Comment ça se fait que le Soudan était pote avec la Chine pour l'argent, mais maintenant ils se battent avec l'Éthiopie pour l'eau et que tout le monde s'en fout ?
Foreign relations

Sudan has had a troubled relationship with many of its neighbours and much of the international community, owing to what is viewed as its radical Islamic stance. For much of the 1990s, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia formed an ad hoc alliance called the "Front Line States" with support from the United States to check the influence of the National Islamic Front government. The Sudanese Government supported anti-Ugandan rebel groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

As the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum gradually emerged as a real threat to the region and the world, the U.S. began to list Sudan on its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. After the US listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, the NIF decided to develop relations with Iraq, and later Iran, the two most controversial countries in the region.

From the mid-1990s, Sudan gradually began to moderate its positions as a result of increased U.S. pressure following the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, in Tanzania and Kenya, and the new development of oil fields previously in rebel hands. Sudan also has a territorial dispute with Egypt over the Hala'ib Triangle. Since 2003, the foreign relations of Sudan had centred on the support for ending the Second Sudanese Civil War and condemnation of government support for militias in the war in Darfur.

Sudan has extensive economic relations with China. China obtains ten percent of its oil from Sudan. According to a former Sudanese government minister, China is Sudan's largest supplier of arms.

In December 2005, Sudan became one of the few states to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

In 2015, Sudan participated in the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen against the Shia Houthis and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was deposed in the 2011 uprising.

In June 2019, Sudan was suspended from the African Union over the lack of progress towards the establishment of a civilian-led transitional authority since its initial meeting following the coup d'état of 11 April 2019.

In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Sudan, have signed a joint letter to the UNHRC defending China's treatment of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region.

On 23 October 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Sudan will start to normalize ties with Israel, making it the third Arab state to do so as part of the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords. On 14 December the U.S. Government removed Sudan from its State Sponsor of Terrorism list; as part of the deal, Sudan agreed to pay $335 million in compensation to victims of the 1998 embassy bombings.

The dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam escalated in 2021. An advisor to the Sudanese leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan spoke of a water war "that would be more horrible than one could imagine".

In February 2022, it is reported that a Sudanese envoy has visited Israel to promote ties between the countries.

In the early months of 2023, fighting reignited, primarily between the military forces of Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the army chief and de facto head of state, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces led by his rival, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. As a result, the U.S. and most European countries have shut down their embassies in Khartoum and have attempted evacuations. In 2023, it was estimated that there were 16,000 Americans in Sudan who needed to be evacuated. In absence of an official evacuation plan from the U.S. State Department, many Americans have been forced to turn to other nations' embassies for guidance, with many fleeing to Nairobi. Other African countries and humanitarian groups have tried to help. The Turkish embassy has reportedly allowed Americans to join its evacuation efforts for its own citizens. The TRAKboys, a South-Africa based political organization which came into conflict with the Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor operating in Sudan since 2017, has been assisting with the evacuation of both Black Americans and Sudanese citizens to safe locations in South Africa.

On April 15, 2024, France is hosting an international conference on Sudan, marking the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of war in the northeast African nation, which has resulted in a humanitarian and political crisis. The country is calling for support from the global community, aiming to draw attention to a crisis that officials believe has been overshadowed by ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.
Litige concernant le partage de l'eau

L'eau du Nil affecte la politique de l'Afrique de l'Est et de la Corne de l'Afrique depuis des décennies. Le différend entre l'Égypte et l'Éthiopie concernant le barrage de la Renaissance éthiopienne, d'un coût de 4,5 milliards de dollars, est devenu une préoccupation nationale dans les deux pays, attisant le patriotisme, des craintes profondes et même des murmures de guerre. Des pays, dont l'Ouganda, le Soudan, l'Éthiopie et le Kenya, se sont plaints de la domination égyptienne de ses ressources en eau. L'Initiative du bassin du Nil promeut une coopération pacifique entre ces États.

Plusieurs tentatives ont été faites pour établir des accords entre les pays partageant les eaux du Nil. Le 14 mai 2010 à Entebbe, en Ouganda, l'Éthiopie, le Rwanda et la Tanzanie ont signé un nouvel accord sur le partage de l'eau du Nil, bien que cet accord ait suscité une forte opposition de la part de l'Égypte et du Soudan. Idéalement, de tels accords internationaux devraient promouvoir une utilisation équitable et efficace des ressources en eau du bassin du Nil. Sans une meilleure compréhension de la disponibilité future des ressources en eau du Nil, il est possible que des conflits surviennent entre ces pays qui dépendent du Nil pour leur approvisionnement en eau, leur développement économique et social.
### Query ###
Comment ça se fait que le Soudan était pote avec la Chine pour l'argent, mais maintenant ils se battent avec l'Éthiopie pour l'eau et que tout le monde s'en fout ?

### Main Text ###
Foreign relations

Sudan has had a troubled relationship with many of its neighbours and much of the international community, owing to what is viewed as its radical Islamic stance. For much of the 1990s, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia formed an ad hoc alliance called the "Front Line States" with support from the United States to check the influence of the National Islamic Front government. The Sudanese Government supported anti-Ugandan rebel groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

As the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum gradually emerged as a real threat to the region and the world, the U.S. began to list Sudan on its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. After the US listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, the NIF decided to develop relations with Iraq, and later Iran, the two most controversial countries in the region.

From the mid-1990s, Sudan gradually began to moderate its positions as a result of increased U.S. pressure following the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, in Tanzania and Kenya, and the new development of oil fields previously in rebel hands. Sudan also has a territorial dispute with Egypt over the Hala'ib Triangle. Since 2003, the foreign relations of Sudan had centred on the support for ending the Second Sudanese Civil War and condemnation of government support for militias in the war in Darfur.

Sudan has extensive economic relations with China. China obtains ten percent of its oil from Sudan. According to a former Sudanese government minister, China is Sudan's largest supplier of arms.

In December 2005, Sudan became one of the few states to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

In 2015, Sudan participated in the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen against the Shia Houthis and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was deposed in the 2011 uprising.

In June 2019, Sudan was suspended from the African Union over the lack of progress towards the establishment of a civilian-led transitional authority since its initial meeting following the coup d'état of 11 April 2019.

In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Sudan, have signed a joint letter to the UNHRC defending China's treatment of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region.

On 23 October 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Sudan will start to normalize ties with Israel, making it the third Arab state to do so as part of the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords. On 14 December the U.S. Government removed Sudan from its State Sponsor of Terrorism list; as part of the deal, Sudan agreed to pay $335 million in compensation to victims of the 1998 embassy bombings.

The dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam escalated in 2021. An advisor to the Sudanese leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan spoke of a water war "that would be more horrible than one could imagine".

In February 2022, it is reported that a Sudanese envoy has visited Israel to promote ties between the countries.

In the early months of 2023, fighting reignited, primarily between the military forces of Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the army chief and de facto head of state, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces led by his rival, Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. As a result, the U.S. and most European countries have shut down their embassies in Khartoum and have attempted evacuations. In 2023, it was estimated that there were 16,000 Americans in Sudan who needed to be evacuated. In absence of an official evacuation plan from the U.S. State Department, many Americans have been forced to turn to other nations' embassies for guidance, with many fleeing to Nairobi. Other African countries and humanitarian groups have tried to help. The Turkish embassy has reportedly allowed Americans to join its evacuation efforts for its own citizens. The TRAKboys, a South-Africa based political organization which came into conflict with the Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor operating in Sudan since 2017, has been assisting with the evacuation of both Black Americans and Sudanese citizens to safe locations in South Africa.

On April 15, 2024, France is hosting an international conference on Sudan, marking the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of war in the northeast African nation, which has resulted in a humanitarian and political crisis. The country is calling for support from the global community, aiming to draw attention to a crisis that officials believe has been overshadowed by ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.

### Supplementary Text ###
Litige concernant le partage de l'eau

L'eau du Nil affecte la politique de l'Afrique de l'Est et de la Corne de l'Afrique depuis des décennies. Le différend entre l'Égypte et l'Éthiopie concernant le barrage de la Renaissance éthiopienne, d'un coût de 4,5 milliards de dollars, est devenu une préoccupation nationale dans les deux pays, attisant le patriotisme, des craintes profondes et même des murmures de guerre. Des pays, dont l'Ouganda, le Soudan, l'Éthiopie et le Kenya, se sont plaints de la domination égyptienne de ses ressources en eau. L'Initiative du bassin du Nil promeut une coopération pacifique entre ces États.

Plusieurs tentatives ont été faites pour établir des accords entre les pays partageant les eaux du Nil. Le 14 mai 2010 à Entebbe, en Ouganda, l'Éthiopie, le Rwanda et la Tanzanie ont signé un nouvel accord sur le partage de l'eau du Nil, bien que cet accord ait suscité une forte opposition de la part de l'Égypte et du Soudan. Idéalement, de tels accords internationaux devraient promouvoir une utilisation équitable et efficace des ressources en eau du bassin du Nil. Sans une meilleure compréhension de la disponibilité future des ressources en eau du Nil, il est possible que des conflits surviennent entre ces pays qui dépendent du Nil pour leur approvisionnement en eau, leur développement économique et social.

### Draft ###

### 1. Query Parsing

"Comment ça se fait que le Soudan était pote avec la Chine pour l'argent" → How come Sudan was friends with China for money?

"mais maintenant ils se battent avec l'Éthiopie pour l'eau" → but now they fight with Ethiopia over water?

"et que tout le monde s'en fout" → and that everyone doesn't give a damn?

Key assumption: temporal shift from economic partnership to regional conflict. User implies international disinterest in current Sudan-Ethiopia tensions.

### 2. Contextual Triangulation

**Geographic scope**: Horn of Africa, Northeast Africa
**Timeframe**: ~2000s-2010s China-Sudan oil deals → 2020s water disputes
**Key actors**: Sudan, Ethiopia, China, international community

⟨H≈0.3⟩ China's energy diplomacy in Africa... Sudan oil fields in Darfur region... Chinese investments in infrastructure, oil extraction... Meanwhile Blue Nile tributaries flowing from Ethiopian highlands to Sudanese dams... Renaissance Dam construction triggering water security concerns...

### 3. Historical Context Construction

**China-Sudan Economic Partnership** ●
- 2000s: Chinese oil investments in Sudan
- ~10% of Chinese oil imports from Sudan 
- Chinese arms transfers to Khartoum
- Strategic energy cooperation during US sanctions period

**Sudan's International Position** ◐
- 1990s: US terrorism designations → isolation
- China fills diplomatic vacuum
- Regional tensions: Egypt-Sudan water disputes, Darfur conflicts

### 4. Contemporary Dynamics Analysis

**Water Conflict Escalation** ●
- 2021: Sudan-Ethiopia border tensions over GERD
- Nile water sharing disputes
- Sudanese official: "water war more horrible than imagined"
- Military cooperation with Egypt vs Ethiopian regional influence

**International Attention Gap** ○
- User observation: "tout le monde s'en fout" 
- Competing global crises: Ukraine, Gaza, Middle East tensions
- Sudan conflict overshadowed in international media
- Regional instability vs global attention allocation

### 5. Information Synthesis

**Causal Chain**: Economic necessity → Chinese partnership → Regional conflicts → Water security crisis → International neglect

**Logical flow**:
1. Sudan needs foreign investment (2000s)
2. China invests in oil, provides diplomatic support  
3. Regional tensions emerge (Darfur, etc.)
4. Water resources become geopolitical flashpoint
5. International attention shifts elsewhere

**Verification constraints**: 
- Chinese investment figures ●
- Timeline of diplomatic relations ●
- Water dispute dynamics ●
- International media coverage patterns ◐

### 6. Response Framework

Structure: Historical partnership → Current conflict → International disinterest explanation

Key elements to address:
- China-Sudan economic ties rationale
- Water dispute escalation mechanics  
- Regional power dynamics
- Global attention economy

**Potential gaps**: 
? Specific Chinese investment amounts
? Exact timeline of relationship shifts
? Comparative international crisis coverage data

**Physical constraints**: 
- Oil reserves finite → Chinese strategic calculations
- Nile basin geography → hydrological determinism
- Media cycle attention spans → limited bandwidth

∴ Response should explain historical economic cooperation basis, current water tensions, and international attention patterns. Acknowledge complexity while maintaining accessible explanation.

### Answer###
Votre question touche effectivement à une évolution géopolitique complexe. Le Soudan a effectivement développé des relations économiques considérables avec la Chine depuis les années 1990, notamment dans le secteur pétrolier - la Chine obtenant environ 10% de son pétrole du Soudan, et Pékin devenant le plus grand fournisseur d'armes du pays selon un ancien ministre soudanais.

Cette coopération sino-soudanaise s'inscrivait dans une stratégie plus large de Khartoum de diversifier ses partenariats internationaux, notamment après que les États-Unis ont désigné le Soudan comme État parrain du terrorisme et que le pays a été progressivement isolé.

Concernant les tensions actuelles avec l'Éthiopie, ces dernières décennies ont montré que les questions d'eau dans la région sont devenues une préoccupation majeure. Le différend sur le barrage de la Renaissance éthiopienne, d'un coût de 4,5 milliards de dollars, a créé des tensions considérables entre les pays de la Corne de l'Afrique. Un conseiller du dirigeant soudanais Abdel Fattah al-Burhan a même parlé d'une guerre de l'eau "qui serait plus horrible que l'on pourrait l'imaginer".

Quant à l'impression que l'international se désintéresse de ces conflits, cela reflète probablement la complexité croissante des crises géopolitiques mondiales et la difficulté pour la communauté internationale à maintenir une attention soutenue sur une seule région. Le Soudan fait face à des défis multiples, notamment les conséquences du conflit militaire actuel entre l'armée et les Forces de soutien rapide, qui ont éclipsé d'autres enjeux régionaux.