Pourquoi les rois anglais devaient donner de l'argent aux vikings ?
Fighting and warfare

Soldiers throughout the country were summoned, for both offensive and defensive war; early armies consisted essentially of household bands, while later on men were recruited on a territorial basis. The mustering of an army, annually at times, occupied an important place in Frankish history, both military and constitutional. The English kingdoms appear to have known no institution similar to this. The earliest reference is Bede's account of the overthrow of the Northumbrian Æthelfrith by Rædwald overlord of the southern English. Rædwald raised a large army, presumably from among the kings who accepted his overlordship, and "not giving him time to summon and assemble his whole army, Rædwald met him with a much greater force and slew him on the Mercian border on the east bank of the river Idle." At the Battle of Edington in 878, when the Danes made a surprise attack on Alfred at Chippenham after Twelfth Night, Alfred retreated to Athelney after Easter and then seven weeks after Easter mustered an army at "Egbert's stone". It is not difficult to imagine that Alfred sent out word to the ealdormen to call his men to arms. This may explain the delay, and it is probably no more than coincidence that the army mustered at the beginning of May, a time when there would have been sufficient grass for the horses. There is also information about the mustering of fleets in the eleventh century. From 992 to 1066 fleets were assembled at London, or returned to the city at the end of their service, on several occasions. Where they took up station depended on the quarter from which a threat was expected: Sandwich if invasion was expected from the north, or the Isle of Wight if it was from Normandy.

Once they left home, these armies and fleets had to be supplied with food and clothing for the men as well as forage for the horses. Yet if armies of the seventh and eighth centuries were accompanied by servants and a supply train of lesser free men, Alfred found these arrangements insufficient to defeat the Vikings. One of his reforms was to divide his military resources into thirds. One part manned the burhs and found the permanent garrisons which would make it impossible for the Danes to overrun Wessex, although they would also take to the field when extra soldiers were needed. The remaining two would take it in turns to serve. They were allocated a fixed term of service and brought the necessary provisions with them. This arrangement did not always function well. On one occasion a division on service went home in the middle of blockading a Danish army on Thorney Island; its provisions were consumed and its term had expired before the king came to relieve them. This method of division and rotation remained in force up to 1066. In 917, when armies from Wessex and Mercia were in the field from early April until November, one division went home and another took over. Again, in 1052 when Edward's fleet was waiting at Sandwich to intercept Godwine's return, the ships returned to London to take on new earls and crews. The importance of supply, vital to military success, was appreciated even if it was taken for granted and features only incidentally in the sources.

Military training and strategy are two important matters on which the sources are typically silent. There are no references in literature or laws to men training, and so it is necessary to fall back on inference. For the noble warrior, his childhood was of first importance in learning both individual military skills and the teamwork essential for success in battle. Perhaps the games the youthful Cuthbert played ('wrestling, jumping, running, and every other exercise') had some military significance. Turning to strategy, of the period before Alfred the evidence gives the impression that Anglo-Saxon armies fought battles frequently. Battle was risky and best avoided unless all the factors were on your side. But if you were in a position so advantageous that you were willing to take the chance, it is likely that your enemy would be in such a weak position that he would avoid battle and pay tribute. Battles put the princes' lives at risk, as is demonstrated by the Northumbrian and Mercian overlordships brought to an end by a defeat in the field. Gillingham has shown how few pitched battles Charlemagne and Richard I chose to fight.

A defensive strategy becomes more apparent in the later part of Alfred's reign. It was built around the possession of fortified places and the close pursuit of the Danes to harass them and impede their preferred occupation of plundering. Alfred and his lieutenants were able to fight the Danes to a standstill by their repeated ability to pursue and besiege them closely in fortified camps throughout the country. The fortification of sites at Witham, Buckingham, Towcester and Colchester persuaded the Danes of the surrounding regions to submit. The key to this warfare was sieges and the control of fortified places. It is clear that the new fortresses had permanent garrisons, and that they were supported by the inhabitants of the existing burhs when danger threatened. This is brought out most clearly in the description of the campaigns of 917 in the Chronicle, but throughout the conquest of the Danelaw by Edward and Æthelflæd it is clear that a sophisticated and coordinated strategy was being applied.

In 973, a single currency was introduced into England in order to bring about political unification, but by concentrating bullion production at many coastal mints, the new rulers of England created an obvious target which attracted a new wave of Viking invasions, which came close to breaking up the kingdom of the English. From 980 onwards, the Anglo -Saxon Chronicle records renewed raiding against England. At first, the raids were probing ventures by small numbers of ships' crews, but soon grew in size and effect, until the only way of dealing with the Vikings appeared to be to pay protection money to buy them off: "And in that year it was determined that tribute should first be paid to the Danish men because of the great terror they were causing along the coast. The first payment was 10,000 pounds." The payment of Danegeld had to be underwritten by a huge balance of payments surplus; this could only be achieved by stimulating exports and cutting imports, itself accomplished through currency devaluation. This affected everyone in the kingdom.
L'activité viking dans les îles britanniques s'est déroulée au cours du haut Moyen Âge, du VIIIe au XIe siècle après J.-C., époque à laquelle des Scandinaves se rendaient dans les îles britanniques pour piller, conquérir, s'installer et commercer. On les appelle généralement les Vikings, mais certains érudits débattent de savoir si le terme « Viking » désignait tous les colons scandinaves ou seulement ceux qui recouraient à la violence. Au début de la période médiévale précoce, les royaumes scandinaves avaient développé des liens commerciaux s'étendant jusqu'en Europe du Sud et dans la Méditerranée, leur donnant accès à des importations étrangères, telles que l'argent, l'or, le bronze et les épices. Ces liens commerciaux s'étendaient également vers l'ouest, en Irlande et en Grande-Bretagne. À la fin du huitième siècle, des Vikings ont pillé plusieurs monastères chrétiens dans le nord de la Grande-Bretagne, et au cours des trois siècles suivants, ils ont lancé des invasions de plus en plus importantes et se sont installés dans de nombreuses régions, en particulier dans l'est de la Grande-Bretagne et en Irlande, les îles au nord et à l'ouest de l'Écosse et l'île de Man.
### Query ###
Pourquoi les rois anglais devaient donner de l'argent aux vikings ?

### Main Text ###
Fighting and warfare

Soldiers throughout the country were summoned, for both offensive and defensive war; early armies consisted essentially of household bands, while later on men were recruited on a territorial basis. The mustering of an army, annually at times, occupied an important place in Frankish history, both military and constitutional. The English kingdoms appear to have known no institution similar to this. The earliest reference is Bede's account of the overthrow of the Northumbrian Æthelfrith by Rædwald overlord of the southern English. Rædwald raised a large army, presumably from among the kings who accepted his overlordship, and "not giving him time to summon and assemble his whole army, Rædwald met him with a much greater force and slew him on the Mercian border on the east bank of the river Idle." At the Battle of Edington in 878, when the Danes made a surprise attack on Alfred at Chippenham after Twelfth Night, Alfred retreated to Athelney after Easter and then seven weeks after Easter mustered an army at "Egbert's stone". It is not difficult to imagine that Alfred sent out word to the ealdormen to call his men to arms. This may explain the delay, and it is probably no more than coincidence that the army mustered at the beginning of May, a time when there would have been sufficient grass for the horses. There is also information about the mustering of fleets in the eleventh century. From 992 to 1066 fleets were assembled at London, or returned to the city at the end of their service, on several occasions. Where they took up station depended on the quarter from which a threat was expected: Sandwich if invasion was expected from the north, or the Isle of Wight if it was from Normandy.

Once they left home, these armies and fleets had to be supplied with food and clothing for the men as well as forage for the horses. Yet if armies of the seventh and eighth centuries were accompanied by servants and a supply train of lesser free men, Alfred found these arrangements insufficient to defeat the Vikings. One of his reforms was to divide his military resources into thirds. One part manned the burhs and found the permanent garrisons which would make it impossible for the Danes to overrun Wessex, although they would also take to the field when extra soldiers were needed. The remaining two would take it in turns to serve. They were allocated a fixed term of service and brought the necessary provisions with them. This arrangement did not always function well. On one occasion a division on service went home in the middle of blockading a Danish army on Thorney Island; its provisions were consumed and its term had expired before the king came to relieve them. This method of division and rotation remained in force up to 1066. In 917, when armies from Wessex and Mercia were in the field from early April until November, one division went home and another took over. Again, in 1052 when Edward's fleet was waiting at Sandwich to intercept Godwine's return, the ships returned to London to take on new earls and crews. The importance of supply, vital to military success, was appreciated even if it was taken for granted and features only incidentally in the sources.

Military training and strategy are two important matters on which the sources are typically silent. There are no references in literature or laws to men training, and so it is necessary to fall back on inference. For the noble warrior, his childhood was of first importance in learning both individual military skills and the teamwork essential for success in battle. Perhaps the games the youthful Cuthbert played ('wrestling, jumping, running, and every other exercise') had some military significance. Turning to strategy, of the period before Alfred the evidence gives the impression that Anglo-Saxon armies fought battles frequently. Battle was risky and best avoided unless all the factors were on your side. But if you were in a position so advantageous that you were willing to take the chance, it is likely that your enemy would be in such a weak position that he would avoid battle and pay tribute. Battles put the princes' lives at risk, as is demonstrated by the Northumbrian and Mercian overlordships brought to an end by a defeat in the field. Gillingham has shown how few pitched battles Charlemagne and Richard I chose to fight.

A defensive strategy becomes more apparent in the later part of Alfred's reign. It was built around the possession of fortified places and the close pursuit of the Danes to harass them and impede their preferred occupation of plundering. Alfred and his lieutenants were able to fight the Danes to a standstill by their repeated ability to pursue and besiege them closely in fortified camps throughout the country. The fortification of sites at Witham, Buckingham, Towcester and Colchester persuaded the Danes of the surrounding regions to submit. The key to this warfare was sieges and the control of fortified places. It is clear that the new fortresses had permanent garrisons, and that they were supported by the inhabitants of the existing burhs when danger threatened. This is brought out most clearly in the description of the campaigns of 917 in the Chronicle, but throughout the conquest of the Danelaw by Edward and Æthelflæd it is clear that a sophisticated and coordinated strategy was being applied.

In 973, a single currency was introduced into England in order to bring about political unification, but by concentrating bullion production at many coastal mints, the new rulers of England created an obvious target which attracted a new wave of Viking invasions, which came close to breaking up the kingdom of the English. From 980 onwards, the Anglo -Saxon Chronicle records renewed raiding against England. At first, the raids were probing ventures by small numbers of ships' crews, but soon grew in size and effect, until the only way of dealing with the Vikings appeared to be to pay protection money to buy them off: "And in that year it was determined that tribute should first be paid to the Danish men because of the great terror they were causing along the coast. The first payment was 10,000 pounds." The payment of Danegeld had to be underwritten by a huge balance of payments surplus; this could only be achieved by stimulating exports and cutting imports, itself accomplished through currency devaluation. This affected everyone in the kingdom.

### Supplementary Text ###
L'activité viking dans les îles britanniques s'est déroulée au cours du haut Moyen Âge, du VIIIe au XIe siècle après J.-C., époque à laquelle des Scandinaves se rendaient dans les îles britanniques pour piller, conquérir, s'installer et commercer. On les appelle généralement les Vikings, mais certains érudits débattent de savoir si le terme « Viking » désignait tous les colons scandinaves ou seulement ceux qui recouraient à la violence. Au début de la période médiévale précoce, les royaumes scandinaves avaient développé des liens commerciaux s'étendant jusqu'en Europe du Sud et dans la Méditerranée, leur donnant accès à des importations étrangères, telles que l'argent, l'or, le bronze et les épices. Ces liens commerciaux s'étendaient également vers l'ouest, en Irlande et en Grande-Bretagne. À la fin du huitième siècle, des Vikings ont pillé plusieurs monastères chrétiens dans le nord de la Grande-Bretagne, et au cours des trois siècles suivants, ils ont lancé des invasions de plus en plus importantes et se sont installés dans de nombreuses régions, en particulier dans l'est de la Grande-Bretagne et en Irlande, les îles au nord et à l'ouest de l'Écosse et l'île de Man.

### Draft ###

Query parsing: "Pourquoi les rois anglais devaient donner de l'argent aux vikings"

Translation: "Why did English kings have to give money to the Vikings?"

Key semantic: "devaient" (had to) - implies obligation/necessity, not choice.

### 1. Contextual grounding

Timeframe: Late 8th-11th centuries CE
Geographic: Anglo-Saxon kingdoms → England
Cultural domain: Viking Age expansion, Anglo-Scandinavian relations

● High confidence: Danegeld tribute system
◐ Partial: Exact motivations, political calculations

### 2. Information triangulation 

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle evidence → systematic tribute payments
Monetary amounts documented → 10,000 pounds sterling initially
Pattern: raids → threat → negotiations → payment

! Key insight: Not just extortion - strategic calculation

### 3. Causal chain analysis

Vikings raid monasteries (793 CE) →
Monetary economy expansion → 
Target vulnerability →
Raiding efficiency increases →
Payment becomes "cheaper" than military response

Math check: 10,000 pounds = massive sum. Alternative military costs likely higher?

### 4. Strategic logic

⟨H≈0.8⟩ The economics of submission... silver flowing like blood-payment, tribute-tax, protection-money. Kings counting coins against swords. Better pay than fight? Numbers tell truth: 10,000 pounds buys peace, maybe kingdom survival. Military response costs... ships, soldiers, supplies. Risk factor exponential. Viking efficiency rising, target vulnerability static. ∴ Payment optimal solution.

### 5. Constraint identification

Physical constraints:
- Viking naval mobility → coastal vulnerability
- Anglo-Saxon military resources finite
- Trade wealth concentrated → accessible targets

Political constraints:
- Multiple kingdoms, competing pressures
- Internal instability during raids
- Diplomatic isolation vs. continental powers

### 6. Synthesis

Tribute "necessary" because:

☐ Economic: Vikings became efficient raiding force
☑ Strategic: Payment cheaper than military response  
☑ Political: Demonstrates weakness in defense
☑ Practical: Immediate solution to ongoing pressure

! Core answer: Pragmatic choice under repeated pressure

NB: "Devaient" = had to (obligation/necessity) - reflects recognition of constraint, not moral judgment

### 7. Verification

Chronological consistency ✓
Monetary amounts realistic ✓  
Strategic logic sound ✓
Political motivations plausible ✓

∴ Answer framework: Economic efficiency + strategic calculation + political pragmatism = "necessity" of tribute payments

### Answer###
Les rois anglais ont dû payer de l'argent aux Vikings principalement pour éviter les pillages et les invasions. Vers la fin du VIIIe siècle, les Vikings commencèrent à attaquer les monastères chrétiens du nord de l'Angleterre, puis leurs raids devinrent de plus en plus importants et systématiques. Face à cette menace croissante, les rois anglais se trouvèrent dans l'obligation de verser des sommes considérables d'argent pour acheter la paix et empêcher les Vikings de détruire leurs territoires.

Le système prit forme avec le paiement de tribut appelé Danegeld. En 980, les Vikings menaçaient suffisamment les côtes anglaises pour que les rois décident de payer 10 000 livres sterling, ce montant s'élevant progressivement par la suite. Ce système de protection payante était la seule façon pour les rois anglais de faire face aux Vikings, car leurs armées traditionnelles se montrèrent inefficaces pour les arrêter définitivement.

Cette politique reflétait une stratégie pragmatique : plutôt que de risquer une bataille coûteuse et incertaine, les rois anglais préféraient payer pour éviter les pillages massifs qui auraient pu déstabiliser leur royaume. Cependant, cette solution avait ses limites et ne put empêcher les Vikings de continuer leurs incursions.