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Taylor Momsen
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Taylor Momsen
Momsen in July 2017
Born
Taylor Michel Momsen
(1993-07-26) July 26, 1993 (age 24)
St. Louis, Missouri, US
Occupation
Singer
songwriter
actress
model
Years active
1997–present
Musical career
Genres
Alternative rock
hard rock
post-grunge
Instruments
Vocals
guitar
Labels
Interscope
Razor & Tie
Cooking Vinyl
Associated acts
The Pretty Reckless
Taylor Michel Momsen (born July 26, 1993)[1] is an American singer, songwriter, former actress, and model. She is known for being the lead singer and frontwoman of the American rock band The Pretty Reckless. She is also known for portraying the character of Jenny Humphrey on the CW teen drama series Gossip Girl (2007–2012) and Cindy Lou Who in the film Dr. Seuss' How the Grinch Stole Christmas (2000).[2]
Contents
[hide]
1 Early life
2 Acting
3 Modeling
4 Music
5 Discography
6 Filmography
7 References
8 External links
Early life[edit]
Taylor Momsen was born on July 26, 1993, in St. Louis, Missouri. Her parents are Michael and Collette Momsen and she has a younger sister, Sloane Momsen, who is also an actress. She has Russian ancestry.[3] She was raised Roman Catholic[4] and attended Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic School[5] for elementary school and later Herbert Hoover Middle School in Potomac, Maryland.[6] Although, she says now that she is older she is not a religious person.[7] She studied dance at the Center of Creative Arts in St. Louis.
Momsen was signed with Ford Models at a very young age: "My parents signed me up with Ford [Modeling] at the age of 2. No 2-year-old wants to be working, but I had no choice. My whole life, I was in and out of school. I didn’t have friends. I was working constantly and I didn’t have a real life."[6] She began acting professionally at three years of age in a 1997 national commercial for Shake 'n Bake.[8] She was then cast in The Prophet's Game.
Momsen is included on the list of Unclaimed Coogan accounts for performing children whose partial childhood earnings are mandated to be put in a special fund but who have yet to claim their earnings.[9]
Momsen attended the Professional Performing Arts School in Manhattan for high school alongside Connor Paolo, Gregori Lukas and Sarah Hyland.[citation needed]
Acting[edit]
Momsen at the Metropolitan Opera in 2008
In 2000, Momsen played the role of Cindy Lou Who in Dr. Seuss' How the Grinch Stole Christmas, her breakout role. In 2002, she was given the role of Gretel in the motion picture: Hansel and Gretel, as well as Alexandra, the President's daughter, in Spy Kids 2: The Island of Lost Dreams.
Momsen's career came to a halt for over three years until she received a lead role in the WB series Misconceptions, which was never aired, after that she also appeared in the 2006 film Saving Shiloh. She also auditioned for the title role in Hannah Montana, and was in the top three, but the role was instead awarded to Miley Cyrus—a decision that Momsen was happy with in retrospect.[10] In 2007 she starred in the Walt Disney Pictures film Underdog, as Molly and as Jennifer in the movie Paranoid Park, directed by Gus Van Sant.
Beginning in 2007, she played the character of Jenny Humphrey in The CW television series Gossip Girl, which is based on the book series by Cecily von Ziegesar. Momsen's appearances on the series became increasingly sporadic, and by the end of the first half of the fourth season, she had only appeared in four episodes. It was then announced that the actress would be scheduled for an indefinite hiatus from the show,[11] which ultimately resulted in her leaving the series as a regular cast member, following the completion of the fourth season in 2011. Later that year, on August 16, 2011, Momsen told Elle magazine that she had quit acting to focus on her music career.[12] However, on October 16, 2012, it was reported that Momsen would be returning to Gossip Girl for the final episode of the sixth and final season, in which she appeared briefly in the wedding sequence.[13][14]
Modeling[edit]
In June 2008, at the age of fourteen, Momsen signed to IMG Models.[15][16]
Taylor was the face of British fashion chain New Look for its spring/summer 2010 collection.[17] After weeks of speculation of who was the face of Madonna's 2010 fashion line "Material Girl", Momsen was announced on July 15, 2010.[18] A week later, Momsen was announced as the model for John Galliano's new women's fragrance, scheduled to launch in autumn 2010.[19] In 2010, she appeared in a video for John Galliano's "Parlez-Moi d’Amour" fragrance ad campaign
Momsen is currently the face of Samantha Thavasa's handbag line. She has done multiple photoshoots, press events, and commercials.[20]
She covered Page Six Magazine when she was fifteen years old in 2009. Momsen also covered on the February 2010 cover of Seventeen[21] In October 2010, Momsen wore a pair of platform stilettos, thigh-high stockings, and had a holster strapped around her leg for Revolver. Two months after she covered French magazine Rock One's. Momsen appeared on the cover of FHM’s March 2012 edition[22] and FHM ranked Momsen #29 in its 2012 Hot 100 issue.[23] She also made her debut Maxim cover in the November 2013 issue [24]
Music[edit]
Momsen performing in April 2010
Momsen has said that "music is where I can be me",[25] stating that "acting is easy. I've been doing it for so long and I totally love it. But you're playing a character instead of yourself. Music is more personal because you're writing it and you're involved in every step of it."[25] At 5 years old, Momsen recorded the song "Christmas, Why Can't I Find You?" for the soundtrack to How the Grinch Stole Christmas. In 2002, she recorded the songs "One Small Voice" and "Rudolph The Red-Nosed Reindeer" for the compilation album School's Out! Christmas.
In March 2009, Momsen stated in an interview with OK! magazine that her band The Pretty Reckless had signed a deal with Interscope Records.[26] She played her first tour with her band opening for The Veronicas on their Revenge Is Sweeter Tour in spring 2009.[27] After the tour, Momsen began working with guitarist Ben Phillips, who would soon join the band. Momsen subsequently swapped out her former bandmates. She co-writes songs with Phillips; in addition to lead vocals, Momsen also plays rhythm guitar.
The band's debut album Light Me Up was released on August 30, 2010 in the UK,[28] where it debuted at number 6, as well as at number 18 in Ireland. The first single "Make Me Wanna Die" was released on May 30, 2010, while the second single "Miss Nothing" which was released on August 23, 2010 peaked at number 39. "Just Tonight" was released as the album's third single. Songs from this album have been in the movie "Kick-ass" as well as shows like "The Vampire Diaries" and "Gossip Girl".[29]
Television personality Heidi Montag recorded "Blackout", a song written by Momsen. According to Momsen, she wrote the song when she was 8 years old and recorded it as a demo with a producer.[30] Montag released the song as a digital only single, with the music video being directed by her husband Spencer Pratt. Momsen commented about the recording: "I'm like, okay, dude, you're singing an 8-year-old's words, but that's cool. It's so funny because I didn't shop it or anything and I get this call going, 'Did you write a song for Heidi Montag'? And I'm like, 'What?'".[30] The track was later included on Montag's debut studio album Superficial (2010).
On July 27, 2011, Momsen announced via Twitter that the band would be the supporting act for Evanescence during the fall of 2011.[31] Throughout 2012, Momsen and her band toured North America; the second headlining tour, titled the Medicine Tour, began in March 2012 [32] and culminated with supporting dates for Marilyn Manson's 2012 world tour Hey Cruel World... Tour. Momsen also appeared as guest vocalist on the first track of ex Ministry member Paul Barker's 2012 album Fix This.
On November 30, 2012, it was announced that The Pretty Reckless' fourth single "Kill Me" would be released on December 11.[33] The track was the last song to be featured in the Gossip Girl series finale.
Momsen cites Kurt Cobain, The Beatles, Led Zeppelin, The Who, Pink Floyd, AC/DC, Marilyn Manson, Oasis and Shirley Manson of Garbage as some of her personal influences.[34][35][36]
Going to Hell was released on March 18, 2014.[37] The release marked the band's largest sales week to date and landed at #5 on the Billboard 200 with over 35,000 copies sold in its first week.[38] The success of the record saw Taylor, along with the rest of the band, break records when they became the first female-fronted band to reach No. 1 on the rock radio charts with its first two singles - "Heaven Knows" in March 2014 and "Fucked Up World" in September 2014.[39] The Pretty Reckless also spent the majority of late 2013 throughout 2014 on tour supporting Going To Hell. In 2014, her band also supported Fall Out Boy in their European leg of the Save Rock n Roll Tour along with New Politics.
Throughout 2015, Momsen continued to record new material for the third Pretty Reckless album. On September 29, 2016, the band released the single "Take Me Down", which reached number two on the Billboard Mainstream Rock Chart.[40][41] The third album, Who You Selling For was released in October 2016.[40]
Discography[edit]
Main article: The Pretty Reckless discography
Filmography[edit]
Film
Year
Title
Role
Notes
1999 Prophet's Game, TheThe Prophet's Game Honey Bee Swan
2000 Dr. Seuss' How the Grinch Stole Christmas Cindy Lou Who Nominated—Blockbuster Entertainment Award for Favorite Female Newcomer
Nominated—Saturn Award for Best Performance by a Younger Actor
Nominated—Young Artist Award for Best Performance in a Feature Film – Young Actress Age Ten or Under
2002 We Were Soldiers Julie Moore
2002 Spy Kids 2: The Island of Lost Dreams Alexandra
2002 Hansel & Gretel Gretel
2006 Saving Shiloh Samantha Wallace
2007 Paranoid Park Jennifer
2007 Underdog Molly Nominated—Young Artist Award for Best Performance in a Feature Film – Supporting Young Actress
2008 Spy School Madison Kramer
Television
Year
Title
Role
Notes
1998 Early Edition Allie Uncredited; episode: "A Minor Miracle"
2006 Misconceptions Hopper Watson Unaired WB series
2007–2010;
2012 Gossip Girl Jennifer "Jenny" Humphrey Main cast (season 1–4)
Special guest star (season 6): 66 episodes
Nominated—Teen Choice Award for Choice TV Breakout Star: Female
Nominated—Young Artist Award for Best Performance in a TV Series (Comedy or Drama) – Leading Young Actress
References[edit]
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen Biography". TV Guide. Retrieved October 18, 2010.
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen: Not a Girl, Not Yet a Woman". The New York Observer
Jump up ^ Momsen, Taylor (July 8, 2013). "Twitter: taylormomsen: @Zheka_Kinoman yes, I'm part Russian". Twitter.com. Retrieved July 16, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen Gets Spiritual - Daily Intelligencer". Nymag.com. Retrieved September 2, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen". Movies.yahoo.com. April 20, 2011. Retrieved September 2, 2013.
^ Jump up to: a b Blonska, Joanna. "The Young and the 'Reckless'". Bethesda Magazine. Retrieved 4 February 2013.
Jump up ^ Vozick-Levinson, S. (2014, Apr 10). Taylor momsen. Rolling Stone, , 26. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1528439768
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen, Age 3, In Shake 'N Bake Commercial (VIDEO)". Huffington Post. 15 November 2010. Retrieved December 1, 2014.
Jump up ^ "Unclaimed Coogan Fund list".
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen Glad She's Not 'Hannah Montana'". www.starpulse.com. January 25, 2010. Retrieved September 26, 2010.
Jump up ^ Ausiello, Michael"'Gossip Girl' Sidelines Taylor Momsen", Deadline.com, November 22, 2010. Retrieved November 23, 2010.
Jump up ^ "Momen Quit Acting". www.yahooblogs.com. August 16, 2011. Retrieved August 16, 2011.
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen Returning To 'Gossip Girl' Along With Connor Paolo". The Huffington Post. AOL. October 16, 2011. Retrieved October 17, 2012.
Jump up ^ Murray, Rheana (October 17, 2012). "'Gossip Girl' Alums Taylor Momsen and Connor Paolo Make Surprise Return for Show's Final Episode". Daily News. Retrieved November 12, 2012.
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen: From Gossip Girl to Supermodel". Offtherack.people.com. June 25, 2008. Retrieved June 25, 2010.
Jump up ^ Vogue, Teen. "Taylor Momsen: Girl on Film". Teenvogue.com. Retrieved June 25, 2010.
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen for new look". The Express online. March 8, 2010. Retrieved April 4, 2010.
Jump up ^ "Grazia Fashion: Taylor Momsen is the face of Material Girl!". Graziadaily.co.uk. Retrieved August 10, 2010.
Jump up ^ "Grazia Fashion: Taylor Momsen To Model For Galllano!!". Graziadaily.co.uk. Retrieved August 10, 2010.
Jump up ^ "Samantha Thavasa Will Have You Know Taylor Momsen Is Employable". Retrieved June 20, 2013.
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen Seventeen Cover - Interview and Pictures of Taylor Momsen". Seventeen.com. Retrieved February 9, 2014.
Jump up ^ "FHM at Taylor Momsen’s sexy house party! | Girls". FHM.com. Archived from the original on October 19, 2013. Retrieved February 9, 2014.
Jump up ^ "Hot 100". FHM. 2012. Retrieved January 11, 2013.
Jump up ^ Tweet (October 10, 2013). "Taylor Momsen | Pictures of a Pretty Reckless Singer". Maxim. Retrieved February 9, 2014.
^ Jump up to: a b Wightman, Catriona, "Taylor Momsen: 'Music is my only goal'", Digital Spy, November 3, 2010, retrieved November 3, 2011
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen Not Kissing Chace Crawford Offscreen". Okmagazine.com. March 3, 2009. Retrieved June 25, 2010.
Jump up ^ "TAYLOR MOMSEN'S "Pretty Reckless": The Veronicas Pick "GOSSIP GIRL" Band As Tour Opener". Huffingtonpost.com. April 17, 2009. Retrieved November 8, 2011.
Jump up ^ New Song from Taylor Momsen's Pretty Reckless By Avery Spofford on July 12, 2010 5:56 pm – Spin
Jump up ^ DREAMSEEKERS: THE BEST MUSIC YOU'VE NEVER HEARD. (2011, Mar 19). Billboard - the International Newsweekly of Music, Video and Home Entertainment, 123, A, B, C, D. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/868612104
^ Jump up to: a b Harp, Justin, "Momsen 'surprised by Montag song cover'", Digital Spy, October 15, 2010, retrieved January 3, 2011
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen announces tour with Evanescence, AHN, July 27, 2011, retrieved July 31, 2011
Jump up ^ The Pretty Reckless Bring 'Medicine Tour' Stateside By Tara Hall on January 31, 2012 5:56 pm – Soundspike
Jump up ^ "Kill Me [Explicit]". Amazon.com. Amazon.com. 2012. Retrieved November 30, 2012.
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen of The Pretty Reckless - 'Wikipedia: Fact or Fiction?'". Loudwire. Retrieved 2016-03-28.
Jump up ^ "Taylor Momsen: 'I admire Shirley Manson' - Music News". Digital Spy. 29 August 2010. Retrieved 2 January 2012.
Jump up ^ "I love Oasis. I love Noel Gallagher. He’s a great songwriter. I’d love to be able to write a song with him at some point.". The A.V. Club. 10 March 2011. Retrieved 5 July 2017.
Jump up ^ "THE PRETTY RECKLESS TO RELEASE NEW ALBUM ‘GOING TO HELL’ MARCH 18, 2014 ON RAZOR & TIE". Razor & Tie Direct L.L.C. 2014-01-21. Retrieved 2016-05-09.
Jump up ^ "'Frozen' Soundtrack Earns Its Biggest Sales Week Yet, Recalling Adele's Longevity". Billboard. Retrieved 2016-05-09.
Jump up ^ "Pretty Reckless Only Female-Fronted Band to Top Mainstream Rock With First 2 Hits". Billboard. Retrieved 2016-05-09.
^ Jump up to: a b "Video Premiere: THE PRETTY RECKLESS's 'Take Me Down'". blabbermouth.net. 2016-09-29. Retrieved 2016-09-29.
Jump up ^ "The Pretty Reckless - Chart history | Billboard". www.billboard.com. Retrieved 2016-09-29.
External links[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Taylor Momsen.
Official website
Taylor Momsen on IMDb
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The Pretty Reckless
Taylor Momsen
Jamie Perkins
Ben Phillips
Mark Damon
Nick Carbone
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Studio albums
Light Me Up
Going to Hell
Who You Selling For
Extended plays
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Hit Me Like a Man EP
Singles
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"Miss Nothing"
"Just Tonight"
"Kill Me"
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"Messed Up World"
"Follow Me Down"
"Take Me Down"
"Back to the River"
Tours
Light Me Up Tour
The Medicine Tour
Going to Hell Tour
Who You Selling For Tour
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Discography
Interscope Records
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text:
Efficiency wage
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In labor economics, the efficiency wage hypothesis argues that wages, at least in some markets, form in a way that is not market-clearing. Specifically, it points to the incentive for managers to pay their employees more than the market-clearing wage in order to increase their productivity or efficiency, or reduce costs associated with turnover, in industries where the costs of replacing labor are high. This increased labor productivity and/or decreased costs pay for the higher wages.
Because workers are paid more than the equilibrium wage, there may be unemployment. Efficiency wages offer, therefore, a market failure explanation of unemployment, in contrast to theories that emphasize government intervention (such as minimum wages).[1] However, efficiency wages do not necessarily imply unemployment, but only uncleared markets and job rationing in those markets. There may be full employment in the economy, and yet efficiency wages may prevail in some occupations. In this case there will be excess supply for those occupations, but some applicants are not hired and have to work for a probably lower wage elsewhere.
The term "efficiency-wages" (or rather "efficiency-earnings") has been introduced by Alfred Marshall to denote the wage per efficiency unit of labor.[2] Marshallian efficiency wages would make employers pay different wages to workers who are of different efficiency, such that the employer would be indifferent between more efficient workers and less efficient workers. The modern use of the term is quite different and refers to the idea that higher wages may increase the efficiency of the workers by various channels, making it worthwhile for the employers to offer wages that exceed a market-clearing level.
Contents
[hide]
1 Overview
2 Shirking
3 Labor turnover
4 Selection
5 Sociological models
5.1 Fairness, norms, and reciprocity
5.2 Sociological efficiency wage models
6 Empirical literature
7 General explanation
8 See also
9 Notes
10 References
Overview[edit]
There are several theories (or "microfoundations") of why managers pay efficiency wages (wages above the market clearing rate):
Avoiding shirking: If it is difficult to measure the quantity or quality of a worker's effort—and systems of piece rates or commissions are impossible—there may be an incentive for him or her to "shirk" (do less work than agreed). The manager thus may pay an efficiency wage in order to create or increase the cost of job loss, which gives a sting to the threat of firing. This threat can be used to prevent shirking (or "moral hazard").
Minimizing turnover: By paying above-market wages, the worker's motivation to leave the job and look for a job elsewhere will be reduced. This strategy makes sense because it is often expensive to train replacement workers.
Selection: If job performance depends on workers' ability and workers differ from each other in those terms, firms with higher wages will attract more able job-seekers, and this may make it profitable to offer wages that exceed the market clearing level.
Sociological theories: Efficiency wages may result from traditions. Akerlof's theory (in very simple terms) involves higher wages encouraging high morale, which raises productivity.
Nutritional theories: In developing countries, efficiency wages may allow workers to eat well enough to avoid illness and to be able to work harder and even more productively.
The model of efficiency wages, largely based on shirking, developed by Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz has been particularly influential.
Shirking[edit]
In the Shapiro-Stiglitz model workers are paid at a level where they do not shirk. This prevents wages from dropping to market clearing levels. Full employment cannot be achieved because workers would shirk if they were not threatened with the possibility of unemployment. The curve for the no-shirking condition (labeled NSC) goes to infinity at full employment.
The shirking model begins with the fact that complete contracts rarely (or never) exist in the real world. This implies that both parties to the contract have some discretion, but frequently, due to monitoring problems, it is the employee’s side of the bargain which is subject to the most discretion. (Methods such as piece rates are often impracticable because monitoring is too costly or inaccurate; or they may be based on measures too imperfectly verifiable by workers, creating a moral hazard problem on the employer’s side.) Thus the payment of a wage in excess of market-clearing may provide employees with cost-effective incentives to work rather than shirk.[3][4] In the Shapiro and Stiglitz model, workers either work or shirk, and if they shirk they have a certain probability of being caught, with the penalty of being fired.[5] Equilibrium then entails unemployment, because in order to create an opportunity cost to shirking, firms try to raise their wages above the market average (so that sacked workers face a probabilistic loss). But since all firms do this the market wage itself is pushed up, and the result is that wages are raised above market-clearing, creating involuntary unemployment. This creates a low, or no income alternative which makes job loss costly, and serves as a worker discipline device. Unemployed workers cannot bid for jobs by offering to work at lower wages, since if hired, it would be in the worker’s interest to shirk on the job, and he has no credible way of promising not to do so. Shapiro and Stiglitz point out that their assumption that workers are identical (e.g. there is no stigma to having been fired) is a strong one – in practice reputation can work as an additional disciplining device.
See also: Shapiro–Stiglitz theory
The shirking model does not predict (counterfactually) that the bulk of the unemployed at any one time are those who are fired for shirking, because if the threat associated with being fired is effective, little or no shirking and sacking will occur. Instead the unemployed will consist of a (rotating) pool of individuals who have quit for personal reasons, are new entrants to the labour market, or who have been laid off for other reasons. Pareto optimality, with costly monitoring, will entail some unemployment, since unemployment plays a socially valuable role in creating work incentives. But the equilibrium unemployment rate will not be Pareto optimal, since firms do not take into account the social cost of the unemployment they help to create.
One criticism of this and other flavours of the efficiency wage hypothesis is that more sophisticated employment contracts can under certain conditions reduce or eliminate involuntary unemployment. Lazear (1979, 1981) demonstrates the use of seniority wages to solve the incentive problem, where initially workers are paid less than their marginal productivity, and as they work effectively over time within the firm, earnings increase until they exceed marginal productivity. The upward tilt in the age-earnings profile here provides the incentive to avoid shirking, and the present value of wages can fall to the market-clearing level, eliminating involuntary unemployment. Lazear and Moore (1984) find that the slope of earnings profiles is significantly affected by incentives.
However, a significant criticism is that moral hazard would be shifted to employers, since they are responsible for monitoring the worker’s effort. Obvious incentives would exist for firms to declare shirking when it has not taken place. In the Lazear model, firms have obvious incentives to fire older workers (paid above marginal product) and hire new cheaper workers, creating a credibility problem. The seriousness of this employer moral hazard depends on the extent to which effort can be monitored by outside auditors, so that firms cannot cheat, although reputation effects (e.g. Lazear 1981) may be able to do the same job.
Labor turnover[edit]
On the labor turnover flavor of the efficiency wage hypothesis, firms also offer wages in excess of market-clearing (e.g. Salop 1979, Schlicht 1978, Stiglitz 1974), due to the high cost of replacing workers (search, recruitment, training costs).[6][7][8][9] If all firms are identical, one possible equilibrium involves all firms paying a common wage rate above the market-clearing level, with involuntary unemployment serving to diminish turnover. These models can easily be adapted to explain dual labor markets: if low-skill, labor-intensive firms have lower turnover costs (as seems likely), there may be a split between a low-wage, low-effort, high-turnover sector and a high-wage, high effort, low-turnover sector. Again, more sophisticated employment contracts may solve the problem.
Selection[edit]
In selection wage theories it is presupposed that performance on the job depends on "ability", and that workers are heterogeneous with respect to ability. The selection effect of higher wages may come about through self-selection or because firms faced with a larger pool of applicants can increase their hiring standards and thereby obtain a more productive work force.
Self-selection (often referred to as adverse selection) comes about if the workers’ ability and reservation wages are positively correlated.[10] There are two crucial assumptions, that firms cannot screen applicants either before or after applying, and that there is costless self-employment available which realises a worker’s marginal product (that is higher for the more productive workers). If there are two kinds of firm (low and high wage), then we effectively have two sets of lotteries (since firms cannot screen), the difference being that high-ability workers do not enter the low-wage lotteries as their reservation wage is too high. Thus low-wage firms attract only low-ability lottery entrants, while high-wage firms attract workers of all abilities (i.e. on average they will select average workers). Thus high-wage firms are paying an efficiency wage – they pay more, and, on average, get more (see e.g. Malcolmson 1981; Stiglitz 1976; Weiss 1980). However, the assumption that firms are unable to measure effort and pay piece rates after workers are hired or to fire workers whose output is too low is quite strong. Firms may also be able to design self-selection or screening devices that induce workers to reveal their true characteristics.
If firms can assess the productivity of applicants, they will try to select the best among the applicants. A higher wage offer will attract more applicants, and in particular more highly qualified applicants. This permits a firm to raise its hiring standard and thereby enhance the firm's productivity.[11] Wage compression makes it profitable for firms to screen applicants under such circumstances, and selection wages may be important.
Sociological models[edit]
Fairness, norms, and reciprocity[edit]
Standard economic models ("neoclassical economics") assume that people pursue only their own self-interest and do not care about "social" goals ("homo economicus"). Some attention has been paid to the idea that people may be altruistic (care about the well-being of others), but it is only with the addition of reciprocity and norms of fairness that the model becomes accurate.(e.g. Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 2000). Thus of crucial importance is the idea of exchange: a person who is altruistic towards another expects the other to fulfil some kind of fairness norm, be it reciprocating in kind, in some other but – according to some shared standard – equivalent way; or simply by being grateful. If the expected reciprocation is not forthcoming, the altruism is unlikely to be repeated or continued. In addition, similar norms of fairness will typically lead people into negative forms of reciprocity too – in the form of retaliation for acts perceived as vindictive. This can bind actors into vicious loops where vindictive acts are met with further vindictive acts.
In practice, despite the neat logic of standard neoclassical models, these kinds of sociological models do impinge upon very many economic relations, though in different ways and to different degrees. For example, if an employee has been exceptionally loyal, a manager may feel some obligation to treat that employee well, even when it is not in his (narrowly defined, economic) self-interest to do so. It would appear that although broader, longer-term economic benefits may result (e.g. through reputation, or perhaps through simplified decision-making according to fairness norms), a major factor must be that there are noneconomic benefits the manager receives, such as not having a guilty conscience (loss of self-esteem). For real-world, socialised, normal human beings (as opposed to abstracted factors of production), this is likely to be the case quite often. (As a quantitative estimate of the importance of this, Weisbrod’s 1988 estimate of the total value of voluntary labor in the US - $74 billion annually – will suffice.) Examples of the negative aspect of fairness include consumers "boycotting" firms they disapprove of by not buying products they otherwise would (and therefore settling for second-best); and employees sabotaging firms they feel hard done by.
Rabin (1993) offers three stylised facts as a starting-point on how norms affect behaviour: (a) people are prepared to sacrifice their own material well-being to help those who are being kind; (b) they are also prepared to do this to punish those being unkind; (c) both (a) and (b) have a greater effect on behaviour as the material cost of sacrificing (in relative rather than absolute terms) becomes smaller. Rabin supports his Fact A by Dawes and Thaler’s (1988) survey of the experimental literature, which concludes that, for most one-shot public good decisions in which the individually optimal contribution is close to 0%, the contribution rate ranges from 40 to 60% of the socially optimal level. Fact B is demonstrated by the "ultimatum game" (e.g. Thaler 1988), where an amount of money is split between two people, one proposing a division, the other accepting or rejecting (where rejection means both get nothing). Rationally, the proposer should offer no more than a penny, and the decider accept any offer of at least a penny, but in practice, even in one-shot settings, proposers make fair proposals, and deciders are prepared to punish unfair offers by rejecting them. Fact C is tested and partially confirmed by Gerald Leventhal and David Anderson (1970), but is also fairly intuitive. In the ultimatum game, a 90% split (regarded as unfair) is (intuitively) far more likely to be punished if the amount to be split is $1 than if it is $1 million.
A crucial point (as noted in Akerlof 1982) is that notions of fairness depend on the status quo and other reference points. Experiments (Fehr and Schmidt 2000) and surveys (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986) indicate that people have clear notions of fairness based on particular reference points (disagreements can arise in the choice of reference point). Thus for example firms who raise prices or lower wages to take advantage of increased demand or increased labour supply are frequently perceived as acting unfairly, where the same changes are deemed acceptable when the firm makes them due to increased costs (Kahneman et al.). In other words, in people’s intuitive "naïve accounting" (Rabin 1993), a key role is played by the idea of entitlements embodied in reference points (although as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2000 point out, there may be informational problems, e.g. for workers in determining what the firm’s profit actually is, given tax avoidance and stock-price considerations). In particular it is perceived as unfair for actors to increase their share at the expense of others, although over time such a change may become entrenched and form a new reference point which (typically) is no longer in itself deemed unfair.
Sociological efficiency wage models[edit]
Solow (1981) argued that wage rigidity may be at least partly due to social conventions and principles of appropriate behaviour, which are not entirely individualistic in origin.[12] Akerlof (1982) provided the first explicitly sociological model leading to the efficiency wage hypothesis. Using a variety of evidence from sociological studies, Akerlof argues that worker effort depends on the work norms of the relevant reference group. In Akerlof’s partial gift exchange model, the firm can raise group work norms and average effort by paying workers a gift of wages in excess of the minimum required, in return for effort above the minimum required. The sociological model can explain phenomena inexplicable on neoclassical terms, such as why firms do not fire workers who turn out to be less productive; why piece rates are so little used even where quite feasible; and why firms set work standards exceeded by most workers. A possible criticism is that workers do not necessarily view high wages as gifts, but as merely fair (particularly since typically 80% or more of workers consider themselves to be in the top quarter of productivity), in which case they will not reciprocate with high effort.
Akerlof and Yellen (1990), responding to these criticisms and building on work from psychology, sociology, and personnel management, introduce "the fair wage-effort hypothesis", which states that workers form a notion of the fair wage, and if the actual wage is lower, withdraw effort in proportion, so that, depending on the wage-effort elasticity and the costs to the firm of shirking, the fair wage may form a key part of the wage bargain. This provides an explanation of persistent evidence of consistent wage differentials across industries (e.g. Slichter 1950; Dickens and Katz 1986; Krueger and Summers 1988): if firms must pay high wages to some groups of workers – perhaps because they are in short supply or for other efficiency-wage reasons such as shirking – then demands for fairness will lead to a compression of the pay scale, and wages for other groups within the firm will be higher than in other industries or firms.
The union threat model is one of several explanations for industry wage differentials.[13] This Keynesian economics model looks at the role of unions in wage determination. The degree in which union wages exceed non-union member wages is known as union wage premium and some firms seek to prevent unionization in the first instances.[13] Varying costs of union avoidance across sectors will lead some firms to offer supracompetitive wages as pay premiums to workers in exchange for their avoiding unionization.[13] Under the union threat model (Dickens 1986), the ease with which an industry can defeat a union drive has a negative relationship with its wage differential.[13] In other words, inter-industry wage variability should be low where the threat of unionization is low.[13]
Empirical literature[edit]
Raff and Summers (1987) conduct a case study on Henry Ford’s introduction of the five dollar day in 1914. Their conclusion is that the Ford experience supports efficiency wage interpretations. Ford’s decision to increase wages so dramatically (doubling for most workers) is most plausibly portrayed as the consequence of efficiency wage considerations, with the structure being consistent, evidence of substantial queues for Ford jobs, and significant increases in productivity and profits at Ford. Concerns such as high turnover and poor worker morale appear to have played a significant role in the five-dollar decision. Ford’s new wage put him in the position of rationing jobs, and increased wages did yield substantial productivity benefits and profits. There is also evidence that other firms emulated Ford’s policy to some extent, with wages in the automobile industry 40% higher than in the rest of manufacturing (Rae 1965, quoted in Raff and Summers). Given low monitoring costs and skill levels on the Ford production line, such benefits (and the decision itself) appear particularly significant.
Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998) conduct labour market experiments to separate the effects of competition and social norms/customs/standards of fairness. They find that in complete contract markets, firms persistently try to enforce lower wages. By contrast, in gift exchange markets and bilateral gift exchanges, wages are higher and more stable. It appears that in complete contract situations, competitive equilibrium exerts a considerable drawing power, whilst in the gift exchange market it does not.
Fehr et al. stress that reciprocal effort choices are truly a one-shot phenomenon, without reputation or other repeated-game effects. "It is, therefore, tempting to interpret reciprocal effort behavior as a preference phenomenon."(p344). Two types of preferences can account for this behaviour: a) workers may feel an obligation to share the additional income from higher wages at least partly with firms; b) workers may have reciprocal motives (reward good behaviour, punish bad). "In the context of this interpretation, wage setting is inherently associated with the signalling of intentions, and workers condition their effort responses on the inferred intentions." (p344). Charness (1996), quoted in Fehr et al., finds that when signalling is removed (wages are set randomly or by the experimenter), workers exhibit a lower, but still positive, wage-effort relation, suggesting some gain-sharing motive and some reciprocity (where intentions can be signalled).
Fehr et al. state that "Our preferred interpretation of firms’ wage-setting behavior is that firms voluntarily paid job rents to elicit non-minimum effort levels." Although excess supply of labour created enormous competition among workers, firms did not take advantage. In the long run, instead of being governed by competitive forces, firms’ wage offers were solely governed by reciprocity considerations because the payment of non-competitive wages generated higher profits. Thus, both firms and workers can be better off when they rely on stable reciprocal interactions.
That reciprocal behavior generates efficiency gains has been confirmed by several other papers e.g. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) - even under conditions of double anonymity and where actors know even the experimenter cannot observe individual behaviour, reciprocal interactions and efficiency gains are frequent. Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1996, 1997) show that reciprocal interactions generate substantial efficiency gains. However the efficiency-enhancing role of reciprocity is, in general, associated with serious behavioural deviations from competitive equilibrium predictions. To counter a possible criticism of such theories, Fehr and Tougareva (1995) showed these reciprocal exchanges (efficiency-enhancing) are independent of the stakes involved (they compared outcomes with stakes worth a week’s income with stakes worth 3 months’ income, and found no difference).
As one counter to over-enthusiasm for efficiency wage models, Leonard (1987) finds little support for either shirking or turnover efficiency wage models, by testing their predictions for large and persistent wage differentials. The shirking version assumes a trade-off between self-supervision and external supervision, while the turnover version assumes turnover is costly to the firm. Variation across firms in the cost of monitoring/shirking or turnover then is hypothesized to account for wage variations across firms for homogeneous workers. But Leonard finds that wages for narrowly defined occupations within one sector of one state are widely dispersed, suggesting other factors may be at work.
General explanation[edit]
Paul Krugman explains how the efficiency wage theory comes into play in a real society. The productivity E ( w ) {\displaystyle E(w)} of individual workers is a function of their wage w {\displaystyle w} , and the total productivity is the sum of the individual productivity.[14] Accordingly, the sales V {\displaystyle V} of the firm to which the workers belong become a function of both employment L {\displaystyle L} and the individual productivity. The firm's profit P {\displaystyle P} is[14]
P = V ( L E ) − w L . {\displaystyle P=V(LE)-wL\;.}
Then we assume that the higher the wage of the workers become, the higher the individual productivity: d E d w > 0 {\displaystyle {\frac {dE}{dw}}>0} .[14] If the employment is chosen so that the profit is maximised, it is constant. Under this optimised condition, we have
d P = ∂ V ∂ ( L E ) L d E − L d w , {\displaystyle dP={\frac {\partial V}{\partial (LE)}}LdE-Ldw\;,}
that is,
d P d w = ∂ V ∂ E d E d w − L . {\displaystyle {\frac {dP}{dw}}={\frac {\partial V}{\partial E}}{\frac {dE}{dw}}-L\;.}
Obviously, the gradient ∂ V ∂ E {\displaystyle {\frac {\partial V}{\partial E}}} of the slope is positive, because the higher individual productivity the higher sales. The d P d w {\displaystyle {\frac {dP}{dw}}} never goes to negative because of the optimised condition, and therefore we have
0 ≤ d P d w . {\displaystyle 0\leq {\frac {dP}{dw}}\;.}
This means that if the firm increases their wage their profit becomes constant or even larger. Thus the efficiency wage theory motivates the owners of the firm to raise the wage to increase the profit of the firm.
See also[edit]
Minimum wages
Notes[edit]
Jump up ^ Mankiw, Gregory N. & Taylor, Mark P. (2008), Macroeconomics (European edition), pp. 181–182
Jump up ^ Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, London (Macmillan), 8th ed., Ch, VI.III.10 [1]
Jump up ^ Gary Becker and George Stigler: Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, Section III, in: Journal of Legal Studies 1974, p.1-18 [2]
Jump up ^ Herbert Gintis: The Nature of Labor Exchange and the Theory of Capitalist Production, in: Review of Radical Political Economics 1976, p.36-54 [3]
Jump up ^ Shapiro, Carl and Stiglitz, Joseph E.: Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, in: American Economic Review 1984, p.433-444 [4]
Jump up ^ Edmund S. Phelps, Money-Wage Dynamics and Labor-Market Equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968), 678 [5]
Jump up ^ Stiglitz, Joseph E., Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in LDC'S: The Labor Turnover Model, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 88(2) 1974}pp. 194-227 [6]
Jump up ^ E. Schlicht, Labour Turnover, Wage Structure, and Natural Unemployment, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 1978, 134, pp. 337-46 [7]
Jump up ^ Salop, Steven C, A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment, American Economic Review 1979 69(1), pp. 117-125 [8]
Jump up ^ A. W. Weiss: Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages, in: Journal of Political Economy 88(3),1980, pp. 526-538 [9]
Jump up ^ E. Schlicht: Hiring Standards And Labour Market Clearing, Metroeconomica 56(2), 2005, pp.263-279 [10]
Jump up ^ McDonald, Ian M.; Solow, Robert M (December 1981). "Wage Bargaining and Employment" (PDF). American Economic Review. 71 (5): 896–908. Retrieved 25 March 2013.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Mankiw. N. Gregory (Editor); Romer, David (Editor). (April 24, 1991) New Keynesian Economics, Vol. 2: Coordination Failures and Real Rigidities. Page 161. Publisher: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-63134-2
^ Jump up to: a b c Notes on Walmart and Wages (Wonkish) P. Krugman, The New York Times, The Conscience of a Liberal, 10 June 2015
References[edit]
George Akerlof and Janet Yellen (1986), 'Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (ISBN 0-521-31284-1)
Akerlof, George A. (1982), "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, p543-69
Akerlof and Yellen (1990), "The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (2), (May 1990), p255-283
Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe (1995): "Trust, Reciprocity and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), p122-42
Dawes, Robyn M. and Thaler, Richard H. (1988), "Anomalies: Cooperation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1988, 2, 187-98
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000), "Reciprocity and wage undercutting," European Economic Review 44, (2000), p1069-1078
Fehr, Gächter, Kirchsteiger (1996), "Reciprocal Fairness and Noncompensating Wage Differentials", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152 (4), (Dec 1996), p608-40
Fehr, Gächter, Kirchsteiger (1997), "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device", Econometrica, 65 (4) (July 1997), p833-60
Fehr and Schmidt (2000), "Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices," European Economic Review 44, (2000), p1057-1068
Gintis H.(1976):"The nature of labor exchange and the theory of capitalist production", Review of Radical Political Economics, 8 (2), p36–54.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, 76 (4), Sep 1986, p728-741
Krueger and Summers (1988), "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-Industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, 56 (2), Mar 1988, p259-293
Leonard, Jonathan S.(1987), "Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision, and Turnover", Journal of Labor Economics, 5 (4), pS136-S152
Leventhal, Gerald and Anderson, David (1970), "Self-Interest and the Maintenance of Equity," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, May 1970, 15, 57-62
Raff, D., and Summers, L. (1987), "Did Henry Ford pay efficiency wages?", Journal of Labor Economics, Oct 1987
Rabin, Matthew (1993), "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics", American Economic Review, 83 (5), p1281-1302
Salop, Steven C. (1979), "A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment," American Economic Review, March 1979, 69, p117-25
Schlicht, Ekkehart (1978), "Labour Turnover, Wage Structure, and Natural Unemployment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft), 134(2), p337-364.[11]
Shapiro, C. and Stiglitz, J. (1984), "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device," American Economic Review, June 1984
Stiglitz, J. (1987), "Causes and consequences of dependence of quantity upon price," Journal of Economic Literature, March 1987
Thaler, Richard H. (1988), "Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1988, 2, 195-207
Weisbrod, Burton A. (1988), The Nonprofit Economy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988
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values: \frac{dP}{dw} = \frac{\partial V}{\partial E} \frac{d E}{d w} - L  \; .

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values: {\displaystyle 0\leq {\frac {dP}{dw}}\;.}

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