Comment les perceptions contrastées de l'élargissement de l'OTAN entre la Russie et les pays d'Europe de l'Est révèlent-elles les enjeux géopolitiques de cette expansion ?
Enlargement

NATO was established on 4 April 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty). The 12 founding members of the alliance were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Four new members joined during the Cold War: Greece (1952), Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain (1982). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many former Warsaw Pact and post-Soviet states sought membership. In 1990, the territory of the former East Germany was added with the reunification of Germany. At the 1999 Washington summit, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic officially joined, and NATO issued new guidelines for membership, with individualized " Membership Action Plans ". These plans governed the addition of new members: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia in 2020. Finland and Sweden are the newest members, joining on 4 April 2023 and 7 March 2024 respectively, spurred on by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine's relationship with NATO began with the NATO–Ukraine Action Plan in 2002. In 2010, under President Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine re-affirmed its non-aligned status and renounced aspirations of joining NATO. During the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, Russia occupied Crimea and supported armed separatists in eastern Ukraine. As a result, in December 2014 Ukraine's parliament voted to end its non-aligned status, and in 2019 it enshrined the goal of NATO membership in the Constitution. At the June 2021 Brussels Summit, NATO leaders affirmed that Ukraine would eventually join the Alliance, and supported Ukraine's right to self-determination without interference. In late 2021, there was another massive Russian military buildup near Ukraine's borders. On 30 November, Russian president Putin said Ukraine joining NATO, and the deployment of missile defense systems or long-range missiles in Ukraine, would be crossing a red line. However, there were no such plans to deploy missiles in Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Ministry drafted a treaty that would forbid Ukraine or any former Soviet state from ever joining NATO. Secretary-General Stoltenberg replied that the decision is up to Ukraine and NATO members, adding "Russia has no veto, Russia has no say, and Russia has no right to establish a sphere of influence to try to control their neighbors". NATO offered to improve communications with Russia and discuss missile placements and military exercises, as long as Russia withdrew troops from Ukraine's borders. Instead, Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Ukraine applied for NATO membership in September 2022 after Russia proclaimed it had annexed the country's southeast.

Georgia was promised "future membership" during the 2008 summit in Bucharest, but US president Barack Obama said in 2014 that the country was not "currently on a path" to membership.

Russia continued to politically oppose further expansion, seeing it as inconsistent with informal understandings between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and European and US negotiators that allowed for a peaceful German reunification. A June 2016 Levada Center poll found that 68 percent of Russians think that deploying NATO troops in the Baltic states and Poland – former Eastern bloc countries bordering Russia – is a threat to Russia. In contrast, 65 percent of Poles surveyed in a 2017 Pew Research Center report identified Russia as a "major threat", with an average of 31 percent saying so across all NATO countries, and 67 percent of Poles surveyed in 2018 favour US forces being based in Poland. Of non- CIS Eastern European countries surveyed by Gallup in 2016, all but Serbia and Montenegro were more likely than not to view NATO as a protective alliance rather than a threat. A 2006 study in the journal Security Studies argued that NATO enlargement contributed to democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. China also opposes further expansion.
L'élargissement

La Russie a continué à s'opposer politiquement à de nouvelles extensions, les considérant comme incompatibles avec les accords informels entre le dirigeant soviétique Mikhaïl Gorbatchev et les négociateurs européens et américains qui ont permis une réunification allemande pacifique. Une enquête du Centre Levada de juin 2016 a révélé que 68 % des Russes pensent que le déploiement de troupes de l'OTAN dans les États baltes et en Pologne – d'anciens pays du bloc de l'Est limitrophes de la Russie – constitue une menace pour la Russie. À l'inverse, 65 % des Polonais interrogés dans un rapport du Pew Research Center de 2017 ont identifié la Russie comme une "menace majeure", avec une moyenne de 31 % affirmant cela dans tous les pays de l'OTAN, et 67 % des Polonais interrogés en 2018 étant favorables à la présence de forces américaines en Pologne. Parmi les pays d'Europe de l'Est non-CIS interrogés par Gallup en 2016, tous, à l'exception de la Serbie et du Monténégro, étaient plus susceptibles de considérer l'OTAN comme une alliance protectrice plutôt que comme une menace. Une étude de 2006 publiée dans la revue Security Studies a soutenu que l'élargissement de l'OTAN a contribué à la consolidation démocratique en Europe centrale et orientale. La Chine s'oppose également à de nouvelles extensions.
### Query ###
Comment les perceptions contrastées de l'élargissement de l'OTAN entre la Russie et les pays d'Europe de l'Est révèlent-elles les enjeux géopolitiques de cette expansion ?

### Main Text ###
Enlargement

NATO was established on 4 April 1949 by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty). The 12 founding members of the alliance were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Four new members joined during the Cold War: Greece (1952), Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain (1982). Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many former Warsaw Pact and post-Soviet states sought membership. In 1990, the territory of the former East Germany was added with the reunification of Germany. At the 1999 Washington summit, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic officially joined, and NATO issued new guidelines for membership, with individualized " Membership Action Plans ". These plans governed the addition of new members: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 2004, Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and North Macedonia in 2020. Finland and Sweden are the newest members, joining on 4 April 2023 and 7 March 2024 respectively, spurred on by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine's relationship with NATO began with the NATO–Ukraine Action Plan in 2002. In 2010, under President Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine re-affirmed its non-aligned status and renounced aspirations of joining NATO. During the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, Russia occupied Crimea and supported armed separatists in eastern Ukraine. As a result, in December 2014 Ukraine's parliament voted to end its non-aligned status, and in 2019 it enshrined the goal of NATO membership in the Constitution. At the June 2021 Brussels Summit, NATO leaders affirmed that Ukraine would eventually join the Alliance, and supported Ukraine's right to self-determination without interference. In late 2021, there was another massive Russian military buildup near Ukraine's borders. On 30 November, Russian president Putin said Ukraine joining NATO, and the deployment of missile defense systems or long-range missiles in Ukraine, would be crossing a red line. However, there were no such plans to deploy missiles in Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Ministry drafted a treaty that would forbid Ukraine or any former Soviet state from ever joining NATO. Secretary-General Stoltenberg replied that the decision is up to Ukraine and NATO members, adding "Russia has no veto, Russia has no say, and Russia has no right to establish a sphere of influence to try to control their neighbors". NATO offered to improve communications with Russia and discuss missile placements and military exercises, as long as Russia withdrew troops from Ukraine's borders. Instead, Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Ukraine applied for NATO membership in September 2022 after Russia proclaimed it had annexed the country's southeast.

Georgia was promised "future membership" during the 2008 summit in Bucharest, but US president Barack Obama said in 2014 that the country was not "currently on a path" to membership.

Russia continued to politically oppose further expansion, seeing it as inconsistent with informal understandings between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and European and US negotiators that allowed for a peaceful German reunification. A June 2016 Levada Center poll found that 68 percent of Russians think that deploying NATO troops in the Baltic states and Poland – former Eastern bloc countries bordering Russia – is a threat to Russia. In contrast, 65 percent of Poles surveyed in a 2017 Pew Research Center report identified Russia as a "major threat", with an average of 31 percent saying so across all NATO countries, and 67 percent of Poles surveyed in 2018 favour US forces being based in Poland. Of non- CIS Eastern European countries surveyed by Gallup in 2016, all but Serbia and Montenegro were more likely than not to view NATO as a protective alliance rather than a threat. A 2006 study in the journal Security Studies argued that NATO enlargement contributed to democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. China also opposes further expansion.

### Supplementary Text ###
L'élargissement

La Russie a continué à s'opposer politiquement à de nouvelles extensions, les considérant comme incompatibles avec les accords informels entre le dirigeant soviétique Mikhaïl Gorbatchev et les négociateurs européens et américains qui ont permis une réunification allemande pacifique. Une enquête du Centre Levada de juin 2016 a révélé que 68 % des Russes pensent que le déploiement de troupes de l'OTAN dans les États baltes et en Pologne – d'anciens pays du bloc de l'Est limitrophes de la Russie – constitue une menace pour la Russie. À l'inverse, 65 % des Polonais interrogés dans un rapport du Pew Research Center de 2017 ont identifié la Russie comme une "menace majeure", avec une moyenne de 31 % affirmant cela dans tous les pays de l'OTAN, et 67 % des Polonais interrogés en 2018 étant favorables à la présence de forces américaines en Pologne. Parmi les pays d'Europe de l'Est non-CIS interrogés par Gallup en 2016, tous, à l'exception de la Serbie et du Monténégro, étaient plus susceptibles de considérer l'OTAN comme une alliance protectrice plutôt que comme une menace. Une étude de 2006 publiée dans la revue Security Studies a soutenu que l'élargissement de l'OTAN a contribué à la consolidation démocratique en Europe centrale et orientale. La Chine s'oppose également à de nouvelles extensions.

### Draft ###

### 1. Query Decomposition

"Comment les perceptions contrastées..." → How do contrasting perceptions...

Key elements to address:
- Russia vs Eastern Europe perceptions ● 
- NATO enlargement as expansion vs defensive response ?
- Geopolitical stakes analysis ●

Translation nuance: "élargissement" = expansion/widening vs "extension" = extending (more neutral)

### 2. Information Retrieval vs Analysis

Not simple retrieval. Requires:
- Historical context (post-1991 NATO growth)
- Survey data triangulation ◐
- Geopolitical interpretation ●

Core tension: Is NATO enlargement threat (Russia) vs opportunity/security (Eastern Europe)?

### 3. Contextual Framework

⟨H≈0.2⟩ Cold War dissolution → NATO paradox: alliance meant to deter Soviet Union now expands into former Soviet sphere. Russia interprets as encirclement. Eastern European states see EU/NATO integration as escape from Russian influence, insurance against potential resurgence.

Timeline: 1997 Poland/Czech Republic, 2004 Baltic states, 2009 Croatia/Albania, 2017 Montenegro, 2020 North Macedonia, 2023 Finland, 2024 Sweden.

### 4. Evidence Assembly

Russian perspective: ●
- Levada Center 2016: 68% Russians view Baltic/Polish NATO expansion as threat
- Red line rhetoric: Ukraine NATO membership = existential threat
- Informal Gorbachev agreements interpretation

Eastern European perspective: ●
- Pew Research 2017: 65% Poles view Russia as major threat
- 67% Polish support US forces in Poland  
- 2016 Gallup: Eastern Europeans overwhelmingly see NATO as protective alliance vs threat

### 5. Analytical Synthesis

Fundamental asymmetry:
- Russia: perceives NATO as aggressive expansion, violates post-Cold War agreements
- Eastern Europe: perceives NATO as defensive alliance, protection from Russian influence

→ Explains contrasting interpretations of same geopolitical reality

Key geopolitical stakes:
1. Security guarantees vs sovereignty concerns
2. Buffer zone dynamics (Russia wants spheres of influence)  
3. Democratic consolidation vs stability concerns
4. Integration models (EU/NATO vs Eurasian Economic Union)

### 6. Verification Check

Cross-reference consistency: ●
- Timeline aligns: 2016 surveys post-Crimea, pre-major Ukrainian escalation
- Numbers coherent: 68% Russian threat perception vs 65% Polish threat perception of Russia
- Regional variation: Poland most hawkish, others less so
- Long-term trends: NATO expansion accelerates after each Russian move

### 7. Conclusion Structure

Opening: Contrasting perceptions reveal fundamental divide over NATO role
Core: Russian threat narrative vs Eastern European security concerns  
Geopolitical stakes: Buffer zones, democratic integration, regional stability
Evidence: Poll data triangulation, key examples (Ukraine, Poland)
Synthesis: Same events, opposite interpretations → intractable tensions

∴ NATO enlargement = zero-sum game for both sides, explains persistent conflicts over alliance expansion.

### Answer###
Les perceptions contrastées de l'élargissement de l'OTAN révèlent une division fondamentale dans la compréhension des enjeux géopolitiques de cette expansion.

Pour la Russie, l'élargissement de l'OTAN est perçu comme une menace directe à sa sécurité. Selon une enquête du Centre Levada de 2016, 68% des Russes considèrent le déploiement de troupes de l'OTAN dans les États baltes et la Pologne comme une menace pour la Russie. Cette perspective s'accompagne d'une interprétation des accords informels entre Gorbatchev et les négociateurs européens et américains comme étant incompatibles avec l'expansion continue de l'Alliance. L'Ukraine, avec son application récente à l'OTAN après l'invasion russe de 2022, représente pour Moscou une ligne rouge qu'elle ne tolérera pas.

En revanche, les pays d'Europe de l'Est ont une vision diamétralement opposée. Une étude de 2016 montre que tous ces pays, à l'exception de la Serbie et du Monténégro, sont plus enclins à considérer l'OTAN comme une alliance protectrice plutôt que comme une menace. Les Polonais illustrent cette différence : 65% les considèrent comme une "menace majeure" et 67% soutiennent la présence de forces américaines sur leur territoire.

Cette divergence révèle les enjeux géopolitiques fondamentaux : pour la Russie, l'OTAN constitue une expansion occidentale menaçante dans son espace traditionnel d'influence, tandis que pour les pays d'Europe de l'Est, l'appartenance à l'Alliance représente une garantie de sécurité démocratique et une protection contre les influences extérieures.