where the individual seller has no reputation to defend. In sum, cheaper prices do carry more risk, so Marvin

should balance his appetite for risk versus the potential headaches of many more unanticipated trips to the

repair shop.

Similar problems with imperfect information arise in labor and financial capital markets. Consider Greta, who

is applying for a job. Her potential employer, like the used car buyer, is concerned about ending up with a

“lemon”—in this case a poor quality employee. The employer will collect information about Greta’s academic

and work history. In the end, however, a degree of uncertainty will inevitably remain regarding Greta’s abilities,
which are hard to demonstrate without actually observing her on the job. How can a potential employer screen
for certain attributes, such as motivation, timeliness, and ability to get along with others? Employers often look
{"file_hash": "830b81f41611ac67a490444dbb5d6aed292224606965b06965b914443c93331a", "uploaded_via": "batch_uploader", "file_size_mb": 26.99, "upload_timestamp": "2026-02-07T15:24:38.309401", "file_type": ".pdf", "creator": "PDFMiner", "source_file": "downloads\\business\\economics\\Microeconomics3e.pdf", "title": "Principles of Microeconomics 3e", "file_name": "Microeconomics3e.pdf", "batch_upload": true, "creationdate": "2022-12-07T14:15:44-06:00", "source": "downloads\\business\\economics\\Microeconomics3e.pdf", "total_pages": 597, "moddate": "2022-12-07T14:23:05-06:00", "producer": "Prince 14.2 (www.princexml.com)"}