the gate machinery with all gates closed, and withdraw, all within two to four hours. Attaching the company to the 1st Cavalry Division, he instructed General Charles D. Palmer to use the Rangers against the dam before the division left the Kansas Line but did not specifically direct or limit the operation to a Ranger raid. Unaware of Hoge's concept of a hit and run attack, General Palmer assigned the mission to Colonel Harris' 7th Cavalry Regiment, then struggling through the rough ground directly below the dam, and instructed Harris to immobilize the sluice gates and occupy the dam area. Harris assigned the mission to his 2nd Battalion, then in reserve, and on 8 April, assembled the battalion with the 4th Ranger Company attached close to the front almost due south of the peninsular approach to the dam. He left detailed planning for later on the assumption that success in achieving the Kansas Line, and thus the dam operation, was some days away. Increasing resistance on 7 and 8 April, did portend a slow advance to the line. In an attempt to accelerate the attack, late on 8 April, General Palmer ordered his two assault regiments to deploy in greater strength the following morning. Obliged to commit the 2nd Battalion, Colonel Harris, with the dam operation in mind, gave the battalion the Kansas Line objectives that would carry it within of the base of the ridge leading to the dam. Although the reservoir was only half full, PVA troops and Korean employees of the dam power plant began opening sluice gates at midnight on the 8th. With the power plant not in operation, they were able to open only four gates fully and raise six slightly. The released water cost had limited impact as General Hoge earlier had warned his forces away from the Pukhan bottomland, but the flow gradually raised the river as much as , forcing the removal of floating bridges above and below Chuncheon and destroying another far downstream before it could be swung into the bank. The only PVA troops below the Pukhan on the morning of the 9th occupied the ridge leading to the dam. Elsewhere, those who had opposed the advance of the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments had withdrawn behind the river during the night to avoid being trapped below the flood. The two regiments were able to reach the Kansas Line well