Pourquoi le behaviorisme ne peut pas expliquer nos pensées et nos sentiments ?
In philosophy

Behaviorism is a psychological movement that can be contrasted with philosophy of mind. The basic premise of behaviorism is that the study of behavior should be a natural science, such as chemistry or physics. Initially behaviorism rejected any reference to hypothetical inner states of organisms as causes for their behavior, but B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism reintroduced reference to inner states and also advocated for the study of thoughts and feelings as behaviors subject to the same mechanisms as external behavior. Behaviorism takes a functional view of behavior. According to Edmund Fantino and colleagues: "Behavior analysis has much to offer the study of phenomena normally dominated by cognitive and social psychologists. We hope that successful application of behavioral theory and methodology will not only shed light on central problems in judgment and choice but will also generate greater appreciation of the behavioral approach."

Behaviorist sentiments are not uncommon within philosophy of language and analytic philosophy. It is sometimes argued that Ludwig Wittgenstein defended a logical behaviorist position (e.g., the beetle in a box argument). In logical positivism (as held, e.g., by Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel), the meaning of psychological statements are their verification conditions, which consist of performed overt behavior. W. V. O. Quine made use of a type of behaviorism, influenced by some of Skinner's ideas, in his own work on language. Quine's work in semantics differed substantially from the empiricist semantics of Carnap which he attempted to create an alternative to, couching his semantic theory in references to physical objects rather than sensations. Gilbert Ryle defended a distinct strain of philosophical behaviorism, sketched in his book The Concept of Mind. Ryle's central claim was that instances of dualism frequently represented " category mistakes ", and hence that they were really misunderstandings of the use of ordinary language. Daniel Dennett likewise acknowledges himself to be a type of behaviorist, though he offers extensive criticism of radical behaviorism and refutes Skinner's rejection of the value of intentional idioms and the possibility of free will.

This is Dennett's main point in "Skinner Skinned." Dennett argues that there is a crucial difference between explaining and explaining away... If our explanation of apparently rational behavior turns out to be extremely simple, we may want to say that the behavior was not really rational after all. But if the explanation is very complex and intricate, we may want to say not that the behavior is not rational, but that we now have a better understanding of what rationality consists in. (Compare: if we find out how a computer program solves problems in linear algebra, we don't say it's not really solving them, we just say we know how it does it. On the other hand, in cases like Weizenbaum's ELIZA program, the explanation of how the computer carries on a conversation is so simple that the right thing to say seems to be that the machine isn't really carrying on a conversation, it's just a trick.)
Le behaviorisme

La position peut être énoncée comme suit : ce qui est ressenti ou observé par introspection n'est pas un monde non physique de conscience, d'esprit ou de vie mentale, mais le propre corps de l'observateur. Cela ne signifie pas, comme je le montrerai plus tard, que l'introspection est une forme de recherche psychologique, ni ne signifie (et c'est le cœur de l'argument) que ce qui est ressenti ou observé par introspection sont les causes du comportement. Un organisme se comporte de telle manière en raison de sa structure actuelle, mais la majeure partie échappe à l'introspection. Pour l'instant, nous devons nous contenter, comme le behavioriste méthodologique le souligne, de l'histoire génétique et environnementale d'une personne. Ce qui est observé par introspection ne sont que certains produits collatéraux de ces histoires.... De cette façon, nous réparons les principaux dommages causés par le mentalisme. Lorsque ce qu'une personne fait est attribué à ce qui se passe à l'intérieur d'elle, l'investigation est interrompue. Pourquoi expliquer l'explication ? Pendant vingt-cinq cents ans, les gens se sont préoccupés des sentiments et de la vie mentale, mais seulement récemment un intérêt a été manifesté pour une analyse plus précise du rôle de l'environnement. L'ignorance de ce rôle a conduit en premier lieu à des fictions mentales, et elle a été perpétuée par les pratiques explicatives qu'elles ont engendrées.
### Query ###
Pourquoi le behaviorisme ne peut pas expliquer nos pensées et nos sentiments ?

### Main Text ###
In philosophy

Behaviorism is a psychological movement that can be contrasted with philosophy of mind. The basic premise of behaviorism is that the study of behavior should be a natural science, such as chemistry or physics. Initially behaviorism rejected any reference to hypothetical inner states of organisms as causes for their behavior, but B.F. Skinner's radical behaviorism reintroduced reference to inner states and also advocated for the study of thoughts and feelings as behaviors subject to the same mechanisms as external behavior. Behaviorism takes a functional view of behavior. According to Edmund Fantino and colleagues: "Behavior analysis has much to offer the study of phenomena normally dominated by cognitive and social psychologists. We hope that successful application of behavioral theory and methodology will not only shed light on central problems in judgment and choice but will also generate greater appreciation of the behavioral approach."

Behaviorist sentiments are not uncommon within philosophy of language and analytic philosophy. It is sometimes argued that Ludwig Wittgenstein defended a logical behaviorist position (e.g., the beetle in a box argument). In logical positivism (as held, e.g., by Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel), the meaning of psychological statements are their verification conditions, which consist of performed overt behavior. W. V. O. Quine made use of a type of behaviorism, influenced by some of Skinner's ideas, in his own work on language. Quine's work in semantics differed substantially from the empiricist semantics of Carnap which he attempted to create an alternative to, couching his semantic theory in references to physical objects rather than sensations. Gilbert Ryle defended a distinct strain of philosophical behaviorism, sketched in his book The Concept of Mind. Ryle's central claim was that instances of dualism frequently represented " category mistakes ", and hence that they were really misunderstandings of the use of ordinary language. Daniel Dennett likewise acknowledges himself to be a type of behaviorist, though he offers extensive criticism of radical behaviorism and refutes Skinner's rejection of the value of intentional idioms and the possibility of free will.

This is Dennett's main point in "Skinner Skinned." Dennett argues that there is a crucial difference between explaining and explaining away... If our explanation of apparently rational behavior turns out to be extremely simple, we may want to say that the behavior was not really rational after all. But if the explanation is very complex and intricate, we may want to say not that the behavior is not rational, but that we now have a better understanding of what rationality consists in. (Compare: if we find out how a computer program solves problems in linear algebra, we don't say it's not really solving them, we just say we know how it does it. On the other hand, in cases like Weizenbaum's ELIZA program, the explanation of how the computer carries on a conversation is so simple that the right thing to say seems to be that the machine isn't really carrying on a conversation, it's just a trick.)

### Supplementary Text ###
Le behaviorisme

La position peut être énoncée comme suit : ce qui est ressenti ou observé par introspection n'est pas un monde non physique de conscience, d'esprit ou de vie mentale, mais le propre corps de l'observateur. Cela ne signifie pas, comme je le montrerai plus tard, que l'introspection est une forme de recherche psychologique, ni ne signifie (et c'est le cœur de l'argument) que ce qui est ressenti ou observé par introspection sont les causes du comportement. Un organisme se comporte de telle manière en raison de sa structure actuelle, mais la majeure partie échappe à l'introspection. Pour l'instant, nous devons nous contenter, comme le behavioriste méthodologique le souligne, de l'histoire génétique et environnementale d'une personne. Ce qui est observé par introspection ne sont que certains produits collatéraux de ces histoires.... De cette façon, nous réparons les principaux dommages causés par le mentalisme. Lorsque ce qu'une personne fait est attribué à ce qui se passe à l'intérieur d'elle, l'investigation est interrompue. Pourquoi expliquer l'explication ? Pendant vingt-cinq cents ans, les gens se sont préoccupés des sentiments et de la vie mentale, mais seulement récemment un intérêt a été manifesté pour une analyse plus précise du rôle de l'environnement. L'ignorance de ce rôle a conduit en premier lieu à des fictions mentales, et elle a été perpétuée par les pratiques explicatives qu'elles ont engendrées.

### Draft ###

### 1. Query Parsing

"Pourquoi le behaviorisme ne peut pas expliquer nos pensées et nos sentiments ?"

→ Why can't behaviorism explain our thoughts and feelings?

Key assumption to challenge: behaviorism completely rejects internal states. Actually... ?

### 2. Initial Assessment

Simple information retrieval? No. Requires philosophical synthesis across:
- Behaviorist theory evolution
- Mind-body problem history  
- Cognitive science developments

Domains: ● Philosophy of mind, ● Psychology history, ◐ Modern behavioral approaches

### 3. Core Limitation Analysis

Classical behaviorism (Watson, early Skinner):
- Observable behavior = only valid data
- Internal states = "pseudo-scientific"
- Stimulus→Response chains sufficient

**Fundamental problem**: ∴ Methodological solipsism about consciousness

Watson's methodological behaviorism: "Give me a dozen healthy infants... and I'll guarantee to take any one... and train him to be anything... regardless of his talents, personality, or race."

? But how train without understanding internal motivational states?

### 4. Theoretical Evolution Track

⟨H≈0.8⟩ Skinner's radical behaviorism... private events as subject to same environmental control as public behavior... verbal behavior analysis... but still no phenomenological access to subjective experience... Dennett's intentional stance vs real patterns... cognitive science emergence challenging behaviorist assumptions... ⟨/H⟩

Timeline:
- 1913: Watson's "Psychology as Behaviorist" 
- 1930s-50s: Behaviorist dominance
- 1960s-70s: Cognitive revolution
- 1980s+: Modern behavioral flexibility

### 5. Technical Limitations

**Missing mechanisms**:
- How do SR+ reinforcement explain complex reasoning?
- Private speech → inner dialogue → abstract thought
- Phenomenological consciousness experience itself

**Example**: Solving mathematical proof vs repeating conditioned response

Behaviorism: Just verbal chains + environmental triggers
Reality: Complex internal symbolic manipulation + subjective awareness

### 6. Philosophical Critique

Ryle's "The Concept of Mind" (1949): 
- "Category confusion" - treating mental as separate substance
- But behaviorism commits category error of its own
- Ignores phenomenological first-person perspective

**Ryle's example**: "I see a face" ≠ "I make facial recognition movements"

### 7. Modern Behavioral Response

Contemporary behavior analysis:
- Contextual behavioral science
- Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)
- Relational frame theory

These acknowledge:
✓ Private events exist
✓ Language/cognition matter  
✓ Subjective experience real

But still ○ on reduction to environmental contingencies

### 8. Synthesis

**Core limitation**: Behaviorism's explanatory gap stems from:

1. **Methodological**: Observable data only
2. **Ontological**: Internal states as reducible
3. **Logical**: Missing bridging concepts

**Key insight** !: Modern behavioral approaches have evolved beyond strict anti-mentalism, but fundamental explanatory limitations remain

**∴ Conclusion**: Classical behaviorism's rejection of consciousness as explanandum creates logical impossibility for comprehensive psychological theory. Contemporary versions maintain some explanatory power but acknowledge limitations.

NB: This represents philosophical progress, not theoretical completeness.

### Answer###
Le behaviorisme classique présente des limitations fondamentales pour expliquer les pensées et les sentiments en raison de sa conception même de la psychologie comme science naturelle. Initialement, le behaviorisme rejetait toute référence aux états internes hypothétiques des organismes comme causes de leur comportement, se concentrant uniquement sur les comportements observables.

Cette approche présente plusieurs problèmes conceptuels. D'une part, elle ignore les mécanismes mentaux qui sous-tendent le comportement complexe. D'autre part, elle ne peut pas expliquer comment les expériences subjectives influencent les décisions et les actions humaines. Les pensées et les sentiments, qui constituent une partie importante de l'expérience humaine, sont considérés comme des phénomènes secondaires ou simplement des comportements verbaux.

Le behaviorisme méthodologique, en se concentrant uniquement sur l'histoire génétique et environnementale d'une personne, manque l'analyse des processus mentaux qui médiatisent entre les stimuli environnementaux et les réponses comportementales. Cette limitation théorique explique en partie pourquoi le behaviorisme a été progressivement dépassé par d'autres approches psychologiques.

Il convient de noter que certaines formes de behaviorisme, notamment l'approche de B.F. Skinner, ont tenté de résoudre ces problèmes en réintroduisant les états internes et en proposant l'étude des pensées et des sentiments comme des comportements soumis aux mêmes mécanismes que les comportements externes. Cependant, cette évolution théorique n'a pas résolu complètement les défis fondamentaux de l'approche behavioriste face à la complexité de l'expérience mentale humaine.