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Red Guards
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This article is about the mass social movement in China. For other uses, see Red Guards (disambiguation).
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Red Guards (simplified Chinese: 红卫兵; traditional Chinese: 紅衛兵; pinyin: Hóng Wèibīng) were a student mass paramilitary social movement mobilized by Mao Zedong in 1966 and 1967, during the Cultural Revolution.[1] According to a Red Guard leader, the movement's aims were as follows:
Chairman Mao has defined our future as an armed revolutionary youth organization...So if Chairman Mao is our Red-Commander-in-Chief and we are his Red Guards, who can stop us? First we will make China Maoist from inside out and then we will help the working people of other countries make the world red...And then the whole universe.[2]
Despite being met with resistance early on, the Red Guards received personal support from Mao, and the movement rapidly grew. Mao made use of the group as propaganda and to accomplish goals such as destroying symbols of China's pre-communist past, including ancient artifacts and gravesites of notable Chinese figures. However, the government was very permissive of the Red Guards, who were even allowed to inflict bodily harm on people viewed as dissidents. The movement quickly grew out of control, frequently coming into conflict with authority and threatening public security until the government made efforts to rein the youths in. The Red Guard groups also suffered from in-fighting as factions developed among them. By the end of 1968, the group as a formal movement had dissolved.
Contents
[hide]
1 Origins
2 Role in the Cultural Revolution
2.1 Attacks upon the "Four Olds"
2.2 Clashes with the PLA
3 Factionalism within the Red Guards
4 Suppression by the PLA (1967-1968)
5 Rustification
6 Historiography
7 In popular culture
8 See also
9 Notes
10 References
Origins[edit]
The first students to call themselves "Red Guards" in China were a group of students at the Tsinghua University Middle School who were given the name Red Guards to sign two big-character posters issued on 25 May – 2 June 1966.[3] The students believed that the criticism of the play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office was a political issue and needed greater attention. The group of students, led by Zhang Chengzhi at Tsinghua University Middle School and Nie Yuanzi at Peking University, originally wrote the posters as a constructive criticism of Tsinghua University and Peking University's administration, who were accused of harboring intellectual elitism and bourgeois tendencies.[4]
The Red Guards were denounced as counter-revolutionaries and radicals by the school administration and fellow students, and were forced to secretly meet amongst the ruins of the Old Summer Palace. Nevertheless, Chairman Mao Zedong ordered that the manifesto of the Red Guards be broadcast on national radio and published in the People's Daily newspaper. This action gave the Red Guards political legitimacy, and student groups quickly began to appear across China.[5]
Due to the factionalism already beginning to emerge in the Red Guard movement, Liu Shaoqi made the decision in early June 1966 to send in Communist Party of China (CPC) work teams.[3] These work groups were led by Zhang Chunqiao, head of China's Propaganda Department, and were the attempt by the Party to keep the movement under its control. Rival Red Guard groups led by the sons and daughters of cadres were formed by these work teams to deflect attacks from those in positions of power towards bourgeois elements in society, mainly intellectuals.[5] In addition, these Party-backed rebel groups also attacked students with 'bad' class backgrounds (these included the children of former landlords and capitalists).[5] These actions were all attempts by the CPC to preserve the existing state government and apparatus.[3]
Mao, concerned that these work teams were hindering the course of the Cultural Revolution, dispatched Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, and others to join the Red Guards and combat the work teams.[4] In July 1966, Mao ordered the removal of the remaining work teams (against the wishes of Liu Shaoqi) and condemned their 'fifty days of White Terror'.[6] The Red Guards were now free to organise without the restrictions of the Party and, within a few weeks, on the encouragement of Mao's supporters, Red Guard groups had appeared in almost every school in China.[7]
Role in the Cultural Revolution[edit]
Mao expressed personal approval and support for the Red Guards in a letter to Tsinghua University Red Guards on 1 August 1966.[8] He gave the movement a more public boost at a massive rally on 18 August at Tiananmen Square. Mao appeared atop Tiananmen wearing an olive green military uniform, the type favored by Red Guards, but which he had not worn in many years.[8] He personally greeted 1,500 Red Guards and waved to 800,000 Red Guards and onlookers below.[8]
The rally was led by Chen Boda, and Lin Biao gave a keynote speech.[8] Red Guard leaders led by Nie Yuanzi also gave speeches.[8] A high school Red Guard put a red arm band enscribed with the characters for "Red Guard" on the Chairman, who stood for six hours.[8] The 8-18 rally, as it was known, was the first of eight receptions the Chairman gave to Red Guards in Tienanmen in the fall of 1966. It was this rally that signified the beginning of the Red Guards' involvement in implementing the aims of the Cultural Revolution.[9]
A second rally, held on 31 August, was led by Kang Sheng and Lin Biao also donned a red arm band. The last rally was held on 26 November 1966. In all, the Chairman greeted eleven to twelve million Red Guards, most of whom traveled from afar to attend the rallies[8][10] including one held on National Day 1966, which included the usual civil-military parade.
Attacks upon the "Four Olds"[edit]
Main article: Four Olds
The remains of Ming dynasty Wanli Emperor at the Ming tombs. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned.[11]
The 11th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee had ratified the 'Sixteen Articles' in August 1966, a document that stated the aims of the Cultural Revolution. It also highlighted the role students would be asked to play in the movement. After the 18 August rally, the Cultural Revolution Group directed the Red Guards to attack the 'Four Olds' of Chinese society (old customs, old culture, old habits and old ideas). For the rest of the year, Red Guards marched across China in a campaign to eradicate the 'Four Olds'. Old books and art were destroyed, museums were ransacked, and streets were renamed with new revolutionary names and adorned with pictures and the sayings of Mao.[12] Many famous temples, shrines, and other heritage sites in Beijing were attacked.[13]
The Cemetery of Confucius was attacked in November 1966 by a team of Red Guards from Beijing Normal University, led by Tan Houlan.[14][15] The corpse of the 76th-generation Duke Yansheng was removed from its grave and hung naked from a tree in front of the palace during the desecration of the cemetery.[16] Attacks on other cultural and historic sites happened between in 1966 and 1967. One of the greater damages was to the Ming Dynasty Tomb of the Wanli Emperor in which his and the empress’s corpses along with a variety of artifacts from the tomb were destroyed by student members of the Red Guard. Between the assaults on Wan Li and Confucius’ tombs alone, more than 6618 historic Chinese artifacts were destroyed in the desire to achieve the goals of the Cultural Revolution.[17]
Individual property was also targeted by Red Guard members if it was considered to represent one of the Four Olds. Commonly religious texts and figures would be confiscated and burned. Other times items of historic importance would be left, but defaced, with examples such as Qin Dynasty scrolls having their writings partially removed and stone and wood carvings having the faces and words carved out of them. Re-education came alongside the destruction of previous culture and history, throughout the Cultural Revolution schools were a target of Red Guard groups to teach both the new ideas of the Cultural Revolution; as well as to point out what ideas represented the previous era idealizing the Four Olds. For example, one student, Mo Bo, described a variety of the Red Guards activities taken to teach the next generation what was no longer the norms.[18] This was done according to Bo with wall posters lining the walls of schools pointing out workers who undertook “bourgeois” lifestyles. These actions inspired other students across China to join the Red Guard as well. One of these very people, Rae Yang, described how these actions inspired students. Through authority figures, such as teachers, using their positions as a form of absolute command rather than as educators gave students a reason to believe Red Guard messages.[19] In Yang’s case it is exemplified through a teacher using a poorly phrased statement as an excuse to shame a student to legitimize the teachers own position.
Attacks on culture quickly descended into attacks on people. Ignoring guidelines in the 'Sixteen Articles' that stipulated that persuasion rather than force were to be used to bring about the Cultural Revolution, officials in positions of authority and perceived 'bourgeois elements' were denounced and suffered physical and psychological attacks.[12] On August 22, 1966, a central directive was issued to stop police intervention in Red Guard activities.[20] Those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled "counter-revolutionaries." Mao's praise for rebellion was effectively an endorsement for the actions of the Red Guards, which grew increasingly violent.[21]
Public security in China deteriorated rapidly as a result of central officials lifting restraints on violent behavior.[22] Xie Fuzhi, the national police chief, said it was "no big deal" if Red Guards were beating "bad people" to death.[23] The police relayed Xie's remarks to the Red Guards and they acted accordingly.[23] In the course of about two weeks, the violence left some one hundred teachers, school officials, and educated cadres dead in Beijing's western district alone. The number injured was "too large to be calculated."[22]
The most gruesome aspects of the campaign included numerous incidents of torture, murder, and public humiliation. Many people who were targets of 'struggle' could no longer bear the stress and committed suicide. In August and September 1966, there were 1,772 people murdered in Beijing alone. In Shanghai there were 704 suicides and 534 deaths related to the Cultural Revolution in September. In Wuhan there were 62 suicides and 32 murders during the same period.[24]
Intellectuals were to suffer the brunt of these attacks. Many were ousted from official posts such as university teaching and allocated manual tasks such as "sweeping courtyards, building walls and cleaning toilets from 7am to 5pm daily" which would encourage them to dwell on past "mistakes".[25] An official report in October 1966 reported that the Red Guards had already arrested 22,000 'counterrevolutionaries'.[26]
The Red Guards were also tasked with rooting out 'capitalist roaders' (those with supposed 'right wing' views) in positions of authority. This search was to extend to the very highest echelons of the CPC, with many top party officials, such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Dehuai being attacked both verbally and physically by the Red Guards.[27] Liu Shaoqi was especially targeted, as he had taken Mao's seat as Chairman of the People's Republic following the Great Leap Forward. Although Mao stepped down from his post as a sign of accepting responsibility, he was angered that a capitalist roader like Liu could take the reins of communist China.
Clashes with the PLA[edit]
The Red Guards were not completely unchallenged. The Red Guards were not permitted to enter Zhongnanhai, the Forbidden City, or any military facility which was tasked with classified information (i.e. special intelligence, Nuclear Weapons development). Several times, Red Guards attempted to storm Zhongnanhai and the 8341 Special Regiment, who were responsible for Mao's security, fired upon the Red Guards.[28]
When Jiang Qing promoted the idea that the Red Guards should "crush the PLA" and Lin Biao being seemingly supportive of her plans (such as allowing Red Guards to loot barracks) while at the same time oblivious to the ongoing chaos the PLA had to deal with, several military commanders disregarded their chain of command and attacked Red Guards whenever their bases or people were threatened. When Red Guards entered factories and other areas of production, they encountered resistance in the form of worker and peasant groups who were keen to maintain the status quo.[28] In addition, there were bitter divisions within the Red Guard movement itself, especially along social and political lines. The most radical students often found themselves in conflict with more conservative Red Guards.[10]
The leadership in Beijing also simultaneously tried to restrain and encourage the Red Guards, adding confusion to an already chaotic situation. On the one hand, the Cultural Revolution Group reiterated calls for non-violence. On the other hand, the People's Liberation Army was told to assist the Red Guards with transport and lodging, and help organize rallies.[10] By the end of 1966, most of the Cultural Revolution Group were of the opinion that the Red Guards had become too much of a political liability.[10] The campaign against 'capitalist-roaders' had led to anarchy, the Red Guards' actions had led to conservatism amongst China's workers, and the lack of discipline and the factionalism in the movement had made the Red Guards politically dangerous.[29] 1967 would see the decision to dispel the student movement.
Factionalism within the Red Guards[edit]
"Enveloped in a trance of excitement and change", all student Red Guards pledged their loyalty to their beloved Chairman Mao Zedong.[1] Many worshipped Mao above everything and this was typical of a "pure and innocent generation".[30] Excited youths took inspiration from Mao's often vague pronouncements, generally believing the sanctity of his words and making serious efforts to figure out what they meant. Factions quickly formed based on individual interpretations of Mao's statements. All groups pledged loyalty to Mao and claimed to have his best interests in mind, yet they continually engaged in verbal and physical skirmishes all throughout the Cultural Revolution.[citation needed]
Youth from families with party-members and of revolutionary origin joined conservative factions. These factions focused on the socio-political status quo, keeping within their localities and working to challenge existing distributions of power and privilege.[31] Those from the countryside and without ties to the Chinese Communist Party often joined radical groups who sought to change and uproot local government leadership.[32]
The primary goal of the radicals was to restructure existing systems to benefit those of poorer backgrounds, as supposed capitalist roaders were corrupting the Socialist agenda. Primarily influenced by travel and a freer exchange of ideas from different regions of China, more joined the radical, rebel factions of the Red Guards by the second half of the Cultural Revolution.[32]
Some historians, one being Andrew Walder, argue that individuals and their political choices also influenced the development of Red Guard factions all across China. Interests of individuals, interactions with authority figures, and social interactions all altered identities to forge factions that would fight for new grievances against "the system".[31] Following Mao Zedong's idea of permanent revolution, the factions and their identities continually evolved as new ideas and people were brought in. Ultimately, the struggle between factions led to the chaotic civil-war-like atmosphere which foiled Mao's original intent to have the people carry out an orderly permanent revolution against the existing regime.
Suppression by the PLA (1967-1968)[edit]
By February 1967, political opinion at the center had decided on the removal of the Red Guards from the Cultural Revolution scene in the interest of stability.[33] The People's Liberation Army (PLA) forcibly suppressed the more radical Red Guard groups in Sichuan, Anhui, Hunan, Fujian, and Hubei provinces in February and March. Students were ordered to return to schools; student radicalism was branded 'counterrevolutionary' and banned.[34] There was a wide backlash in the spring against the suppression, with student attacks on any symbol of authority and PLA units. An order from Mao, the Cultural Revolution Group, the State Council, and the Central Military Affairs Committee of the PLA on 5 September 1967 instructed the PLA to restore order to China.[35]
The PLA violently put down the national Red Guard movement in the year that followed, with the suppression often brutal. A radical alliance of Red Guard groups in Hunan province called the Sheng Wu Lien was involved in clashes with local PLA units, for example, and in the first half of 1968 was forcibly suppressed.[36] At the same time the PLA carried out mass executions of Red Guards in Guangxi province that were unprecedented in the Cultural Revolution.[36]
The final remnants of the movement were defeated in Beijing in the summer of 1968. Reportedly, in an audience of the Red Guard leaders with Mao, the Chairman informed them gently of the end of the movement with a tear in his eye. The repression of the students by the PLA was not as gentle.[37] After the summer of 1968 some more-radical students continued to travel across China and play an unofficial part in the Cultural Revolution, but by then the movement's official and substantial role was over.
Rustification[edit]
Main article: Sent-down youth
From 1962 to 1979, 16 to 18 million youth were sent to the countryside to undergo re-education.[38][39]
Sending city students to the countryside was also used to defuse the student fanaticism set in motion by the Red Guards. On December 22, 1968, Chairman Mao directed the People's Daily to publish a piece entitled "We too have two hands, let us not laze about in the city", which quoted Mao as saying "The intellectual youth must go to the country, and will be educated from living in rural poverty." In 1969 many youth were rusticated.[40] Many students could not deal with the harsh life and died in the process of reeducation.[41]
Historiography[edit]
The Red Guards and the wider Cultural Revolution are a sensitive and heavily censored chapter in China’s history. Official government mentions of the era are rare and brief.[42]
In popular culture[edit]
Allen Ginsberg refers to "Red Guards battling country workers in Nanking" in the first line of his poem "Returning North of Vortex," included in the collection The Fall of America: Poems of These States.
In The Last Emperor, the Red Guard appeared near the end of the film humiliating the prison warden who treated the Emperor of China Puyi kindly.
The 1967 Nick Carter spy novel The Red Guard features scenes involving Red Guards in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution
The film To Live has the Red Guards appearing in a few scenes, showing their various types of activity.
In Farewell My Concubine, the Red Guards humiliate Cheng Dieyi and Duan Xiaolou as they try to overthrow the old society.
In the film The Blue Kite, Tei Tou's classmates are shown wearing the red scarves of the red guards, and the film ends with the red guards denouncing his stepfather.
Jung Chang's autobiography Wild Swans describes the atrocities committed by the Red Guards.
Nien Cheng's memoir Life and Death in Shanghai describes Red Guard activities in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution.
In Hong Kong, TVB and ATV often depicted the brutality of the Red Guards in films and television dramas. They are rarely portrayed in film and television programs produced in mainland China.
The video game Command & Conquer: Generals misleadingly named the Chinese standard infantry unit the "Red Guard", that ensured the game's ban in China.
The novel about the Cultural Revolution, Red Scarf Girl by Ji-Li Jiang, prominently features the Red Guards. The main character often wishes she could become one.
In the book Son of the Revolution, the main character, Liang Heng, becomes a red guard at age 12, despite the years of persecution he and his family received from them.
In the autobiography Gang of One, Fan Shen provides first hand accounts of his youth as a Red Guard.
Li Cunxin makes repeated reference to the Red Guards in his autobiography, Mao's Last Dancer.
In the book Red Flower of China, Zhai Zhenhua recounts her time as a Red Guard.
Yang Rae recounts her time in the Red Guards and in the countryside in Spider Eaters.
In the novel Frog by Mo Yan, Red Guard is mentioned on several occasions, like public prosecution.
Members of the Red Guard are featured prominently in the novel The Three-Body Problem by the Chinese novelist Liu Cixin.
See also[edit]
Gang of Four
Morning Sun (film)
Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung
Notes[edit]
^ Jump up to: a b Teiwes
Jump up ^ Woei Lien Chong, China's great proletarian Cultural Revolution: master narratives and post-Mao counter narratives, page 105, published 2002
^ Jump up to: a b c Chesneaux, p. 141
^ Jump up to: a b Jiaqi, Yan; Gao Gao. Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution. University of Hawaii Press. pp. 56–64. ISBN 0-8248-1695-1.
^ Jump up to: a b c Meisner, p. 334
Jump up ^ Meisner, p. 335
Jump up ^ Meisner, p. 366
^ Jump up to: a b c d e f g (Chinese) 倪天祚, "毛主席八次接见红卫兵的组织工作" 中国共产党新闻网 2011-04-07
Jump up ^ Van der Sprenkel, p. 455
^ Jump up to: a b c d Meisner, p. 340
Jump up ^ "China's reluctant Emperor", The New York Times, Sheila Melvin, Sept. 7, 2011.
^ Jump up to: a b Meisner, p. 339
Jump up ^ Esherick, Joseph, Paul Pickowicz, Andrew George Walder (2006). The Chinese cultural revolution as history. Stanford University Press. p. 92. ISBN 0-8047-5350-4. CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)
Jump up ^ Ma, Aiping; Si, Lina; Zhang, Hongfei (2009), "The evolution of cultural tourism: The example of Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius", in Ryan, Chris; Gu, Huimin, Tourism in China: destination, cultures and communities, Routledge advances in tourism, Taylor & Francis US, p. 183, ISBN 0-415-99189-7
Jump up ^ Asiaweek, Volume 10
Jump up ^ Jeni Hung (April 5, 2003). "Children of confucius". The Spectator. Retrieved 2007-03-04.
Jump up ^ "Burn, loot and pillage! Destruction of antiques during China's Cultural Revolution". AFC China. February 10, 2013.
Jump up ^ bo, Lo (April 1987). "I Was a Teenage Red Guard". New Internationalist Magazine.
Jump up ^ Yang, Rae (1997). Spider Eaters. University of California Press. p. 116.
Jump up ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. Mao's Last Revolution. Harvard University Press, 2006. p. 124
Jump up ^ MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; pp. 515
^ Jump up to: a b MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. Mao's Last Revolution. Harvard University Press, 2006. p. 126
^ Jump up to: a b MacFarquhar, Roderick and Schoenhals, Michael. Mao's Last Revolution. Harvard University Press, 2006. p. 125
Jump up ^ MacFarquhar & Schoenhals; p. 124
Jump up ^ Howard, p. 169.
Jump up ^ Karnow, p. 209
Jump up ^ Karnow, p. 232 and 244
^ Jump up to: a b Meisner, p. 339-340
Jump up ^ Meisner, p. 341
Jump up ^ Chan
^ Jump up to: a b Walder
^ Jump up to: a b Chan, pg. 143
Jump up ^ Meisner, p. 351
Jump up ^ Meisner, p. 352
Jump up ^ Meisner, p. 357
^ Jump up to: a b Meisner, p. 361
Jump up ^ Meisner, p. 362
Jump up ^ Riskin, Carl; United Nations Development Programme (2000), China human development report 1999: transition and the state, Oxford University Press, p. 37, ISBN 978-0-19-592586-9
Jump up ^ Bramall, Chris. Industrialization of Rural China, p. 148. Oxford University Press (Oxford), 2007. ISBN 0199275939.
Jump up ^ Shu Jiang Lu, When Huai Flowers Bloom, p 115 ISBN 978-0-7914-7231-6
Jump up ^ "Up to the mountains, down to the villages (1968)". chineseposters.net. Retrieved 2017-02-13.
Jump up ^ "Bowed and Remorseful, Former Red Guard Recalls Teacher’s Death", New York Times, Chris Buckley, January 12, 2014.
References[edit]
Chan, A; 'Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation'; University of Washington Press (1985)
Chesneaux, J; 'China: The People's Republic Since 1949'; Harvester Press (1979)
Howard, R; "Red Guards are always right". New Society, 2 February 1967, pp169–70.
Karnow, S; 'Mao and China: Inside China's Cultural Revolution'; Penguin (1984)
Meisner, M; 'Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic Since 1949'; Free Press (1986)
Teiwes, F; "Mao and His Followers". A Critical Introduction to Mao Zedong; Cambridge University Press (2010)
Van der Sprenkel, S; The Red Guards in perspective. New Society, 22 September 1966, pp455–6.
Walder, A; 'Fractured Rebellion: the Beijing Red Guard Movement'; Harvard University Press (2009)
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Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
For more information, see Causes of World War II.
A series of events led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility that each nation's military forces planned for in the 1920s, though real tension did not begin until the 1931 invasion of Manchuria by Japan. Over the next decade, Japan expanded slowly into China, leading to the Second Sino-Japanese war in 1937. In 1940 Japan invaded French Indochina in an effort to embargo all imports into China, including war supplies purchased from the U.S. This move prompted the United States to embargo all oil exports, leading the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) to estimate it had less than two years of bunker oil remaining and to support the existing plans to seize oil resources in the Dutch East Indies. Planning had been underway for some time on an attack on the "Southern Resource Area" to add it to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Japan envisioned in the Pacific.
The Philippines, at that time an American territory, were also a Japanese target. The Japanese military concluded an invasion of the Philippines would provoke an American military response. Rather than seize and fortify the islands, and wait for the inevitable U.S. counterattack, Japan's military leaders instead decided on the preventive Pearl Harbor attack, which they assumed would negate the American forces needed for the liberation and reconquest of the islands.
Planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor had begun in very early 1941, by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. He finally won assent from the Naval High Command by, among other things, threatening to resign. The attack was approved in the summer at an Imperial Conference and again at a second Conference in the fall. Simultaneously over the year, pilots were trained, and ships prepared for its execution. Authority for the attack was granted at the second Imperial Conference if a diplomatic result satisfactory to Japan was not reached. After final approval by Emperor Hirohito the order to attack was issued at the beginning of December.
Contents
[hide]
1 Background to conflict
2 Breaking off negotiations
2.1 War
2.2 Intelligence gathering
2.3 Planning
2.3.1 Concept of a Japanese invasion of Hawaii
3 Strike force
3.1 Execute order
4 Lack of preparation
5 See also
6 References
Background to conflict[edit]
Tensions between Japan and the prominent Western countries (the United States, France, Britain and the Netherlands) increased significantly during the increasingly militaristic early rule of Emperor Hirohito. Japanese nationalists and military leaders increasingly influenced government policy, promoting a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as part of Japan's alleged "divine right" to unify Asia under Hirohito's rule.[1]
Hirohito
During the 1930s, Japan's increasingly expansionist policies brought it into renewed conflict with its neighbors, Russia and China (Japan had fought the First Sino-Japanese War with China in 1894–95 and the Russo-Japanese War with Russia in 1904–05; Japan's imperialist ambitions had a hand in precipitating both conflicts). In March 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in response to international condemnation of its conquest of Manchuria and subsequent establishment of the Manchukuo puppet government.[2] On January 15, 1936, Japan withdrew from the Second London Naval Disarmament Conference because the United States and Great Britain refused to grant the Japanese Navy parity with theirs.[3] A second war between Japan and China began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937.
Japan's 1937 attack on China was condemned by the U.S. and several members of the League of Nations including Britain, France, Australia and the Netherlands. Japanese atrocities during the conflict, such as the notorious Nanking Massacre that December, served to further complicate relations with the rest of the world. The U.S., Britain, France and the Netherlands each possessed colonies in East and Southeast Asia. Japan's new military power and willingness to use it threatened these Western economic and territorial interests in Asia.
Beginning in 1938, the U.S. adopted a succession of increasingly restrictive trade restrictions with Japan. This included terminating its 1911 commercial treaty with Japan in 1939, further tightened by the Export Control Act of 1940. These efforts failed to deter Japan from continuing its war in China, or from signing the Tripartite Pact in 1940 with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, officially forming the Axis Powers.
Japan would take advantage of Hitler's war in Europe to advance its own ambitions in the Far East. The Tripartite Pact guaranteed assistance if a signatory was attacked by any country not already involved in conflict with the signatory; this implicitly meant the U.S. By joining the pact, Japan gained geopolitical power and sent the unmistakable message that any U.S. military intervention risked war on both of her shores[citation needed]—with Germany and Italy on the Atlantic, and with Japan on the Pacific. The Roosevelt administration would not be dissuaded; believing the American way of life would be endangered if Europe and the Far East fell under military dictatorship,[citation needed] it committed to help the British and Chinese through loans of money and materiel, and pledged sufficient continuing aid to ensure their survival. Thus, the United States slowly moved from being a neutral power to one preparing for war.[4]
In mid-1940, Roosevelt moved the U.S. Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to deter Japan.[5] On October 8, 1940, Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, provoked a confrontation with Roosevelt by repeating his earlier arguments to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox that Pearl Harbor was the wrong place for his ships. Roosevelt believed relocating the fleet to Hawaii would exert a "restraining influence" on Japan.[citation needed]
Richardson asked the President if the United States was going to war. Roosevelt's view was:
At least as early as October 8, 1940, ...affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become involved in a war with Japan. ... 'that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and that area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.' ... .[6][7]
Japan's 1940 move into Vichy-controlled Indochina further raised tensions. When combined with its war with China, withdrawal from the League of Nations, alliance with Germany and Italy and increasing militarization, the move provoked an attempt to restrain Japan economically. The United States embargoed scrap metal shipments to Japan and closed the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping.[8] This hit Japan's economy particularly hard because 74.1% of Japan's scrap iron came from the United States in 1938. Also, 93% of Japan's copper in 1939 came from the United States.[9] In early 1941, Japan moved into southern Indochina,[10] thereby threatening British Malaya, North Borneo and Brunei.
Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations during the course of 1941 in an effort to improve relations. During these negotiations, Japan considered withdrawal from most of China and Indochina after drawing up peace terms with the Chinese. Japan would also adopt an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, and would not discriminate in trade, provided all other countries reciprocated. However, these compromises in China were rejected by General Tojo, then War Minister.[11] Responding to Japanese occupation of key airfields in Indochina (July 24) following an agreement between Japan and Vichy France, the U.S. froze Japanese assets on July 26, 1941, and on August 1 established an embargo on oil and gasoline exports to Japan.[12][13] The oil embargo was an especially strong response because oil was Japan's most crucial import, and more than 80% of Japan's oil at the time came from the United States.[14]
Japanese war planners had long looked south, especially to Brunei for oil and Malaya for rubber and tin. In the autumn of 1940, Japan requested 3.15 million barrels of oil from the Dutch East Indies, but received a counteroffer of only 1.35 million.[15] The Navy was (mistakenly) certain any attempt to seize this region would bring the U.S. into the war,[16][page needed] but the complete U.S. oil embargo removed any hesitancy. Moreover, any southern operation would be vulnerable to attack from the Philippines, then a U.S. commonwealth, so war with the U.S. seemed necessary in any case.[17]
After the embargoes and the asset freezes, the Japanese ambassador to Washington, Kichisaburō Nomura, and U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull held multiple meetings in order to resolve Japanese-American relations. No solution could be agreed upon for three key reasons:
Japan honored its alliance to Germany and Italy through the Tripartite Pact.
Japan wanted economic control and responsibility for southeast Asia.
Japan refused to leave mainland China (without Manchoukuo[clarification needed]).[18]
The U.S. embargoes gave Japan a sense of urgency. It would either have to agree to Washington's demands or use force to gain access to the resources it needed.
In their final proposal on November 20, Japan offered to withdraw its forces from southern Indochina and not to launch any attacks in southeast Asia provided the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands ceased aiding China and lifted their sanctions against Japan.[11] The American counterproposal of November 26 (the Hull note) required Japan to evacuate all of China, without conditions, and to conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers.
Breaking off negotiations[edit]
Part of the Japanese plan for the attack included breaking off negotiations with the United States 30 minutes before the attack began. Diplomats from the Japanese embassy in Washington, including the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura and special representative Saburō Kurusu, had been conducting extended talks with the State Department regarding the U.S. reactions to the Japanese move into French Indochina in the summer.
In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo (encrypted with the Type 97 cypher machine, in a cipher named PURPLE by U.S. cryptanalysts), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1:00 p.m. Washington time. The last part arrived late Saturday night (Washington time), but because of decryption and typing delays, as well as Tokyo's failure to stress the crucial necessity of the timing, embassy personnel did not deliver the message to Secretary Hull until several hours after the attack.
The United States had decrypted the 14th part well before the Japanese managed to, and long before embassy staff composed a clean typed copy. The final part, with its instruction for the time of delivery, had been decoded Saturday night but was not acted upon until the next morning (according to Henry Clausen[citation needed]).
Ambassador Nomura asked for an appointment to see Hull at 1:00 p.m., but later asked it be postponed to 1:45 as the ambassador was not quite ready. Nomura and Kurusu arrived at 2:05 p.m. and were received by Hull at 2:20. Nomura apologized for the delay in presenting the message. After Hull had read several pages, he asked Nomura whether the document was presented under instructions of the Japanese government; the Ambassador replied it was. After reading the full document, Hull turned to the ambassador and said:
I must say that in all my conversations with you...during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them.[19]
Japanese records, admitted into evidence during congressional hearings on the attack after the war, established that Japan had not even written a declaration of war until hearing news of the successful attack. The two-line declaration was finally delivered to U.S. ambassador Grew in Tokyo about ten hours after the completion of the attack. Grew was allowed to transmit it to the United States, where it was received late Monday afternoon (Washington time).
War[edit]
Prime Minister of Japan Hideki Tōjō
In July 1941, IJN headquarters informed Emperor Hirohito its reserve bunker oil would be exhausted within two years if a new source was not found. In August 1941, Japanese prime minister Fumimaro Konoe proposed a summit with President Roosevelt to discuss differences. Roosevelt replied Japan must leave China before a summit meeting could be held.[citation needed] On September 6, 1941, at the second Imperial Conference concerning attacks on the Western colonies in Asia and Hawaii, Japanese leaders met to consider the attack plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters. The summit occurred one day after the emperor had reprimanded General Hajime Sugiyama, chief of the IJA General Staff, about the lack of success in China and the speculated low chances of victory against the United States, the British Empire and their allies.[20]
Prime Minister Konoe argued for more negotiations and possible concessions to avert war. However, military leaders such as Sugiyama, Minister of War General Hideki Tōjō, and chief of the IJN General Staff Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano asserted time had run out and that additional negotiations would be pointless. They urged swift military actions against all American and European colonies in Southeast Asia and Hawaii. Tōjō argued that yielding to the American demand to withdraw troops would wipe out all the gains of the Second Sino-Japanese War, depress Army morale, endanger Manchukuo and jeopardize control of Korea; hence, doing nothing was the same as defeat and a loss of face.
On October 16, 1941, Konoe resigned and proposed Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, who was also the choice of the army and navy, as his successor. Hirohito chose Hideki Tōjō instead, worried (as he told Konoe) about having the Imperial House being held responsible for a war against Western powers.[21]
Prince Takamatsu
On November 3, 1941, Nagano presented a complete plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor to Hirohito.[22] At the Imperial Conference on November 5, Hirohito approved the plan for a war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, scheduled to start at the beginning of December if an acceptable diplomatic settlement were not achieved before then.[23] Over the following weeks, Tōjō's military regime offered a final deal to the United States. They offered to leave only Indochina, but in return for large American economic aid.[citation needed] On November 26, the so-called Hull Memorandum (or Hull Note) rejected the offer and demanded that, in addition to leaving Indochina, the Japanese must leave China (without Manchoukuo) and agree to an Open Door Policy in the Far East.[24]
Kōichi Kido
On November 30, 1941, Prince Takamatsu warned his brother, Hirohito, the navy felt the Empire could not fight more than two years against the United States and wished to avoid war. After consulting with Kōichi Kido (who advised him to take his time until he was convinced) and Tōjō, the Emperor called Shigetarō Shimada and Nagano, who reassured him that war would be successful.[25] On December 1, Hirohito finally approved a "war against United States, Great Britain and Holland" during another Imperial Conference, to commence with a surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at its main forward base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.[26]
Intelligence gathering[edit]
Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa, a spy in Pearl Harbor.
On February 3, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the potential attack plan, asking him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help from a German already living in Hawaii who was an Abwehr agent. None had been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add 29-year-old Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially requested additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner Nitta-maru at Yokohama. He had grown his hair longer than military length, and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura.[27]
Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands, and toured Oahu in a small plane, posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently, sketching the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to Hickam Field in a taxi, memorizing the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He was also able to discover that Sunday was the day of the week on which the largest number of ships were likely to be in harbor, that PBY patrol planes went out every morning and evening, and that there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor.[28] Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications, and by direct delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff.
In June 1941, German and Italian consulates were closed, and there were suggestions Japan's should be closed, as well. They were not, because they continued to provide valuable information (via MAGIC) and neither President Roosevelt nor Secretary Hull wanted trouble in the Pacific.[29] Had they been closed, however, it is possible Naval General Staff, which had opposed the attack from the outset, would have called it off, since up-to-date information on the location of the Pacific Fleet, on which Yamamoto's plan depended, would no longer have been available.[30]
Planning[edit]
Main articles: Imperial Japanese Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service
Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
Expecting war, and seeing an opportunity in the forward basing of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, the Japanese began planning in early 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor. For the next several months, planning and organizing a simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of British and Dutch colonies to the south occupied much of the Japanese Navy's time and attention. The plans for the Pearl Harbor attack arose out of the Japanese expectation the U.S. would be inevitably drawn into war after a Japanese attack against Malaya and Singapore.[31]
The intent of a preventive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific, thus removing it from influencing operations against American, British, and Dutch colonies. Successful attacks on colonies were judged to depend on successfully dealing with the Pacific Fleet. Planning[32] had long anticipated a battle in Japanese home waters after the U.S. fleet traveled across the Pacific, under attack by submarines and other forces all the way. The U.S. fleet would be defeated in a "decisive battle", as Russia's Baltic Fleet had been in 1905. A surprise attack posed a twofold difficulty compared to longstanding expectations. First, the Pacific Fleet was a formidable force, and would not be easy to defeat or to surprise. Second, Pearl Harbor's shallow waters made using conventional aerial torpedoes ineffective. On the other hand, Hawaii's distance meant a successful surprise attack could not be blocked or quickly countered by forces from the continental U.S.
Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by the British action in the Battle of Taranto, in which 21 obsolete Fairey Swordfish disabled half the Regia Marina (Italian Navy). Admiral Yamamoto even dispatched a delegation to Italy, which concluded a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the time necessary to establish a "barrier" defense to protect Japanese control of the Dutch East Indies. The delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow-running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised.[citation needed]
Japanese strategists were undoubtedly influenced by Admiral Togo's surprise attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur in 1904. Yamamoto's emphasis on destroying the American battleships was in keeping with the Mahanian doctrine shared by all major navies during this period, including the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy.[33]
Planner Commander Minoru Genda stressed surprise would be critical.
In a letter dated January 7, 1941, Yamamoto finally delivered a rough outline of his plan to Koshiro Oikawa, then Navy Minister, from whom he also requested to be made Commander in Chief of the air fleet to attack Pearl Harbor. A few weeks later, in yet another letter, Yamamoto requested Admiral Takijiro Onishi, chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, study the technical feasibility of an attack against the American base. Onishi gathered as many facts as possible about Pearl Harbor.
After first consulting with Kosei Maeda, an expert on aerial torpedo warfare, and being told the harbor's shallow waters rendered such an attack almost impossible, Onishi summoned Commander Minoru Genda. After studying the original proposal put forth by Yamamoto, Genda agreed: "[T]he plan is difficult but not impossible".[34] Yamamoto gave the bulk of the planning to Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, who was very worried about the area's air defenses. Yamamoto encouraged Kusaka by telling him, "Pearl Harbor is my idea and I need your support."[35] Genda emphasized the attack should be carried out early in the morning and in total secrecy, employing an aircraft carrier force and several types of bombing.[34]
Although attacking the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchor would achieve surprise, it also carried two distinct disadvantages. The targeted ships would be sunk or damaged in very shallow water, meaning it would be quite likely that they could be salvaged and possibly returned to duty (as six of the eight battleships eventually were). Also, most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor afterward. Despite these concerns, Yamamoto and Genda pressed ahead.
By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as Operation Z, after the famous Z signal given by Admiral Tōgō at Tsushima.[citation needed] Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest near Kagoshima City on Kyūshū. Genda chose it because its geography and infrastructure presented most of the same problems bombers would face at Pearl Harbor. In training, each crew flew over the 5,000 ft (1,500 m) mountain behind Kagoshima and dove into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to 25 ft (7.6 m) at the piers. Bombardiers released torpedoes at a breakwater some 300 yd (270 m) away.[36]
However, even this low-altitude approach would not overcome the problem of torpedoes bottoming in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japanese weapons engineers created and tested modifications allowing successful shallow water drops. The effort resulted in a heavily modified version of the Type 91 torpedo, which inflicted most of the ship damage during the eventual attack.[citation needed] Japanese weapons technicians also produced special armor-piercing bombs by fitting fins and release shackles to 14- and 16-inch (356- and 406-mm) naval shells. These were able to penetrate the lightly armored decks of the old battleships.
Concept of a Japanese invasion of Hawaii[edit]
At several stages during 1941, Japan's military leaders discussed the possibility of launching an invasion to seize the Hawaiian Islands; this would provide Japan with a strategic base to shield its new empire, deny the United States any bases beyond the West coast and further isolate Australia and New Zealand.
Genda, who saw Hawaii as vital for American operations against Japan after war began, believed Japan must follow any attack on Pearl Harbor with an invasion of Hawaii or risk losing the war. He viewed Hawaii as a base to threaten the west coast of North America, and perhaps as a negotiating tool for ending the war. He believed, following a successful air attack, 10,000-15,000 men could capture Hawaii, and saw the operation as a precursor or alternative to a Japanese invasion of the Philippines. In September 1941, Commander Yasuji Watanabe of the Combined Fleet staff estimated two divisions (30,000 men) and 80 ships, in addition to the carrier strike force, could capture the islands. He identified two possible landing sites, near Haleiwa and Kaneohe Bay, and proposed both be used in an operation that would require up to four weeks with Japanese air superiority.[37]
Although this idea gained some support, it was soon dismissed for several reasons:
Japan's ground forces, logistics, and resources were already fully committed, not only to the Second Sino-Japanese War but also for offensives in Southeast Asia that were planned to occur almost simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack.
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) insisted it needed to focus on operations in China and Southeast Asia, and refused to provide substantial support elsewhere. Because of a lack of cooperation between the services, the IJN never discussed the Hawaiian invasion proposal with the IJA.[37][38]
Most of the senior officers of the Combined Fleet, in particular Admiral Nagano, believed an invasion of Hawaii was too risky.[39][37]
With an invasion ruled out, it was agreed a massive carrier-based three wave airstrike against Pearl Harbor to destroy the Pacific Fleet would be sufficient. Japanese planners knew that Hawaii, with its strategic location in the Central Pacific, would serve as a critical base from which the United States could extend its military power against Japan. However, the confidence of Japan's leaders that the conflict would be over quickly and that the United States would choose to negotiate a compromise, rather than fight a long, bloody war, overrode this concern.[40][41][42][43]
Watanabe's superior, Captain Kameto Kuroshima, who believed the invasion plan unrealistic, after the war called his rejection of it the "biggest mistake" of his life.[37]
Strike force[edit]
Main articles: Carrier Striking Task Force and Attack on Pearl Harbor order of battle
Admiral Chuichi Nagumo
On November 26, 1941, the day the Hull note (which the Japanese leaders saw as an unproductive and old proposal) was received, the carrier force under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (already assembled in Hitokappu Wan) sortied for Hawaii under strict radio silence.
In 1941, Japan was one of the few countries capable of carrier aviation.[44] The Kido Butai, the Combined Fleet's main carrier force of six aircraft carriers (at the time, the most powerful carrier force with the greatest concentration of air power in the history of naval warfare),[45] embarked 359 airplanes,[46] organized as the First Air Fleet. The carriers Akagi (flag), Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, and the newest, Shōkaku and Zuikaku, had 135 Mitsubishi A6M Type 0 fighters (Allied codename "Zeke", commonly called "Zero"), 171 Nakajima B5N Type 97 torpedo bombers (Allied codename "Kate"), and 108 Aichi D3A Type 99 dive bombers (Allied codename "Val") aboard. Two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, nine destroyers, and three fleet submarines provided escort and screening. In addition, the Advanced Expeditionary Force included 20 fleet and five two-man Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarines, which were to gather intelligence and sink U.S. vessels attempting to flee Pearl Harbor during or soon after the attack. It also had eight oilers for underway fueling.[47]
Execute order[edit]
Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano
On December 1, 1941, after the striking force was en route, Chief of Staff Nagano gave a verbal directive to the commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, informing him:
Japan has decided to open hostilities against the United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands early in December...Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that all elements of the Combined Fleet are to be assembled and returned to their bases in accordance with separate orders.[48] [The Kido Butai will] proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day.[48]
Upon completion, the force was to return to Japan, re-equip, and re-deploy for "Second Phase Operations".
Finally, Order number 9, issued on 1 December 1941 by Nagano, instructed Yamamoto to crush hostile naval and air forces in Asia, the Pacific and Hawaii, promptly seize the main U.S., British, and Dutch bases in East Asia and "capture and secure the key areas of the southern regions".[48]
On the home leg, the force was ordered to be alert for tracking and counterattacks by the Americans, and to return to the friendly base in the Marshall Islands, rather than the Home Islands.[49]
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commanding general of the Army post at Pearl Harbor
Lack of preparation[edit]
U.S. civil and military intelligence had, amongst them, good information suggesting additional Japanese aggression throughout the summer and fall before the attack. At the time, no reports specifically indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor. Public press reports during summer and fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the growing tension in the Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were separately and explicitly warned[50] war with Japan was expected in the very near future, and it was preferred Japan make the first hostile act.[51] It was felt war would most probably start with attacks in the Far East: the Philippines,[52] Indochina, Thailand, or the Russian Far East; Pearl Harbor was never mentioned as a potential target. The warnings were not specific to any area, noting only that war with Japan was expected in the near future and all commands should act accordingly. Had any of these warnings produced an active alert status in Hawaii, the attack might have been resisted more effectively, and perhaps resulted in less death and damage. On the other hand, recall of men on shore leave to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties from bombs and torpedoes, or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors (as the attack alert status would have required),[53] or killed (in their obsolete aircraft) by more experienced Japanese aviators. When the attack actually arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared: anti-aircraft weapons not manned, most ammunition locked down, anti-submarine measures not implemented (e.g., no torpedo nets in the harbor), combat air patrol not flying, available scouting aircraft not in the air at first light, Air Corps aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce sabotage risks (not ready to fly at a moment's warning), and so on.
By 1941, U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army's Signal Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence's OP-20-G, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval cipher traffic, though nothing actually carrying significant information about Japanese military plans in 1940-41. Decryption and distribution of this intelligence, including such decrypts as were available, was capricious and sporadic, some of which can be accounted for by lack of resources and manpower.[54][page needed] At best, the information available to decision makers in Washington was fragmentary, contradictory, or poorly distributed, and was almost entirely raw, without supporting analysis. It was thus, incompletely understood. Nothing in it pointed directly to an attack at Pearl Harbor,[55] and a lack of awareness of Imperial Navy capabilities led to a widespread underlying belief Pearl Harbor was not a possible attack target. Only one message from the Hawaiian Japanese consulate (sent on 6 December), in a low level consular cipher, included mention of an attack at Pearl; it was not decrypted until 8 December.[56] While the Japanese Diplomatic codes (Purple code) could be read, the current version (JN-25C) of the Japanese Naval code (JN-25) which had replaced JN-25B on 4 December 1941 could not be read until May 1942.
In 1924, General William L. Mitchell produced a 324-page report warning that future wars (including with Japan) would include a new role for aircraft against existing ships and facilities. He even discussed the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, but his warnings were ignored. Navy Secretary Knox had also appreciated the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor in a written analysis shortly after taking office. American commanders had been warned that tests had demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo attacks were possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated this. And in a 1932 fleet problem, a surprise airstrike led by Admiral Harry E. Yarnell had been judged a success and to have caused considerable damage, a finding corroborated in a 1938 exercise by Admiral Ernest King.[57]
Nevertheless, because it was believed Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack (e.g., the shallow water), the Navy did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged to inconvenience ordinary operations. As a result of limited numbers of long-range aircraft (including Army Air Corps bombers), reconnaissance patrols were not being made as often or as far out as required for adequate coverage against possible surprise attack (they improved considerably, with far fewer remaining planes,[citation needed] after the attack). The Navy had 33 PBYs in the islands, but only three on patrol at the time of the attack.[58] Hawaii was low on the priority list for the B-17s finally becoming available for the Pacific, largely because General MacArthur in the Philippines was successfully demanding as many as could be made available to the Pacific (where they were intended as a deterrent). The British, who had contracted for them, even agreed to accept fewer to facilitate this buildup. At the time of the attack, Army and Navy were both on training status rather than operational alert.[citation needed]
There was also confusion about the Army's readiness status as General Short had changed local alert level designations without clearly informing Washington. Most of the Army's mobile anti-aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked down in armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, and in keeping with Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations (e.g., in the late November war warning messages from the Navy and War Departments), guns were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (i.e., on private property)[citation needed]. Additionally, aircraft were parked on airfields to lessen the risk of sabotage, not in anticipation of air attack, in keeping with Short's interpretation of the war warnings.
Chester Nimitz said later, "It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941." Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese approach, he would have sortied to meet them. With the American carriers absent and Kimmel's battleships at a severe disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely result would have been the sinking of the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous casualties (as many as twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could easily be rescued, and six battleships ultimately raised.[59]
See also[edit]
World War II portal
Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory
References[edit]
Jump up ^ The effort to establish the Imperial Way (kōdō) had begun with the Second Sino-Japanese War (called seisen, or "holy war", by Japan). Bix, Herbert, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, p.326-327.
Jump up ^ "Imperial Rescript to Withdraw from League of Nations". Retrieved 2009-10-24.
Jump up ^ Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean Burns, Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations: 1932-1988, 2003, p. 504.
Jump up ^ Parkes, Henry Bamford. Recent America, A History Of The United States Since 1900 (Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1946)Page. 635-645
Jump up ^ Shift Of Our Fleet To Atlantic Studied, New York Times, June 23, 1940
Jump up ^ Joint Congressional Hearings on the Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 40, ^p.506, "Conclusions Restated With Supporting Evidence".
Jump up ^ Richardson, "On the Treadmill", pp.425 and 434; Baker, "Human Smoke", p.239, ISBN 1-4165-6784-4
Jump up ^ Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, translated by Wen Ha-hsiung. History of The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), 2nd ed. (Taipei, Republic of China: Chung Wu Publishing, 1971), p.317, "Invasion of French Indochina".
Jump up ^ Barnhart, Michael A. (1987). Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941. Ithaca: Cornell UP. pp. 144–145.
Jump up ^ Bix, Herbert, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001, p.395
^ Jump up to: a b Chapter V: The Decision for War Morton, Louis. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
Jump up ^ US freezes Japanese assets and why
Jump up ^ Bix, p. 401; Worth, Roland H., Jr., No Choice But War: the United States Embargo Against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 1995). ISBN 0-7864-0141-9
Jump up ^ Yuichi Arima, The Way to Pearl Harbor: U.S. vs Japan, ICE Case Studies Number 118, December, 2003 (accessed April 10, 2006).
Jump up ^ Barnhart, Michael A. (1987). Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. p. 166.
Jump up ^ Peattie, Mark R. & Evans, David C. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997).
Jump up ^ Evans & Peattie 2012, p. 489.
Jump up ^ La Feber, Walter. Polenberg, Richard The American Century, A History Of The United States Since the 1890s (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), pp. 243-247
Jump up ^ Memorandum 95 Regarding a Conversation, Between the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), and Mr. Kurusu Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (Department of State, Washington, DC 1943)
Jump up ^ Bix, Hirohito, pp.411 & 745.
Jump up ^ Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 1998, p.44
Jump up ^ Wetzler, op.cit., pp.29 & 35
Jump up ^ Wetzler, p.39.[citation not found]
Jump up ^ OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (Department of State, Washington, DC 1943)
Jump up ^ Bix, op.cit., pp.430-431
Jump up ^ Wetzler, p. 39
Jump up ^ Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945 (Random House, 1970), pp.152-53
Jump up ^ Toland, op.cit., p.167
Jump up ^ Prange, Gordon W., Dillon, Katherine V., and Goldstein, Donald M. At Dawn We Slept (New York: Penguin, 1991), p.151.
Jump up ^ Prange et al., At Dawn We Slept, pp.151-2.
Jump up ^ Evans, David C.; Peattie, Mark R. (2012). Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941. Seaforth Publishing. pp. 462. 489. ISBN 978-1-84832-159-5.
Jump up ^ Both U.S. and Japanese, as it turns out. Miller, Edward S. (2007). War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-500-7.
Jump up ^ Willmott, Barrier; Miller, War Plan Orange.; Peattie & Evans, Kaigun; Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power on History.
^ Jump up to: a b Prange, Gordon, At Dawn We Slept, pp.25-27
Jump up ^ Lord, Walter (2012). Day of Infamy. Open Road Media. p. 14. ISBN 1453238425.
Jump up ^ Toland, op.cit., p.160
^ Jump up to: a b c d Caravaggio, Angelo N. (Winter 2014). ""Winning" the Pacific War". Naval War College Review. 67 (1): 85–118. Archived from the original on 2014-07-14.
Jump up ^ It was for these reasons IJA also rejected proposals for an invasion of Australia.
Jump up ^ For a more detailed analysis of whether a Japanese invasion of Hawaii could have been successful, see Invasion: Pearl Harbor! at Combinedfleet.com.
Jump up ^ In late April or early May of 1942, Yamamoto reportedly secured a tentative agreement that an invasion of Hawaii would be launched after military operations in the Western Pacific were completed and additional ground troops and warships were available. By mid-1942, Yamamoto had assembled sufficient forces for an invasion of the Midway Atoll, which was expected to serve as a base for further attacks against Hawaii. However, in the subsequent Battle of Midway, the loss of four of Japan's six largest aircraft carriers made any future air and naval operations (let alone an invasion) against Hawaii impossible.
Jump up ^ Goldstein, Donald M. (1993). The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans. Washington: Brassey's.
Jump up ^ Weinberg, Gerhard L., A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), pp. 260, 323, and 329-330.
Jump up ^ Willmott, H.P. The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942. (United States Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1983)[page needed]
Jump up ^ Evans, David C. (1997). Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Japanese Imperial Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute. p. 472.
Jump up ^ US Department of the Navy description of Pearl Harbor Attack
Jump up ^ The figure of 414 includes scout planes operated by escorts, which were not part of the strike force.
Jump up ^ Order of Battle for Pearl Harbor Attack
^ Jump up to: a b c US Army. Japanese monograph #97. Pearl Harbor Operations: General Outline of Orders and Plans, 5 November to 2 December 1941. Washington, D.C.: US dept of the Army.
Jump up ^ Japanese Monograph No. 97
Jump up ^ November 28, 1941, message
Jump up ^ ibiblio.org
Jump up ^ War warning, dated 27 November 1941
Jump up ^ Technically called "Condition Zed". Prange et al. op. cit.
Jump up ^ Kahn, David. The Codebreakers; Prange et al., Peaarl Harbor: The Verdict of History.
Jump up ^ In August 1941 Yugoslav/English agent Dušan Popov submitted a report to the F.B.I. J. Edgar Hoover including a questionnaire about Pearl Harbor from the Japanese.
Jump up ^ Costello, John (1994). Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill – the Shocking Truth Revealed. New York: Pocket Books. p. 174. ISBN 978-0-671-76985-7.
Jump up ^ Rebekah. "The Day that Will Live in Infamy…but it didn't have to". The USS Flier Project. Retrieved 7 August 2012.
Jump up ^ Naval Air Station, Kanoehe Bay, during the Pearl Harbor Raid Archived 2012-01-07 at the Wayback Machine.
Jump up ^ Gordon William Prange; Donald M. Goldstein; Katherine V. Dillon. Miracle at Midway. McGraw-Hill; 1982. ISBN 978-0-07-050672-5. p. 9.
[hide]
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