github.com/wenhuchen/Program-of-Thoughts}.

With the widespread use of large language models (LLMs) in NLP tasks, researchers have discovered the potential of Chain-of-thought (CoT) to assist LLMs in accomplishing complex reasoning tasks by generating intermediate steps. However, human thought processes are often non-linear, rather than simply sequential chains of thoughts. Therefore, we propose Graph-of-Thought (GoT) reasoning, which models human thought processes not only as a chain but also as a graph. By representing thought units as nodes and connections between them as edges, our approach captures the non-sequential nature of human thinking and allows for a more realistic modeling of thought processes. Similar to Multimodal-CoT, we modeled GoT reasoning as a two-stage framework, generating rationales first and then producing the final answer. Specifically, we employ an additional graph-of-thoughts encoder for GoT representation learning and fuse the GoT representation with the original input representation through a gated fusion mechanism. We implement a GoT reasoning model on the T5 pre-trained model and evaluate its performance on a text-only reasoning task (GSM8K) and a multimodal reasoning task (ScienceQA). Our model achieves significant improvement over the strong CoT baseline with 3.41% and 5.08% on the GSM8K test set with T5-base and T5-large architectures, respectively. Additionally, our model boosts accuracy from 84.91% to 91.54% using the T5-base model and from 91.68% to 92.77% using the T5-large model over the state-of-the-art Multimodal-CoT on the ScienceQA test set. Experiments have shown that GoT achieves comparable results to Multimodal-CoT(large) with over 700M parameters, despite having fewer than 250M backbone model parameters, demonstrating the effectiveness of GoT.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate significant reasoning capabilities, particularly through long chain-of-thought (CoT) processes, which can be elicited by reinforcement learning (RL). However, prolonged CoT reasoning presents limitations, primarily verbose outputs due to excessive introspection. The reasoning process in these LLMs often appears to follow a trial-and-error methodology rather than a systematic, logical deduction. In contrast, tree-of-thoughts (ToT) offers a conceptually more advanced approach by modeling reasoning as an exploration within a tree structure. This reasoning structure facilitates the parallel generation and evaluation of multiple reasoning branches, allowing for the active identification, assessment, and pruning of unproductive paths. This process can potentially lead to improved performance and reduced token costs. Building upon the long CoT capability of LLMs, we introduce tree-of-thoughts RL (ToTRL), a novel on-policy RL framework with a rule-based reward. ToTRL is designed to guide LLMs in developing the parallel ToT strategy based on the sequential CoT strategy. Furthermore, we employ LLMs as players in a puzzle game during the ToTRL training process. Solving puzzle games inherently necessitates exploring interdependent choices and managing multiple constraints, which requires the construction and exploration of a thought tree, providing challenging tasks for cultivating the ToT reasoning capability. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate that our ToTQwen3-8B model, trained with our ToTRL, achieves significant improvement in performance and reasoning efficiency on complex reasoning tasks.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

Recent advancements in large language models have showcased their remarkable generalizability across various domains. However, their reasoning abilities still have significant room for improvement, especially when confronted with scenarios requiring multi-step reasoning. Although large language models possess extensive knowledge, their behavior, particularly in terms of reasoning, often fails to effectively utilize this knowledge to establish a coherent thinking paradigm. Generative language models sometimes show hallucinations as their reasoning procedures are unconstrained by logical principles. Aiming to improve the zero-shot chain-of-thought reasoning ability of large language models, we propose Logical Chain-of-Thought (LogiCoT), a neurosymbolic framework that leverages principles from symbolic logic to verify and revise the reasoning processes accordingly. Experimental evaluations conducted on language tasks in diverse domains, including arithmetic, commonsense, symbolic, causal inference, and social problems, demonstrate the efficacy of the enhanced reasoning paradigm by logic.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning typically utilizes the discrete language space for thinking, which is inherently inefficient, as many generated tokens only enforce linguistic rules that are not required for reasoning. To bypass this, latent-space thinking allows models to think using the continuous embedding space. While existing methods for training those models show domain-specific gains, they fail to maintain performance in complex tasks, such as mathematical reasoning. We experimentally demonstrate that the Coconut approach, a form of supervised fine-tuning for latent-space thinking, is highly sensitive to design choices and exhibits several inherent limitations. To address these issues, we investigate reinforcement learning (RL) techniques -- an underexplored direction in latent-space thinking -- including GRPO and design a novel Latent RL method for directly optimizing the latent thinking steps. Our experimental results reveal that these RL-trained models still lag behind traditional language-space CoT models in the mathematical reasoning domain. We make our codebase publicly available.

Extracting causal relationships from observed correlations is a growing area in probabilistic reasoning, originating with the seminal work of Pearl and others from the early 1990s. This paper develops a new, categorically oriented view based on a clear distinction between syntax (string diagrams) and semantics (stochastic matrices), connected via interpretations as structure-preserving functors. A key notion in the identification of causal effects is that of an intervention, whereby a variable is forcefully set to a particular value independent of any prior propensities. We represent the effect of such an intervention as an endofunctor which performs `string diagram surgery' within the syntactic category of string diagrams. This diagram surgery in turn yields a new, interventional distribution via the interpretation functor. While in general there is no way to compute interventional distributions purely from observed data, we show that this is possible in certain special cases using a calculational tool called comb disintegration. We demonstrate the use of this technique on a well-known toy example, where we predict the causal effect of smoking on cancer in the presence of a confounding common cause. After developing this specific example, we show this technique provides simple sufficient conditions for computing interventions which apply to a wide variety of situations considered in the causal inference literature.

Although large language models demonstrate emergent abilities in solving math word problems, there is a challenging task in complex multi-step mathematical reasoning tasks. To improve model performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, previous work has conducted supervised fine-tuning on open-source models by improving the quality and quantity of data. In this paper, we propose a novel approach, named Brain, to imitate human thought processes to enhance mathematical reasoning abilities, using the Frontal Lobe Model to generate plans, and then employing the Parietal Lobe Model to generate code and execute to obtain answers. First, we achieve SOTA performance in comparison with Code LLaMA 7B based models through this method. Secondly, we find that plans can be explicitly extracted from natural language, code, or formal language. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/cyzhh/Brain.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has proven highly effective for enhancing complex reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Yet, it struggles in complex spatial reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, human cognition extends beyond language alone, enabling the remarkable capability to think in both words and images. Inspired by this mechanism, we propose a new reasoning paradigm, Multimodal Visualization-of-Thought (MVoT). It enables visual thinking in MLLMs by generating image visualizations of their reasoning traces. To ensure high-quality visualization, we introduce token discrepancy loss into autoregressive MLLMs. This innovation significantly improves both visual coherence and fidelity. We validate this approach through several dynamic spatial reasoning tasks. Experimental results reveal that MVoT demonstrates competitive performance across tasks. Moreover, it exhibits robust and reliable improvements in the most challenging scenarios where CoT fails. Ultimately, MVoT establishes new possibilities for complex reasoning tasks where visual thinking can effectively complement verbal reasoning.

Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities given chain-of-thought prompts (examples with intermediate reasoning steps). Existing benchmarks measure reasoning ability indirectly, by evaluating accuracy on downstream tasks such as mathematical reasoning. However, it is unclear how these models obtain the answers and whether they rely on simple heuristics rather than the generated chain-of-thought. To enable systematic exploration of the reasoning ability of LLMs, we present a new synthetic question-answering dataset called PrOntoQA, where each example is generated from a synthetic world model represented in first-order logic. This allows us to parse the generated chain-of-thought into symbolic proofs for formal analysis. Our analysis on InstructGPT and GPT-3 shows that LLMs are quite capable of making correct individual deduction steps, and so are generally capable of reasoning, even in fictional contexts. However, they have difficulty with proof planning: When multiple valid deduction steps are available, they are not able to systematically explore the different options.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Large Language Model can reasonably understand and generate human expressions but may lack of thorough thinking and reasoning mechanisms. Recently there have been several studies which enhance the thinking ability of language models but most of them are not data-driven or training-based. In this paper, we are motivated by the cognitive mechanism in the natural world, and design a novel model architecture called TaS which allows it to first consider the thoughts and then express the response based upon the query. We design several pipelines to annotate or generate the thought contents from prompt-response samples, then add language heads in a middle layer which behaves as the thinking layer. We train the language model by the thoughts-augmented data and successfully let the thinking layer automatically generate reasonable thoughts and finally output more reasonable responses. Both qualitative examples and quantitative results validate the effectiveness and performance of TaS. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/TadE.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning often fails to faithfully reflect a language model's underlying decision process. We address this by making CoT text causally essential in a "Markovian" language model, factoring next-token prediction through an intermediate CoT and training it to predict future tokens independently of the original prompt. We formalize this via an "informativeness" objective that quantifies how much a trained CoT improves next-token predictions over a baseline. Using policy gradient, we show that Llama 3.1 8B achieves a 33.2% absolute accuracy improvement on GSM8K. Perturbation tests confirm stronger reliance on the CoT, while cross-model transfers indicate these reasoning traces generalize across interpreters. Our approach enhances both accuracy and interpretability, potentially extending CoT reasoning to arbitrarily long contexts and diverse tasks.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized decision-making by breaking down complex problems into more manageable language sequences referred to as ``thoughts''. An effective thought design should consider three key perspectives: performance, efficiency, and flexibility. However, existing thought can at most exhibit two of these attributes. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel thought prompting approach called ``Everything of Thoughts'' (XoT) to defy the law of ``Penrose triangle of existing thought paradigms. XoT leverages pretrained reinforcement learning and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to incorporate external domain knowledge into thoughts, thereby enhancing LLMs' capabilities and enabling them to generalize to unseen problems efficiently. Through the utilization of the MCTS-LLM collaborative thought revision framework, this approach autonomously produces high-quality comprehensive cognitive mappings with minimal LLM interactions. Additionally, XoT empowers LLMs to engage in unconstrained thinking, allowing for flexible cognitive mappings for problems with multiple solutions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Eliciting information to reduce uncertainty about a latent entity is a critical task in many application domains, e.g., assessing individual student learning outcomes, diagnosing underlying diseases, or learning user preferences. Though natural language is a powerful medium for this purpose, large language models (LLMs) and existing fine-tuning algorithms lack mechanisms for strategically gathering information to refine their own understanding of the latent entity. To harness the generalization power and world knowledge of LLMs in developing effective information-gathering strategies, we propose an adaptive elicitation framework that actively reduces uncertainty on the latent entity. Since probabilistic modeling of an abstract latent entity is difficult, our framework adopts a predictive view of uncertainty, using a meta-learned language model to simulate future observations and enable scalable uncertainty quantification over complex natural language. Through autoregressive forward simulation, our model quantifies how new questions reduce epistemic uncertainty, enabling the development of sophisticated information-gathering strategies to choose the most informative next queries. In experiments on the 20 questions game, dynamic opinion polling, and adaptive student assessment, our method consistently outperforms baselines in identifying critical unknowns and improving downstream predictions, illustrating the promise of strategic information gathering in natural language settings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as transformative tools in artificial intelligence (AI), exhibiting remarkable capabilities across diverse tasks such as text generation, reasoning, and decision-making. While their success has primarily been driven by advances in computational power and deep learning architectures, emerging problems -- in areas such as uncertainty quantification, decision-making, causal inference, and distribution shift -- require a deeper engagement with the field of statistics. This paper explores potential areas where statisticians can make important contributions to the development of LLMs, particularly those that aim to engender trustworthiness and transparency for human users. Thus, we focus on issues such as uncertainty quantification, interpretability, fairness, privacy, watermarking and model adaptation. We also consider possible roles for LLMs in statistical analysis. By bridging AI and statistics, we aim to foster a deeper collaboration that advances both the theoretical foundations and practical applications of LLMs, ultimately shaping their role in addressing complex societal challenges.

Without writing a single line of code by a human, an example Monte Carlo simulation based application for stochastic dependence modeling with copulas is developed using a state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) fine-tuned for conversations. This includes interaction with ChatGPT in natural language and using mathematical formalism, which, under careful supervision by a human-expert, led to producing a working code in MATLAB, Python and R for sampling from a given copula model, evaluation of the model's density, performing maximum likelihood estimation, optimizing the code for parallel computing for CPUs as well as for GPUs, and visualization of the computed results. In contrast to other emerging studies that assess the accuracy of LLMs like ChatGPT on tasks from a selected area, this work rather investigates ways how to achieve a successful solution of a standard statistical task in a collaboration of a human-expert and artificial intelligence (AI). Particularly, through careful prompt engineering, we separate successful solutions generated by ChatGPT from unsuccessful ones, resulting in a comprehensive list of related pros and cons. It is demonstrated that if the typical pitfalls are avoided, we can substantially benefit from collaborating with an AI partner. For example, we show that if ChatGPT is not able to provide a correct solution due to a lack of or incorrect knowledge, the human-expert can feed it with the correct knowledge, e.g., in the form of mathematical theorems and formulas, and make it to apply the gained knowledge in order to provide a solution that is correct. Such ability presents an attractive opportunity to achieve a programmed solution even for users with rather limited knowledge of programming techniques.

Effective interlocutors account for the uncertain goals, beliefs, and emotions of others. But even the best human conversationalist cannot perfectly anticipate the trajectory of a dialogue. How well can language models represent inherent uncertainty in conversations? We propose FortUne Dial, an expansion of the long-standing "conversation forecasting" task: instead of just accuracy, evaluation is conducted with uncertainty-aware metrics, effectively enabling abstention on individual instances. We study two ways in which language models potentially represent outcome uncertainty (internally, using scores and directly, using tokens) and propose fine-tuning strategies to improve calibration of both representations. Experiments on eight difficult negotiation corpora demonstrate that our proposed fine-tuning strategies (a traditional supervision strategy and an off-policy reinforcement learning strategy) can calibrate smaller open-source models to compete with pre-trained models 10x their size.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Chain-of-thought emerges as a promising technique for eliciting reasoning capabilities from Large Language Models (LLMs). However, it does not always improve task performance or accurately represent reasoning processes, leaving unresolved questions about its usage. In this paper, we diagnose the underlying mechanism by comparing the reasoning process of LLMs with humans, using causal analysis to understand the relationships between the problem instruction, reasoning, and the answer in LLMs. Our empirical study reveals that LLMs often deviate from the ideal causal chain, resulting in spurious correlations and potential consistency errors (inconsistent reasoning and answers). We also examine various factors influencing the causal structure, finding that in-context learning with examples strengthens it, while post-training techniques like supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning on human feedback weaken it. To our surprise, the causal structure cannot be strengthened by enlarging the model size only, urging research on new techniques. We hope that this preliminary study will shed light on understanding and improving the reasoning process in LLM.

Large language models (LLMs) can suffer from hallucinations when generating text. These hallucinations impede various applications in society and industry by making LLMs untrustworthy. Current LLMs generate text in an autoregressive fashion by predicting and appending text tokens. When an LLM is uncertain about the semantic meaning of the next tokens to generate, it is likely to start hallucinating. Thus, it has been suggested that hallucinations stem from predictive uncertainty. We introduce Semantically Diverse Language Generation (SDLG) to quantify predictive uncertainty in LLMs. SDLG steers the LLM to generate semantically diverse yet likely alternatives for an initially generated text. This approach provides a precise measure of aleatoric semantic uncertainty, detecting whether the initial text is likely to be hallucinated. Experiments on question-answering tasks demonstrate that SDLG consistently outperforms existing methods while being the most computationally efficient, setting a new standard for uncertainty estimation in LLMs.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly benefit from Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in performing various reasoning tasks. While CoT allows models to produce more comprehensive reasoning processes, its emphasis on intermediate reasoning steps can inadvertently introduce hallucinations and accumulated errors, thereby limiting models' ability to solve complex reasoning tasks. Inspired by how humans engage in careful and meticulous deductive logical reasoning processes to solve tasks, we seek to enable language models to perform explicit and rigorous deductive reasoning, and also ensure the trustworthiness of their reasoning process through self-verification. However, directly verifying the validity of an entire deductive reasoning process is challenging, even with advanced models like ChatGPT. In light of this, we propose to decompose a reasoning verification process into a series of step-by-step subprocesses, each only receiving their necessary context and premises. To facilitate this procedure, we propose Natural Program, a natural language-based deductive reasoning format. Our approach enables models to generate precise reasoning steps where subsequent steps are more rigorously grounded on prior steps. It also empowers language models to carry out reasoning self-verification in a step-by-step manner. By integrating this verification process into each deductive reasoning stage, we significantly enhance the rigor and trustfulness of generated reasoning steps. Along this process, we also improve the answer correctness on complex reasoning tasks. Code will be released at https://github.com/lz1oceani/verify_cot.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at processing information reactively but lack the ability to systemically explore hypothetical futures. They cannot ask, "what if we take this action? how will it affect the final outcome" and forecast its potential consequences before acting. This critical gap limits their utility in dynamic, high-stakes scenarios like strategic planning, risk assessment, and real-time decision making. To bridge this gap, we propose WiA-LLM, a new paradigm that equips LLMs with proactive thinking capabilities. Our approach integrates What-If Analysis (WIA), a systematic approach for evaluating hypothetical scenarios by changing input variables. By leveraging environmental feedback via reinforcement learning, WiA-LLM moves beyond reactive thinking. It dynamically simulates the outcomes of each potential action, enabling the model to anticipate future states rather than merely react to the present conditions. We validate WiA-LLM in Honor of Kings (HoK), a complex multiplayer game environment characterized by rapid state changes and intricate interactions. The game's real-time state changes require precise multi-step consequence prediction, making it an ideal testbed for our approach. Experimental results demonstrate WiA-LLM achieves a remarkable 74.2% accuracy in forecasting game-state changes (up to two times gain over baselines). The model shows particularly significant gains in high-difficulty scenarios where accurate foresight is critical. To our knowledge, this is the first work to formally explore and integrate what-if analysis capabilities within LLMs. WiA-LLM represents a fundamental advance toward proactive reasoning in LLMs, providing a scalable framework for robust decision-making in dynamic environments with broad implications for strategic applications.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) empowers Large Language Models (LLMs) to tackle complex problems, but remains constrained by the computational cost and reasoning path collapse when grounded in discrete token spaces. Recent latent reasoning approaches attempt to optimize efficiency by performing reasoning within continuous hidden states. However, these methods typically operate as opaque end-to-end mappings from explicit reasoning steps to latent states, and often require a pre-defined number of latent steps during inference. In this work, we introduce PLaT (Planning with Latent Thoughts), a framework that reformulates latent reasoning as planning by fundamentally decouple reasoning from verbalization. We model reasoning as a deterministic trajectory of latent planning states, while a separate Decoder grounds these thoughts into text when necessary. This decoupling allows the model to dynamically determine when to terminate reasoning rather than relying on fixed hyperparameters. Empirical results on mathematical benchmarks reveal a distinct trade-off: while PLaT achieves lower greedy accuracy than baselines, it demonstrates superior scalability in terms of reasoning diversity. This indicates that PLaT learns a robust, broader solution space, offering a transparent and scalable foundation for inference-time search.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

As Generative AI becomes a key component in physics education, a significant ethical challenge has emerged: the tendency of students to anthropomorphize Large Language Models (LLMs), treating them as authoritative "oracles" that retrieve fixed facts from an internal database. However, LLMs operate fundamentally as probabilistic engines. This paper describes the design and implementation of a didactic activity, a reduced version of the "20 Questions" game, aimed at making this stochastic nature directly observable. Unlike a human player who fixes a target object at the start of the game, students discover that the model generates answers based solely on local coherence with the interaction history. By utilizing functionalities such as re-sampling and history rewinding, students act as experimenters, observing how identical interaction histories can yield diverging narrative paths. We discuss how mapping these behaviors to familiar physics concepts provides the epistemic scaffolding necessary to promote informed skepticism, framing the verification of AI outputs not merely as a compliance rule, but as a technical necessity derived from the system's probabilistic nature.

We introduce Graph of Thoughts (GoT): a framework that advances prompting capabilities in large language models (LLMs) beyond those offered by paradigms such as Chain-of-Thought or Tree of Thoughts (ToT). The key idea and primary advantage of GoT is the ability to model the information generated by an LLM as an arbitrary graph, where units of information ("LLM thoughts") are vertices, and edges correspond to dependencies between these vertices. This approach enables combining arbitrary LLM thoughts into synergistic outcomes, distilling the essence of whole networks of thoughts, or enhancing thoughts using feedback loops. We illustrate that GoT offers advantages over state of the art on different tasks, for example increasing the quality of sorting by 62% over ToT, while simultaneously reducing costs by >31%. We ensure that GoT is extensible with new thought transformations and thus can be used to spearhead new prompting schemes. This work brings the LLM reasoning closer to human thinking or brain mechanisms such as recurrence, both of which form complex networks.

Large language models (LLMs) are restricted to reason in the "language space", where they typically express the reasoning process with a chain-of-thought (CoT) to solve a complex reasoning problem. However, we argue that language space may not always be optimal for reasoning. For example, most word tokens are primarily for textual coherence and not essential for reasoning, while some critical tokens require complex planning and pose huge challenges to LLMs. To explore the potential of LLM reasoning in an unrestricted latent space instead of using natural language, we introduce a new paradigm Coconut (Chain of Continuous Thought). We utilize the last hidden state of the LLM as a representation of the reasoning state (termed "continuous thought"). Rather than decoding this into a word token, we feed it back to the LLM as the subsequent input embedding directly in the continuous space. Experiments show that Coconut can effectively augment the LLM on several reasoning tasks. This novel latent reasoning paradigm leads to emergent advanced reasoning patterns: the continuous thought can encode multiple alternative next reasoning steps, allowing the model to perform a breadth-first search (BFS) to solve the problem, rather than prematurely committing to a single deterministic path like CoT. Coconut outperforms CoT in certain logical reasoning tasks that require substantial backtracking during planning, with fewer thinking tokens during inference. These findings demonstrate the promise of latent reasoning and offer valuable insights for future research.

Natural language has long enabled human cooperation, but its lossy, ambiguous, and indirect nature limits the potential of collective intelligence. While machines are not subject to these constraints, most LLM-based multi-agent systems still rely solely on natural language, exchanging tokens or their embeddings. To go beyond language, we introduce a new paradigm, thought communication, which enables agents to interact directly mind-to-mind, akin to telepathy. To uncover these latent thoughts in a principled way, we formalize the process as a general latent variable model, where agent states are generated by an unknown function of underlying thoughts. We prove that, in a nonparametric setting without auxiliary information, both shared and private latent thoughts between any pair of agents can be identified. Moreover, the global structure of thought sharing, including which agents share which thoughts and how these relationships are structured, can also be recovered with theoretical guarantees. Guided by the established theory, we develop a framework that extracts latent thoughts from all agents prior to communication and assigns each agent the relevant thoughts, along with their sharing patterns. This paradigm naturally extends beyond LLMs to all modalities, as most observational data arise from hidden generative processes. Experiments on both synthetic and real-world benchmarks validate the theory and demonstrate the collaborative advantages of thought communication. We hope this work illuminates the potential of leveraging the hidden world, as many challenges remain unsolvable through surface-level observation alone, regardless of compute or data scale.

Large language models (LLMs) have dramatically enhanced the field of language intelligence, as demonstrably evidenced by their formidable empirical performance across a spectrum of complex reasoning tasks. Additionally, theoretical proofs have illuminated their emergent reasoning capabilities, providing a compelling showcase of their advanced cognitive abilities in linguistic contexts. Critical to their remarkable efficacy in handling complex reasoning tasks, LLMs leverage the intriguing chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning techniques, obliging them to formulate intermediate steps en route to deriving an answer. The CoT reasoning approach has not only exhibited proficiency in amplifying reasoning performance but also in enhancing interpretability, controllability, and flexibility. In light of these merits, recent research endeavors have extended CoT reasoning methodologies to nurture the development of autonomous language agents, which adeptly adhere to language instructions and execute actions within varied environments. This survey paper orchestrates a thorough discourse, penetrating vital research dimensions, encompassing: (i) the foundational mechanics of CoT techniques, with a focus on elucidating the circumstances and justification behind its efficacy; (ii) the paradigm shift in CoT; and (iii) the burgeoning of language agents fortified by CoT approaches. Prospective research avenues envelop explorations into generalization, efficiency, customization, scaling, and safety. This paper caters to a wide audience, including beginners seeking comprehensive knowledge of CoT reasoning and language agents, as well as experienced researchers interested in foundational mechanics and engaging in cutting-edge discussions on these topics. A repository for the related papers is available at https://github.com/Zoeyyao27/CoT-Igniting-Agent.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) plays a crucial role in reasoning for math problem solving. We conduct a comprehensive examination of methods for designing CoT, comparing conventional natural language CoT with various program CoTs, including the self-describing program, the comment-describing program, and the non-describing program. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of programming language on program CoTs, comparing Python and Wolfram Language. Through extensive experiments on GSM8K, MATHQA, and SVAMP, we find that program CoTs often have superior effectiveness in math problem solving. Notably, the best performing combination with 30B parameters beats GPT-3.5-turbo by a significant margin. The results show that self-describing program offers greater diversity and thus can generally achieve higher performance. We also find that Python is a better choice of language than Wolfram for program CoTs. The experimental results provide a valuable guideline for future CoT designs that take into account both programming language and coding style for further advancements. Our datasets and code are publicly available.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision Language Models (VLMs) have shown significant progress in mathematical reasoning, yet they still face a critical bottleneck with problems requiring visual assistance, such as drawing auxiliary lines or plotting functions to solve the problems. Most LLMs and VLMs are constrained to text-only reasoning chains, while multimodal unified models that can generate interleaved text and images lack the necessary precision and controllability for such tasks. To address this, we propose CodePlot-CoT, a code-driven Chain-of-Thought paradigm for "thinking with images" in mathematics. Our approach leverages the VLM to generate text reasoning as well as executable plotting code, which is then rendered into images as "visual thought", to solve mathematical problems. To achieve this, we first construct Math-VR, the first large-scale, bilingual dataset and benchmark for Mathematics problems with Visual Reasoning, comprising 178K samples. Second, to create high-quality training data, we develop a state-of-the-art image-to-code converter specialized for parsing complex mathematical figures into codes. Finally, using these training data, we train the CodePlot-CoT model for solving mathematical problems. Experimental results show that our model achieves up to 21% increase over base model on our new benchmark, fully validating the efficacy of our proposed code-driven reasoning paradigm. Our work opens a new direction for multimodal mathematical reasoning and provides the community with the first large-scale dataset, comprehensive benchmark, and strong approach for such problems. To facilitate future research, we make our datasets, code, and pretrained models publicly available at https://github.com/HKU-MMLab/Math-VR-CodePlot-CoT.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, a cognitive process fundamental to human intelligence, has garnered significant attention in the realm of artificial intelligence and natural language processing. However, there still remains a lack of a comprehensive survey for this arena. To this end, we take the first step and present a thorough survey of this research field carefully and widely. We use X-of-Thought to refer to Chain-of-Thought in a broad sense. In detail, we systematically organize the current research according to the taxonomies of methods, including XoT construction, XoT structure variants, and enhanced XoT. Additionally, we describe XoT with frontier applications, covering planning, tool use, and distillation. Furthermore, we address challenges and discuss some future directions, including faithfulness, multi-modal, and theory. We hope this survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers seeking to innovate within the domain of chain-of-thought reasoning.

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in human-AI interactions, their social reasoning capabilities in interpersonal contexts are critical. We introduce SCRIPTS, a 1k-dialogue dataset in English and Korean, sourced from movie scripts. The task involves evaluating models' social reasoning capability to infer the interpersonal relationships (e.g., friends, sisters, lovers) between speakers in each dialogue. Each dialogue is annotated with probabilistic relational labels (Highly Likely, Less Likely, Unlikely) by native (or equivalent) Korean and English speakers from Korea and the U.S. Evaluating nine models on our task, current proprietary LLMs achieve around 75-80% on the English dataset, whereas their performance on Korean drops to 58-69%. More strikingly, models select Unlikely relationships in 10-25% of their responses. Furthermore, we find that thinking models and chain-of-thought prompting, effective for general reasoning, provide minimal benefits for social reasoning and occasionally amplify social biases. Our findings reveal significant limitations in current LLMs' social reasoning capabilities, highlighting the need for efforts to develop socially-aware language models.

Recently, there has been a surge in interest in NLP driven by ChatGPT. ChatGPT, a transformer-based generative language model of substantial scale, exhibits versatility in performing various tasks based on natural language. Nevertheless, large language models often exhibit poor performance in solving mathematics questions that require reasoning. Prior research has demonstrated the effectiveness of chain-of-thought prompting in enhancing reasoning capabilities. Now, we aim to investigate whether fine-tuning a model for the generation of Prolog codes, a logic language, and subsequently passing these codes to a compiler can further improve accuracy. Consequently, we employ chain-of-thought to fine-tune LLaMA7B as a baseline model and develop other fine-tuned LLaMA7B models for the generation of Prolog code, Prolog code + chain-of-thought, and chain-of-thought + Prolog code, respectively. The results reveal that the Prolog generation model surpasses the baseline in performance, while the combination generation models do not yield significant improvements. The Prolog corpus based on GSM8K and the correspondingly finetuned Prolog generation model based on LLaMA7B are released to the research community.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across multiple tasks through in-context learning. For complex reasoning tasks that require step-by-step thinking, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has given impressive results, especially when combined with self-consistency. Nonetheless, some tasks remain particularly difficult for LLMs to solve. Tree of Thoughts (ToT) and Graph of Thoughts (GoT) emerged as alternatives, dividing the complex problem into paths of subproblems. In this paper, we propose Tree of Problems (ToP), a simpler version of ToT, which we hypothesise can work better for complex tasks that can be divided into identical subtasks. Our empirical results show that our approach outperforms ToT and GoT, and in addition performs better than CoT on complex reasoning tasks. All code for this paper is publicly available here: https://github.com/ArmelRandy/tree-of-problems.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, often attributed to their capability to generate explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) explanations. However, recent work shows that LRMs often arrive at the correct answer before completing these textual reasoning steps, indicating the presence of latent reasoning -- internal, non-verbal computation encoded in hidden states. While this phenomenon has been explored in English, its multilingual behavior remains largely unknown. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation of multilingual latent reasoning in LRMs across 11 languages. Using a truncation-based strategy, we examine how the correct answer emerges as the model is given only partial reasoning traces, allowing us to measure stepwise latent prediction formation. Our results reveal clear evidence of multilingual latent reasoning, though unevenly: strong in resource-rich languages, weaker in low-resource ones, and broadly less observable on harder benchmarks. To understand whether these differences reflect distinct internal mechanisms, we further perform representational analyses. Despite surface-level disparities, we find that the internal evolution of predictions is highly consistent across languages and broadly aligns with English -- a pattern suggesting an English-centered latent reasoning pathway.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

Human reasoning relies on constructing and manipulating mental models-simplified internal representations of situations that we use to understand and solve problems. Conceptual diagrams (for example, sketches drawn by humans to aid reasoning) externalize these mental models, abstracting irrelevant details to efficiently capture relational and spatial information. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) predominantly reason through textual representations, limiting their effectiveness in complex multi-step combinatorial and planning tasks. In this paper, we propose a zero-shot fully automatic framework that enables LMMs to reason through multiple chains of self-generated intermediate conceptual diagrams, significantly enhancing their combinatorial planning capabilities. Our approach does not require any human initialization beyond a natural language description of the task. It integrates both textual and diagrammatic reasoning within an optimized graph-of-thought inference framework, enhanced by beam search and depth-wise backtracking. Evaluated on multiple challenging PDDL planning domains, our method substantially improves GPT-4o's performance (for example, from 35.5% to 90.2% in Blocksworld). On more difficult planning domains with solution depths up to 40, our approach outperforms even the o1-preview reasoning model (for example, over 13% improvement in Parking). These results highlight the value of conceptual diagrams as a complementary reasoning medium in LMMs.

Accurate prediction of human behavior is essential for robust and safe human-AI collaboration. However, existing approaches for modeling people are often data-hungry and brittle because they either make unrealistic assumptions about rationality or are too computationally demanding to adapt rapidly. Our key insight is that many everyday social interactions may follow predictable patterns; efficient "scripts" that minimize cognitive load for actors and observers, e.g., "wait for the green light, then go." We propose modeling these routines as behavioral programs instantiated in computer code rather than policies conditioned on beliefs and desires. We introduce ROTE, a novel algorithm that leverages both large language models (LLMs) for synthesizing a hypothesis space of behavioral programs, and probabilistic inference for reasoning about uncertainty over that space. We test ROTE in a suite of gridworld tasks and a large-scale embodied household simulator. ROTE predicts human and AI behaviors from sparse observations, outperforming competitive baselines -- including behavior cloning and LLM-based methods -- by as much as 50% in terms of in-sample accuracy and out-of-sample generalization. By treating action understanding as a program synthesis problem, ROTE opens a path for AI systems to efficiently and effectively predict human behavior in the real-world.

Planning in a text-based environment continues to be a major challenge for AI systems. Recent approaches have used language models to predict a planning domain definition (e.g., PDDL) but have only been evaluated in closed-domain simulated environments. To address this, we present Proc2PDDL , the first dataset containing open-domain procedural texts paired with expert-annotated PDDL representations. Using this dataset, we evaluate state-of-the-art models on defining the preconditions and effects of actions. We show that Proc2PDDL is highly challenging, with GPT-3.5's success rate close to 0% and GPT-4's around 35%. Our analysis shows both syntactic and semantic errors, indicating LMs' deficiency in both generating domain-specific prgorams and reasoning about events. We hope this analysis and dataset helps future progress towards integrating the best of LMs and formal planning.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) and their multimodal extensions (MLLMs) have substantially enhanced machine reasoning across diverse tasks. However, these models predominantly rely on pure text as the medium for both expressing and structuring reasoning, even when visual information is present. In this work, we argue that language may not always be the most natural or effective modality for reasoning, particularly in tasks involving spatial and geometrical information. Motivated by this, we propose a new paradigm, Visual Planning, which enables planning through purely visual representations, independent of text. In this paradigm, planning is executed via sequences of images that encode step-by-step inference in the visual domain, akin to how humans sketch or visualize future actions. We introduce a novel reinforcement learning framework, Visual Planning via Reinforcement Learning (VPRL), empowered by GRPO for post-training large vision models, leading to substantial improvements in planning in a selection of representative visual navigation tasks, FrozenLake, Maze, and MiniBehavior. Our visual planning paradigm outperforms all other planning variants that conduct reasoning in the text-only space. Our results establish Visual Planning as a viable and promising alternative to language-based reasoning, opening new avenues for tasks that benefit from intuitive, image-based inference.

Language is often considered a key aspect of human thinking, providing us with exceptional abilities to generalize, explore, plan, replan, and adapt to new situations. However, Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents are far from human-level performance in any of these abilities. We hypothesize one reason for such cognitive deficiencies is that they lack the benefits of thinking in language and that we can improve AI agents by training them to think like humans do. We introduce a novel Imitation Learning framework, Thought Cloning, where the idea is to not just clone the behaviors of human demonstrators, but also the thoughts humans have as they perform these behaviors. While we expect Thought Cloning to truly shine at scale on internet-sized datasets of humans thinking out loud while acting (e.g. online videos with transcripts), here we conduct experiments in a domain where the thinking and action data are synthetically generated. Results reveal that Thought Cloning learns much faster than Behavioral Cloning and its performance advantage grows the further out of distribution test tasks are, highlighting its ability to better handle novel situations. Thought Cloning also provides important benefits for AI Safety and Interpretability, and makes it easier to debug and improve AI. Because we can observe the agent's thoughts, we can (1) more easily diagnose why things are going wrong, making it easier to fix the problem, (2) steer the agent by correcting its thinking, or (3) prevent it from doing unsafe things it plans to do. Overall, by training agents how to think as well as behave, Thought Cloning creates safer, more powerful agents.

AI systems are becoming increasingly intertwined with human life. In order to effectively collaborate with humans and ensure safety, AI systems need to be able to understand, interpret and predict human moral judgments and decisions. Human moral judgments are often guided by rules, but not always. A central challenge for AI safety is capturing the flexibility of the human moral mind -- the ability to determine when a rule should be broken, especially in novel or unusual situations. In this paper, we present a novel challenge set consisting of rule-breaking question answering (RBQA) of cases that involve potentially permissible rule-breaking -- inspired by recent moral psychology studies. Using a state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) as a basis, we propose a novel moral chain of thought (MORALCOT) prompting strategy that combines the strengths of LLMs with theories of moral reasoning developed in cognitive science to predict human moral judgments. MORALCOT outperforms seven existing LLMs by 6.2% F1, suggesting that modeling human reasoning might be necessary to capture the flexibility of the human moral mind. We also conduct a detailed error analysis to suggest directions for future work to improve AI safety using RBQA. Our data is open-sourced at https://huggingface.co/datasets/feradauto/MoralExceptQA and code at https://github.com/feradauto/MoralCoT

Large language models (LLMs) are capable of answering knowledge-intensive complex questions with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. However, they tend to generate factually incorrect reasoning steps when the required knowledge is not available or up-to-date in models' parameters. Recent works turn to retrieving external knowledge to augment CoT reasoning. Despite being promising, these chain-based methods suffer from: 1) Negative retrieval. Unnecessary or incorrect retrieval may mislead the reasoning; 2) Limited sight. Lacking the ability to look backward or forward, a local error in one step will propagate along the chain. In this paper, we propose a novel approach: Probabilistic Tree-of-thought Reasoning (ProbTree). First, LLMs translate a complex question into a query tree, in which each non-root node denotes a sub-question of its parent node. Then, probabilistic reasoning is conducted over the tree, by solving questions from leaf to root considering the confidence of both question decomposing and answering. During reasoning, for leaf nodes, LLMs choose a more confident answer from Closed-book QA that employs parametric knowledge and Open-book QA that employs retrieved external knowledge, thus eliminating the negative retrieval problem. For non-leaf nodes, with the hierarchical structure, LLMs have broader sights and are able to globally reason with the information from child nodes, thus recovering from local errors. The experiments on three Complex QA datasets under the open-domain setting show that our approach outperforms SOTA methods significantly, demonstrating the effect of probabilistic tree-of-thought reasoning.

Ever since the Multilayered Perceptron was first introduced the connectionist community has struggled with the concept of uncertainty and how this could be represented in these types of models. This past decade has seen a lot of effort in trying to join the principled approach of probabilistic modeling with the scalable nature of deep neural networks. While the theoretical benefits of this consolidation are clear, there are also several important practical aspects of these endeavors; namely to force the models we create to represent, learn, and report uncertainty in every prediction that is made. Many of these efforts have been based on extending existing frameworks with additional structures. We present Borch, a scalable deep universal probabilistic programming language, built on top of PyTorch. The code is available for download and use in our repository https://gitlab.com/desupervised/borch.

The remarkable performance of large language models (LLMs) in content generation, coding, and common-sense reasoning has spurred widespread integration into many facets of society. However, integration of LLMs raises valid questions on their reliability and trustworthiness, given their propensity to generate hallucinations: plausible, factually-incorrect responses, which are expressed with striking confidence. Previous work has shown that hallucinations and other non-factual responses generated by LLMs can be detected by examining the uncertainty of the LLM in its response to the pertinent prompt, driving significant research efforts devoted to quantifying the uncertainty of LLMs. This survey seeks to provide an extensive review of existing uncertainty quantification methods for LLMs, identifying their salient features, along with their strengths and weaknesses. We present existing methods within a relevant taxonomy, unifying ostensibly disparate methods to aid understanding of the state of the art. Furthermore, we highlight applications of uncertainty quantification methods for LLMs, spanning chatbot and textual applications to embodied artificial intelligence applications in robotics. We conclude with open research challenges in uncertainty quantification of LLMs, seeking to motivate future research.

Existing LLM reasoning methods have shown impressive capabilities across various tasks, such as solving math and coding problems. However, applying these methods to scenarios without ground-truth answers or rule-based verification methods - such as tracking the mental states of an agent - remains challenging. Inspired by the sequential Monte Carlo algorithm, we introduce thought-tracing, an inference-time reasoning algorithm designed to trace the mental states of specific agents by generating hypotheses and weighting them based on observations without relying on ground-truth solutions to questions in datasets. Our algorithm is modeled after the Bayesian theory-of-mind framework, using LLMs to approximate probabilistic inference over agents' evolving mental states based on their perceptions and actions. We evaluate thought-tracing on diverse theory-of-mind benchmarks, demonstrating significant performance improvements compared to baseline LLMs. Our experiments also reveal interesting behaviors of the recent reasoning models - e.g., o3 and R1 - on theory-of-mind, highlighting the difference of social reasoning compared to other domains.

Drawing from the resources of psychoanalysis and critical media studies, in this paper we develop an analysis of Large Language Models (LLMs) as automated subjects. We argue the intentional fictional projection of subjectivity onto LLMs can yield an alternate frame through which AI behaviour, including its productions of bias and harm, can be analysed. First, we introduce language models, discuss their significance and risks, and outline our case for interpreting model design and outputs with support from psychoanalytic concepts. We trace a brief history of language models, culminating with the releases, in 2022, of systems that realise state-of-the-art natural language processing performance. We engage with one such system, OpenAI's InstructGPT, as a case study, detailing the layers of its construction and conducting exploratory and semi-structured interviews with chatbots. These interviews probe the model's moral imperatives to be helpful, truthful and harmless by design. The model acts, we argue, as the condensation of often competing social desires, articulated through the internet and harvested into training data, which must then be regulated and repressed. This foundational structure can however be redirected via prompting, so that the model comes to identify with, and transfer, its commitments to the immediate human subject before it. In turn, these automated productions of language can lead to the human subject projecting agency upon the model, effecting occasionally further forms of countertransference. We conclude that critical media methods and psychoanalytic theory together offer a productive frame for grasping the powerful new capacities of AI-driven language systems.

Higher-order probabilistic programming languages allow programmers to write sophisticated models in machine learning and statistics in a succinct and structured way, but step outside the standard measure-theoretic formalization of probability theory. Programs may use both higher-order functions and continuous distributions, or even define a probability distribution on functions. But standard probability theory does not handle higher-order functions well: the category of measurable spaces is not cartesian closed. Here we introduce quasi-Borel spaces. We show that these spaces: form a new formalization of probability theory replacing measurable spaces; form a cartesian closed category and so support higher-order functions; form a well-pointed category and so support good proof principles for equational reasoning; and support continuous probability distributions. We demonstrate the use of quasi-Borel spaces for higher-order functions and probability by: showing that a well-known construction of probability theory involving random functions gains a cleaner expression; and generalizing de Finetti's theorem, that is a crucial theorem in probability theory, to quasi-Borel spaces.

Large language models' reasoning abilities benefit from methods that organize their thought processes, such as chain-of-thought prompting, which employs a sequential structure to guide the reasoning process step-by-step. However, existing approaches focus primarily on organizing the sequence of thoughts, leaving structure in individual thought steps underexplored. To address this gap, we propose Table as Thought, a framework inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories on human thought. Table as Thought organizes reasoning within a tabular schema, where rows represent sequential thought steps and columns capture critical constraints and contextual information to enhance reasoning. The reasoning process iteratively populates the table until self-verification ensures completeness and correctness. Our experiments show that Table as Thought excels in planning tasks and demonstrates a strong potential for enhancing LLM performance in mathematical reasoning compared to unstructured thought baselines. This work provides a novel exploration of refining thought representation within LLMs, paving the way for advancements in reasoning and AI cognition.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Despite their tremendous success in many applications, large language models often fall short of consistent reasoning and planning in various (language, embodied, and social) scenarios, due to inherent limitations in their inference, learning, and modeling capabilities. In this position paper, we present a new perspective of machine reasoning, LAW, that connects the concepts of Language models, Agent models, and World models, for more robust and versatile reasoning capabilities. In particular, we propose that world and agent models are a better abstraction of reasoning, that introduces the crucial elements of deliberate human-like reasoning, including beliefs about the world and other agents, anticipation of consequences, goals/rewards, and strategic planning. Crucially, language models in LAW serve as a backend to implement the system or its elements and hence provide the computational power and adaptability. We review the recent studies that have made relevant progress and discuss future research directions towards operationalizing the LAW framework.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

When people reason about cause and effect, they often consider many competing "what if" scenarios before deciding which explanation fits best. Analogously, advanced language models capable of causal inference can consider multiple interventions and counterfactuals to judge the validity of causal claims. Crucially, this type of reasoning is less like a single calculation and more like an internal dialogue between alternative hypotheses. In this paper, we make this dialogue explicit through a dual-agent debate framework where one model provides a structured causal inference, and the other critically examines this reasoning for logical flaws. When disagreements arise, agents attempt to persuade each other, challenging each other's logic and revising their conclusions until they converge on a mutually agreed answer. To take advantage of this deliberative process, we specifically use reasoning language models, whose strengths in both causal inference and adversarial debate remain under-explored relative to standard large language models. We evaluate our approach on the CLadder dataset, a benchmark linking natural language questions to formally defined causal graphs across all three rungs of Pearl's ladder of causation. With Qwen3 and DeepSeek-R1 as debater agents, we demonstrate that multi-agent debate improves DeepSeek-R1's overall accuracy in causal inference from 78.03% to 87.45%, with the counterfactual category specifically improving from 67.94% to 80.04% accuracy. Similarly, Qwen3's overall accuracy improves from 84.16% to 89.41%, and counterfactual questions from 71.53% to 80.35%, showing that strong models can still benefit greatly from debate with weaker agents. Our results highlight the potential of reasoning models as building blocks for multi-agent systems in causal inference, and demonstrate the importance of diverse perspectives in causal problem-solving.

We define a probabilistic programming language for Gaussian random variables with a first-class exact conditioning construct. We give operational, denotational and equational semantics for this language, establishing convenient properties like exchangeability of conditions. Conditioning on equality of continuous random variables is nontrivial, as the exact observation may have probability zero; this is Borel's paradox. Using categorical formulations of conditional probability, we show that the good properties of our language are not particular to Gaussians, but can be derived from universal properties, thus generalizing to wider settings. We define the Cond construction, which internalizes conditioning as a morphism, providing general compositional semantics for probabilistic programming with exact conditioning.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has made remarkable progress across various domains, with large language models like ChatGPT gaining substantial attention for their human-like text-generation capabilities. Despite these achievements, spatial reasoning remains a significant challenge for these models. Benchmarks like StepGame evaluate AI spatial reasoning, where ChatGPT has shown unsatisfactory performance. However, the presence of template errors in the benchmark has an impact on the evaluation results. Thus there is potential for ChatGPT to perform better if these template errors are addressed, leading to more accurate assessments of its spatial reasoning capabilities. In this study, we refine the StepGame benchmark, providing a more accurate dataset for model evaluation. We analyze GPT's spatial reasoning performance on the rectified benchmark, identifying proficiency in mapping natural language text to spatial relations but limitations in multi-hop reasoning. We provide a flawless solution to the benchmark by combining template-to-relation mapping with logic-based reasoning. This combination demonstrates proficiency in performing qualitative reasoning on StepGame without encountering any errors. We then address the limitations of GPT models in spatial reasoning. We deploy Chain-of-thought and Tree-of-thoughts prompting strategies, offering insights into GPT's ``cognitive process", and achieving remarkable improvements in accuracy. Our investigation not only sheds light on model deficiencies but also proposes enhancements, contributing to the advancement of AI with more robust spatial reasoning capabilities.

Procedural planning, which entails decomposing a high-level goal into a sequence of temporally ordered steps, is an important yet intricate task for machines. It involves integrating common-sense knowledge to reason about complex contextualized situations that are often counterfactual, e.g. "scheduling a doctor's appointment without a phone". While current approaches show encouraging results using large language models (LLMs), they are hindered by drawbacks such as costly API calls and reproducibility issues. In this paper, we advocate planning using smaller language models. We present PlaSma, a novel two-pronged approach to endow small language models with procedural knowledge and (counterfactual) planning capabilities. More concretely, we develop symbolic procedural knowledge distillation to enhance the implicit knowledge in small language models and an inference-time algorithm to facilitate more structured and accurate reasoning. In addition, we introduce a novel task, Counterfactual Planning, that requires a revision of a plan to cope with a counterfactual situation. In both the original and counterfactual setting, we show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (770M-11B parameters) can compete and often surpass their larger teacher models' capabilities.

As a sub-discipline of evolutionary and computational linguistics, emergent communication (EC) studies communication protocols, called emergent languages, arising in simulations where agents communicate. A key goal of EC is to give rise to languages that share statistical properties with natural languages. In this paper, we reinterpret Lewis's signaling game, a frequently used setting in EC, as beta-VAE and reformulate its objective function as ELBO. Consequently, we clarify the existence of prior distributions of emergent languages and show that the choice of the priors can influence their statistical properties. Specifically, we address the properties of word lengths and segmentation, known as Zipf's law of abbreviation (ZLA) and Harris's articulation scheme (HAS), respectively. It has been reported that the emergent languages do not follow them when using the conventional objective. We experimentally demonstrate that by selecting an appropriate prior distribution, more natural segments emerge, while suggesting that the conventional one prevents the languages from following ZLA and HAS.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Recently, diffusion models have garnered significant interest in the field of text processing due to their many potential advantages compared to conventional autoregressive models. In this work, we propose Diffusion-of-Thought (DoT), a novel approach that integrates diffusion models with Chain-of-Thought, a well-established technique for improving the reasoning ability of autoregressive language models. In contrast to autoregressive language models that make decisions in a left-to-right, token-by-token manner, DoT allows reasoning steps to diffuse over time through a diffusion language model and offers greater flexibility in trading-off computation for reasoning performance. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of DoT in multi-digit multiplication, boolean logic, and grade school math problems, with a small diffusion model outperforming a much larger autoregressive model in both efficiency and accuracy. In addition to that, DoT showcases promising self-correction abilities and benefits from existing reasoning-enhancing techniques like self-consistency decoding. Our findings contribute to the understanding and development of reasoning with diffusion language models.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

Large language models perform near-Bayesian inference yet violate permutation invariance on exchangeable data. We resolve this by showing transformers minimize expected conditional description length (cross-entropy) over orderings, E_pi[ell(Y mid Gamma_pi(X))], which admits a Kolmogorov-complexity interpretation up to additive constants, rather than the permutation-invariant description length ell(Y mid X). This makes them Bayesian in expectation, not in realization. We derive (i) a Quantified Martingale Violation bound showing order-induced deviations scale as O(log n) with constants; (ii) the Expectation-level Decompression Law linking information budgets to reliability for Bernoulli predicates; and (iii) deployable planners (B2T/RoH/ISR) for answer/abstain decisions. Empirically, permutation dispersion follows a+bln n (Qwen2-7B b approx 0.377, Llama-3.1-8B b approx 0.147); permutation mixtures improve ground-truth likelihood/accuracy; and randomized dose-response shows hallucinations drop by sim 0.13 per additional nat. A pre-specified audit with a fixed ISR=1.0 achieves near-0\% hallucinations via calibrated refusal at 24\% abstention. The framework turns hallucinations into predictable compression failures and enables principled information budgeting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in various natural language processing tasks but face challenges in mathematical reasoning, where complex problem-solving requires both linguistic understanding and mathematical reasoning skills. Existing approaches to address this challenge often rely on ensemble methods and suffer from the problem of data scarcity in target domains. In this work, we present a novel method to enhance LLMs' capabilities in mathematical reasoning tasks. Motivated by the need to bridge this gap, our approach incorporates a question paraphrase strategy, which aims at diversifying the linguistic forms of mathematical questions to improve generalization. Additionally, specialized training objectives are employed to guide the model's learning process, focusing on enhancing its understanding of mathematical concepts and reasoning processes. We conduct experiments on four datasets using different LLMs, and demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in improving LLMs' performance on mathematical reasoning tasks. Our findings underscore the significance of our methodology in the advancement of large language models and its potential implications for real-world applications that require mathematical reasoning abilities.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has become a pivotal approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a significant theoretical gap persists, as traditional token-level RL frameworks fail to align with the reasoning-level nature of complex, multi-step thought processes like Chain-of-Thought (CoT). To address this challenge, we introduce CoT-Space, a novel theoretical framework that recasts LLM reasoning from a discrete token-prediction task to an optimization process within a continuous, reasoning-level semantic space. By analyzing this process from both a noise perspective and a risk perspective, we demonstrate that the convergence to an optimal CoT length is a natural consequence of the fundamental trade-off between underfitting and overfitting. Furthermore, extensive experiments provide strong empirical validation for our theoretical findings. Our framework not only provides a coherent explanation for empirical phenomena such as overthinking but also offers a solid theoretical foundation to guide the future development of more effective and generalizable reasoning agents.

We explore how generating a chain of thought -- a series of intermediate reasoning steps -- significantly improves the ability of large language models to perform complex reasoning. In particular, we show how such reasoning abilities emerge naturally in sufficiently large language models via a simple method called chain of thought prompting, where a few chain of thought demonstrations are provided as exemplars in prompting. Experiments on three large language models show that chain of thought prompting improves performance on a range of arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning tasks. The empirical gains can be striking. For instance, prompting a 540B-parameter language model with just eight chain of thought exemplars achieves state of the art accuracy on the GSM8K benchmark of math word problems, surpassing even finetuned GPT-3 with a verifier.

Cognitively inspired Natural Language Pro-cessing uses human-derived behavioral datalike eye-tracking data, which reflect the seman-tic representations of language in the humanbrain to augment the neural nets to solve arange of tasks spanning syntax and semanticswith the aim of teaching machines about lan-guage processing mechanisms. In this paper,we use the ZuCo 1.0 and ZuCo 2.0 dataset con-taining the eye-gaze features to explore differ-ent linguistic models to directly predict thesegaze features for each word with respect to itssentence. We tried different neural networkmodels with the words as inputs to predict thetargets. And after lots of experimentation andfeature engineering finally devised a novel ar-chitecture consisting of RoBERTa Token Clas-sifier with a dense layer on top for languagemodeling and a stand-alone model consistingof dense layers followed by a transformer layerfor the extra features we engineered. Finally,we took the mean of the outputs of both thesemodels to make the final predictions. We eval-uated the models using mean absolute error(MAE) and the R2 score for each target.

Designing robotic agents to perform open vocabulary tasks has been the long-standing goal in robotics and AI. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved impressive results in creating robotic agents for performing open vocabulary tasks. However, planning for these tasks in the presence of uncertainties is challenging as it requires chain-of-thought reasoning, aggregating information from the environment, updating state estimates, and generating actions based on the updated state estimates. In this paper, we present an interactive planning technique for partially observable tasks using LLMs. In the proposed method, an LLM is used to collect missing information from the environment using a robot and infer the state of the underlying problem from collected observations while guiding the robot to perform the required actions. We also use a fine-tuned Llama 2 model via self-instruct and compare its performance against a pre-trained LLM like GPT-4. Results are demonstrated on several tasks in simulation as well as real-world environments. A video describing our work along with some results could be found here.

Large language models increasingly expose reasoning traces, yet their underlying cognitive structure and steps remain difficult to identify and analyze beyond surface-level statistics. We adopt Schoenfeld's Episode Theory as an inductive, intermediate-scale lens and introduce ThinkARM (Anatomy of Reasoning in Models), a scalable framework that explicitly abstracts reasoning traces into functional reasoning steps such as Analysis, Explore, Implement, Verify, etc. When applied to mathematical problem solving by diverse models, this abstraction reveals reproducible thinking dynamics and structural differences between reasoning and non-reasoning models, which are not apparent from token-level views. We further present two diagnostic case studies showing that exploration functions as a critical branching step associated with correctness, and that efficiency-oriented methods selectively suppress evaluative feedback steps rather than uniformly shortening responses. Together, our results demonstrate that episode-level representations make reasoning steps explicit, enabling systematic analysis of how reasoning is structured, stabilized, and altered in modern language models.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

Test-time compute has led to remarkable success in the large language model (LLM) community, particularly for complex tasks, where longer chains of thought (CoTs) are generated to enhance reasoning capabilities. However, growing evidence reveals that such reasoning models often produce CoTs plagued by excessive redundancy, including unnecessary verification steps and repetitive reasoning shifts. The root cause lies in post-training of them that overly rely on outcome reward paradigms, as the data of process reward paradigms, which regulate intermediate reasoning steps, is difficult to construct at scale. To address this, we propose PI, a novel framework for Test-time Prompt Intervention. PI provides an interface to dynamically guide and regulate reasoning paths during inference through timely (When module) and proper (How module) interventions and post-intervention sampling (Which module). This allows human problem-solving expertise and cognitive science principles to be seamlessly integrated into LLMs' reasoning processes, enhancing controllability and interpretability. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that PI significantly shortens CoTs while reducing hallucination, yielding more concise and reliable reasoning.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning enables large language models (LLMs) to break down complex problems into interpretable intermediate steps, significantly enhancing model transparency and performance in reasoning tasks. However, conventional CoT methods rely on heuristic sampling without structured modeling of reasoning transitions, constraining their ability to systematically explore and discover diverse and effective reasoning trajectories. In this work, we introduce CTRLS, a framework that formulates CoT reasoning as a Markov decision process (MDP) with latent state transitions, enabling principled and state-aware exploration via distributional reinforcement learning. By modelling reasoning actions as explicit probability distributions in latent space, our approach explicitly models epistemic uncertainty, facilitating robust exploration of the reasoning space. As part of our framework, we introduce an on-policy reinforcement learning strategy incorporating epsilon-greedy exploration and entropy-based regularization to iteratively refine latent state transitions without requiring additional fine-tuning of the underlying LLM. Theoretical analyses provide evidence lower bounds (ELBO), theoretically grounding our transition-aware modeling of latent reasoning dynamics. Further experiments demonstrate improvements in reasoning accuracy, diversity, and exploration efficiency across benchmark reasoning tasks.

Recent work has sought to quantify large language model uncertainty to facilitate model control and modulate user trust. Previous works focus on measures of uncertainty that are theoretically grounded or reflect the average overt behavior of the model. In this work, we investigate a variety of uncertainty measures, in order to identify measures that correlate with human group-level uncertainty. We find that Bayesian measures and a variation on entropy measures, top-k entropy, tend to agree with human behavior as a function of model size. We find that some strong measures decrease in human-similarity with model size, but, by multiple linear regression, we find that combining multiple uncertainty measures provide comparable human-alignment with reduced size-dependency.

Being probabilistic models, during inference large language models (LLMs) display rare events: behaviour that is far from typical but highly significant. By definition all rare events are hard to see, but the enormous scale of LLM usage means that events completely unobserved during development are likely to become prominent in deployment. Here we present an end-to-end framework for the systematic analysis of rare events in LLMs. We provide a practical implementation spanning theory, efficient generation strategies, probability estimation and error analysis, which we illustrate with concrete examples. We outline extensions and applications to other models and contexts, highlighting the generality of the concepts and techniques presented here.

LLMs are ideal for decision-making thanks to their ability to reason over long contexts. However, challenges arise when processing speech transcripts that describe complex scenarios, as they are verbose and include repetition, hedging, and vagueness. E.g., during a company's earnings call, an executive might project a positive revenue outlook to reassure investors, despite uncertainty regarding future earnings. It is crucial for LLMs to incorporate this uncertainty systematically when making decisions. In this paper, we introduce DeFine, a modular framework that constructs probabilistic factor profiles from complex scenarios. It then integrates these profiles with analogical reasoning, leveraging insights from similar past experiences to guide LLMs in making critical decisions in new situations. Our framework separates the tasks of quantifying uncertainty and incorporating it into LLM decision-making. This approach is particularly useful in areas such as consulting and financial deliberation, where making decisions under uncertainty is vital.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing and hold immense potential for advancing Artificial Intelligence. However, the core architecture of most mainstream LLMs -- the Transformer -- has inherent limitations in computational depth, rendering them theoretically incapable of solving many reasoning tasks that demand increasingly deep computations. Chain of Thought (CoT) prompting has emerged as a technique to address these architectural limitations, as evidenced by several theoretical studies. It offers a promising approach to solving complex reasoning tasks that were previously beyond the capabilities of these models. Despite its successes, CoT and its variants (such as Tree of Thought, Graph of Thought, etc.) rely on a "one-prompt-for-all" approach, using a single prompt structure (e.g., "think step by step") for a wide range of tasks -- from counting and sorting to solving mathematical and algorithmic problems. This approach poses significant challenges for models to generate the correct reasoning steps, as the model must navigate through a vast prompt template space to find the appropriate template for each task. In this work, we build upon previous theoretical analyses of CoT to demonstrate how the one-prompt-for-all approach can negatively affect the computability of LLMs. We partition the solution search space into two: the prompt space and the answer space. Our findings show that task-specific supervision is essential for navigating the prompt space accurately and achieving optimal performance. Through experiments with state-of-the-art LLMs, we reveal a gap in reasoning performance when supervision is applied versus when it is not.

Understanding and manipulating the causal generation mechanisms in language models is essential for controlling their behavior. Previous work has primarily relied on techniques such as representation surgery -- e.g., model ablations or manipulation of linear subspaces tied to specific concepts -- to intervene on these models. To understand the impact of interventions precisely, it is useful to examine counterfactuals -- e.g., how a given sentence would have appeared had it been generated by the model following a specific intervention. We highlight that counterfactual reasoning is conceptually distinct from interventions, as articulated in Pearl's causal hierarchy. Based on this observation, we propose a framework for generating true string counterfactuals by reformulating language models as Generalized Structural-equation. Models using the Gumbel-max trick. This allows us to model the joint distribution over original strings and their counterfactuals resulting from the same instantiation of the sampling noise. We develop an algorithm based on hindsight Gumbel sampling that allows us to infer the latent noise variables and generate counterfactuals of observed strings. Our experiments demonstrate that the approach produces meaningful counterfactuals while at the same time showing that commonly used intervention techniques have considerable undesired side effects.