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List of U.S. states and territories by elevation
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State high points are shown as red circles. Low points are shown with green squares, except in states whose lowest elevation spans coastlines or lake shores (the Great Lakes or Lake Champlain).
The elevation of U.S. states and territories may be described in several ways. These include:
the elevation of their highest point;
the elevation of their lowest point
and the difference between (range of) their highest points and lowest points.
The following list is a comparison of elevation absolutes in the United States. Data include interval measures of highest and lowest elevation for all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories.[1]
Which state or territory is "highest" and "lowest" is determined by the definition of "high" and "low". For instance, Alaska could be regarded as the highest state because Denali, at 20,310 feet (6,190.5 m), is the highest point in the United States. However, Colorado, with the highest mean elevation of any state as well as the highest low point, could also be considered a candidate for "highest state". Determining which state is "lowest" is equally problematic. California contains the Badwater Basin in Death Valley, at 279 feet (85 m) below sea level, the lowest point in the United States;[2] while Florida has the lowest high point, and Delaware has the lowest mean elevation. Florida is also the flattest state, with the smallest difference between its highest and lowest points.
The list of highest points in each state is important to the sport of highpointing, where enthusiasts attempt to visit the highest point in each of the contiguous 48 states, or in all 50 states, or in all 50 states plus the District of Columbia and the territories.[3] As of 2006, 155 people had reached all fifty state highpoints.[4] Roughly 200–300 people attend the Highpointers Club convention each year.[5]
All elevations in the table below have been adjusted to the North American Vertical Datum of 1988.[6] The mean elevation for each state is accurate to the nearest 100 ft (30 m).
Contents
1 Elevation table
2 Gallery
3 Additional highest U.S. areas
4 See also
5 References
6 External links
Elevation table[edit]
Elevations of the 50 United States, the District of Columbia, and territories[1][7][8]

State / Territory / District
Highest point
Highest elevation
Rank (High point)
Lowest point
Lowest elevation
Mean elevation
Elevation span
Alabama Cheaha Mountain[9] 2,413 ft
736 m 38 Gulf of Mexico sea level 500 ft
150 m 2,413 ft
736 m
Alaska Denali[10] 20,310 ft
6190.5 m 1 Gulf of Alaska, Bering Sea, and Arctic Ocean sea level 1,900 ft
580 m 20,310 ft
6190.5 m
American Samoa Lata Mountain on Ta‘ū island[11] 3,163 ft
964 m 36 Pacific Ocean sea level NA 3,163 ft
964 m
Arizona Humphreys Peak[12] 12,637 ft
3852 m 12 Colorado River at Sonora border, San Luis, Arizona 72 ft
22 m 4,100 ft
1250 m 12,565 ft
3830 m
Arkansas Mount Magazine[13] 2,753 ft
839 m 37 Ouachita River at Louisiana border 55 ft
17 m 650 ft
200 m 2,698 ft
822 m
California Mount Whitney[14][15] 14,505 ft
4421.0 m 2 Badwater Basin in Death Valley[1][2][16] 2998150000000000000♠−279 ft
−85 m 2,900 ft
880 m 14,783 ft
4506 m
Colorado Mount Elbert[17][18] 14,440 ft
4401.2 m 3 Arikaree River at Kansas border[19][20] 3,317 ft
1011 m 6,800 ft
2070 m 11,123 ft
3390 m
Connecticut Massachusetts border on south side of Mount Frissell[21] 2,379 ft
725 m 39 Long Island Sound sea level 500 ft
150 m 2,379 ft
725 m
Delaware Near the Ebright Azimuth[22][23] 447 ft
136 m 54 Atlantic Ocean sea level 60 ft
20 m 447 ft
136 m
District of Columbia Fort Reno[24] 409 ft
125 m 55 Potomac River at eastern Maryland border 1.0 ft
0.3 m 150 ft
50 m 408 ft
124 m
Florida Britton Hill 345 ft
105 m 56 Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico sea level 100 ft
30 m 345 ft
105 m
Georgia Brasstown Bald 4,784 ft
1458 m 25 Atlantic Ocean sea level 600 ft
180 m 4,784 ft
1458 m
Guam Mount Lamlam 1,332 ft
406 m[25] 48 Pacific Ocean sea level NA 1,332 ft
406 m
Hawaii Mauna Kea[26][27] on the Island of Hawai'i 13,803 ft
4207 m 6 Pacific Ocean sea level 3,030 ft
920 m 13,803 ft
4207 m
Idaho Borah Peak[28] 12,668 ft
3861 m 11 Confluence of Snake River and Clearwater River 713 ft
217 m 5,000 ft
1520 m 11,954 ft
3644 m
Illinois Charles Mound[29] 1,235 ft
376 m 50 Confluence of Mississippi River and Ohio River 280 ft
85 m 600 ft
180 m 955 ft
291 m
Indiana Hoosier Hill 1,257 ft
383 m 49 Confluence of Wabash River and Ohio River 320 ft
97 m 700 ft
210 m 937 ft
286 m
Iowa Hawkeye Point 1,671 ft
509 m 45 Confluence of Mississippi River and Des Moines River 480 ft
146 m 1,100 ft
340 m 1,191 ft
363 m
Kansas Mount Sunflower 4,041 ft
1232 m 29 Verdigris River at Oklahoma border 679 ft
207 m 2,000 ft
610 m 3,361 ft
1025 m
Kentucky Black Mountain 4,145 ft
1263 m 28 Mississippi River at Kentucky Bend 257 ft
78 m 750 ft
230 m 3,887 ft
1185 m
Louisiana Driskill Mountain 535 ft
163 m 53 New Orleans 2999760000000000000♠−8 ft
−2.4 m 100 ft
30 m 543 ft
165 m
Maine Mount Katahdin[30] 5,270 ft
1606.4 m 22 Atlantic Ocean sea level 600 ft
180 m 5,270 ft
1606.4 m
Maryland Hoye-Crest 3,360 ft
1024 m 33 Atlantic Ocean sea level 350 ft
110 m 3,360 ft
1024 m
Massachusetts Mount Greylock[31] 3,489 ft
1063 m 32 Atlantic Ocean sea level 500 ft
150 m 3,489 ft
1063 m
Michigan Mount Arvon 1,979 ft
603 m 41 Lake Erie 571 ft
174 m 900 ft
270 m 1,408 ft
429 m
Minnesota Eagle Mountain 2,302 ft
701 m 40 Lake Superior 601 ft
183 m 1,200 ft
370 m 1,700 ft
518 m
Mississippi Woodall Mountain[32] 807 ft
246 m 52 Gulf of Mexico sea level 300 ft
90 m 807 ft
246 m
Missouri Taum Sauk Mountain 1,772 ft
540 m 44 Saint Francis River at southern Arkansas border 230 ft
70 m 800 ft
240 m 1,542 ft
470 m
Montana Granite Peak[33] 12,807 ft
3903.5 m 10 Kootenai River at Idaho border 1,804 ft
550 m 3,400 ft
1040 m 11,003 ft
3354 m
Nebraska Panorama Point 5,427 ft
1654 m 20 Missouri River at Kansas border 840 ft
256 m 2,600 ft
790 m 4,587 ft
1398 m
Nevada Boundary Peak[34] 13,147 ft
4007 m 9 Colorado River at California border 481 ft
147 m 5,500 ft
1680 m 12,665 ft
3860 m
New Hampshire Mount Washington[35][36] 6,288 ft
1917 m 18 Atlantic Ocean sea level 1,000 ft
300 m 6,288 ft
1917 m
New Jersey High Point 1,803 ft
550 m 43 Atlantic Ocean sea level 250 ft
80 m 1,803 ft
550 m
New Mexico Wheeler Peak[37] 13,167 ft
4013.3 m 8 Red Bluff Reservoir on Texas border 2,844 ft
867 m 5,700 ft
1740 m 10,323 ft
3147 m
New York Mount Marcy[38] 5,343 ft
1628.57 m 21 Atlantic Ocean sea level 1,000 ft
300 m 5,343 ft
1628.57 m
North Carolina Mount Mitchell[39] 6,684 ft
2037 m 16 Atlantic Ocean sea level 700 ft
210 m 6,684 ft
2037 m
North Dakota White Butte 3,508 ft
1069 m 31 Red River of the North at Manitoba border 751 ft
229 m 1,900 ft
580 m 2,757 ft
840 m
Northern Mariana Islands Unnamed point on Agrihan island 3,166 ft
965 m[40] 35 Pacific Ocean sea level NA 3,166 ft
965 m
Ohio Campbell Hill 1,549 ft
472 m 47 Ohio River at Indiana border 455 ft
139 m 850 ft
260 m 1,094 ft
333 m
Oklahoma Black Mesa 4,975 ft
1516 m 23 Little River at Arkansas border 289 ft
88 m 1,300 ft
400 m 4,686 ft
1428 m
Oregon Mount Hood[41] 11,249 ft
3428.8 m 13 Pacific Ocean sea level 3,300 ft
1010 m 11,249 ft
3428.8 m
Pennsylvania Mount Davis 3,213 ft
979 m 34 Delaware River at Delaware border sea level 1,100 ft
340 m 3,213 ft
979 m
Puerto Rico Cerro de Punta 4,390 ft
1338 m[42] 27 Atlantic Ocean (Caribbean sea) sea level 856 ft
261 m 4,390 ft
1338 m
Rhode Island Jerimoth Hill 811 ft
247 m 51 Atlantic Ocean sea level 200 ft
60 m 811 ft
247 m
South Carolina Sassafras Mountain 3,560 ft
1085 m 30 Atlantic Ocean sea level 350 ft
110 m 3,560 ft
1085 m
South Dakota Black Elk Peak[43] 7,244 ft
2208 m 15 Big Stone Lake on Minnesota border 968 ft
295 m 2,200 ft
670 m 6,276 ft
1913 m
Tennessee Clingmans Dome 6,643 ft
2025 m 17 Mississippi River at Mississippi border 178 ft
54 m 900 ft
270 m 6,466 ft
1971 m
Texas Guadalupe Peak[44] 8,751 ft
2667 m 14 Gulf of Mexico sea level 1,700 ft
520 m 8,751 ft
2667 m
United States Minor Outlying Islands Unnamed point on Navassa Island 279 ft
85 m[45] 57 Pacific Ocean (8 islands) and Caribbean Sea (Navassa Island) sea level NA 279 ft
85 m
Utah Kings Peak[46] 13,534 ft
4125 m 7 Beaver Dam Wash at Arizona border 2,180 ft
664 m 6,100 ft
1860 m 11,354 ft
3461 m
Vermont Mount Mansfield[47] 4,395 ft
1340 m 26 Lake Champlain 95 ft
29 m 1,000 ft
300 m 4,300 ft
1311 m
Virgin Islands (U.S.) Crown Mountain on the island of Saint Thomas 1,555 ft
474 m[48] 46 Atlantic Ocean (Caribbean Sea) sea level NA 1,555 ft
474 m
Virginia Mount Rogers 5,729 ft
1746 m 19 Atlantic Ocean sea level 950 ft
290 m 5,729 ft
1746 m
Washington Mount Rainier[49] 14,417 ft
4394 m 4 Pacific Ocean sea level 1,700 ft
520 m 14,417 ft
4394 m
West Virginia Spruce Knob[50] 4,863 ft
1482.1 m 24 Potomac River at Virginia border 240 ft
73 m 1,500 ft
460 m 4,623 ft
1409 m
Wisconsin Timms Hill 1,951 ft
595 m 42 Lake Michigan 579 ft
176 m 1,050 ft
320 m 1,372 ft
418 m
Wyoming Gannett Peak[51] 13,809 ft
4209.1 m 5 Belle Fourche River at South Dakota border 3,101 ft
945 m 6,700 ft
2040 m 10,709 ft
3264 m
United States Denali,[10] Alaska 20,310 ft
6190.5 m Badwater Basin,[16] California 2998150000000000000♠−279 ft
−85 m 2,500 ft
760 m 20,589 ft
6275.5 m
Gallery[edit]
Denali is the highest summit of the State of Alaska, the United States, and all of North America.
Mount Whitney is the highest summit of the Sierra Nevada, the State of California, and the "Lower 48" contiguous United States.
Mount Elbert is the highest summit of the Rocky Mountains and the State of Colorado.
Mount Rainier is the highest summit of the Cascade Range and the State of Washington
Gannett Peak is the highest summit of the Wind River Range and the State of Wyoming.
Mauna Kea is the highest summit of the State of Hawaiʻi and the entire Pacific Ocean.
Kings Peak is the highest summit of the Uinta Range and the State of Utah.
Wheeler Peak in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains is the highest summit of the State of New Mexico.
Granite Peak is the highest summit of the Beartooth Range and the State of Montana.
Borah Peak is the highest summit of the Lost River Range and the State of Idaho.
Black Elk Peak is the highest summit of the Black Hills and the State of South Dakota.
Mount Mitchell is the highest summit of the Appalachian Mountains and the State of North Carolina.
Mount Washington is the highest summit of the White Mountains and the State of New Hampshire.
Mount Katahdin is the highest summit of the State of Maine
Lake Michigan is the lowest area of the State of Wisconsin.
Britton Hill in the State of Florida is the lowest state high point in the United States.
Lake Champlain is the lowest area of the State of Vermont.
The Badwater Basin in Death Valley is the lowest area of the State of California, the United States, and all of North America.
Cerro de Punta, the highest point in Puerto Rico, seen from Ponce (highest point in U.S. outside the 50 states)
Agrihan is the highest point in the Northern Mariana Islands
Additional highest U.S. areas[edit]
Highest points in the U.S. Minor Outlying Islands, all unnamed:[52]
Baker Island – 8 m (26.2 ft)
Howland Island – 3 m (9.8 ft)
Jarvis Island – 7 m (23 ft)
Johnston Atoll (Sand Island) – 10 m (32.8 ft)
Kingman Reef – less than 2 m (less than 6.5 ft)
Midway Atoll – 13 m (42.6 ft) (Highest point of the U.S. Minor Outlying Islands in the Pacific Ocean)
Navassa Island – 85 m (278.5 ft)[45] (Highest point of the U.S. Minor Outlying Islands)
Palmyra Atoll – 3 m (9.8 ft)
Wake Island – 8 m (26.2 ft)[53]
See also[edit]
An enlargeable topographic map of the contiguous United States with hypsometric tints
List of elevation extremes by country
List of elevation extremes by region
United States
U.S. state
Lists of U.S. states
Lists of highest points for other highpoint lists
List of mountain peaks of the United States
List of the highest major summits of the United States
List of the most prominent summits of the United States
List of the most isolated major summits of the United States
List of highest United States cities by state
World Geodetic System
National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929
North American Vertical Datum of 1988
References[edit]
^ Jump up to: a b c "Elevations and Distances in the United States". Reston, Virginia: USGS. April 29, 2005. Archived from the original on November 20, 2010. Retrieved October 24, 2011. Originally published in 1995.
^ Jump up to: a b "USGS National Elevation Dataset (NED) 1 meter Downloadable Data Collection from The National Map 3D Elevation Program (3DEP) - National Geospatial Data Asset (NGDA) National Elevation Data Set (NED)". United States Geological Survey. September 21, 2015. Retrieved September 22, 2015.
Jump up ^ Holmes, Don W. (2000). Highpoints of the United States: A Guide to the Fifty State Summits. University of Utah Press. ISBN 0-87480-645-3.
Jump up ^ Regenold, Stephen (June 10, 2006). "Seeing the highpoints of every state". Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. Associated Press. Retrieved December 4, 2008.
Jump up ^ "Highpointers Club Frequently Asked Questions". highpointers.org. Archived from the original on July 22, 2007. Retrieved December 4, 2008.
Jump up ^ "What is a geodetic datum?". Frequently Asked Questions about the National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 19, 2011.
Jump up ^ "U.S. State Highpoints". summitpost.org. Retrieved November 28, 2008.
Jump up ^ "U.S. State High Points". peakbagger.com. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ "Cheehahaw". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
^ Jump up to: a b The summit of Denali is the highest point in North America and the United States of America. The summit of Denali is the third-most prominent summit and the third-most isolated summit on Earth after Mount Everest and Aconcagua.
Jump up ^ hahttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aq.html
Jump up ^ "Frisco". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ "Mag". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ "Whitney". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 21, 2015.
Jump up ^ The summit of Mount Whitney is the highest point in the contiguous United States.
^ Jump up to: a b The Badwater Basin in Death Valley is the lowest point in North America and the United States of America.
Jump up ^ "Mount Elbert". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 21, 2015.
Jump up ^ The summit of Mount Elbert is the highest point of the Rocky Mountains of North America.
Jump up ^ The Arikaree River at the point where it exits the State of Colorado is the highest state low point of the 50 United States.
Jump up ^ Dale Sanderson. "Arikaree River - Lowest Point in Colorado". Archived from the original on March 28, 2012. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ The highest point in the State of Connecticut is the only U.S. state high point that is not a topographic summit.
Jump up ^ "Highest Point in Delaware". Delaware Geological Survey. Archived from the original on October 5, 2011. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ "Regarding the highest point in Delaware". Delaware Repeater Association. Archived from the original on 2011-07-26. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ Dvorak, Petula. "D.C.'s Puny Peak Enough to Pump Up 'Highpointers'". The Washington Post. The Washington Post. Retrieved 1 January 2015.
Jump up ^ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gnq.html[permanent dead link]
Jump up ^ "Summit USGS 1977". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ The summit of Mauna Kea is the highest point in Oceania. Mauna Kea is also the tallest mountain on Earth as measured from base to summit. The shield volcano sits on the floor of the Pacific Ocean at a depth of 5,998 meters (19,678 ft) for a total height of 10,205.3 meters (33,482 ft)
Jump up ^ "Beauty Reset". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ "Charles". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ "Katahdin 2". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 21, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Greylock RM 1 Reset". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey.
Jump up ^ "Knob Reset". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey.
Jump up ^ "Granite Peak". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 21, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Boundary". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ "Mt Wash". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ The summit of Mount Washington is the highest point on the northeastern Northern American Continent.
Jump up ^ "Wheeler". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 21, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Marcy". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 21, 2015.
Jump up ^ The summit of Mount Mitchell is the highest point on the eastern Northern American Continent.
Jump up ^ "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
Jump up ^ "Mount Hood Highest Point". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 21, 2015.
Jump up ^ "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
Jump up ^ "Black Elk Peak". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved August 13, 2016.
Jump up ^ "El Capitan". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
^ Jump up to: a b "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
Jump up ^ "Kings Peak, Utah". Peakbagger.com. Retrieved 2009-12-27.
Jump up ^ "Mt Mansfield Highest Point". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 20, 2011.
Jump up ^ "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
Jump up ^ The summit of Mount Rainier is the most prominent point in the contiguous United States.
Jump up ^ "Spruce Knob Cairn 1956". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 21, 2015.
Jump up ^ "Gannett Peak Cairn". NGS data sheet. U.S. National Geodetic Survey. Retrieved October 21, 2015.
Jump up ^ "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
Jump up ^ "The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency". www.cia.gov. Retrieved 30 March 2018.
External links[edit]
United States National Geodetic Survey website
United States Geological Survey website
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Gettier problem
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The Gettier problem, in the field of epistemology, is a landmark philosophical problem with our understanding of knowledge. Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier, Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases") challenged the long-held justified true belief (or JTB) account of knowledge. On the JTB account, knowledge is equivalent to justified true belief, and if all three conditions (justification, truth, and belief) are met of a given claim, then we have knowledge of that proposition. In his three-page 1963 paper, titled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", Gettier showed, by means of two counterexamples, that there were cases where individuals had justified true belief of a claim, but still failed to know it. Thus, Gettier claimed to have shown that the JTB account was inadequate—it could not account for all of knowledge. The JTB account was first credited to Plato, though Plato argued against this very account of knowledge in the Theaetetus (210a).
The term "Gettier problem", or "Gettier case", or even the adjective "Gettiered", is sometimes used to describe any case in epistemology that purports to repudiate the JTB account.
Responses to Gettier's paper have been numerous. Some rejected Gettier's examples, while others sought to adjust the JTB account to blunt the force of counterexamples. Gettier problems have even found their way into experiments, where the intuitive responses of people of varying demographics to Gettier cases have been studied.
Contents
[hide]
1 History
2 Knowledge as justified true belief (JTB)
3 Gettier's two original counterexamples
3.1 Case I
3.2 Case II
4 False premises
5 More general Gettier-style problems
6 Responses to Gettier
6.1 Fourth condition (JTB+G) approaches
6.1.1 Goldman's causal theory
6.1.2 Lehrer–Paxson's defeasibility condition
6.1.3 Pragmatism
6.2 Revisions of JTB approaches
6.2.1 Fred Dretske's conclusive reasons and Robert Nozick's truth-tracking
6.2.2 Richard Kirkham's skepticism
6.3 Attempts to dissolve the problem
6.4 Experimental research
7 Notes
8 References
9 External links
History[edit]
The question of what constitutes "knowledge" is as old as philosophy itself. Its earliest instances are found in Plato's dialogues, notably Meno (97a–98b) and Theaetetus. Gettier himself was not even the first to raise the problem named after him; its existence is known to have been acknowledged by both Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russell. The latter discussed it in his book Human knowledge: Its scope and limits.
Russell's case, called the stopped clock case, goes as follows:[1] Alice sees a clock that reads two o'clock, and believes that the time is two o'clock. It is in fact two o'clock. There's a problem, however: unknown to Alice, the clock she's looking at stopped twelve hours ago. Alice thus has an accidentally true, justified belief. Russell provides an answer of his own to the problem. Edmund Gettier's formulation of the problem was important as it coincided with the rise of the sort of philosophical naturalism promoted by W.V.O. Quine and others, and was used as a justification for a shift towards externalist theories of justification.[2] John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz have stated that the Gettier problem has "fundamentally altered the character of contemporary epistemology" and has become "a central problem of epistemology since it poses a clear barrier to analyzing knowledge".[3]
Alvin Plantinga rejects the historical analysis:
According to the inherited lore of the epistemological tribe, the JTB [justified true belief] account enjoyed the status of epistemological orthodoxy until 1963, when it was shattered by Edmund Gettier... Of course there is an interesting historical irony here: it isn't easy to find many really explicit statements of a JTB analysis of knowledge prior to Gettier. It is almost as if a distinguished critic created a tradition in the very act of destroying it.[4]
Despite this, Plantinga does accept that some philosophers before Gettier have advanced a JTB account of knowledge, specifically C. I. Lewis and A. J. Ayer.[4]
Knowledge as justified true belief (JTB)[edit]
The JTB account of knowledge is the claim that knowledge can be conceptually analyzed as justified true belief, which is to say that the meaning of sentences such as "Smith knows that it rained today" can be given with the following set of conditions, which are necessary and sufficient for knowledge to obtain:
A subject S knows that a proposition P is true if and only if:
P is true, and
S believes that P is true, and
S is justified in believing that P is true
This account of knowledge is what Gettier subjected to criticism.
Gettier's two original counterexamples[edit]
Gettier's paper used counterexamples (see also thought experiment) to argue that there are cases of beliefs that are both true and justified—therefore satisfying all three conditions for knowledge on the JTB account—but that do not appear to be genuine cases of knowledge. Gettier, therefore, argued that his counterexamples show that the JTB account of knowledge is false, and thus that a different conceptual analysis is needed to correctly track what we mean by "knowledge".
Gettier's case is based on two counterexamples to the JTB analysis. Both of them rely on the established claim (under JTB) that justification is preserved by entailment, and the further claim that such applies significantly, or can be applied there coherently to the "stipulation" attributed to Smith's putative "belief" in the case of this particular counter-example: that is, that if Smith is justified in believing P, and Smith realizes that the truth of P entails the truth of Q, then Smith would also be justified in believing Q. Gettier calls these counterexamples "Case I" and "Case II":
Case I[edit]
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.
But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.[citation needed]
Case II[edit]
Smith, it is claimed by the hidden interlocutor, has a justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of disjunction introduction) that "Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona", even though Smith has no knowledge whatsoever about the location of Brown.
In fact, Jones does not own a Ford, but by sheer coincidence, Brown really is in Barcelona. Again, Smith had a belief that was true and justified, but not knowledge.
False premises[edit]
In both of Gettier's actual examples (see also counterfactual conditional), the justified true belief came about, if Smith's purported claims are disputable, as the result of entailment (but see also material conditional) from justified false beliefs that "Jones will get the job" (in case I), and that "Jones owns a Ford" (in case II). This led some early responses to Gettier to conclude that the definition of knowledge could be easily adjusted, so that knowledge was justified true belief that does not depend on false premises.
More general Gettier-style problems[edit]
In a 1966 scenario known as "The sheep in the field", Roderick Chisholm asks us to imagine that someone is standing outside a field looking at something that looks like a sheep (although in fact it is a dog disguised as a sheep). They believe there is a sheep in the field, and in fact they are right because there is a sheep behind the hill in the middle of the field. Hence, they have a justified true belief that there is a sheep in the field. But is that belief knowledge? A similar problem which seeks to be more plausible called the "Cow in the Field" appears in Martin Cohen's book 101 Philosophy Problems, where it is supposed that a farmer checking up on his favourite cow confuses a piece of black and white paper caught up in a distant bush for his cow. However, since the animal actually is in the field, but hidden in a hollow, again, the farmer has a justified, true belief which seems nonetheless not to qualify as "knowledge".
Another scenario by Brian Skyrms is "The Pyromaniac",[5] in which a struck match lights not for the reasons the pyromaniac imagines but because of some unknown "Q radiation".
A different perspective on the issue is given by Alvin Goldman in the "fake barns" scenario (crediting Carl Ginet with the example).[6] In this one, a man is driving in the countryside, and sees what looks exactly like a barn. Accordingly, he thinks that he is seeing a barn. In fact, that is what he is doing. But what he does not know is that the neighborhood generally consists of many fake barns — barn facades designed to look exactly like real barns when viewed from the road, as in the case of a visit in the countryside by Catherine II of Russia, just to please her. Since if he had been looking at one of them, he would have been unable to tell the difference, his "knowledge" that he was looking at a barn would seem to be poorly founded. A similar process appears in Robert A. Heinlein's Stranger in a Strange Land as an example of Fair Witness behavior.
The "no false premises" (or "no false lemmas") solution which was proposed early in the discussion proved to be somewhat problematic, as more general Gettier-style problems were then constructed or contrived in which the justified true belief does not seem to be the result of a chain of reasoning from a justified false belief.
For example:
After arranging to meet with Mark for help with homework, Luke arrives at the appointed time and place. Walking into Mark's office Luke clearly sees Mark at his desk; Luke immediately forms the belief "Mark is in the room. He can help me with my logic homework". Luke is justified in his belief; he clearly sees Mark at his desk. In fact, it's not Mark that Luke saw; it was a marvelous hologram, perfect in every respect, giving the appearance of Mark diligently grading papers at his desk. Nevertheless, Mark is in the room; he is crouched under his desk reading Frege. Luke's belief that Mark is in the room is true (he is in the room, under his desk) and justified (Mark's hologram is giving the appearance of Mark hard at work).
Again, it seems as though Luke does not "know" that Mark is in the room, even though it is claimed he has a justified true belief that Mark is in the room, but it is not nearly so clear that the perceptual belief that "Mark is in the room" was inferred from any premises at all, let alone any false ones, nor led to significant conclusions on its own; Luke did not seem to be reasoning about anything; "Mark is in the room" seems to have been part of what he seemed to see.
To save the "no false lemmas" solution, one must logically say that Luke's inference from sensory data does not count as a justified belief unless he consciously or unconsciously considers the possibilities of deception and self-deception. A justified version of Luke's thought process, by that logic, might go like this:
That looks to me like Mark in the room.
No factor, right now, could deceive me on this point.
Therefore, I can safely ignore that possibility.
"Mark is in the room" (or, "I can safely treat that as Mark").
The second line counts as a false premise. However, by the previous argument, this suggests we have fewer justified beliefs than we think we do.
Responses to Gettier[edit]
The Gettier problem is formally a problem in first-order logic, but the introduction by Gettier of terms such as believes and knows moves the discussion into the field of epistemology. Here, the sound (true) arguments ascribed to Smith then need also to be valid (believed) and convincing (justified) if they are to issue in real-world discussion about justified true belief. [7]
Responses to Gettier problems have fallen into one of three categories:
Affirmations of the JTB account: This response affirms the JTB account of knowledge, but rejects Gettier cases. Typically, the proponent of this response rejects Gettier cases because, they say, Gettier cases involve insufficient levels of justification. Knowledge actually requires higher levels of justification than Gettier cases involve.
Fourth condition responses: This response accepts the problem raised by Gettier cases, and affirms that JTB is necessary (but not sufficient) for knowledge. A proper account of knowledge, according to this type of view, will contain some fourth condition (JTB + ?). With the fourth condition in place, Gettier counterexamples (and other similar counterexamples) will not work, and we will have an adequate set of criteria that are both necessary and sufficient for knowledge.
Justification replacement response: This response also accepts the problem raised by Gettier cases. However, instead of invoking a fourth condition, it seeks to replace Justification itself for some other third condition (?TB) that will make counterexamples obsolete.
One response, therefore, is that in none of the above cases was the belief justified because it is impossible to justify anything that is not true. Conversely, the fact that a proposition turns out to be untrue is proof that it was not sufficiently justified in the first place. Under this interpretation the JTB definition of knowledge survives. This shifts the problem to a definition of justification, rather than knowledge. Another view is that justification and non-justification are not in binary opposition. Instead, justification is a matter of degree, with an idea being more or less justified. This account of justification is supported by mainstream philosophers such as Paul Boghossian [8] [1] and Stephen Hicks[2][3]. In common sense usage, an idea can not only be more justified or less justified, but it can also partially justified (Smith's boss told him X) and partially unjustified (Smith's boss is a liar). Gettier's cases involve propositions that were true, believed, but which had weak justification. In case 1, the premise that the testimony of Smith's boss is "strong evidence" is rejected. The case itself depends on the boss being either wrong or deceitful (Jones did not get the job) and therefore unreliable. In case 2, Smith again has accepted a questionable idea (Jones owns a Ford) with unspecified justification. Without justification, both cases do not undermine the JTB account of knowledge.
Other epistemologists accept Gettier's conclusion. Their responses to the Gettier problem, therefore, consist of trying to find alternative analyses of knowledge. They have struggled to discover and agree upon as a beginning any single notion of truth, or belief, or justifying which is wholly and obviously accepted. Truth, belief, and justifying have not yet been satisfactorily defined[citation needed], so that JTB (justified true belief) may be defined satisfactorily is still problematical, on account or otherwise of Gettier's examples. Gettier, for many years a professor at University of Massachusetts Amherst later also was interested in the epistemic logic of Hintikka, a Finnish philosopher at Boston University, who published Knowledge and Belief in 1962. [4]
Fourth condition (JTB+G) approaches[edit]
The most common direction for this sort of response to take is what might be called a "JTB+G" analysis: that is, an analysis based on finding some fourth condition—a "no-Gettier-problem" condition—which, when added to the conditions of justification, truth, and belief, will yield a set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions.
Goldman's causal theory[edit]
One such response is that of Alvin Goldman (1967), who suggested the addition of a causal condition: a subject's belief is justified, for Goldman, only if the truth of a belief has caused the subject to have that belief (in the appropriate way); and for a justified true belief to count as knowledge, the subject must also be able to "correctly reconstruct" (mentally) that causal chain. Goldman's analysis would rule out Gettier cases in that Smith's beliefs are not caused by the truths of those beliefs; it is merely accidental that Smith's beliefs in the Gettier cases happen to be true, or that the prediction made by Smith: " The winner of the job will have 10 coins", on the basis of his putative belief, (see also bundling) came true in this one case. This theory is challenged by the difficulty of giving a principled explanation of how an appropriate causal relationship differs from an inappropriate one (without the circular response of saying that the appropriate sort of causal relationship is the knowledge-producing one); or retreating to a position in which justified true belief is weakly defined as the consensus of learned opinion. The latter would be useful, but not as useful nor desirable as the unchanging definitions of scientific concepts such as momentum. Thus, adopting a causal response to the Gettier problem usually requires one to adopt (as Goldman gladly does) some form of reliabilism about justification. See Goldmans Theory of justification.
Lehrer–Paxson's defeasibility condition[edit]
Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson (1969) proposed another response, by adding a defeasibility condition to the JTB analysis. On their account, knowledge is undefeated justified true belief — which is to say that a justified true belief counts as knowledge if and only if it is also the case that there is no further truth that, had the subject known it, would have defeated her present justification for the belief. (Thus, for example, Smith's justification for believing that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is his justified belief that Jones will get the job, combined with his justified belief that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. But if Smith had known the truth that Jones will not get the job, that would have defeated the justification for his belief.) However, many critics (such as Marshall Swain [1974]) have argued that the notion of a defeater fact cannot be made precise enough to rule out the Gettier cases without also ruling out a priori cases of knowledge[citation needed].
Pragmatism[edit]
Pragmatism was developed as a philosophical doctrine by C.S.Peirce and William James (1842–1910). In Peirce's view, truth is nominally defined as a sign's correspondence to its object, and pragmatically defined as the ideal final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead sooner or later. James' epistemological model of truth was that which works in the way of belief, and a belief was true if in the long run it worked for all of us, and guided us expeditiously through our semihospitable world. Peirce argued that metaphysics could be cleaned up by a pragmatic approach.
Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.[9]
From a pragmatic viewpoint of the kind often ascribed to James, defining on a particular occasion whether a particular belief can rightly be said to be both true and justified is seen as no more than an exercise in pedantry, but being able to discern whether that belief led to fruitful outcomes is a fruitful enterprise. Peirce emphasized fallibilism, considered the assertion of absolute certainty a barrier to inquiry,[10] and in 1901 defined truth as follows: "Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth."[11] In other words, any unqualified assertion is likely to be at least a little wrong or, if right, still right for not entirely the right reasons. Therefore one is more veracious by being Socratic, including a recognition of one's own ignorance and knowing one may be proved wrong. This is the case, even though in practical matters one sometimes must act, if one is to act at all, with decision and complete confidence.[12]
Revisions of JTB approaches[edit]
The difficulties involved in producing a viable fourth condition have led to claims that attempting to repair the JTB account is a deficient strategy. For example, one might argue that what the Gettier problem shows is not the need for a fourth independent condition in addition to the original three, but rather that the attempt to build up an account of knowledging by conjoining a set of independent conditions was misguided from the outset. Those who have adopted this approach generally argue that epistemological terms like justification, evidence, certainty, etc. should be analyzed in terms of a primitive notion of knowledge, rather than vice versa. Knowledge is understood as factive, that is, as embodying a sort of epistemological "tie" between a truth and a belief. The JTB account is then criticized for trying to get and encapsulate the factivity of knowledge "on the cheap," as it were, or via a circular argument, by replacing an irreducible notion of factivity with the conjunction of some of the properties that accompany it (in particular, truth and justification). Of course, the introduction of irreducible primitives into a philosophical theory is always problematical (some would say a sign of desperation), and such anti-reductionist accounts are unlikely to please those who have other reasons to hold fast to the method behind JTB+G accounts.
Fred Dretske's conclusive reasons and Robert Nozick's truth-tracking[edit]
Fred Dretske (1971) developed an account of knowledge which he called "conclusive reasons", revived by Robert Nozick as what he called the subjunctive or truth-tracking account (1981). Nozick's formulation posits that proposition P is an instance of knowledge when:
p is true
S believes that p
if p were true, S would believe that p
if p weren't true, S wouldn't believe that p
Nozick's definition is intended to preserve Goldman's intuition that Gettier cases should be ruled out by disacknowledging "accidentally" true justified beliefs, but without risking the potentially onerous consequences of building a causal requirement into the analysis. This tactic though, invites the riposte that Nozick's account merely hides the problem and does not solve it, for it leaves open the question of why Smith would not have had his belief if it had been false. The most promising answer seems to be that it is because Smith's belief was caused by the truth of what he believes; but that puts us back in the causalist camp.
Criticisms and counter examples (notably the Grandma case) prompted a revision, which resulted in the alteration of (3) and (4) to limit themselves to the same method (i.e. vision):
p is true
S believes that p
if p were true, S (using M) would believe that p
if p weren't true, S (using method M) wouldn't believe that p
Saul Kripke has pointed out that this view remains problematic and uses a counterexample called the Fake Barn Country example, which describes a certain locality containing a number of fake barns or facades of barns. In the midst of these fake barns is one real barn, which is painted red. There is one more piece of crucial information for this example: the fake barns cannot be painted red.
Jones is driving along the highway, looks up and happens to see the real barn, and so forms the belief
I see a barn
Though Jones has gotten lucky, he could have just as easily been deceived and not have known it. Therefore it doesn't fulfill premise 4, for if Jones saw a fake barn he wouldn't have any idea it was a fake barn. So this is not knowledge.
An alternate example is if Jones looks up and forms the belief
I see a red barn.
According to Nozick's view this fulfills all four premises. Therefore this is knowledge, since Jones couldn't have been wrong, since the fake barns cannot be painted red. This is a troubling account however, since it seems the first statement I see a barn can be inferred from I see a red barn; however by Nozick's view the first belief is not knowledge and the second is knowledge.
Richard Kirkham's skepticism[edit]
Richard Kirkham has proposed that it is best to start with a definition of knowledge so strong that giving a counterexample to it is logically impossible. Whether it can be weakened without becoming subject to a counterexample should then be checked. He concludes that there will always be a counterexample to any definition of knowledge in which the believer's evidence does not logically necessitate the belief. Since in most cases the believer's evidence does not necessitate a belief, Kirkham embraces skepticism about knowledge. He notes that a belief can still be rational even if it is not an item of knowledge. (see also: fallibilism)
Attempts to dissolve the problem[edit]
One might respond to Gettier by finding a way to avoid his conclusion(s) in the first place. However, it can hardly be argued that knowledge is justified true belief if there are cases that are justified true belief without being knowledge; thus, those who want to avoid Gettier's conclusions have to find some way to defuse Gettier's counterexamples. In order to do so, within the parameters of the particular counter-example or exemplar, they must then either accept that
Gettier's cases are not really cases of justified true belief, or
Gettier's cases really are cases of knowledge after all,
or, demonstrate a case in which it is possible to circumvent surrender to the exemplar by eliminating any necessity for it to be considered that JTB apply in just those areas that Gettier has rendered obscure, without thereby lessening the force of JTB to apply in those cases where it actually is crucial. Then, though Gettier's cases stipulate that Smith has a certain belief and that his belief is true, it seems that in order to propose (1), one must argue that Gettier, (or, that is, the writer responsible for the particular form of words on this present occasion known as case (1), and who makes assertion's about Smith's "putative" beliefs), goes wrong because he has the wrong notion of justification. Such an argument often depends on an externalist account on which "justification" is understood in such a way that whether or not a belief is "justified" depends not just on the internal state of the believer, but also on how that internal state is related to the outside world. Externalist accounts typically are constructed such that Smith's putative beliefs in Case I and Case II are not really justified (even though it seems to Smith that they are), because his beliefs are not lined up with the world in the right way, or that it is possible to show that it is invalid to assert that "Smith" has any significant "particular" belief at all, in terms of JTB or otherwise. Such accounts, of course, face the same burden as causalist responses to Gettier: they have to explain what sort of relationship between the world and the believer counts as a justificatory relationship.
Those who accept (2) are by far in the minority in analytic philosophy; generally those who are willing to accept it are those who have independent reasons to say that more things count as knowledge than the intuitions that led to the JTB account would acknowledge. Chief among these are epistemic minimalists such as Crispin Sartwell, who hold that all true belief, including both Gettier's cases and lucky guesses, counts as knowledge.
Experimental research[edit]
Some early work in the field of experimental philosophy suggested that traditional intuitions about Gettier cases might vary cross-culturally.[13] However, subsequent studies have consistently failed to replicate these results, finding instead of that participants from different cultures do share the traditional intuition.[14][15][16] Indeed, more recent studies have actually been providing evidence for the opposite hypothesis, that people from a variety of different cultures have surprisingly similar intuitions in these cases.[17]
Notes[edit]
Jump up ^ 'Conditions of Knowledge' (1965). Chicago: Scott, Foresman
Jump up ^ Timothy McGrew (2007), Internalism and Externalism, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge , chapter 1
Jump up ^ John L. Pollock; Joseph Cruz (1999), Contemporary theories of knowledge, Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 13–14, ISBN 0-8476-8936-0, 0847689360
^ Jump up to: a b Alvin Plantinga (1992). Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford University Press. pp. 6–7. ISBN 0-19-507862-4.
Jump up ^ Skyrms, Brian (22 June 1967). "The Explication of 'X knows that p'". The Journal of Philosophy. 64 (12): 373–389. JSTOR 2024269. doi:10.2307/2024269.
Jump up ^ Goldman, Alvin I. (18 November 1976). "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge". The Journal of Philosophy. 73 (20): 771–791. JSTOR 2025679. doi:10.2307/2025679.
Jump up ^ James Pryor. Theory of Knowledge - The Gettier Problem (archive)
Jump up ^ Paul Boghossian (2007), Fear of Knowledge: Against relativism and constructivism, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press , Chapter 7, p 95-101.
Jump up ^ See p. 481 in Peirce, C. S. (1905), "Issues of Pragmaticism", The Monist, vol. 15, pp. 481–499, Google Book Search Beta Eprint, Internet Archive Eprint. Reprinted in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce v. 5 paragraphs 438–463, see 438, and in Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings, pp. 203–226)
Jump up ^ Peirce, C. S. (1899), "F.R.L." [First Rule of Logic], unpaginated manuscript, c. 1899, CP 1.135–140. Eprint Archived January 6, 2012, at the Wayback Machine..
Jump up ^ Peirce, C.S. (1901), "Truth and Falsity and Error" (in part), pp. 718–720 in J.M. Baldwin. ed., Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, vol. 2. Reprinted, CP 5.565–573.
Jump up ^ Peirce, C.S. (1898), "Philosophy and the Conduct of Life", Lecture 1 of the Cambridge (MA) Conferences Lectures, published in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce v. 1, paragraphs 616–48 in part and in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, Ketner (ed., intro.) and Putnam (intro., commentary), 105–22, reprinted in The Essential Peirce, v. 2, 27–41.
Jump up ^ Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun; Stich, Stephen (Spring–Fall 2001). "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions". Philosophical Topics. 29 (1–2): 429–460. doi:10.5840/philtopics2001291/217.
Jump up ^ Kim, Minsun; Yuan, Yuan (2015). "No cross-cultural differences in the Gettier car case intuition: A replication study of Weinberg et al. 2001". Episteme. 12 (3): 355–361. doi:10.1017/epi.2015.17.
Jump up ^ Seyedsayamdost, Hamid (2014). "On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication". Episteme. 12 (1): 95–116. doi:10.1017/epi.2014.27.
Jump up ^ Nagel, Jennifer (November 2012). "Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 85 (3): 495–527. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00634.x.
Jump up ^ Machery, Edouard; Stich, Stephen; Rose, David; Chatterjee, Amita; Karasawa, Kaori; Struchiner, Noel; Sirker, Smita; Usui, Naoki; Hashimoto, Takaaki (August 2015). "Gettier Across Cultures". Noûs. doi:10.1111/nous.12110.
References[edit]
Mario Alai: "Subjective and Objective Justification in the Solution of Gettier’s Problem", in Selected Proceedings of the SILFS 2010 International Congress , edited by S. R. Arpaia, L&PS - Logic and Philosophy of Science , IX, 1, 2011, pp. 493–501, online: http://www2.units.it/episteme/L&PS_Vol9No1/L&PS_Vol9No1_2011_48_Alai.pdf.
Fred Dretske: "Conclusive Reasons" in Australasian Journal of Philosophy v. 49 (1971), pp. 1–22.
Floridi, Luciano (2004). "On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem" (PDF). Synthese. 142 (1): 61–79. doi:10.1023/B:SYNT.0000047709.27594.c4. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-09-26.
Gettier, Edmund L. (1963). "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". Analysis. 23: 121–123. doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121. Retrieved 12 June 2013.
Alvin Goldman: "A Causal Theory of Knowing" in The Journal of Philosophy v. 64 (1967), pp. 357–372.
Richard Kirkham, "Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake?" Mind , 93, 1984.
Lehrer, Keith; Paxson, Thomas, Jr. (24 April 1969). "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief". The Journal of Philosophy. Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 66 (8): 225–237. ISSN 0022-362X. JSTOR 2024435. doi:10.2307/2024435.
Robert Nozick: Philosophical Explanations . Harvard University Press. 1981.
Marshall Swain: "Epistemic Defeasibility", American Philosophical Quarterly , v. II n. 1 (January 1974).
External links[edit]
Text of the article
Gettier problem at PhilPapers
"The Analysis of Knowledge". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Gettier problem at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
"Gettier problem". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Safety Condition for Knowledge". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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