Dans quelle mesure la combinaison de la dette irakienne et du différend sur les quotas pétroliers a-t-elle contribué à l'escalade des tensions entre l'Irak et le Koweït en 1990 ?
Background

Throughout the Cold War, Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union, and there was a history of friction between Iraq and the United States. The US was concerned with Iraq's position on Israeli– Palestinian politics. The US also disliked Iraqi support for Palestinian militant groups, which led to Iraq's inclusion on the developing US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in December 1979.

The US remained officially neutral after Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980, which became the Iran–Iraq War, although it provided resources, political support, and some "non-military" aircraft to Iraq. In March 1982, Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation Undeniable Victory), and the US increased its support for Iraq to prevent Iran from forcing a surrender. In a US bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Ostensibly, this was because of improvement in the regime's record, although former US Assistant Defense Secretary Noel Koch later stated: "No one had any doubts about continued involvement in terrorism... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."

With Iraq's newfound success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales to Iraq reached a record spike in 1982. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein expelled Abu Nidal to Syria at the US's request in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to meet Saddam as a special envoy and to cultivate ties. By the time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was heavily debt-ridden and tensions within society were rising. Most of its debt was owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq's debts to Kuwait amounted to $14 billion. Iraq pressured both nations to forgive the debts, but they refused.

The Iraq–Kuwait border dispute involved Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory. Kuwait had been a part of the Ottoman Empire 's province of Basra, something that Iraq claimed made Kuwait rightful Iraqi territory. Kuwait's ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for Kuwait's foreign affairs to the United Kingdom. The UK drew the border between Kuwait and Iraq in 1922, making Iraq almost entirely landlocked. Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts to secure further provisions in the region.

Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its OPEC quotas for oil production. In order for the cartel to maintain its desired price of $18 per barrel, discipline was required. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait were consistently overproducing; the latter at least in part to repair losses caused by Iranian attacks in the Iran–Iraq War and to pay for the losses of an economic scandal. The result was a slump in the oil price – as low as $10 per barrel ($63/m) – with a resulting loss of $7 billion a year to Iraq, equal to its 1989 balance of payments deficit. Resulting revenues struggled to support the government's basic costs, let alone repair Iraq's damaged infrastructure. Jordan and Iraq both looked for more discipline, with little success. The Iraqi government described it as a form of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait slant-drilling across the border into Iraq's Rumaila oil field. According to oil workers in the area, Iraq's slant drilling claim was fabricated, as "oil flows easily from the Rumaila field without any need for these techniques." At the same time, Saddam looked for closer ties with those Arab states that had supported Iraq in the war. This move was supported by the US, who believed that Iraqi ties with pro-Western Gulf states would help bring and maintain Iraq inside the US' sphere of influence.

In 1989, it appeared that Saudi–Iraqi relations, strong during the war, would be maintained. A pact of non-interference and non-aggression was signed between the countries, followed by a Kuwaiti-Iraqi deal for Iraq to supply Kuwait with water for drinking and irrigation, although a request for Kuwait to lease Iraq Umm Qasr was rejected. Saudi-backed development projects were hampered by Iraq's large debts, even with the demobilization of 200,000 soldiers. Iraq also looked to increase arms production so as to become an exporter, although the success of these projects was also restrained by Iraq's obligations; in Iraq, resentment to OPEC's controls mounted.

Iraq's relations with its Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, were degraded by mounting violence in Iraq against expatriate groups, who were well-employed during the war, by unemployed Iraqis, among them demobilized soldiers. These events drew little notice outside the Arab world because of fast-moving events directly related to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. However, the US did begin to condemn Iraq's human rights record, including the well-known use of torture. The UK also condemned the execution of Farzad Bazoft, a journalist working for the British newspaper The Observer. Following Saddam's declaration that "binary chemical weapons" would be used on Israel if it used military force against Iraq, Washington halted part of its funding. A UN mission to the Israeli-occupied territories, where riots had resulted in Palestinian deaths, was vetoed by the US, making Iraq deeply skeptical of US foreign policy aims in the region, combined with the reliance of the US on Middle Eastern energy reserves.

In early July 1990, Iraq complained about Kuwait's behavior, such as not respecting their quota, and openly threatened to take military action. On the 23rd, the CIA reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border, and the US naval fleet in the Persian Gulf was placed on alert. Saddam believed an anti-Iraq conspiracy was developing – Kuwait had begun talks with Iran, and Iraq's rival Syria had arranged a visit to Egypt. On 15 July 1990, Saddam's government laid out its combined objections to the Arab League, including that policy moves were costing Iraq $1 billion a year, that Kuwait was still using the Rumaila oil field, and that loans made by the UAE and Kuwait could not be considered debts to its "Arab brothers". He threatened force against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: "The policies of some Arab rulers are American... They are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security." The US sent aerial refuelling planes and combat ships to the Persian Gulf in response to these threats. Discussions in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, mediated on the Arab League's behalf by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, were held on 31 July and led Mubarak to believe that a peaceful course could be established.

It was revealed during Saddam Hussein's 2003–2004 interrogation following his capture that in addition to economic disputes, an insulting exchange between the Kuwaiti emir Al Sabah and the Iraqi foreign minister – during which Saddam claimed that the emir stated his intention to turn "every Iraqi woman into a $10 prostitute" by bankrupting the country – was a decisive factor in triggering the Iraqi invasion.

On the 25th, Saddam met with April Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, in Baghdad. The Iraqi leader attacked American policy with regards to Kuwait and the UAE:

So what can it mean when America says it will now protect its friends? It can only mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made has encouraged the UAE and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights... If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you... We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year made it apparent that America did not regard us as friends.

Glaspie replied:

I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait... Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the UAE and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned.

Saddam stated that he would attempt last-ditch negotiations with the Kuwaitis but Iraq "would not accept death."

According to Glaspie's own account, she stated in reference to the precise border between Kuwait and Iraq, "... that she had served in Kuwait 20 years before; 'then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs'." Glaspie similarly believed that war was not imminent.

On 26 July 1990, only a few days before the Iraqi invasion, OPEC officials said that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had agreed to a proposal to limit their oil output to 1.5 million barrels (240,000 m) per day, "down from the nearly 2 million barrels a day they had each been pumping," thus potentially settling differences over oil policy between Kuwait and Iraq.
Tensions avec le Koweït : 1988–1990

La fin de la guerre avec l'Iran a permis d'approfondir les tensions latentes entre l'Irak et son riche voisin, le Koweït. Saddam a exhorté les Koweïtiens à renoncer à la dette irakienne accumulée pendant la guerre, soit 30 milliards de dollars, mais ils ont refusé. Saddam a incité les pays exportateurs de pétrole à augmenter les prix du pétrole en réduisant la production ; le Koweït a refusé, puis a dirigé l'opposition aux réductions demandées par Saddam. Le Koweït pompait de grandes quantités de pétrole, maintenant ainsi les prix bas, alors que l'Irak avait besoin de vendre du pétrole à des prix élevés pour rembourser son énorme dette.

Saddam avait constamment affirmé que le Koweït faisait historiquement partie intégrante de l'Irak et qu'il n'était né qu'à la suite d'une ingérence du gouvernement britannique ; écho d'une conviction que les nationalistes irakiens soutenaient depuis cinquante ans. Cette conviction était l'un des rares points de foi unissant la scène politique d'une nation profondément divisée sur les plans sociaux, ethniques, religieux et idéologiques. L'ampleur des réserves pétrolières du Koweït (avec une population de 2 millions à côté des 25 millions de l'Irak) était à peu près égale à celle de l'Irak. Ensemble, l'Irak et le Koweït assuraient environ 20 % des réserves pétrolières mondiales connues ; l'Arabie saoudite en détenait 25 %. Saddam disposait toujours d'une armée expérimentée et bien équipée, qu'il utilisait pour influencer les affaires régionales. Il a ensuite ordonné le déploiement de troupes à la frontière entre l'Irak et le Koweït.

Alors que les relations entre l'Irak et le Koweït se détérioraient rapidement, Saddam recevait des informations contradictoires sur la manière dont les États-Unis réagiraient à la perspective d'une invasion. En effet, Washington prenait depuis une dizaine d'années des mesures pour cultiver une relation constructive avec l'Irak. L'administration Reagan a accordé à l'Irak environ 4 milliards de dollars de crédits agricoles pour le soutenir contre l'Iran. L'Irak de Saddam est devenu "le troisième plus grand bénéficiaire de l'aide américaine".

En réaction aux critiques occidentales en avril 1990, Saddam a menacé de détruire la moitié d'Israël avec des armes chimiques si elle attaquait l'Irak. En mai 1990, il a critiqué le soutien américain à Israël, avertissant que "les États-Unis ne peuvent pas maintenir une telle politique tout en professant une amitié envers les Arabes". En juillet 1990, il a menacé de recourir à la force contre le Koweït et les Émirats arabes unis (EAU), affirmant que "les politiques de certains dirigeants arabes sont américaines... Ils sont inspirés par l'Amérique pour saper les intérêts et la sécurité arabes". Les États-Unis ont envoyé des avions de combat et des navires de guerre dans le golfe Persique en réponse à ces menaces.

L'ambassadrice américaine en Irak, April Glaspie, a rencontré Saddam dans une réunion d'urgence le 25 juillet 1990, où le dirigeur irakien a attaqué la politique américaine concernant le Koweït et les Émirats arabes unis (EAU) :

Alors, que peut signifier quand l'Amérique dit qu'elle protégera désormais ses amis ? Cela ne peut signifier qu'un préjugé contre l'Irak. Cette position, ainsi que les manœuvres et les déclarations qui ont été faites, ont encouragé les ÉAU et le Koweït à ne pas tenir compte des droits irakiens. Si vous utilisez la pression, nous exercerons la pression et la force. Nous savons que vous pouvez nous nuire, bien que nous ne vous menacions pas. Mais nous aussi, nous pouvons vous nuire. Tout le monde peut causer du tort selon ses capacités et sa taille. Nous ne pouvons pas venir jusqu'à vous aux États-Unis, mais des Arabes individuels peuvent vous atteindre. Nous ne plaçons pas l'Amérique parmi nos ennemis. Nous la plaçons là où nous voulons que soient nos amis et nous essayons d'être amis. Mais les déclarations américaines répétées l'année dernière ont montré que l'Amérique ne nous considérait pas comme des amis.

Glaspie a répondu :

Je sais que vous avez besoin de fonds. Nous comprenons cela et notre opinion est que vous devriez avoir la possibilité de reconstruire votre pays. Mais nous n'avons aucune opinion sur les conflits arabes-arabes, comme votre différend frontalier avec le Koweït.... Honnêtement, nous ne pouvons constater que vous avez déployé d'importantes troupes dans le sud. Cela ne serait normalement pas de notre ressort. Mais lorsque cela se produit dans le contexte de ce que vous avez dit à l'occasion de votre fête nationale, lorsque nous lisons les détails dans les deux lettres du ministre des Affaires étrangères, lorsque nous voyons le point de vue irakien selon lequel les mesures prises par les ÉAU et le Koweït sont, en fin de compte, parallèles à une agression militaire contre l'Irak, alors il serait raisonnable pour moi d'être préoccupée.

Saddam a déclaré qu'il tenterait des négociations de dernière minute avec les Koweïtiens, mais que l'Irak "n'accepterait pas la mort". Les responsables américains ont tenté de maintenir une ligne conciliante avec l'Irak, indiquant que, bien que George H. W. Bush et James Baker ne souhaitaient pas recourir à la force, ils ne prendraient aucune position sur le différend frontalier entre l'Irak et le Koweït et ne souhaitaient pas s'impliquer. Plus tard, l'Irak et le Koweït se sont rencontrés pour une dernière session de négociation, qui a échoué. Saddam a alors envoyé ses troupes au Koweït. Alors que les tensions entre Washington et Saddam commençaient à s'intensifier, l'Union soviétique, sous la direction de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, a renforcé ses relations militaires avec le dirigeant irakien, lui fournissant des conseillers militaires, des armes et de l'aide.
### Query ###
Dans quelle mesure la combinaison de la dette irakienne et du différend sur les quotas pétroliers a-t-elle contribué à l'escalade des tensions entre l'Irak et le Koweït en 1990 ?

### Main Text ###
Background

Throughout the Cold War, Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union, and there was a history of friction between Iraq and the United States. The US was concerned with Iraq's position on Israeli– Palestinian politics. The US also disliked Iraqi support for Palestinian militant groups, which led to Iraq's inclusion on the developing US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in December 1979.

The US remained officially neutral after Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980, which became the Iran–Iraq War, although it provided resources, political support, and some "non-military" aircraft to Iraq. In March 1982, Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation Undeniable Victory), and the US increased its support for Iraq to prevent Iran from forcing a surrender. In a US bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Ostensibly, this was because of improvement in the regime's record, although former US Assistant Defense Secretary Noel Koch later stated: "No one had any doubts about continued involvement in terrorism... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."

With Iraq's newfound success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales to Iraq reached a record spike in 1982. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein expelled Abu Nidal to Syria at the US's request in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to meet Saddam as a special envoy and to cultivate ties. By the time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was heavily debt-ridden and tensions within society were rising. Most of its debt was owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq's debts to Kuwait amounted to $14 billion. Iraq pressured both nations to forgive the debts, but they refused.

The Iraq–Kuwait border dispute involved Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory. Kuwait had been a part of the Ottoman Empire 's province of Basra, something that Iraq claimed made Kuwait rightful Iraqi territory. Kuwait's ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for Kuwait's foreign affairs to the United Kingdom. The UK drew the border between Kuwait and Iraq in 1922, making Iraq almost entirely landlocked. Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts to secure further provisions in the region.

Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its OPEC quotas for oil production. In order for the cartel to maintain its desired price of $18 per barrel, discipline was required. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait were consistently overproducing; the latter at least in part to repair losses caused by Iranian attacks in the Iran–Iraq War and to pay for the losses of an economic scandal. The result was a slump in the oil price – as low as $10 per barrel ($63/m) – with a resulting loss of $7 billion a year to Iraq, equal to its 1989 balance of payments deficit. Resulting revenues struggled to support the government's basic costs, let alone repair Iraq's damaged infrastructure. Jordan and Iraq both looked for more discipline, with little success. The Iraqi government described it as a form of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait slant-drilling across the border into Iraq's Rumaila oil field. According to oil workers in the area, Iraq's slant drilling claim was fabricated, as "oil flows easily from the Rumaila field without any need for these techniques." At the same time, Saddam looked for closer ties with those Arab states that had supported Iraq in the war. This move was supported by the US, who believed that Iraqi ties with pro-Western Gulf states would help bring and maintain Iraq inside the US' sphere of influence.

In 1989, it appeared that Saudi–Iraqi relations, strong during the war, would be maintained. A pact of non-interference and non-aggression was signed between the countries, followed by a Kuwaiti-Iraqi deal for Iraq to supply Kuwait with water for drinking and irrigation, although a request for Kuwait to lease Iraq Umm Qasr was rejected. Saudi-backed development projects were hampered by Iraq's large debts, even with the demobilization of 200,000 soldiers. Iraq also looked to increase arms production so as to become an exporter, although the success of these projects was also restrained by Iraq's obligations; in Iraq, resentment to OPEC's controls mounted.

Iraq's relations with its Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, were degraded by mounting violence in Iraq against expatriate groups, who were well-employed during the war, by unemployed Iraqis, among them demobilized soldiers. These events drew little notice outside the Arab world because of fast-moving events directly related to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. However, the US did begin to condemn Iraq's human rights record, including the well-known use of torture. The UK also condemned the execution of Farzad Bazoft, a journalist working for the British newspaper The Observer. Following Saddam's declaration that "binary chemical weapons" would be used on Israel if it used military force against Iraq, Washington halted part of its funding. A UN mission to the Israeli-occupied territories, where riots had resulted in Palestinian deaths, was vetoed by the US, making Iraq deeply skeptical of US foreign policy aims in the region, combined with the reliance of the US on Middle Eastern energy reserves.

In early July 1990, Iraq complained about Kuwait's behavior, such as not respecting their quota, and openly threatened to take military action. On the 23rd, the CIA reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border, and the US naval fleet in the Persian Gulf was placed on alert. Saddam believed an anti-Iraq conspiracy was developing – Kuwait had begun talks with Iran, and Iraq's rival Syria had arranged a visit to Egypt. On 15 July 1990, Saddam's government laid out its combined objections to the Arab League, including that policy moves were costing Iraq $1 billion a year, that Kuwait was still using the Rumaila oil field, and that loans made by the UAE and Kuwait could not be considered debts to its "Arab brothers". He threatened force against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: "The policies of some Arab rulers are American... They are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security." The US sent aerial refuelling planes and combat ships to the Persian Gulf in response to these threats. Discussions in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, mediated on the Arab League's behalf by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, were held on 31 July and led Mubarak to believe that a peaceful course could be established.

It was revealed during Saddam Hussein's 2003–2004 interrogation following his capture that in addition to economic disputes, an insulting exchange between the Kuwaiti emir Al Sabah and the Iraqi foreign minister – during which Saddam claimed that the emir stated his intention to turn "every Iraqi woman into a $10 prostitute" by bankrupting the country – was a decisive factor in triggering the Iraqi invasion.

On the 25th, Saddam met with April Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, in Baghdad. The Iraqi leader attacked American policy with regards to Kuwait and the UAE:

So what can it mean when America says it will now protect its friends? It can only mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made has encouraged the UAE and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights... If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you... We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year made it apparent that America did not regard us as friends.

Glaspie replied:

I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait... Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the UAE and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned.

Saddam stated that he would attempt last-ditch negotiations with the Kuwaitis but Iraq "would not accept death."

According to Glaspie's own account, she stated in reference to the precise border between Kuwait and Iraq, "... that she had served in Kuwait 20 years before; 'then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs'." Glaspie similarly believed that war was not imminent.

On 26 July 1990, only a few days before the Iraqi invasion, OPEC officials said that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had agreed to a proposal to limit their oil output to 1.5 million barrels (240,000 m) per day, "down from the nearly 2 million barrels a day they had each been pumping," thus potentially settling differences over oil policy between Kuwait and Iraq.

### Supplementary Text ###
Tensions avec le Koweït : 1988–1990

La fin de la guerre avec l'Iran a permis d'approfondir les tensions latentes entre l'Irak et son riche voisin, le Koweït. Saddam a exhorté les Koweïtiens à renoncer à la dette irakienne accumulée pendant la guerre, soit 30 milliards de dollars, mais ils ont refusé. Saddam a incité les pays exportateurs de pétrole à augmenter les prix du pétrole en réduisant la production ; le Koweït a refusé, puis a dirigé l'opposition aux réductions demandées par Saddam. Le Koweït pompait de grandes quantités de pétrole, maintenant ainsi les prix bas, alors que l'Irak avait besoin de vendre du pétrole à des prix élevés pour rembourser son énorme dette.

Saddam avait constamment affirmé que le Koweït faisait historiquement partie intégrante de l'Irak et qu'il n'était né qu'à la suite d'une ingérence du gouvernement britannique ; écho d'une conviction que les nationalistes irakiens soutenaient depuis cinquante ans. Cette conviction était l'un des rares points de foi unissant la scène politique d'une nation profondément divisée sur les plans sociaux, ethniques, religieux et idéologiques. L'ampleur des réserves pétrolières du Koweït (avec une population de 2 millions à côté des 25 millions de l'Irak) était à peu près égale à celle de l'Irak. Ensemble, l'Irak et le Koweït assuraient environ 20 % des réserves pétrolières mondiales connues ; l'Arabie saoudite en détenait 25 %. Saddam disposait toujours d'une armée expérimentée et bien équipée, qu'il utilisait pour influencer les affaires régionales. Il a ensuite ordonné le déploiement de troupes à la frontière entre l'Irak et le Koweït.

Alors que les relations entre l'Irak et le Koweït se détérioraient rapidement, Saddam recevait des informations contradictoires sur la manière dont les États-Unis réagiraient à la perspective d'une invasion. En effet, Washington prenait depuis une dizaine d'années des mesures pour cultiver une relation constructive avec l'Irak. L'administration Reagan a accordé à l'Irak environ 4 milliards de dollars de crédits agricoles pour le soutenir contre l'Iran. L'Irak de Saddam est devenu "le troisième plus grand bénéficiaire de l'aide américaine".

En réaction aux critiques occidentales en avril 1990, Saddam a menacé de détruire la moitié d'Israël avec des armes chimiques si elle attaquait l'Irak. En mai 1990, il a critiqué le soutien américain à Israël, avertissant que "les États-Unis ne peuvent pas maintenir une telle politique tout en professant une amitié envers les Arabes". En juillet 1990, il a menacé de recourir à la force contre le Koweït et les Émirats arabes unis (EAU), affirmant que "les politiques de certains dirigeants arabes sont américaines... Ils sont inspirés par l'Amérique pour saper les intérêts et la sécurité arabes". Les États-Unis ont envoyé des avions de combat et des navires de guerre dans le golfe Persique en réponse à ces menaces.

L'ambassadrice américaine en Irak, April Glaspie, a rencontré Saddam dans une réunion d'urgence le 25 juillet 1990, où le dirigeur irakien a attaqué la politique américaine concernant le Koweït et les Émirats arabes unis (EAU) :

Alors, que peut signifier quand l'Amérique dit qu'elle protégera désormais ses amis ? Cela ne peut signifier qu'un préjugé contre l'Irak. Cette position, ainsi que les manœuvres et les déclarations qui ont été faites, ont encouragé les ÉAU et le Koweït à ne pas tenir compte des droits irakiens. Si vous utilisez la pression, nous exercerons la pression et la force. Nous savons que vous pouvez nous nuire, bien que nous ne vous menacions pas. Mais nous aussi, nous pouvons vous nuire. Tout le monde peut causer du tort selon ses capacités et sa taille. Nous ne pouvons pas venir jusqu'à vous aux États-Unis, mais des Arabes individuels peuvent vous atteindre. Nous ne plaçons pas l'Amérique parmi nos ennemis. Nous la plaçons là où nous voulons que soient nos amis et nous essayons d'être amis. Mais les déclarations américaines répétées l'année dernière ont montré que l'Amérique ne nous considérait pas comme des amis.

Glaspie a répondu :

Je sais que vous avez besoin de fonds. Nous comprenons cela et notre opinion est que vous devriez avoir la possibilité de reconstruire votre pays. Mais nous n'avons aucune opinion sur les conflits arabes-arabes, comme votre différend frontalier avec le Koweït.... Honnêtement, nous ne pouvons constater que vous avez déployé d'importantes troupes dans le sud. Cela ne serait normalement pas de notre ressort. Mais lorsque cela se produit dans le contexte de ce que vous avez dit à l'occasion de votre fête nationale, lorsque nous lisons les détails dans les deux lettres du ministre des Affaires étrangères, lorsque nous voyons le point de vue irakien selon lequel les mesures prises par les ÉAU et le Koweït sont, en fin de compte, parallèles à une agression militaire contre l'Irak, alors il serait raisonnable pour moi d'être préoccupée.

Saddam a déclaré qu'il tenterait des négociations de dernière minute avec les Koweïtiens, mais que l'Irak "n'accepterait pas la mort". Les responsables américains ont tenté de maintenir une ligne conciliante avec l'Irak, indiquant que, bien que George H. W. Bush et James Baker ne souhaitaient pas recourir à la force, ils ne prendraient aucune position sur le différend frontalier entre l'Irak et le Koweït et ne souhaitaient pas s'impliquer. Plus tard, l'Irak et le Koweït se sont rencontrés pour une dernière session de négociation, qui a échoué. Saddam a alors envoyé ses troupes au Koweït. Alors que les tensions entre Washington et Saddam commençaient à s'intensifier, l'Union soviétique, sous la direction de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, a renforcé ses relations militaires avec le dirigeant irakien, lui fournissant des conseillers militaires, des armes et de l'aide.

### Draft ###

Query: "Dans quelle mesure la combinaison de la dette irakienne et du différend sur les quotas pétroliers a-t-elle contribué à l'escalade des tensions entre l'Irak et le Koweït en 1990 ?"

Translation check: "To what extent did the combination of Iraqi debt and oil quota disputes contribute to the escalation of tensions between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990?"

→ Key semantic: "en 1990" = temporal precision needed, "combinaison" = synergistic analysis required

### 1. Query Classification

Not simple retrieval. Multi-hop synthesis:
- Economic grievances (debt + oil)  
- Timeline escalation 1988-1990
- Causal weighting assessment
- Regional dynamics context

### 2. Information Architecture

Core domains needed:
├─ Iraqi debt burden post-Iran War ●
├─ OPEC quota system mechanics ◐  
├─ Iraq-Kuwait bilateral tensions ●
└─ Escalation timeline (1990) ●

⟨H≈0.4⟩ Debt mountains from eight-year war... Kuwait pumping past quotas... Saddam's calculations of regional humiliation... the economic noose tightening...

### 3. Memory Triangulation

Iraq-Kuwait tensions 1990:
- Debt: $14B Iraqi debt to Kuwait ●
- Oil quotas: OPEC discipline collapse ◐
- Border disputes: Shatt al-Arab, Rumaila field ●
- Timeline: Gradual escalation 1988-1990 ●

Key inflection points:
- 1988: Iran-Iraq War ends → debt burden acute
- 1989: OPEC quota violations peak
- July 1990: Final escalation phase

### 4. Debt Dimension Analysis

Iraq's post-war financial state:
- $14B debt to Kuwait (primary creditor) ●
- $7B annual OPEC revenue loss ⚠
- Infrastructure reconstruction costs
- Regional arms race financing

Kuwait's position:
- Refused debt forgiveness despite Iraqi requests ●
- Strategic hedging against Iraqi military capacity
- Maintaining oil market share → revenue maximization

### 5. Oil Quota Dynamics

OPEC pricing strategy 1980s:
- $18/barrel target required production discipline
- UAE + Kuwait consistently overproducing ◐
- Result: price collapse to $10/barrel ⚠
- → $7B annual revenue hemorrhage for Iraq

Rumaila field disputes:
- Border oil extraction claims ◐
- "Slant drilling" accusations (Iraq) ○
- Economic warfare framing by Saddam ●

### 6. Escalation Timeline Reconstruction

1988-1989: 
- Iraq seeks debt relief from Gulf states
- Kuwait + UAE resist OPEC discipline  
- Economic pressure mounting on Iraq

1989:
- Saudi-Iraqi relations improve temporarily ●
- Water/oil deals discussed but rejected ◐
- Economic grievances crystallize

Early 1990:
- Iraq threatens military action if economic pressure continues ●
- July 25: US assesses troop movements ◐
- July 26: OPEC output deal collapses ⚠
- July 28: Arab League mediation fails ●

### 7. Causal Weighting Assessment

Debt + Oil Quotas as escalation drivers:

Direct causation: ◐
- Economic pressure created war rationale
- But Saddam always had territorial disputes
- Personal grievances (April Glaspie meeting) decisive? ○

Enabling factors: ●
- Weakened Iraq vulnerable to humiliation
- Kuwait's wealth vs Iraqi debt dependency
- Regional arms race dynamics

### 8. Synthesis

The combination of debt and oil disputes created perfect storm:

Financial asphyxiation → Regional humiliation → Military confrontation

But escalation likely regardless:
- Border disputes pre-existed economic tensions
- Saddam's expansionist tendencies independent of debt
- Economic grievances provided justification, not cause

∴ Debt and oil disputes = major escalation catalysts, not sole drivers

### 9. Answer Construction

P(Debt + Oil quotas significantly contributed) ≈ 0.85
- Economic pressure created war rationale ●
- But personal/political factors decisive ●

Key evidence:
- $14B debt burden + $7B annual OPEC losses ●
- Kuwait's refusal to forgive debt despite improving relations ●  
- Oil quota violations costing Iraq billions ●
- Escalation timeline shows economic grievances → military threats ●

Limitations:
- April Glaspie meeting significance disputed ○
- Personal vs structural factors in decision-making ○
- Regional context (Cold War dynamics) underweighted ◐

Final assessment: Debt and oil disputes were necessary but not sufficient conditions for 1990 Iraq-Kuwait escalation. Created economic pressure cooker but personal grievances and regional dynamics equally important.

### Answer###
La combinaison de la dette irakienne et des différends sur les quotas pétroliers a effectivement joué un rôle déterminant dans l'escalade des tensions entre l'Irak et le Koweït en 1990, bien que d'autres facteurs aient également contribué à cette évolution.

L'aspect économique était particulièrement pesant pour l'Irak. Le pays avait contracté une dette massive de 14 milliards de dollars auprès du Koweït suite à la guerre Iran-Irak. Malgré les appels répétés de Saddam Hussein aux Koweïtiens pour renoncer à cette dette, ces derniers ont systématiquement refusé. Cette situation financière contraignante était aggravée par la politique pétrolière du Koweït. Face à la nécessité de maintenir un prix de 18 dollars le baril pour l'OPEP, les Émirats arabes unis et le Koweït produisaient constamment au-delà de leurs quotas. Cette surproduction, à laquelle l'Irak était opposé, a entraîné une chute du prix du pétrole à 10 dollars le baril, causant une perte annuelle de 7 milliards de dollars pour l'Irak et un déficit de 7 milliards de dollars au niveau des paiements.

Ces pressions économiques se sont manifestées dans une escalade progressive des tensions. En 1989, malgré l'amélioration des relations saoudo-irakiennes et les accords bilatéraux, le Koweït a refusé les demandes irakiennes concernant l'approvisionnement en eau et la location du port d'Umm Qasr. Les hostilités verbales se sont intensifiées en 1990, avec des menaces irakiennes de juillet et la présence de 30 000 soldats irakiens à la frontière. Une session de négociations finales le 26 juillet 1990 s'est soldée par l'échec, précédant l'invasion irakienne du Koweït.

Cette situation illustre comment les facteurs économiques peuvent créer des dynamiques géopolitiques complexes, les dettes et les politiques pétrolières servant de catalyseurs à des conflits plus larges d'influence régionale.