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Demographic transition
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Not to be confused with Demographic shift.
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Demographic transition (DT) refers to the transition from high birth and death rates to lower birth and death rates as a country or region develops from a pre-industrial to an industrialized economic system. The theory was proposed in 1929 by the American demographer Warren Thompson,[1] who observed changes, or transitions, in birth and death rates in industrialized societies over the previous 200 years. Most developed countries have completed the demographic transition and have low birth rates; most developing countries are in the process of this transition.[2][3] The major (relative) exceptions are some poor countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and some Middle Eastern countries, which are poor or affected by government policy or civil strife, notably, Pakistan, Palestinian territories, Yemen, and Afghanistan.[2]
The demographic transition model, in isolation, can be taken to predict that birth rates will continue to go down as societies grow increasingly wealthy; however, recent data contradicts this, suggesting that beyond a certain level of development birth rates increase again.[4] In addition, in the very long term, the demographic transition should be reversed via evolutionary pressure for higher fertility and higher mortality.[5]
The existence of some kind of demographic transition is widely accepted in the social sciences because of the well-established historical correlation linking dropping fertility to social and economic development.[4] Scholars debate whether industrialization and higher incomes lead to lower population, or whether lower populations lead to industrialization and higher incomes. Scholars also debate to what extent various proposed and sometimes inter-related factors such as higher per-capita income, higher female income, lower mortality, old-age security, and rise of demand for human capital are involved.[6]
Demographic Transition overview, with below-replacement-fertility broken out into a "stage 5"
Contents
[hide]
1 History of the theory
2 Summary of the theory
3 Stage One
4 Stage Two
5 Stage Three
6 Stage Four
7 Stage Five
8 Effects on age structure
9 Historical studies
9.1 Britain
9.2 Ireland
9.3 France
9.4 Asia
9.4.1 India
9.4.2 Korea
9.5 Africa
9.6 Russia
9.7 United States
10 Critical evaluation
11 Second demographic transition
12 See also
13 Footnotes
14 References
History of the theory[edit]
The theory is based on an interpretation of demographic history developed in 1929 by the American demographer Warren Thompson (1887–1973).[1] Adolphe Landry of France made similar observations on demographic patterns and population growth potential around 1934.[7] In the 1940s and 1950s Frank W. Notestein developed a more formal theory of demographic transition.[8] By 2009, the existence of a negative correlation between fertility and industrial development had become one of the most widely accepted findings in social science.[4]
Summary of the theory[edit]
Demographic change in Germany, Sweden, Chile, Mauritius, China from 1820 to 2010.
Pink line: crude death rate (CDR), green line: (crude) birth rate (CBR), yellow line: population
The transition involves four stages, or possibly five.
In stage one, pre-industrial society, death rates and birth rates are high and roughly in balance. All human populations are believed to have had this balance until the late 18th century, when this balance ended in Western Europe.[9] In fact, growth rates were less than 0.05% at least since the Agricultural Revolution over 10,000 years ago.[9] Population growth is typically very slow in this stage, because the society is constrained by the available food supply; therefore, unless the society develops new technologies to increase food production (e.g. discovers new sources of food or achieves higher crop yields), any fluctuations in birth rates are soon matched by death rates.[9]
In stage two, that of a developing country, the death rates drop quickly due to improvements in food supply and sanitation, which increase life expectancies and reduce disease. The improvements specific to food supply typically include selective breeding and crop rotation and farming techniques.[9] Other improvements generally include access to ovens, baking, and television. For example, numerous improvements in public health reduce mortality, especially childhood mortality.[9] Prior to the mid-20th century, these improvements in public health were primarily in the areas of food handling, water supply, sewage, and personal hygiene.[9] One of the variables often cited is the increase in female literacy combined with public health education programs which emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[9] In Europe, the death rate decline started in the late 18th century in northwestern Europe and spread to the south and east over approximately the next 100 years.[9] Without a corresponding fall in birth rates this produces an imbalance, and the countries in this stage experience a large increase in population.
In stage three, birth rates fall due to various fertility factors such as access to contraception, increases in wages, urbanization, a reduction in subsistence agriculture, an increase in the status and education of women, a reduction in the value of children's work, an increase in parental investment in the education of children and other social changes. Population growth begins to level off. The birth rate decline in developed countries started in the late 19th century in northern Europe.[9] While improvements in contraception do play a role in birth rate decline, it should be noted that contraceptives were not generally available nor widely used in the 19th century and as a result likely did not play a significant role in the decline then.[9] It is important to note that birth rate decline is caused also by a transition in values; not just because of the availability of contraceptives.[9]
During stage four there are both low birth rates and low death rates. Birth rates may drop to well below replacement level as has happened in countries like Germany, Italy, and Japan, leading to a shrinking population, a threat to many industries that rely on population growth. As the large group born during stage two ages, it creates an economic burden on the shrinking working population. Death rates may remain consistently low or increase slightly due to increases in lifestyle diseases due to low exercise levels and high obesity and an aging population in developed countries. By the late 20th century, birth rates and death rates in developed countries leveled off at lower rates.[3]
Some scholars break out, from stage four, a "stage five" of below-replacement fertility levels. Others hypothesize a different "stage five" involving an increase in fertility.[5]
As with all models, this is an idealized picture of population change in these countries. The model is a generalization that applies to these countries as a group and may not accurately describe all individual cases. The extent to which it applies to less-developed societies today remains to be seen. Many countries such as China, Brazil and Thailand have passed through the Demographic Transition Model (DTM) very quickly due to fast social and economic change. Some countries, particularly African countries, appear to be stalled in the second stage due to stagnant development and the effect of AIDS.
Stage One[edit]
In pre-industrial society, death rates and birth rates were both high, and fluctuated rapidly according to natural events, such as drought and disease, to produce a relatively constant and young population. Family planning and contraception were virtually nonexistent; therefore, birth rates were essentially only limited by the ability of women to bear children. Emigration depressed death rates in some special cases (for example, Europe and particularly the Eastern United States during the 19th century), but, overall, death rates tended to match birth rates, often exceeding 40 per 1000 per year. Children contributed to the economy of the household from an early age by carrying water, firewood, and messages, caring for younger siblings, sweeping, washing dishes, preparing food, and working in the fields.[10] Raising a child cost little more than feeding him or her; there were no education or entertainment expenses. Thus, the total cost of raising children barely exceeded their contribution to the household. In addition, as they became adults they become a major input to the family business, mainly farming, and were the primary form of insurance for adults in old age. In India, an adult son was all that prevented a widow from falling into destitution. While death rates remained high there was no question as to the need for children, even if the means to prevent them had existed.[11]
During this stage, the society evolves in accordance with Malthusian paradigm, with population essentially determined by the food supply. Any fluctuations in food supply (either positive, for example, due to technology improvements, or negative, due to droughts and pest invasions) tend to translate directly into population fluctuations. Famines resulting in significant mortality are frequent. Overall, population dynamics during stage one are comparable to those of animals living in the wild. According to Edward, Revocatus. (2016) This is the earlier stage of demographic transition in the world and also characterized by primary activities such as small fishing activities, farming practices, pastoralism and petty businesses.
Stage Two[edit]
World population 10,000 BC-2017 AD
This stage leads to a fall in death rates and an increase in population.[12] The changes leading to this stage in Europe were initiated in the Agricultural Revolution of the 18th century and were initially quite slow. In the 20th century, the falls in death rates in developing countries tended to be substantially faster. Countries in this stage include Yemen, Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories, Bhutan and Laos and much of Sub-Saharan Africa (but do not include South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia, Kenya and Ghana, which have begun to move into stage 3).[13]
The decline in the death rate is due initially to two factors:
First, improvements in the food supply brought about by higher yields in agricultural practices and better transportation reduce death due to starvation and lack of water. Agricultural improvements included crop rotation, selective breeding, and seed drill technology.
Second, significant improvements in public health reduce mortality, particularly in childhood. These are not so many medical breakthroughs (Europe passed through stage two before the advances of the mid-20th century, although there was significant medical progress in the 19th century, such as the development of vaccination) as they are improvements in water supply, sewerage, food handling, and general personal hygiene following from growing scientific knowledge of the causes of disease and the improved education and social status of mothers.
A consequence of the decline in mortality in Stage Two is an increasingly rapid growth in population growth (a.k.a. "population explosion") as the gap between deaths and births grows wider and wider. Note that this growth is not due to an increase in fertility (or birth rates) but to a decline in deaths. This change in population occurred in north-western Europe during the 19th century due to the Industrial Revolution. During the second half of the 20th century less-developed countries entered Stage Two, creating the worldwide rapid growth of number of living persons that has demographers concerned today. In this stage of DT, countries are vulnerable to become failed states in the absence of progressive governments.
Population pyramid of Angola 2005
Another characteristic of Stage Two of the demographic transition is a change in the age structure of the population. In Stage One, the majority of deaths are concentrated in the first 5–10 years of life. Therefore, more than anything else, the decline in death rates in Stage Two entails the increasing survival of children and a growing population. Hence, the age structure of the population becomes increasingly youthful and start to have big families and more of these children enter the reproductive cycle of their lives while maintaining the high fertility rates of their parents. The bottom of the "age pyramid" widens first where children, teenagers and infants are here, accelerating population growth rate. The age structure of such a population is illustrated by using an example from the Third World today.
Stage Three[edit]
In Stage 3 of the Demographic Transition Model (DTM), death rates are low and birth rates diminish, as a rule accordingly of enhanced economic conditions, an expansion in women’s status and education, and access to contraception. The decrease in birth rate fluctuates from nation to nation, as does the time span in which it is experienced.[14]Stage Three moves the population towards stability through a decline in the birth rate.[15] Several fertility factors contribute to this eventual decline, and are generally similar to those associated with sub-replacement fertility, although some are speculative:
In rural areas continued decline in childhood death means that at some point parents realize they need not require so many children to be born to ensure a comfortable old age. As childhood death continues to fall and incomes increase parents can become increasingly confident that fewer children will suffice to help in family business and care for them in old age.
Increasing urbanization changes the traditional values placed upon fertility and the value of children in rural society. Urban living also raises the cost of dependent children to a family. A recent theory suggests that urbanization also contributes to reducing the birth rate because it disrupts optimal mating patterns. A 2008 study in Iceland found that the most fecund marriages are between distant cousins. Genetic incompatibilities inherent in more distant outbreeding makes reproduction harder.[16]
In both rural and urban areas, the cost of children to parents is exacerbated by the introduction of compulsory education acts and the increased need to educate children so they can take up a respected position in society. Children are increasingly prohibited under law from working outside the household and make an increasingly limited contribution to the household, as school children are increasingly exempted from the expectation of making a significant contribution to domestic work. Even in equatorial Africa, children (age under 5) now required to have clothes and shoes, through the body, and may even require school uniforms. Parents begin to consider it a duty to buy children(s) books and toys, partly due to education and access to family planning, people begin to reassess their need for children and their ability to grow them.[11]
A major factor in reducing birth rates in stage 3 countries such as Malaysia is the availability of family planning facilities, like this one in Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu, Malaysia.
Increasing literacy and employment lowers the uncritical acceptance of childbearing and motherhood as measures of the status of women. Working women have less time to raise children; this is particularly an issue where fathers traditionally make little or no contribution to child-raising, such as southern Europe or Japan. Valuation of women beyond childbearing and motherhood becomes important.
Improvements in contraceptive technology are now a major factor. Fertility decline is caused as much by changes in values about children and gender as by the availability of contraceptives and knowledge of how to use them.
The resulting changes in the age structure of the population include a decline in the youth dependency ratio and eventually population aging. The population structure becomes less triangular and more like an elongated balloon. During the period between the decline in youth dependency and rise in old age dependency there is a demographic window of opportunity that can potentially produce economic growth through an increase in the ratio of working age to dependent population; the demographic dividend.
However, unless factors such as those listed above are allowed to work, a society's birth rates may not drop to a low level in due time, which means that the society cannot proceed to stage Three and is locked in what is called a demographic trap.
Countries that have witnessed a fertility decline of over 50% from their pre-transition levels include: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Jamaica, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, South Africa, India, Saudi Arabia, and many Pacific islands.
Countries that have experienced a fertility decline of 25-50% include: Guatemala, Tajikistan, Egypt, and Zimbabwe.
Countries that have experienced a fertility decline of less than 25% include: Sudan, Niger, Afghanistan.
Stage Four[edit]
This occurs where birth and death rates are both low, leading to a total population stable. Death rates are low for a number of reasons, primarily lower rates of diseases and higher production of food. The birth rate is low because people have more opportunities to choose if they want children; this is made possible by improvements in contraception or women gaining more independence and work opportunities.[17] The DTM is only a suggestion about the future population levels of a country, not a prediction.
Countries that are at this stage (Total Fertility Rate of < 2.5 in 1997) include: United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, the majority of Europe, Bahamas, Puerto Rico (US territory), Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Singapore, Iran, China, Turkey, Thailand, and Mauritius.[13]
Stage Five[edit]
See also: Population aging, Aging of Europe, Aging of Japan, and Evolutionary psychology
United Nation's population projections by location.
Note the vertical axis is logarithmic and represents millions of people.
The original Demographic Transition model has just four stages, but additional stages have been proposed. Both more-fertile and less-fertile futures have been claimed as a Stage Five.
Some countries have sub-replacement fertility (that is, below 2.1-2.2 children per woman). Replacement fertility is typically 2.1-2.2 because this replaces the two parents and boys are born more often than girls (somewhat 1.05-1.1 to 1) and adds population to compensate for deaths (i.e. members of the population who die without full reproducing, for example, in the age of 30-35, giving a birth just to one baby) with approx. 0.1 additional. Many European and East Asian countries now have higher death rates than birth rates. Population aging and population decline may eventually occur, assuming that the fertility rate does not change and sustained mass immigration does not occur.
In an article in the August 2009 issue of Nature, Myrskylä, Kohler and Francesco Billari argue that the previously negative relationship between "development", as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), and birth rates has become J-shaped. The HDI is a composite of life expectancy, income, and level of education. Development promotes fertility decline at HDI levels below 0.9 but further advances in HDI cause a small rebound in birth rate.[18] In many countries with very high levels of development, fertility rates are now approaching two children per woman — although there are exceptions, notably Germany, Italy and Japan.[19]
In the current century, most developed countries have increased fertility. From the point of view of evolutionary biology, wealthier people having fewer children is unexpected, as natural selection would be expected to favor individuals who are willing and able to convert plentiful resources into plentiful fertile descendants. This may be the result of a departure from the environment of evolutionary adaptedness.[20][21] Thus, from the perspective of evolutionary psychology, the modern environment is exerting evolutionary pressure for higher fertility.[5]
Jane Falkingham of Southampton University has noted that "We've actually got population projections wrong consistently over the last 50 years... we've underestimated the improvements in mortality... but also we've not been very good at spotting the trends in fertility."[5] In 2004 a United Nations office published its guesses for global population in the year 2300; estimates ranged from a "low estimate" of 2.3 billion (tending to -0.32% per year) to a "high estimate" of 36.4 billion (tending to +0.54% per year), which were contrasted with a deliberately "unrealistic" illustrative "constant fertility" scenario of 134 trillion (obtained if 1995-2000 fertility rates stay constant into the far future).[5][22] In stage 5 of the demographic transition, a country encounters misfortune as a whole this is because the death rate becomes higher than the birth rate. There will be a negative population growth rate which will have an impact on the country. This will take a generation or two before the population grows back up.[23]
Effects on age structure[edit]
The decline in death rate and birth rate that occurs during the demographic transition may transform the age structure. When the death rate declines during the second stage of the transition, the result is primarily an increase in the child population. The reason being that when the death rate is high (stage one), the infant mortality rate is very high, often above 200 deaths per 1000 children born. When the death rate falls or improves, this may include lower infant mortality rate and increased child survival. Over time, as individuals with increased survival rates age, there may also be an increase in the number of older children, teenagers, and young adults. This implies that there is an increase in the fertile population proportion which, with constant fertility rates, may lead to an increase in the number of children born. This will further increase the growth of the child population. The second stage of the demographic transition, therefore, implies a rise in child dependency and creates a youth bulge in the population structure.[24] As a population continues to move through the demographic transition into the third stage, fertility declines and the youth bulge prior to the decline ages out of child dependency into the working ages. This stage of the transition is often referred to as the golden age, and is typically when populations see the greatest advancements in living standards and economic development.[24] However, further declines in both mortality and fertility will eventually result in an aging population, and a rise in the aged dependency ratio. An increase of the aged dependency ratio often indicates that a population has reached below replacement levels of fertility, and as result does not have enough people in the working ages to support the economy, and the growing dependent population. [24]
One such visualization of this effect may be approximated by these hypothetical population pyramids.
Historical studies[edit]
Britain[edit]
Between 1750 and 1975 England experienced the transition from high levels of both mortality and fertility, to low levels. A major factor was the sharp decline in the death rate due to infectious diseases, which has fallen from about 11 per 1,000 to less than 1 per 1,000. By contrast, the death rate from other causes was 12 per 1,000 in 1850 and has not declined markedly. The agricultural revolution and the development of transport, initiated by the construction of canals, led to greater availability of food and coal, and enabled the Industrial Revolution to improve the standard of living. Scientific discoveries and medical breakthroughs did not, in general, contribute importantly to the early major decline in infectious disease mortality, and the decline in fertility occurred before efficient contraception became available.[citation needed]
Ireland[edit]
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Irish demographic status converged to the European norm. Mortality rose above the European Community average, and in 1991 Irish fertility fell to replacement level. The peculiarities of Ireland's past demography and its recent rapid changes challenge established theory. The recent changes have mirrored inward changes in Irish society, with respect to family planning, women in the work force, the sharply declining power of the Catholic Church, and the emigration factor.[25]
France[edit]
France displays real divergences from the standard model of Western demographic evolution. The uniqueness of the French case arises from its specific demographic history, its historic cultural values, and its internal regional dynamics. France's demographic transition was unusual in that the mortality and the natality decreased at the same time, thus there was no demographic boom in the 19th century.[26]
France's demographic profile is similar to its European neighbors and to developed countries in general, yet it seems to be staving off the population decline of Western countries. With 62.9 million inhabitants in 2006, it was the second most populous country in the European Union, and it displayed a certain demographic dynamism, with a growth rate of 2.4% between 2000 and 2005, above the European average. More than two-thirds of that growth can be ascribed to a natural increase resulting from high fertility and birthrates. In contrast, France is one of the developed nations whose migratory balance is rather weak, which is an original feature at the European level. Several interrelated reasons account for such singularities, in particular the impact of pro-family policies accompanied by greater unmarried households and out-of-wedlock births. These general demographic trends parallel equally important changes in regional demographics. Since 1982 the same significant tendencies have occurred throughout mainland France: demographic stagnation in the least-populated rural regions and industrial regions in the northeast, with strong growth in the southwest and along the Atlantic coast, plus dynamism in metropolitan areas. Shifts in population between regions account for most of the differences in growth. The varying demographic evolution regions can be analyzed though the filter of several parameters, including residential facilities, economic growth, and urban dynamism, which yield several distinct regional profiles. The distribution of the French population therefore seems increasingly defined not only by interregional mobility but also by the residential preferences of individual households. These challenges, linked to configurations of population and the dynamics of distribution, inevitably raise the issue of town and country planning. The most recent census figures show that an outpouring of the urban population means that fewer rural areas are continuing to register a negative migratory flow - two-thirds of rural communities have shown some since 2000. The spatial demographic expansion of large cities amplifies the process of peri-urbanization yet is also accompanied by movement of selective residential flow, social selection, and sociospatial segregation based on income.[27]
Asia[edit]
McNicoll (2006) examines the common features behind the striking changes in health and fertility in East and Southeast Asia in the 1960s–1990’s, focusing on seven countries: Taiwan and South Korea ("tiger" economies), Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia ("second wave" countries), and China and Vietnam ("market-Leninist" economies). Demographic change can be seen as a byproduct of social and economic development together with, in some cases, strong governmental pressures. The transition sequence entailed the establishment of an effective, typically authoritarian, system of local administration, providing a framework for promotion and service delivery in health, education, and family planning. Subsequent economic liberalization offered new opportunities for upward mobility — and risks of backsliding —, accompanied by the erosion of social capital and the breakdown or privatization of service programs.[citation needed]
India[edit]
As of year 2013, India is in the later half of the third stage of the demographic transition, with a population of 1.23 billion.[28] It is nearly 40 years behind in the demographic transition process compared to EU countries, Japan, etc. The present demographic transition stage of India along with its higher population base will yield rich demographic dividend in future decades.[29]
Korea[edit]
Cha (2007) analyzes a panel data set to explore how industrial revolution, demographic transition, and human capital accumulation interacted in Korea from 1916–38. Income growth and public investment in health caused mortality to fall, which suppressed fertility and promoted education. Industrialization, skill premium, and closing gender wage gap further induced parents to opt for child quality. Expanding demand for education was accommodated by an active public school building program. The interwar agricultural depression aggravated traditional income inequality, raising fertility and impeding the spread of mass schooling. Landlordism collapsed in the wake of de-colonization, and the consequent reduction in inequality accelerated human and physical capital accumulation, hence leading to growth in South Korea.[30]
Africa[edit]
Campbell has studied the demography of 19th-century Madagascar in the light of demographic transition theory. Both supporters and critics of the theory hold to an intrinsic opposition between human and "natural" factors, such as climate, famine, and disease, influencing demography. They also suppose a sharp chronological divide between the precolonial and colonial eras, arguing that whereas "natural" demographic influences were of greater importance in the former period, human factors predominated thereafter. Campbell argues that in 19th-century Madagascar the human factor, in the form of the Merina state, was the predominant demographic influence. However, the impact of the state was felt through natural forces, and it varied over time. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries Merina state policies stimulated agricultural production, which helped to create a larger and healthier population and laid the foundation for Merina military and economic expansion within Madagascar. From 1820, the cost of such expansionism led the state to increase its exploitation of forced labor at the expense of agricultural production and thus transformed it into a negative demographic force. Infertility and infant mortality, which were probably more significant influences on overall population levels than the adult mortality rate, increased from 1820 due to disease, malnutrition, and stress, all of which stemmed from state forced labor policies. Available estimates indicate little if any population growth for Madagascar between 1820 and 1895. The demographic "crisis" in Africa, ascribed by critics of the demographic transition theory to the colonial era, stemmed in Madagascar from the policies of the imperial Merina regime, which in this sense formed a link to the French regime of the colonial era. Campbell thus questions the underlying assumptions governing the debate about historical demography in Africa and suggests that the demographic impact of political forces be reevaluated in terms of their changing interaction with "natural" demographic influences.[31]
Russia[edit]
Main article: Demographics of Russia
Russian male and female life expectancy since 1950.[32][33]
Russia entered stage two of the transition in the 18th century, simultaneously with the rest of Europe, though the effect of transition remained limited to a modest decline in death rates and steady population growth. The population of Russia nearly quadrupled during the 19th century, from 30 million to 133 million, and continued to grow until the First World War and the turmoil that followed.[34] Russia then quickly transitioned through stage three. Though fertility rates rebounded initially and almost reached 7 children/woman in the mid-1920s, they were depressed by the 1931-33 famine, crashed due to the Second World War in 1941, and only rebounded to a sustained level of 3 children/woman after the war. By 1970 Russia was firmly in stage four, with crude birth rates and crude death rates on the order of 15/1000 and 9/1000 respectively.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Russia underwent a unique demographic transition; observers call it a "demographic catastrophe": the number of deaths exceeded the number of births, life expectancy fell sharply (especially for males) and the number of suicides increased.[35] From 1992 through 2011, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births.
United States[edit]
Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) show that from 1800 to 1940 there was a demographic shift from a mostly rural US population with high fertility, with an average of seven children born per white woman, to a minority (43%) rural population with low fertility, with an average of two births per white woman. This shift resulted from technological progress. A sixfold increase in real wages made children more expensive in terms of forgone opportunities to work and increases in agricultural productivity reduced rural demand for labor, a substantial portion of which traditionally had been performed by children in farm families.
A simplification of the DTM theory proposes an initial decline in mortality followed by a later drop in fertility. The changing demographics of the U.S. in the last two centuries did not parallel this model. Beginning around 1800, there was a sharp fertility decline; at this time, an average woman usually produced seven births per lifetime, but by 1900 this number had dropped to nearly four. A mortality decline was not observed in the U.S. until almost 1900—a hundred years following the drop in fertility.
However, this late decline occurred from a very low initial level. During the 17th and 18th centuries, crude death rates in much of colonial North America ranged from 15 to 25 deaths per 1000 residents per year[36][37] (levels of up to 40 per 1000 being typical during stages one and two). Life expectancy at birth was on the order of 40 and, in some places, reached 50, and a resident of 18th century Philadelphia who reached age 20 could have expected, on average, additional 40 years of life.
This phenomenon is explained by the pattern of colonization of the United States. Sparsely populated interior of the country allowed ample room to accommodate all the "excess" people, counteracting mechanisms (spread of communicable diseases due to overcrowding, low real wages and insufficient calories per capita due to the limited amount of available agricultural land) which led to high mortality in the Old World. With low mortality but stage 1 birth rates, the United States necessarily experienced exponential population growth (from less than 4 million people in 1790, to 23 million in 1850, to 76 million in 1900.)
The only area where this pattern did not hold was the American South. High prevalence of deadly endemic diseases such as malaria kept mortality as high as 45-50 per 1000 residents per year in 18th century North Carolina. In New Orleans, mortality remained so high (mainly due to yellow fever) that the city was characterized as the "death capital of the United States" - at the level of 50 per 1000 population or higher - well into the second half of the 19th century.[38]
Today, the U.S. is recognized as having both low fertility and mortality rates. Specifically, birth rates stand at 14 per 1000 per year and death rates at 8 per 1000 per year.[39]
Critical evaluation[edit]
It must be remembered that the DTM is only a model and cannot necessarily predict the future. It does however give an indication of what the future birth and death rates may be for an underdeveloped country, together with the total population size. Most particularly, of course, the DTM makes no comment on change in population due to migration. It is not applicable for high levels of development, as it has been shown that after a HDI of 0.9 the fertility increases again.[4]
DTM does not account for recent phenomena such as AIDS; in these areas HIV has become the leading source of mortality. Some trends in waterborne bacterial infant mortality are also disturbing in countries like Malawi, Sudan and Nigeria; for example, progress in the DTM clearly arrested and reversed between 1975 and 2005.[40]
Countries with lower economic development have much faster demographic transition than high-income countries.
DTM assumes that population changes are induced by industrial changes and increased wealth, without taking into account the role of social change in determining birth rates, e.g., the education of women. In recent decades more work has been done on developing the social mechanisms behind it.[2]
DTM assumes that the birth rate is independent of the death rate. Nevertheless, demographers maintain that there is no historical evidence for society-wide fertility rates rising significantly after high mortality events. Notably, some historic populations have taken many years to replace lives after events such as the Black Death.
Some have claimed that DTM does not explain the early fertility declines in much of Asia in the second half of the 20th century or the delays in fertility decline in parts of the Middle East. Nevertheless, the demographer John C Caldwell has suggested that the reason for the rapid decline in fertility in some developing countries compared to Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand is mainly due to government programs and a massive investment in education both by governments and parents.[13]
Second demographic transition[edit]
The Second Demographic Transition (SDT) is a conceptual framework first formulated in 1986 by Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa in a short article that was published in the Dutch sociology journal Mens en Maatschappij.[41]:181[42][43][41] SDT addressed the changes in the patterns of sexual and reproductive behavior which occurred in North America and Western Europe in the period from about 1963, when the birth control pill and other cheap effective contraceptive methods such as the IUD were adopted by the general population, to the present. Combined with the sexual revolution and the increased role of women in society and the workforce the resulting changes have profoundly affected the demographics of industrialized countries resulting in a sub-replacement fertility level.[44]
The changes, increased numbers of women choosing to not marry or have children, increased cohabitation outside marriage, increased childbearing by single mothers, increased participation by women in higher education and professional careers, and other changes are associated with increased individualism and autonomy, particularly of women. Motivations have changed from traditional and economic ones to those of self-realization.[45]
In 2015, Nicholas Eberstadt, political economist at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, described the Second Demographic Transition as one in which "long, stable marriages are out, and divorce or separation are in, along with serial cohabitation and increasingly contingent liaisons."[46]
See also[edit]
Birth dearth
Demographic dividend
Demographic economics
Demographic trap
Demographic window
Epidemiological transition
Malthusian catastrophe
Migration Transition Model
Overpopulation
Population pyramid
Waithood
World population milestones
Rate of Natural Increase
Footnotes[edit]
^ Jump up to: a b "Warren Thompson". Encyclopedia of Population. 2. Macmillan Reference. 2003. pp. 939–40. ISBN 0-02-865677-6.
^ Jump up to: a b c Caldwell, John C.; Bruce K Caldwell; Pat Caldwell; Peter F McDonald; Thomas Schindlmayr (2006). Demographic Transition Theory. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. p. 239. ISBN 1-4020-4373-2.
^ Jump up to: a b "Demographic transition", Geography, About .
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References[edit]
Carrying capacity
Caldwell, John C. (1976). "Toward a restatement of demographic transition theory". Population and Development Review. 2 (3/4): 321–66. JSTOR 1971615. doi:10.2307/1971615.
————————; Bruce K Caldwell; Pat Caldwell; Peter F McDonald; Thomas Schindlmayr (2006). Demographic Transition Theory. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer. p. 418. ISBN 1-4020-4373-2.
Chesnais, Jean-Claude. The Demographic Transition: Stages, Patterns, and Economic Implications: A Longitudinal Study of Sixty-Seven Countries Covering the Period 1720–1984. Oxford U. Press, 1993. 633 pp.
Coale, Ansley J. 1973. "The demographic transition," IUSSP Liege International Population Conference. Liege: IUSSP. Volume 1: 53–72.
————————; Anderson, Barbara A; Härm, Erna (1979), Human Fertility in Russia since the Nineteenth Century, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press .
Coale, Ansley J; Watkins, Susan C, eds. (1987), The Decline of Fertility in Europe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press .
Davis, Kingsley (1945), "The World Demographic Transition", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (237): 1–11, JSTOR 1025490 . Classic article that introduced concept of transition.
Davis, Kingsley. 1963. "The theory of change and response in modern demographic history." Population Index 29(October): 345–66.
Kunisch, Sven; Boehm, Stephan A.; Boppel, Michael (eds): From Grey to Silver: Managing the Demographic Change Successfully, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg 2011, ISBN 978-3-642-15593-2
Friedlander, Dov; S Okun, Barbara; Segal, Sharon (1999), "The Demographic Transition Then and Now: Processes, Perspectives, and Analyses", Journal of Family History, 24 (4): 493–533, ISSN 0363-1990, PMID 11623954, doi:10.1177/036319909902400406 , full text in Ebsco.
Galor, Oded (2005). "The Demographic Transition and the Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth". Journal of the European Economic Association. 3: 494–504. doi:10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.494.
———————— (2008), "The Demographic Transition", New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd ed.), Macmillan .
Gillis, John R., Louise A. Tilly, and David Levine, eds. The European Experience of Declining Fertility, 1850–1970: The Quiet Revolution. 1992.
Greenwood, Jeremy; Seshadri, Ananth (2002). "The US Demographic Transition". American Economic Review. 92 (2): 153–59. JSTOR 3083393. doi:10.1257/000282802320189168.
Harbison, Sarah F.; Robinson, Warren C. (2002). "Policy Implications of the Next World Demographic Transition". Studies in Family Planning. 33 (1): 37–48. JSTOR 2696331. PMID 11974418. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4465.2002.00037.x.
Hirschman, Charles (1994). "Why fertility changes". Annual Review of Sociology. 20: 203–233. PMID 12318868. doi:10.1146/annurev.so.20.080194.001223.
Jones, GW, ed. (1997), The Continuing Demographic Transition, et al, Questia .
Korotayev, Andrey; Malkov, Artemy & Khaltourina, Daria (2006). Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth. Moscow, Russia: URSS. p. 128. ISBN 5-484-00414-4. CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)
Kirk, Dudley (1996). "The Demographic Transition". Population Studies. 50 (3): 361–87. JSTOR 2174639. PMID 11618374. doi:10.1080/0032472031000149536.
Borgerhoff, Luttbeg B; Borgerhoff Mulder, M; Mangel, MS (2000), "To marry or not to marry? A dynamic model of marriage behavior and demographic transition", in Cronk, L; Chagnon, NA; Irons, W, Human behavior and adaptation: An anthropological perspective, New York: Aldine Transaction, p. 528, ISBN 0-202-02044-4
Landry, Adolphe, 1982 [1934], La révolution démographique – Études et essais sur les problèmes de la population, Paris, INED-Presses Universitaires de France
McNicoll, Geoffrey. "Policy Lessons of the East Asian Demographic Transition," Population and Development Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 2006), pp. 1–25
Mercer, Alexander (2014), Infections, Chronic Disease, and the Epidemiological Transition. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press/Rochester Studies in Medical History, ISBN 978-1-58046-508-3
Montgomery, Keith, "The Demographic Transition", Geography, UWC .
Notestein, Frank W. 1945. "Population — The Long View," in Theodore W. Schultz, Ed., Food for the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Saito, Oasamu (1996), "Historical Demography: Achievements and Prospects", Population Studies, 50 (3): 537–53, ISSN 0032-4728, JSTOR 2174646, PMID 11618380, doi:10.1080/0032472031000149606 .
Soares, Rodrigo R., and Bruno L. S. Falcão. "The Demographic Transition and the Sexual Division of Labor," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 116, No. 6 (Dec., 2008), pp. 1058–104
Szreter, Simon (1993), "The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility: A Critical Intellectual History", Population and Development Review, 19 (4): 659–701, JSTOR 2938410, doi:10.2307/2938410 .
————————; Nye, Robert A; van Poppel, Frans (2003), "Fertility and Contraception During the Demographic Transition: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 34 (2): 141–54, ISSN 0022-1953, doi:10.1162/002219503322649453 , full text in Project Muse and Ebsco
Thompson, Warren S (1929), "Population", American Journal of Sociology, 34 (6): 959–75, doi:10.1086/214874, After the next World War, we will see Germany lose more women and children and soon start again from a developing stage .
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text:
Gun laws in Texas
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Location of Texas in the United States
Gun laws in Texas regulate the sale, possession, and use of firearms and ammunition in the U.S. state of Texas.
Contents
[hide]
1 Summary table
2 Firearms possession
3 Firearms carry
3.1 License to Carry
3.2 College Carry Laws
3.3 Restrictions on licensed carry
3.3.1 30.06 signage
3.4 Open Carry
3.4.1 30.07 signage
4 Castle Doctrine
4.1 Stand Your Ground
4.2 Civil Immunity
5 Motorists Protection Act
6 National Firearms Act
7 See also
8 References
Summary table[edit]
Subject/Law
Long guns
Handguns
Relevant Statutes
Notes
State permit to purchase? No No
Firearm registration? No No
Owner license required? No No
Assault weapon law? No No
Magazine capacity restriction? No No
Carry license required? No Yes GC Ch. 411.172[1] Licensed carry of a handgun requires a "shall-issue" license, and is subject to specific laws governing trespass while armed. People who are barred from licensing include those under age 21, felons, fugitives, people who are "chemically dependent" or "incapable of exercising sound judgment", and those in arrears for taxes or child support.
Open carry? Yes Yes PC 46.02 Long gun and black powder weapon (including handgun) open carry is not forbidden by law, unless in a manner "calculated to cause alarm."
Effective January 1, 2016, individuals with a handgun carry license are permitted to carry openly, per House Bill 910 of the 2015 legislative session. Non-residents from states whose permits are recognized by Texas are also allowed to open carry under the new law.
Concealed carry on college campus? No Yes May carry in parking lots, parking garages, outdoor walkways on campus.
Public four-year universities (as of August 1, 2016) and public two-year colleges (as of August 1, 2017) must allow concealed carry in campus buildings as well. Universities will be allowed to designate certain sensitive areas as "gun free zones"; these will be subject to legislative analysis.
State preemption of local restrictions? Yes Yes LGC §229.001. State law prohibits municipal governments from regulating the ownership, transfer, storage, or licensing of firearms, ammunition, or accessories. Local ordinances can regulate the discharge of firearms (such as for noise, nuisance or public safety), but not in contradiction of state law concerning justified use of a firearm.
NFA weapons restricted? No No PC 46.01, PC 46.05 Texas Penal Code Section 46.05 requires that "explosive weapons", "machine guns", "short-barrel firearms", and "firearm silencers", as defined in Section 46.01, be "registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record maintained by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives or classified as a curio or relic by the United States Department of Justice". Prior to May 22nd 2015, Section 46.05 called "registration pursuant to the National Firearms Act" a "defense to prosecution".[2]
Peaceable journey laws? Yes Yes PC 46.02, PC 46.15 A person may carry a loaded handgun without a permit while in or heading directly to a motor vehicle or watercraft they own or control. The statute does not specifically state the handgun must be concealed while heading to the vehicle or watercraft, and 46.02, which requires concealment of a handgun while in a motor vehicle or watercraft, is not applicable to a person while the person is traveling, pursuant to said activities. 46.15(b)(2).
Castle doctrine/ stand your ground law? Yes Yes PC 9.32 A person is presumed justified in using deadly force to protect themselves against an unlawful, forceful intrusion into their dwelling, or to prevent an unlawful, forceful attempt to remove a lawful occupant from the dwelling, or to prevent certain serious felonies such as burglary or arson. There is no duty to retreat from any place where the shooter has a legal right to be.
Background checks required for private sales? No No
A notice stating that the Turman Halfway House in Austin, Texas prohibits concealed handguns. This sign uses obsolete wording in font smaller than required, and is no longer enforceable under current law.[3]
Firearms possession[edit]
Texas has no laws regarding possession of any firearm regardless of age, without felony convictions; all existing restrictions in State law mirror Federal law. A person of any age, except certain Felons, can possess a firearm such as at a firing range. Texas and Federal law only regulate the ownership of all firearms to 18 years of age or older, and regulate the transfer of handguns to 21 years or older by FFL dealers. However, a private citizen may sell, gift, lease etc. a handgun to anyone over 18 who is not Felon. NFA weapons are also only subject to Federal restrictions; no State regulations exist. Municipal and county ordinances on possession and carry are generally overridden (preempted) due to the wording of the Texas Constitution, which gives the Texas Legislature (and it alone) the power to "regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime".[4] Penal Code Section 1.08 also prohibits local jurisdictions from enacting or enforcing any law that conflicts with State statute. Local ordinances restricting discharge of a firearm are generally allowed as State law has little or no specification thereof, but such restrictions do not preempt State law concerning justification of use of force and deadly force.
In Texas a convicted felon may possess a firearm in the residence in which he lives once five years have elapsed from his release from prison or parole, whichever is later. Under Texas Penal Code §§ 12.33, 46.04, the unlawful possession of a firearm is a third degree felony with a punishment range of two to ten years for a defendant with one prior felony conviction and fine up to $10,001.
Firearms carry[edit]
There is no legal statute specifically prohibiting the carry of a firearm other than a handgun (pre-1899 black powder weapons, and replicas of such, are not legally firearms in Texas).[5] However, if the firearm is displayed in a manner "calculated to cause alarm," then it is "disorderly conduct". Open carry of a handgun in public had long been illegal in Texas, except when the carrier was on property he/she owned or had lawful control over, was legally hunting, or was participating in some gun-related public event such as a gun show. However, the 2015 Texas Legislature passed a bill to allow concealed handgun permit holders to begin carrying handguns openly. The bill was signed into law on June 13, 2015, and took effect on January 1, 2016. A License to Carry (LTC) is still required to carry a handgun openly or concealed in public.
License to Carry[edit]
The Texas handgun carry permit was previously called a "Concealed Handgun License" or CHL. This has changed on Jan 1. 2016 to LTC "License To Carry" and at the same time the laws changed to include "Open Carry". Permits are issued on a non-discretionary ("shall-issue") basis to all eligible, qualified applicants. Texas has full reciprocity agreements with 30 states, not including Vermont (which is an "unrestricted" state and neither issues nor requires permits), most of these having some residency restrictions (the holder must either be a resident of Texas or a non-resident of the reciprocal state for the Texas license to be valid in that state). Texas recognizes an additional 11 states' concealed-carry permits unilaterally; those states do not recognize Texas' own permit as valid within their jurisdiction, usually due to some lesser requirement of the Texas permit compared to their own.
The handgun licensing law sets out the eligibility criteria that must be met. For example, an applicant must be eligible to purchase a handgun under the State and Federal laws (including an age restriction of 21), however an exception is granted to active members of the military who are age 18 and over. Additionally, a number of factors may make a person ineligible (temporarily or permanently) to obtain a license, including:
felony convictions (permanent) and Class A or B misdemeanors (5 years, permanent in cases of domestic violence), including charges that resulted in probation or deferred adjudication;
pending criminal charges (indefinite until resolved);
chemical or alcohol dependency (defined as 2 convictions for substance-related offenses in a 10-year period; 10-year ban from the date of the first conviction);
certain types of psychological diagnoses (indefinite until the condition is testified by a medical professional as being in remission);
protective or restraining orders (indefinite until rescinded); or
defaults on taxes, student loans, child support and/or other governmental fees (indefinite until resolved).[6]
This last category, though having little to do with a person's ability to own a firearm, is in keeping with Texas policy for any licensing; those who are delinquent or in default on State-regulated debts or court judgments are generally barred from obtaining or renewing any State-issued license (including driver licenses), as an incentive to settle those debts.
"Information regarding any psychiatric, drug, alcohol, or criminal history" is required only from new users.[7] Renewals are required every five years, but are granted without further inquiry into or update of this information.
An eligible person wishing to obtain an LTC (formerly CHL) must take a State-set instruction course taught by a licensed instructor for a minimum of 4 hours and a maximum of 6 hours, covering topics such as applicable laws, conflict resolution, criminal/civil liability, and handgun safety, and pass a practical qualification at a firing range with a handgun.[6] The caliber requirement was repealed on September 1, 2017.[8] Such courses vary in cost, but are typically around $100–$125 for new applicants (usually not including the cost of ammunition and other shooting supplies; the practical qualification requires firing 50 rounds of ammunition). They may then apply, providing a picture, fingerprints, other documentation, and a $40 application fee[9] (as of September 1, 2017; previously $140 and $70 for renewals), – active and discharged military are eligible for discounts – to the DPS, which processes the application, runs a federal background check, and if all is well, issues the permit. Permits are valid for five years, and allow resident holders to carry in 29 other states (nonresidents may carry in all but four of those),[10] due to reciprocity agreements.[11] Discounted LTC fees vary from $0 for active duty military (through one year after discharge), to $25 for military veterans.[12]
College Carry Laws[edit]
Public four-year universities (as of August 1, 2016) and public two-year colleges (as of August 1, 2017) must allow concealed carry in campus buildings as well. Universities will be allowed to designate certain sensitive areas as "gun free zones"; these will be subject to legislative analysis.
Restrictions on licensed carry[edit]
While a permitted resident of Texas (or a nonresident holding a recognized permit) is generally authorized to carry in most public places, there are State and Federal laws that still restrict a permit holder from carrying a weapon in certain situations. These include:
Federal buildings - Premises owned by the U.S. Federal Government or its agencies for the purpose of any official business of the Federal Government are covered by Federal statutes that supersede State law. It is illegal in general under said statutes to possess a firearm while in any such location, and possession of a State-issued concealed firearms permit is no defense. Such places commonly encountered include post offices, Federal courts, and offices of the IRS, FBI, Justice Department, Department of Energy, USDA, FDA, etc. A rider tied to the 2009 Federal CARD Act has restricted the Department of the Interior from enacting or enforcing restrictions on carry of arms within lands controlled by the Bureau of Land Management; CHL permittees may carry concealed while in a federal park or wildlife preserve contained wholly or partially within the borders of the State of Texas. However, Army Corps of Engineers properties (including all reservoir lakes and included park areas) are still off-limits.
Schools - Concealed carry in a school may be a felony under TPC section 46.03: "A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possesses or goes with a firearm, illegal knife, club, or prohibited weapon listed in Section 46.05(a): …on the physical premises of a school or educational institution, any grounds or building on which an activity sponsored by a school or educational institution is being conducted, or a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or educational institution, whether the school or educational institution is public or private, unless pursuant to written regulations or written authorization of the institution [emphasis added]."[13] The age/grade level, funding type or for-profit status of the school does not matter. Carry of a concealed weapon while in a public outdoor area surrounding an educational building is permitted; as defined by TPC 46.035(f)(3), "premises" refers only to a building or part of a building, and does not refer to driveways, streets, sidewalks, parking lots, parking garages, or privately owned vehicles.[12] Employees of schools will be able to keep their firearms within their vehicles as of September 1, 2017.[8]
Public sporting events - It is a Class A misdemeanor to carry while inside a building currently being used for an interscholastic or professional sporting event, unless the person carrying is a participant in the sporting event and said sporting event requires the use of the firearm (i.e. a target shooting competition).
Businesses posting a compliant "51% sign" - It is a felony to carry a firearm while on the premises of a business that makes more than 51% of its revenue from the sale of alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption (colloquially "bars", "nightclubs", "taverns", "saloons", etc.). A person with a LTC that is in violation has a defense that the establishment did not post the proper signage, as required by the Government Code section 411.204. The proper signage contains similar language as is required of all liquor license holders, but with the addition of a couple of words to prohibit licensed as well as unlicensed carry, and a background containing a red "51%" to make it obvious at a glance that the sign applies to LTC holders.
Correctional facilities - It is a felony, whether licensed or not, to carry inside a building generally termed a "jail" or "prison".
Execution premises - within 1,000 feet of premises the location of which is designated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice as a place of execution under Article 43.19, Code of Criminal Procedure, on a day that a sentence of death is set to be imposed on the designated premises and the person received notice that: (A) going within 1,000 feet of the premises with a weapon listed under this subsection was prohibited; or (B) possessing a weapon listed under this subsection within 1,000 feet of the premises was prohibited.
Courts or court offices - It is a felony, whether licensed or not, to carry inside a building used by a functioning municipal, state or federal court for official business. Exceptions are granted to certain employees of those offices, such as judges, attorneys, baliffs, and law enforcement officials.
Election polling places - It is a felony, whether licensed or not, to carry inside a building being used as a polling center for any municipal, state and/or federal elections process on the scheduled voting date or while polling is underway. This is significant, as a local business or other generally public building, which would normally not prohibit concealed carry, may offer their facilities for use as a polling place. A person would be in violation if they entered the building on the day voting occurs, even if the polls are not open at the time, and even if the license holder is there for some other purpose than to vote.
Racetracks - It is a felony, whether licensed or not, to carry a firearm on the premises of a racetrack (horse or dog).
While intoxicated - LTC holders may not carry in any place or at any time while intoxicated (Penal Code 46.035.), defined as: (a) not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other substance into the body; or (B) having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent BAC or more (Penal Code 49.01.)
30.06 signage[edit]
TPC section 30.06 covers "Trespass by a person licensed to carry a concealed handgun". It allows a residential or commercial landowner to post signage that preemptively bars licensed persons from entering the premises while carrying concealed. It is a Class A misdemeanor to fail to heed compliant signage. As of January 1, 2016, the charge for failing to heed signage has been reduced to a Class C misdemeanor, unless it can be shown at trial that the actor was given oral notice and failed to depart, in which case it remains a Class A misdemeanor. This is a significant difference, in that conviction of a Class A or B misdemeanor will result in the loss of your handgun license for at least 5 years, this is not the case if convicted of a Class C misdemeanor.
Signs posted in compliance with TPC 30.06 are colloquially called "30.06 signs" or "30.06 signage".
The courts have yet to rule on any specific requirements of 30.06, but LTC permittees are generally instructed that signage which does not comply exactly with TPC Sec. 30.06(c)(3)(B) is not binding. The law states a compliant sign must be:
In contrasting colors;
With block letters;
Having text 1" or greater in height;
Containing "identical" text to the following:
"Pursuant to Section 30.06, Penal Code (trespass by license holder with a concealed handgun), a person licensed under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code (handgun licensing law), may not enter this property with a concealed handgun"[14]
In both English and Spanish;
Posted conspicuously and "clearly visible to the public".
Hospitals are a gray area due to conflicts in the law and multiple provisions that may apply to a medical facility:
License holders were originally prohibited from carrying concealed inside a hospital without written authorization, under TPS 46.035(b)(4).
An amendment in 2007 added paragraph (i) to the same section, stating that (b)(4) the prohibition does not apply if the license holder did not receive notice (oral or written communication, including posting of a sign, under TPC 30.06) of the prohibition.
But, a hospital may be a "teaching hospital" and considered a school, where firearms carry is prohibited, under TPC 46.03(a)(1).
It may also be a VA or military hospital, and thus subject to federal prohibition on weapons carry.
All hospitals are required under Government Code Section 411.204(b) to post a sign stating that possession of a handgun whether licensed or not is a felony. It is unknown, given the amendments to 46.035, whether the GC 411.204 signage would actually prohibit a CHL holder from carrying, as it would not constitute "effective notice under section 30.06" and GC 411.204 does not describe failure to heed such a sign as an offense by the license holder.
Anyone who owns or controls property may orally or in writing, inform a person carrying a concealed handgun that they must leave the property.
Open Carry[edit]
As of January 1, 2016, holders of a Texas CHL or LTC are able to openly carry handguns in the same places that allow concealed carry with some exceptions. Openly carried handguns must be in a shoulder or belt holster.
Existing CHL holders may continue to carry with a valid license. New applicants will be required to complete training on the use of restraint holsters and methods to ensure the secure carry of openly carried handguns.
Exceptions to Open Carry
Open carry is not permitted on the premises of a public institution of higher education or on the premises of a private or independent institution of higher education
Open carry is not permitted on any public or private driveway, street, sidewalk or walkway, parking lot, parking garage or other parking area of an institution of higher education or private or independent institution of higher education
Open carry is not permitted by an individual who is acting as a personal protection officer under Chapter 1702 Texas Occupations Code and is not wearing a uniform[15]
30.07 signage[edit]
This law took effect January 1, 2016, and covers the new Open Carry law. Section 30.07 is substantially similar to Section 30.06 which covers concealed carry.
TPC section 30.07 covers "Trespass by license holder with an openly carried handgun" This allows a residential or commercial landowner to post signage that preemptively bars licensed persons from entering the premises while openly carrying a handgun. An offense under section 30.07 is a Class C misdemeanor, unless it is shown at trial that the actor was given oral notice and failed to depart, in which case the offense is a Class A misdemeanor. The 30.07 sign differs from the 30.06 sign in that it must be displayed at each entrance to the property. (In both cases the sign must be "clearly visible to the public".)
The law states that notice may be given orally by the owner of the property, or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner, or by written communication.
Written communication consists of a card or other document consisting the 30.07 language below, or a sign posted on the property.
Both written communication and a posted sign must contain language identical to the following (30.07 notice):
"Pursuant to section 30.07, Penal Code (trespass by license holder with an openly carried handgun), a person licensed under Subchapter H, Chapter 411, Government Code (handgun licensing law), may not enter this property with a handgun that is carried openly"
Additionally, signs posted on the property must conform to the following regulations:
Must include the 30.07 notice above in both English and Spanish
Must appear in contrasting colors
Must be in block letters at least one inch in height
Must be "displayed in a conspicuous manner clearly visible to the public at each entrance to the property"
[16]
Castle Doctrine[edit]
On March 27, 2007, Governor Rick Perry signed Senate Bill 378 into law, making Texas a "Castle Doctrine" state which came into effect September 1, 2007.[17] Residents lawfully occupying a dwelling may use deadly force against a person who "unlawfully, and with force, enters or attempts to enter the dwelling", or who unlawfully and with force removes or attempts to remove someone from that dwelling, or who commits or attempts to commit a "qualifying" felony such as "aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery" (TPC 9.32(b)).
Stand Your Ground[edit]
Senate Bill 378 also contains a "Stand Your Ground" clause; A person who has a legal right to be wherever he/she is at the time of a defensive shooting has no "duty to retreat" before being justified in shooting. The "trier of fact" (the jury in a jury trial, otherwise the judge) may not consider whether the person retreated when deciding whether the person was justified in shooting (TPC 9.32(c,d)).
Civil Immunity[edit]
In addition, two statutes of the Texas Civil Practice And Remedies Code protect people who justifiably threaten or use deadly force. Chapter 86 prohibits a person convicted of a misdemeanor or felony from filing suit to recover any damages suffered as a result of the criminal act or any justifiable action taken by others to prevent the criminal act or to apprehend the person, including the firing of a weapon.[18] Chapter 83 of the same code states that a person who used force or deadly force against an individual that is justified under TPC Chapter 9 is immune from liability for personal injury or death of the individual against whom the force was used.[19] This does not relieve a person from liability for use of force or deadly force on someone against whom the force would not be justified, such as a bystander hit by an errant shot.
This law does not prevent a person from being sued for using deadly force. The civil court will determine if the defendant was justified under chapter 9 of the Penal Code.
Motorists Protection Act[edit]
Gov. Perry also signed H.B. 1815 after passage by the 2007 Legislature, a bill that allows any Texas resident to carry a handgun in the resident's motor vehicle without a CHL or other permit.[20] The bill revised Chapter 46, Section 2 of the Penal Code to state that it is in fact not "Unlawful Carry of a Weapon", as defined by the statute, for a person to carry a handgun while in a motor vehicle they own or control, or to carry while heading directly from the person's home to that car. However, lawful carry while in a vehicle requires these four critical qualifiers: (1) the weapon must not be in plain sight (in Texas law, "plain sight" and "concealed" are mutually exclusive opposing terms);[21] (2) the carrier cannot be involved in criminal activities, other than Class C traffic misdemeanors; (3) the carrier cannot be prohibited by state or federal law from possessing a firearm; and (4) the carrier cannot be a member of a criminal gang.[22][23]
Previous legislation (H.B. 823) enacted in the 2005 session of the Legislature had modified TPC 46.15 ("Non-Applicability") to include the "traveller assumption"; a law enforcement officer who encounters a firearm in a vehicle was required to presume that the driver of that vehicle was "travelling" under a pre-existing provision of 46.15, and thus the Unlawful Carry statute did not apply, absent evidence that the person was engaged in criminal activity, a member of a gang, or prohibited from possessing a firearm. However, attorneys and law enforcement officials in several municipalities including DA Chuck Rosenthal of Houston stated that they would continue to prosecute individuals found transporting firearms in their vehicles despite this presumption,[24] leading to the more forceful statement of non-applicability in the 2007 H.B. 1815.
National Firearms Act[edit]
Possession of destructive devices, automatic firearms (machine guns), short-barrel shotguns (SBS), short-barrel rifles (SBR), suppressors, smoothbore pistols and other such NFA-restricted weapons is permitted by Texas law as long the owner has registered the item(s) into the NFA registry. This registration is legal if the owner possesses the proper forms, processed in accordance with the National Firearms Act which includes a paid tax stamp and approval by the NFA branch of the BATFE.[25]
See also[edit]
Gun violence and gun control in Texas
Law of Texas
References[edit]
Jump up ^ "Texas Government Code - Section 411.172". Texas Constitution and Statutes. Retrieved 2015-06-13.
Jump up ^ "NFA Weapons Now Legal In Texas". ammoland.com. 2015-06-02. Retrieved 2017-04-15.
Jump up ^ "TxDPS - CHL Sign Posting". Txdps.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2011-12-23.
Jump up ^ "NRA/ILA Firearms Laws for Texas" (PDF). Retrieved 2014-10-17.
Jump up ^ "PENAL CODE CHAPTER 46. WEAPONS". Statutes.legis.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2015-03-16.
^ Jump up to: a b "Texas License to Carry a Handgun Laws" (PDF). Txdps.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2016-02-23. ]
Jump up ^ "Welcome | License To Carry A Handgun | Texas.gov". Txapps.texas.gov. Retrieved 2016-02-23.
^ Jump up to: a b NRA-ILA. "NRA-ILA | Texas: Governor Abbott Signs Remaining Pro-Second Amendment Bills from 2017 Regular Session". NRA-ILA. Retrieved 2017-06-17.
Jump up ^ NRA-ILA. "NRA-ILA | Abbott Signs Senate Bill 16, Bringing Texas License To Carry Fees Down to Among Lowest in Nation". NRA-ILA. Retrieved 2017-05-26.
Jump up ^ "Texas CCW information" (PDF). Handgunlaw.us. Retrieved 2013-11-27.
Jump up ^ "TxDPS – Agreements with other states". Txdps.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2016-02-23.
^ Jump up to: a b "TxDPS - New laws for Handgun Licensing Program". Txdps.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2016-02-23.
Jump up ^ [1]
Jump up ^ "TEX PE. CODE § 30.06 : Section 30.06: TRESPASS BY LICENSE HOLDER WITH A CONCEALED HANDGUN". www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us. 2016-01-01. Retrieved 2016-01-25.
Jump up ^ "TxDPS - New Legislation for Concealed Handgun Licensing". www.dps.texas.gov. Retrieved 2015-12-17.
Jump up ^ "PENAL CODE CHAPTER 30. BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS". www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2015-12-17.
Jump up ^ "Texas Legislature Online – History of Senate Bill 378". Capitol.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2011-12-23.
Jump up ^ "CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE CHAPTER 86. LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN INJURIES TO CONVICTED PERSONS". Statutes.legis.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2015-03-16.
Jump up ^ "CIVIL PRACTICE AND REMEDIES CODE CHAPTER 83. USE OF FORCE OR DEADLY FORCE". Statutes.legis.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2015-03-16.
Jump up ^ "Texas H.B. 1815". Capitol.state.tx.us. 2007-09-01. Retrieved 2011-12-23.
Jump up ^ "PENAL CODE CHAPTER 46. WEAPONS". Statutes.legis.state.tx.us. Retrieved 2015-03-16.
Jump up ^ https://web.archive.org/web/20111126103705/http://apps.carryconcealed.net/legal/texas-ccw-state-laws.php. Archived from the original on November 26, 2011. Retrieved December 23, 2011. Missing or empty |title= (help)
Jump up ^ "Texas Concealed Carry Permit Information on". Usacarry.com. Retrieved 2011-12-23.
Jump up ^ "DA warns handgun law won't relax enforcement - Houston Chronicle". Chron.com. 2005-08-30. Retrieved 2015-03-16.
Jump up ^ "Weapons - When can you carry a gun in Texas". Texasgunlaws.org. 2007-09-01. Retrieved 2015-03-16.
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