Division and 1st Marine Division in the IX Corps' zone, the Wyoming Line curved southeast from the Kumhwa area to the Hwacheon Reservoir. On the 21st the two IX Corps' divisions moved to above the Kansas Line against almost no opposition. Immediately west, the 24th Division did not test the opposition below Kumhwa, but deliberately stood fast in the Kwangdok-san ridges to allow the neighboring ROK 6th Division to come abreast. In the Pogae-san heights, the 25th Division attacked toward Ch'orwon, but made no substantial progress after receiving increasing artillery fire during the day and becoming involved in hard fights right at the Utah Line, especially in the zone of the Turkish Brigade along Route 33. Neither Corps developed evidence of enemy offensive preparations during the day. The absence of opposition in the IX Corps' zone only confirmed the recent patrol reports of withdrawal. Below the Iron Triangle, the resistance that began to stiffen on 19 April had been expected to grow progressively heavier as I Corps' forces moved above the Utah Line. On the Imjin front, daylight patrols working above the river again found only a scattering of PVA. General Milburn concluded in an evening wrap-up report to General Van Fleet that the "enemy attitude remains defensive." The only appreciable change in enemy activity on the 21st occurred east of the Hwacheon Reservoir in the X Corps' zone. North and northeast of Yanggu, 2nd and 7th Division patrols, after several days of nearly fruitless searches, located several groups of 600-1000 KPA immediately above the Corps' front. These groups suggested, as General Almond reported to Van Fleet, that a relief or reinforcement of enemy units was taking place. On the 21st, the Eighth Army G-2 reported that his information still was not firm enough to "indicate the nearness" of the impending enemy offensive with any degree of certainty. A worrisome fact, as he earlier had pointed out to General Van Fleet, was that a lack of offensive signs did not necessarily mean that the opening of the offensive was distant. In preparing past attacks, PVA forces had successfully concealed their locations until they moved into forward assembly areas immediately before they attacked. The first indication that the enemy would repeat this pattern appeared during the night when I Corps' patrols reconnoitering above the Imjin ran into PVA positions that were stronger and nearer the river than those encountered during past