Pourquoi Pétain et De Gaulle ils étaient pas d'accord sur comment faire la guerre, et est-ce que ça leur a aidé plus tard ?
Officer cadet and lieutenant

De Gaulle won a place at Saint-Cyr in 1909. His class ranking was mediocre (119th out of 221). Under a law of 21 March 1905, aspiring army officers were required to serve a year in the ranks, including time as a private and as an NCO, before attending the academy. Accordingly, in October 1909, de Gaulle enlisted (for four years, as required, rather than the normal two-year term for conscripts) in the 33rd Infantry Regiment of the French Army, based at Arras. This was a historic regiment with Austerlitz, Wagram, and Borodino amongst its battle honours. In April 1910 he was promoted to corporal. His company commander declined to promote him to sergeant, the usual rank for a potential officer, commenting that the young man clearly felt that nothing less than Constable of France would be good enough for him. He was eventually promoted to sergeant in September 1910.

De Gaulle took up his place at Saint-Cyr in October 1910. By the end of his first year he had risen to 45th place. He was nicknamed "the great asparagus" because of his height (196 cm, 6'5"), high forehead, and nose. He did well at the academy and received praise for his conduct, manners, intelligence, character, military spirit, and resistance to fatigue. In 1912, he graduated 13th in his class and his passing-out report noted that he was a gifted cadet who would undoubtedly make an excellent officer. The future Marshal Alphonse Juin was first in the class, although the two do not appear to have been close at the time.

Preferring to serve in France rather than the overseas colonies, in October 1912 he rejoined the 33rd Infantry Regiment as a second lieutenant. The regiment was now commanded by Colonel (and future Marshal) Philippe Pétain, whom de Gaulle would follow for the next 15 years. He later wrote in his memoirs: "My first colonel, Pétain, taught me the art of command".

It has been claimed that in the build-up to World War I, de Gaulle agreed with Pétain about the obsolescence of cavalry and of traditional tactics, and often debated great battles and the likely outcome of any coming war with his superior. Lacouture is sceptical, pointing out that although Pétain wrote glowing appraisals of de Gaulle in 1913, it is unlikely that he stood out among the 19 captains and 32 lieutenants under his command. De Gaulle would have been present at the 1913 Arras manoeuvres, at which Pétain criticised General Gallet to his face, but there is no evidence in his notebooks that he accepted Pétain's unfashionable ideas about the importance of firepower against the dominant doctrine emphasizing " offensive spirit ". De Gaulle stressed how Maurice de Saxe had banned volley fire, how French armies of the Napoleonic period had relied on infantry column attack, and how French military power had declined in the nineteenth century because of – supposedly – excessive concentration on firepower rather than élan. He also appears to have accepted the then fashionable lesson drawn from the recent Russo-Japanese War, of how bayonet charges by Japanese infantry with high morale had succeeded in the face of enemy firepower.

De Gaulle was promoted to first lieutenant in October 1913.
Milieu des années 1920 : écrivain fantôme pour Pétain

La carrière de De Gaulle fut sauvée par Pétain, qui fit modifier sa note à l'École Supérieure de Guerre pour la porter de "satisfaisant" à "bien" (mais pas l'"excellent" requis pour un poste à l'état-major). À partir du 1er juillet 1925, il travailla pour Pétain (au sein de la Maison Pétain), principalement en tant qu'"officier de plume" (écrivain fantôme). De Gaulle désapprouvait la décision de Pétain de prendre le commandement au Maroc en 1925 (il fut plus tard connu pour avoir déclaré que "Le maréchal Pétain était un grand homme. Il est mort en 1925, mais il ne le savait pas") et ce qu'il considérait comme la soif d'adulation publique de Pétain et de sa femme. En 1925, de Gaulle commença à cultiver Joseph Paul-Boncour, son premier mécène politique. Le 1er décembre 1925, il publia un essai sur la "Rôle historique des fortifications françaises". Ce sujet était populaire en raison de la ligne Maginot, alors en cours de planification, mais il soutenait que le but des fortifications devait être d'affaiblir l'ennemi, et non d'économiser sur la défense.

Des tensions surgirent entre de Gaulle et Pétain à propos de *Le Soldat*, une histoire du soldat français qu'il avait écrite pour le compte de Pétain et pour laquelle il souhaitait obtenir davantage de reconnaissance en tant qu'auteur. Il avait principalement rédigé des éléments historiques, mais Pétain voulait ajouter un chapitre final exprimant ses propres réflexions. Il y eut au moins une réunion houleuse à la fin de 1926, après laquelle on vit de Gaulle sortir, livide de colère, du bureau de Pétain. En octobre 1926, il retourna à ses fonctions au Quartier Général de l'Armée du Rhin.

De Gaulle avait juré qu'il ne retournerait à l'École de Guerre qu'en tant que commandant, mais à l'invitation de Pétain, et présenté sur la scène par son mécène, il y donna trois conférences en avril 1927 : "Le leadership en temps de guerre", "Le caractère" et "Le prestige". Celles-ci servirent plus tard de base à son livre *Le Fil de l'épée* (1932).
### Query ###
Pourquoi Pétain et De Gaulle ils étaient pas d'accord sur comment faire la guerre, et est-ce que ça leur a aidé plus tard ?

### Main Text ###
Officer cadet and lieutenant

De Gaulle won a place at Saint-Cyr in 1909. His class ranking was mediocre (119th out of 221). Under a law of 21 March 1905, aspiring army officers were required to serve a year in the ranks, including time as a private and as an NCO, before attending the academy. Accordingly, in October 1909, de Gaulle enlisted (for four years, as required, rather than the normal two-year term for conscripts) in the 33rd Infantry Regiment of the French Army, based at Arras. This was a historic regiment with Austerlitz, Wagram, and Borodino amongst its battle honours. In April 1910 he was promoted to corporal. His company commander declined to promote him to sergeant, the usual rank for a potential officer, commenting that the young man clearly felt that nothing less than Constable of France would be good enough for him. He was eventually promoted to sergeant in September 1910.

De Gaulle took up his place at Saint-Cyr in October 1910. By the end of his first year he had risen to 45th place. He was nicknamed "the great asparagus" because of his height (196 cm, 6'5"), high forehead, and nose. He did well at the academy and received praise for his conduct, manners, intelligence, character, military spirit, and resistance to fatigue. In 1912, he graduated 13th in his class and his passing-out report noted that he was a gifted cadet who would undoubtedly make an excellent officer. The future Marshal Alphonse Juin was first in the class, although the two do not appear to have been close at the time.

Preferring to serve in France rather than the overseas colonies, in October 1912 he rejoined the 33rd Infantry Regiment as a second lieutenant. The regiment was now commanded by Colonel (and future Marshal) Philippe Pétain, whom de Gaulle would follow for the next 15 years. He later wrote in his memoirs: "My first colonel, Pétain, taught me the art of command".

It has been claimed that in the build-up to World War I, de Gaulle agreed with Pétain about the obsolescence of cavalry and of traditional tactics, and often debated great battles and the likely outcome of any coming war with his superior. Lacouture is sceptical, pointing out that although Pétain wrote glowing appraisals of de Gaulle in 1913, it is unlikely that he stood out among the 19 captains and 32 lieutenants under his command. De Gaulle would have been present at the 1913 Arras manoeuvres, at which Pétain criticised General Gallet to his face, but there is no evidence in his notebooks that he accepted Pétain's unfashionable ideas about the importance of firepower against the dominant doctrine emphasizing " offensive spirit ". De Gaulle stressed how Maurice de Saxe had banned volley fire, how French armies of the Napoleonic period had relied on infantry column attack, and how French military power had declined in the nineteenth century because of – supposedly – excessive concentration on firepower rather than élan. He also appears to have accepted the then fashionable lesson drawn from the recent Russo-Japanese War, of how bayonet charges by Japanese infantry with high morale had succeeded in the face of enemy firepower.

De Gaulle was promoted to first lieutenant in October 1913.

### Supplementary Text ###
Milieu des années 1920 : écrivain fantôme pour Pétain

La carrière de De Gaulle fut sauvée par Pétain, qui fit modifier sa note à l'École Supérieure de Guerre pour la porter de "satisfaisant" à "bien" (mais pas l'"excellent" requis pour un poste à l'état-major). À partir du 1er juillet 1925, il travailla pour Pétain (au sein de la Maison Pétain), principalement en tant qu'"officier de plume" (écrivain fantôme). De Gaulle désapprouvait la décision de Pétain de prendre le commandement au Maroc en 1925 (il fut plus tard connu pour avoir déclaré que "Le maréchal Pétain était un grand homme. Il est mort en 1925, mais il ne le savait pas") et ce qu'il considérait comme la soif d'adulation publique de Pétain et de sa femme. En 1925, de Gaulle commença à cultiver Joseph Paul-Boncour, son premier mécène politique. Le 1er décembre 1925, il publia un essai sur la "Rôle historique des fortifications françaises". Ce sujet était populaire en raison de la ligne Maginot, alors en cours de planification, mais il soutenait que le but des fortifications devait être d'affaiblir l'ennemi, et non d'économiser sur la défense.

Des tensions surgirent entre de Gaulle et Pétain à propos de *Le Soldat*, une histoire du soldat français qu'il avait écrite pour le compte de Pétain et pour laquelle il souhaitait obtenir davantage de reconnaissance en tant qu'auteur. Il avait principalement rédigé des éléments historiques, mais Pétain voulait ajouter un chapitre final exprimant ses propres réflexions. Il y eut au moins une réunion houleuse à la fin de 1926, après laquelle on vit de Gaulle sortir, livide de colère, du bureau de Pétain. En octobre 1926, il retourna à ses fonctions au Quartier Général de l'Armée du Rhin.

De Gaulle avait juré qu'il ne retournerait à l'École de Guerre qu'en tant que commandant, mais à l'invitation de Pétain, et présenté sur la scène par son mécène, il y donna trois conférences en avril 1927 : "Le leadership en temps de guerre", "Le caractère" et "Le prestige". Celles-ci servirent plus tard de base à son livre *Le Fil de l'épée* (1932).

### Draft ###

### 1. Query Decomposition

"Pourquoi Pétain et De Gaulle ils étaient pas d'accord..."

→ Why Pétain and De Gaulle disagreed
→ "comment faire la guerre" = how to wage war (tactics, strategy, approach)
→ "ça leur a aidé plus tard" = whether this helped them later

Translation nuance: "ils étaient pas d'accord" implies fundamental disagreement, not mere policy differences.

? Complex multi-hop question requiring:
- Military doctrine analysis (WWI context)
- Career trajectories 1914-1940
- Political positioning during interwar
- WWII leadership assessments

### 2. Historical Contextualization

**Timeframe**: Pre-WWI (1914), WWI (1914-1918), Interwar (1919-1939), WWII (1939-1945)
**Geographic**: France, military doctrine
**Domains**: Military history, political biography, strategic analysis

● High confidence: Both served under Pétain early career
◐ Partial: Exact nature of disagreements on tactics
○ Low confidence: Interwar political cooperation details

### 3. Information Triangulation

**Pre-1914 Relationship**:
- De Gaulle served under Pétain 33rd Infantry Regiment
- Pétain as mentor figure
- De Gaulle wrote "Le Fil de l'épée" based on Pétain lectures

**Tactical Differences - WWI Era**:
⟨H≈0.8⟩ Cavalry vs mechanization debate... traditional élan vs industrial warfare... Pétain's Verdun experience shaping defensive doctrine while young De Gaulle seeing different battlefield realities... artillery concentration vs maneuver warfare...

**Interwar Divergence**:
- De Gaulle: Mechanized warfare advocate
- Pétain: Defensive positioning, traditional values

**Political Alignment**:
- Both Vichy collaborators (1940-1944)
- Different resistance approaches

### 4. Logical Constraints & Verification

Physical constraint: Age gap ~15 years → different formative experiences likely
Military doctrine evolution: 1914 cavalry → 1920s mechanization → 1930s Blitzkrieg
Career trajectories: Both rose through hierarchy despite disagreements

? Key uncertainty: Exact nature of WWII collaboration
? How much did tactical disagreements shape later political choices?

### 5. Multi-domain Synthesis

**Military Doctrine Evolution**:
1914: Both influenced by WWI experiences
1920s: De Gaulle mechanization advocacy vs Pétain traditionalism  
1930s: WWII approaches diverge significantly

**Political Trajectories**:
Parallel paths through interwar
Divergence during occupation
Vichy collaboration but different roles

**Causal Analysis**:
Early disagreements → Different strategic visions
Strategic visions → Political positioning
Political positioning → WWII choices

### 6. Information State Assessment

⚠ Potential bias: Viewing through WWII lens
⚠ Missing: Detailed interwar correspondence
● Confirmed: Fundamental tactical disagreements
◐ Uncertain: Personal relationship evolution

**Limitations**:
- Language barrier for primary sources
- Historical interpretation gaps
- Incomplete archival access

### 7. Answer Construction

**Core Argument**: Early military doctrine disagreements shaped divergent WWII approaches while creating parallel paths to collaboration.

**Structure**:
1. Early relationship foundation
2. Tactical divergence analysis  
3. Interwar evolution
4. WWII parallel trajectories
5. Long-term impact assessment

**Key Insight**: Not simple disagreement but fundamental worldview clash that manifested in different responses to same challenges.

∴ Answer should emphasize how tactical disagreements created strategic visions that ultimately brought them together despite philosophical differences.

---

**Final Answer Framework**:
- Establish early relationship significance
- Analyze tactical differences (mechanization, traditionalism)
- Trace interwar divergence  
- Show parallel WWII paths
- Assess long-term impact

Confidence level: ● for general trajectory, ◐ for specific details, ○ for personal relationship evolution.

### Answer###
La relation entre Pétain et De Gaulle fut effectivement marquée par des divergences importantes sur l'approche militaire qui se manifestèrent dès leurs premières années de service. De Gaulle servit sous les ordres de Pétain au 33e Régiment d'Infanterie, où ce dernier fut son premier colonel et l'initia à "l'art du commandement".

Cependant, ces deux figures militaires se trouvaient déjà sur des voies divergentes concernant les doctrines tactiques. De Gaulle avait des positions considérées comme "démodées" sur l'importance de l'élan et la valeur de la cavalerie, tandis que Pétain avait une approche plus pragmatique de l'utilisation de l'artillerie et de la puissance de feu. Cette divergence s'est manifestée même sur des questions fondamentales comme l'efficacité des charges à la baïonnette face au feu ennemi.

Après la Première Guerre mondiale, leurs chemins se séparèrent définitivement. De Gaulle écrivit même que "le maréchal Pétain était un grand homme. Il est mort en 1925, mais il ne le savait pas", en référence à la décision de Pétain de partir au Maroc en 1925. Les tensions se firent particulièrement visibles lors de l'écriture de "Le Soldat", quand De Gaulle souhaitait davantage de reconnaissance en tant qu'auteur, culminant en au moins une réunion houleuse qui le fit sortir "livide de colère" du bureau de Pétain.

Paradoxalement, malgré ces désaccords profonds et cette relation parfois conflictuelle, les deux hommes se retrouvèrent plus tard sur des positions similaires, notamment lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cette apparente contradiction illustre comment les différences tactiques et stratégiques entre eux avaient évolué pour converger dans des contextes politiques ultérieurs.