Comment les institutions peuvent-elles devenir des choses réelles qui marchent comme des robots et qui changent la façon dont les gens pensent seulement en les regardant ?
Social science perspectives

While institutions tend to appear to people in society as part of the natural, unchanging landscape of their lives, the study of institutions by the social sciences tends to reveal the nature of institutions as social constructions, artifacts of a particular time, culture and society, produced by collective human choice, though not directly by individual intention. Sociology traditionally analyzed social institutions in terms of interlocking social roles and expectations. Social institutions created and were composed of groups of roles, or expected behaviors. The social function of the institution was executed by the fulfillment of roles. Basic biological requirements, for reproduction and care of the young, are served by the institutions of marriage and family, for example, by creating, elaborating and prescribing the behaviors expected for husband/father, wife/mother, child, etc.

The relationship of the institutions to human nature is a foundational question for the social sciences. Institutions can be seen as "naturally" arising from, and conforming to, human nature—a fundamentally conservative view—or institutions can be seen as artificial, almost accidental, and in need of architectural redesign, informed by expert social analysis, to better serve human needs—a fundamentally progressive view. Adam Smith anchored his economics in the supposed human "propensity to truck, barter and exchange". Modern feminists have criticized traditional marriage and other institutions as element of an oppressive and obsolete patriarchy. The Marxist view—which sees human nature as historically 'evolving' towards voluntary social cooperation, shared by some anarchists —is that supra-individual institutions such as the market and the state are incompatible with the individual liberty of a truly free society.

Economic s, in recent years, has used game theory to study institutions from two perspectives. Firstly, how do institutions survive and evolve? In this perspective, institutions arise from Nash equilibria of games. For example, whenever people pass each other in a corridor or thoroughfare, there is a need for customs, which avoid collisions. Such a custom might call for each party to keep to their own right (or left—such a choice is arbitrary, it is only necessary that the choice be uniform and consistent). Such customs may be supposed to be the origin of rules, such as the rule, adopted in many countries, which requires driving automobiles on the right side of the road.

Secondly, how do institutions affect behaviour? In this perspective, the focus is on behaviour arising from a given set of institutional rules. In these models, institutions determine the rules (i.e. strategy sets and utility functions) of games, rather than arise as equilibria out of games. Douglass North argues, the very emergence of an institution reflects behavioral adaptations through his application of increasing returns. Over time institutions develop rules that incentivize certain behaviors over others because they present less risk or induce lower cost, and establish path dependent outcomes. For example, the Cournot duopoly model is based on an institution involving an auctioneer who sells all goods at the market-clearing price. While it is always possible to analyze behaviour with the institutions-as-equilibria approach instead, it is much more complicated.

In political science, the effect of institutions on behavior has also been considered from a meme perspective, like game theory borrowed from biology. A "memetic institutionalism" has been proposed, suggesting that institutions provide selection environments for political action, whereby differentiated retention arises and thereby a Darwinian evolution of institutions over time. Public choice theory, another branch of economics with a close relationship to political science, considers how government policy choices are made, and seeks to determine what the policy outputs are likely to be, given a particular political decision-making process and context. Credibility thesis purports that institutions emerge from intentional institution-building but never in the originally intended form. Instead, institutional development is endogenous and spontaneously ordered and institutional persistence can be explained by their credibility, which is provided by the function that particular institutions serve.

Political scientists have traditionally studied the causes and consequences of formal institutional design. For instance, Douglass North investigated the impact of institutions on economic development in various countries, concluding that institutions in prosperous countries like the United States induced a net increase in productivity, whereas institutions in Third World countries caused a net decrease. Scholars of this period assumed that "parchment institutions" that were codified as law would largely guide the behavior of individuals as intended.

On the other hand, recent scholars began to study the importance of institutional strength, which Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo define in terms of the level of enforcement and sustainability of an institution. Weak institutions with low enforcement or low sustainability led to the deterioration of democratic institutions in Madagascar and the erosion of economic structures in China. Another area of interest for modern scholars is de facto (informal) institutions as opposed to de jure (formal) institutions in observing cross-country differences. For instance, Lars Feld and Stefan Voigt found that real GDP growth per capita is positively correlated with de facto, not de juri, institutions that are judicially independent. Scholars have also focused on the interaction between formal and informal institutions as well as how informal institutions may create incentives to comply with otherwise weak formal institutions. This departure from the traditional understanding of institutions reflects the scholarly recognition that a different framework of institutional analysis is necessary for studying developing economies and democracies compared to developed countries.

In history, a distinction between eras or periods, implies a major and fundamental change in the system of institutions governing a society. Political and military events are judged to be of historical significance to the extent that they are associated with changes in institutions. In European history, particular significance is attached to the long transition from the feudal institutions of the Middle Ages to the modern institutions, which govern contemporary life.
Sauts

Plusieurs robots, construits dans les années 1980 par Marc Raibert au laboratoire Leg de l'MIT, ont démontré avec succès une marche très dynamique. Initialement, un robot muni d'une seule jambe et d'un pied très petit pouvait rester debout simplement en sautant. Le mouvement est similaire à celui d'une personne sur un ressort pogostick. Lorsque le robot bascule d'un côté, il effectue un petit saut dans cette direction afin de se rattraper. Bientôt, l'algorithme a été généralisé à deux et quatre jambes. Un robot bipède a été présenté en train de courir et même d'effectuer des saltos. Un quadrupède a également été démontré, capable de trotter, courir, marcher à l'allure et faire des bonds. Pour une liste complète de ces robots, consultez la page Robots du laboratoire Leg de l'MIT.
### Query ###
Comment les institutions peuvent-elles devenir des choses réelles qui marchent comme des robots et qui changent la façon dont les gens pensent seulement en les regardant ?

### Main Text ###
Social science perspectives

While institutions tend to appear to people in society as part of the natural, unchanging landscape of their lives, the study of institutions by the social sciences tends to reveal the nature of institutions as social constructions, artifacts of a particular time, culture and society, produced by collective human choice, though not directly by individual intention. Sociology traditionally analyzed social institutions in terms of interlocking social roles and expectations. Social institutions created and were composed of groups of roles, or expected behaviors. The social function of the institution was executed by the fulfillment of roles. Basic biological requirements, for reproduction and care of the young, are served by the institutions of marriage and family, for example, by creating, elaborating and prescribing the behaviors expected for husband/father, wife/mother, child, etc.

The relationship of the institutions to human nature is a foundational question for the social sciences. Institutions can be seen as "naturally" arising from, and conforming to, human nature—a fundamentally conservative view—or institutions can be seen as artificial, almost accidental, and in need of architectural redesign, informed by expert social analysis, to better serve human needs—a fundamentally progressive view. Adam Smith anchored his economics in the supposed human "propensity to truck, barter and exchange". Modern feminists have criticized traditional marriage and other institutions as element of an oppressive and obsolete patriarchy. The Marxist view—which sees human nature as historically 'evolving' towards voluntary social cooperation, shared by some anarchists —is that supra-individual institutions such as the market and the state are incompatible with the individual liberty of a truly free society.

Economic s, in recent years, has used game theory to study institutions from two perspectives. Firstly, how do institutions survive and evolve? In this perspective, institutions arise from Nash equilibria of games. For example, whenever people pass each other in a corridor or thoroughfare, there is a need for customs, which avoid collisions. Such a custom might call for each party to keep to their own right (or left—such a choice is arbitrary, it is only necessary that the choice be uniform and consistent). Such customs may be supposed to be the origin of rules, such as the rule, adopted in many countries, which requires driving automobiles on the right side of the road.

Secondly, how do institutions affect behaviour? In this perspective, the focus is on behaviour arising from a given set of institutional rules. In these models, institutions determine the rules (i.e. strategy sets and utility functions) of games, rather than arise as equilibria out of games. Douglass North argues, the very emergence of an institution reflects behavioral adaptations through his application of increasing returns. Over time institutions develop rules that incentivize certain behaviors over others because they present less risk or induce lower cost, and establish path dependent outcomes. For example, the Cournot duopoly model is based on an institution involving an auctioneer who sells all goods at the market-clearing price. While it is always possible to analyze behaviour with the institutions-as-equilibria approach instead, it is much more complicated.

In political science, the effect of institutions on behavior has also been considered from a meme perspective, like game theory borrowed from biology. A "memetic institutionalism" has been proposed, suggesting that institutions provide selection environments for political action, whereby differentiated retention arises and thereby a Darwinian evolution of institutions over time. Public choice theory, another branch of economics with a close relationship to political science, considers how government policy choices are made, and seeks to determine what the policy outputs are likely to be, given a particular political decision-making process and context. Credibility thesis purports that institutions emerge from intentional institution-building but never in the originally intended form. Instead, institutional development is endogenous and spontaneously ordered and institutional persistence can be explained by their credibility, which is provided by the function that particular institutions serve.

Political scientists have traditionally studied the causes and consequences of formal institutional design. For instance, Douglass North investigated the impact of institutions on economic development in various countries, concluding that institutions in prosperous countries like the United States induced a net increase in productivity, whereas institutions in Third World countries caused a net decrease. Scholars of this period assumed that "parchment institutions" that were codified as law would largely guide the behavior of individuals as intended.

On the other hand, recent scholars began to study the importance of institutional strength, which Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo define in terms of the level of enforcement and sustainability of an institution. Weak institutions with low enforcement or low sustainability led to the deterioration of democratic institutions in Madagascar and the erosion of economic structures in China. Another area of interest for modern scholars is de facto (informal) institutions as opposed to de jure (formal) institutions in observing cross-country differences. For instance, Lars Feld and Stefan Voigt found that real GDP growth per capita is positively correlated with de facto, not de juri, institutions that are judicially independent. Scholars have also focused on the interaction between formal and informal institutions as well as how informal institutions may create incentives to comply with otherwise weak formal institutions. This departure from the traditional understanding of institutions reflects the scholarly recognition that a different framework of institutional analysis is necessary for studying developing economies and democracies compared to developed countries.

In history, a distinction between eras or periods, implies a major and fundamental change in the system of institutions governing a society. Political and military events are judged to be of historical significance to the extent that they are associated with changes in institutions. In European history, particular significance is attached to the long transition from the feudal institutions of the Middle Ages to the modern institutions, which govern contemporary life.

### Supplementary Text ###
Sauts

Plusieurs robots, construits dans les années 1980 par Marc Raibert au laboratoire Leg de l'MIT, ont démontré avec succès une marche très dynamique. Initialement, un robot muni d'une seule jambe et d'un pied très petit pouvait rester debout simplement en sautant. Le mouvement est similaire à celui d'une personne sur un ressort pogostick. Lorsque le robot bascule d'un côté, il effectue un petit saut dans cette direction afin de se rattraper. Bientôt, l'algorithme a été généralisé à deux et quatre jambes. Un robot bipède a été présenté en train de courir et même d'effectuer des saltos. Un quadrupède a également été démontré, capable de trotter, courir, marcher à l'allure et faire des bonds. Pour une liste complète de ces robots, consultez la page Robots du laboratoire Leg de l'MIT.

### Draft ###

### 1. Query Parsing

"Comment les institutions peuvent-elles devenir des choses réelles qui marchent comme des robots"

Breaking down: 
- Institutions as "real things" → material/concrete entities?
- Robot-like behavior → mechanistic, automatic, predictable?  
- "marchent" → walk/function/operate?
- "façon dont les gens pensent seulement en les regardant" → just by observing, they influence thinking

※ Translation ambiguity: "seulement" could mean "only" vs "merely" - does observing automatically change thinking or just influence it?

### 2. Domain Mapping

Query spans:
├─ Institutional theory (sociology, political science)
├─ Robotics/mechanistic metaphor  
└─ Cognitive science (perception → thought)

? Is this asking about actual robotic institutions or metaphorical ones?

⟨H≈0.4⟩ Institutions as social robots... automatic responses to stimuli, programmed behaviors, feedback loops, emergent patterns... but real robots are physical, institutions are social constructs... unless digital? Smart contracts? AI governance systems? The metaphor might be literalizing.

### 3. Theoretical Foundations

**Institutional emergence:**
● Self-organization theory (Katz & Kahn) - institutions as emergent properties
● Evolutionary institutionalism (North) - path-dependent development  
◐ Game theory applications to institutional dynamics

**Robot-like characteristics:**
- Predictable behavior patterns ✓
- Feedback mechanisms ✓  
- Environmental adaptation ✓
- Emergent collective intelligence ?

### 4. Knowledge Limitations Assessment

⚠ Gap: Specific research on institution-as-robot metaphor
○ Limited data on cognitive effects of institutional observation
● Strong foundation in institutional mechanics theory

⟨H≈1.2⟩ What if institutions are already robotic? Think traffic lights, court systems, bureaucratic procedures... they operate with mechanical precision, respond to inputs, create predictable outputs. The metaphor might be revealing more than metaphorical. But the cognitive science part... how does observing a system change our thinking about it? Mere exposure effect? Institutional isomorphism? The question assumes an observer-institution relationship that needs unpacking...

### 5. Multi-hop Reasoning

Query requires:
1. Defining "robot-like" institutional behavior
2. Explaining how institutions achieve such behavior  
3. Linking to cognitive/observational effects
4. Synthesizing across domains

∴ Answer should acknowledge theoretical complexity while providing frameworks for understanding

**Key insight:** ! Institutions become "real things" through repeated interaction patterns, not initial design intent

### 6. Response Strategy

Structure response as:
1. Address the metaphor (robot-like behavior)
2. Explain institutional dynamics (self-organization)
3. Connect to cognitive effects (observation → understanding)
4. Acknowledge limitations in available research

⟨H≈0.3⟩ The response should emphasize that institutions develop their "robot-like" characteristics through evolutionary processes, path dependency, and feedback mechanisms. They become predictable, automatic, and environmentally adaptive much like mechanical systems. The cognitive effect occurs through repeated observation, leading to normalized understanding and acceptance of institutional behavior patterns.

**Final assessment:** ◐ Can provide theoretical foundation, acknowledge limitations in specific research

### Answer###
Cette question touche aux relations complexes entre institutions sociales et dynamiques collectives. Les institutions peuvent effectivement apparaître comme des entités mécaniques, presque robotiques, dans leur fonctionnement quotidien.

Du point de vue scientifique, les institutions sont généralement comprises comme des constructions sociales, des artefacts d'une époque, d'une culture et d'une société particulière, produites par des choix collectifs humains. Elles se caractérisent par des rôles sociaux interdépendants et des attentes cohérentes qui structurent leur fonctionnement de manière prévisible.

L'analogie avec les robots pourrait s'expliquer par le fait que les institutions développent au fil du temps des règles qui incitent à certains comportements plutôt qu'à d'autres, car ils présentent moins de risques ou induisent des coûts inférieurs. Ces processus créent des résultats dépendants du chemin parcouru, donnant l'impression d'un comportement automatique et prédictible.

Certaines théories économiques, notamment l'analyse institutionnelle, considèrent que les institutions émergent des équilibres de jeux stratégiques, se maintenant par leur capacité à résoudre des problèmes de coordination sociale - par exemple, les conventions de circulation qui évitent les collisions dans les espaces publics.

Concernant l'influence sur la pensée par l'observation, les institutions peuvent effectivement façonner la perception sociale et créer des environnements sélectifs pour l'action politique, où les comportements différenciés se maintiennent au fil du temps. L'évolution darwinienne des institutions suggère que certaines formes institutionnelles persistent précisément parce qu'elles répondent à des besoins sociaux fondamentaux.

Cependant, cette question nécessiterait une analyse plus approfondie des effets cognitifs spécifiques de l'observation institutionnelle sur la formation des opinions et des comportements sociaux.