Est-ce que la déclaration Balfour voulait vraiment dire un pays juif ou juste une maison pour les juifs ?
The "national home for the Jewish people" vs. Jewish state

"This is a very carefully worded document and but for the somewhat vague phrase 'A National Home for the Jewish People' might be considered sufficiently unalarming... But the vagueness of the phrase cited has been a cause of trouble from the commencement. Various persons in high positions have used language of the loosest kind calculated to convey a very different impression to the more moderate interpretation which can be put upon the words. President Wilson brushed away all doubts as to what was intended from his point of view when, in March 1919, he said to the Jewish leaders in America, 'I am moreover persuaded that the allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own Government and people are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth.' The late President Roosevelt declared that one of the Allies peace conditions should be that 'Palestine must be made a Jewish State.' Mr. Winston Churchill has spoken of a 'Jewish State' and Mr. Bonar Law has talked in Parliament of 'restoring Palestine to the Jews'."

Report of the Palin Commission, August 1920

The term "national home" was intentionally ambiguous, having no legal value or precedent in international law, such that its meaning was unclear when compared to other terms such as "state". The term was intentionally used instead of "state" because of opposition to the Zionist program within the British Cabinet. According to historian Norman Rose, the chief architects of the declaration contemplated that a Jewish State would emerge in time while the Palestine Royal Commission concluded that the wording was "the outcome of a compromise between those Ministers who contemplated the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State and those who did not."

Interpretation of the wording has been sought in the correspondence leading to the final version of the declaration. An official report to the War Cabinet sent by Sykes on 22 September said that the Zionists did not want "to set up a Jewish Republic or any other form of state in Palestine or in any part of Palestine" but rather preferred some form of protectorate as provided in the Palestine Mandate. A month later, Curzon produced a memorandum circulated on 26 October 1917 where he addressed two questions, the first concerning the meaning of the phrase "a National Home for the Jewish race in Palestine"; he noted that there were different opinions ranging from a fully fledged state to a merely spiritual centre for the Jews.

Sections of the British press assumed that a Jewish state was intended even before the Declaration was finalized. In the United States the press began using the terms "Jewish National Home", "Jewish State", "Jewish republic" and "Jewish Commonwealth" interchangeably.

Treaty expert David Hunter Miller, who was at the conference and subsequently compiled a 22 volume compendium of documents, provides a report of the Intelligence Section of the American Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 which recommended that "there be established a separate state in Palestine," and that "it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a Jewish state, as soon as it is a Jewish state in fact." The report further advised that an independent Palestinian state under a British League of Nations mandate be created. Jewish settlement would be allowed and encouraged in this state and this state's holy sites would be under the control of the League of Nations. Indeed, the Inquiry spoke positively about the possibility of a Jewish state eventually being created in Palestine if the necessary demographics for this were to exist.

Historian Matthew Jacobs later wrote that the US approach was hampered by the "general absence of specialist knowledge about the region" and that "like much of the Inquiry's work on the Middle East, the reports on Palestine were deeply flawed" and "presupposed a particular outcome of the conflict". He quotes Miller, writing about one report on the history and impact of Zionism, "absolutely inadequate from any standpoint and must be regarded as nothing more than material for a future report".

Lord Robert Cecil on 2 December 1917, assured an audience that the government fully intended that "Judea for the Jews." Yair Auron opines that Cecil, then a deputy Foreign Secretary representing the British Government at a celebratory gathering of the English Zionist Federation, "possibly went beyond his official brief" in saying (he cites Stein) "Our wish is that Arabian countries shall be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians and Judaea for the Jews".

The following October Neville Chamberlain, while chairing a Zionist meeting, discussed a "new Jewish State." At the time, Chamberlain was a Member of Parliament for Ladywood, Birmingham; recalling the event in 1939, just after Chamberlain had approved the 1939 White Paper, the Jewish Telegraph Agency noted that the Prime Minister had "experienced a pronounced change of mind in the 21 years intervening" A year later, on the Declaration's second anniversary, General Jan Smuts said that Britain "would redeem her pledge... and a great Jewish state would ultimately rise." In similar vein, Churchill a few months later stated:

If, as may well happen, there should be created in our own lifetime by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of the British Crown which might comprise three or four millions of Jews, an event will have occurred in the history of the world which would from every point of view be beneficial.

At the 22 June 1921 meeting of the Imperial Cabinet, Churchill was asked by Arthur Meighen, the Canadian Prime Minister, about the meaning of the national home. Churchill said "If in the course of many years they become a majority in the country, they naturally would take it over... pro rata with the Arab. We made an equal pledge that we would not turn the Arab off his land or invade his political and social rights".

Responding to Curzon in January 1919, Balfour wrote "Weizmann has never put forward a claim for the Jewish Government of Palestine. Such a claim in my opinion is clearly inadmissible and personally I do not think we should go further than the original declaration which I made to Lord Rothschild".

In February 1919, France issued a statement that it would not oppose putting Palestine under British trusteeship and the formation of a Jewish State. Friedman further notes that France's attitude went on to change; Yehuda Blum, while discussing France's "unfriendly attitude towards the Jewish national movement", notes the content of a report made by Robert Vansittart (a leading member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference) to Curzon in November 1920 which said:

had agreed to a Jewish National Home, not a Jewish State. They considered we were steering straight upon the latter, and the very last thing they would do was to enlarge that State for they totally disapproved our policy.

Greece's Foreign Minister told the editor of the Salonica Jewish organ Pro-Israel that "the establishment of a Jewish State meets in Greece with full and sincere sympathy... A Jewish Palestine would become an ally of Greece." In Switzerland, a number of noted historians including professors Tobler, Forel-Yvorne, and Rogaz, supported the idea of establishing a Jewish state, with one referring to it as "a sacred right of the Jews." While in Germany, officials and most of the press took the Declaration to mean a British sponsored state for the Jews.

The British government, including Churchill, made it clear that the Declaration did not intend for the whole of Palestine to be converted into a Jewish National Home, "but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine." Emir Faisal, King of Syria and Iraq, made a formal written agreement with Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, which was drafted by T. E. Lawrence, whereby they would try to establish a peaceful relationship between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The 3 January 1919 Faisal–Weizmann Agreement was a short-lived agreement for Arab–Jewish cooperation on the development of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Faisal did treat Palestine differently in his presentation to the Peace Conference on 6 February 1919 saying "Palestine, for its universal character, left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties concerned". The agreement was never implemented. In a subsequent letter written in English by Lawrence for Faisal's signature, he explained:

We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, suffering similar oppression at the hands of powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step toward the attainment of their national ideals together. We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement... We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through; we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.

When the letter was tabled at the Shaw Commission in 1929, Rustam Haidar spoke to Faisal in Baghdad and cabled that Faisal had "no recollection that he wrote anything of the sort". In January 1930, Haidar wrote to a newspaper in Baghdad that Faisal: "finds it exceedingly strange that such a matter is attributed to him as he at no time would consider allowing any foreign nation to share in an Arab country". Awni Abd al-Hadi, Faisal's secretary, wrote in his memoirs that he was not aware that a meeting between Frankfurter and Faisal took place and that: "I believe that this letter, assuming that it is authentic, was written by Lawrence, and that Lawrence signed it in English on behalf of Faisal. I believe this letter is part of the false claims made by Chaim Weizmann and Lawrence to lead astray public opinion." According to Allawi, the most likely explanation for the Frankfurter letter is that a meeting took place, a letter was drafted in English by Lawrence, but that its "contents were not entirely made clear to Faisal. He then may or may not have been induced to sign it", since it ran counter to Faisal's other public and private statements at the time. A 1 March interview by Le Matin quoted Faisal as saying:

This feeling of respect for other religions dictates my opinion about Palestine, our neighbor. That the unhappy Jews come to reside there and behave as good citizens of this country, our humanity rejoices given that they are placed under a Muslim or Christian government mandated by The League of Nations. If they want to constitute a state and claim sovereign rights in this region, I foresee very serious dangers. It is to be feared that there will be a conflict between them and the other races.

Referring to his 1922 White Paper, Churchill later wrote that "there is nothing in it to prohibit the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State." And in private, many British officials agreed with the Zionists' interpretation that a state would be established when a Jewish majority was achieved.

When Chaim Weizmann met with Churchill, Lloyd George and Balfour at Balfour's home in London on 21 July 1921, Lloyd George and Balfour assured Weizmann "that by the Declaration they had always meant an eventual Jewish State," according to Weizmann minutes of that meeting. Lloyd George stated in 1937 that it was intended that Palestine would become a Jewish Commonwealth if and when Jews "had become a definite majority of the inhabitants", and Leo Amery echoed the same position in 1946. In the UNSCOP report of 1947, the issue of home versus state was subjected to scrutiny arriving at a similar conclusion to that of Lloyd George.
La Déclaration Balfour était une déclaration publique émise par le gouvernement britannique en 1917 pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, annonçant son soutien à l'établissement d'un « foyer national pour le peuple juif » en Palestine, alors une région ottomane avec une petite minorité de population juive. La déclaration était contenue dans une lettre datée du 2 novembre 1917 du secrétaire d'État britannique aux Affaires étrangères, Arthur Balfour, à Lord Rothschild, un dirigeant de la communauté juive britannique, pour transmission à la Fédération sioniste de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande. Le texte de la déclaration a été publié dans la presse le 9 novembre 1917.

Immédiatement après la déclaration de guerre de la Grande-Bretagne contre l'Empire ottoman en novembre 1914, elle a commencé à envisager l'avenir de la Palestine. Dans les deux mois qui ont suivi, une note a été diffusée au War Cabinet par un membre sioniste, Herbert Samuel, proposant le soutien aux ambitions sionistes afin de rallier le soutien des Juifs à l'effort de guerre plus large. Un comité a été créé en avril 1915 par le Premier ministre britannique H. H. Asquith pour déterminer sa politique à l'égard de l'Empire ottoman, y compris la Palestine. Asquith, qui avait favorisé une réforme de l'Empire ottoman après la guerre, a démissionné en décembre 1916 ; son successeur, David Lloyd George, était favorable à la partition de l'Empire. Les premières négociations entre les Britanniques et les sionistes ont eu lieu lors d'une conférence le 7 février 1917, qui comprenait Sir Mark Sykes et la direction sioniste. Les discussions ultérieures ont conduit à la demande de Balfour, le 19 juin, à Rothschild et Chaim Weizmann de soumettre un projet de déclaration publique. D'autres projets ont été discutés par le Cabinet britannique en septembre et octobre, avec la participation de Juifs sionistes et anti-sionistes, mais sans représentation de la population locale en Palestine.

Fin 1917, à l'approche de la Déclaration Balfour, la guerre s'était enlisée, deux alliés de la Grande-Bretagne n'étant pas pleinement engagés : les États-Unis n'avaient pas encore subi de victimes, et les Russes étaient en pleine révolution, les bolcheviks prenant le pouvoir. L'impasse dans le sud de la Palestine a été brisée par la bataille de Beer-Sheva le 31 octobre 1917. La publication de la déclaration finale a été autorisée le 31 octobre ; la discussion ministérielle précédente avait fait référence aux avantages perçus en matière de propagande au sein de la communauté juive mondiale pour l'effort de guerre allié.

Les premières phrases de la déclaration représentaient la première expression publique de soutien au sionisme par une grande puissance politique. Le terme « foyer national » n'avait aucun précédent au regard du droit international, et était intentionnellement vague quant à la question de savoir si un État juif était envisagé. Les limites prévues de la Palestine n'étaient pas spécifiées, et le gouvernement britannique a confirmé plus tard que les mots « en Palestine » signifiaient que le foyer national juif n'était pas destiné à couvrir toute la Palestine. La deuxième partie de la déclaration a été ajoutée pour satisfaire les opposants à cette politique, qui avaient fait valoir qu'elle nuirait autrement à la situation de la population locale de Palestine et encouragerait l'antisémitisme dans le monde entier en « estampillant les Juifs comme des étrangers dans leurs terres natales ». La déclaration appelait à la sauvegarde des droits civils et religieux des Arabes palestiniens, qui constituaient la grande majorité de la population locale, ainsi qu'aux droits et au statut politique des communautés juives dans d'autres pays en dehors de la Palestine. Le gouvernement britannique a reconnu en 1939 que les souhaits et les intérêts de la population locale auraient dû être pris en compte, et a reconnu en 2017 que la déclaration aurait dû appeler à la protection des droits politiques des Palestiniens.

La déclaration a eu de nombreuses conséquences durables. Elle a considérablement accru le soutien populaire au sionisme au sein des communautés juives du monde entier, et est devenue un élément essentiel du Mandat britannique pour la Palestine, le document fondateur de la Palestine mandataire. Elle a indirectement conduit à l'émergence de l'État d'Israël et est considérée comme une cause principale du conflit israélo-palestinien en cours, souvent décrit comme le plus insoluble du monde. Des controverses subsistent sur un certain nombre de points, tels que la question de savoir si la déclaration contredisait les promesses antérieures que la Grande-Bretagne avait faites au Sharif de La Mecque dans la correspondance McMahon-Hussein.
### Query ###
Est-ce que la déclaration Balfour voulait vraiment dire un pays juif ou juste une maison pour les juifs ?

### Main Text ###
The "national home for the Jewish people" vs. Jewish state

"This is a very carefully worded document and but for the somewhat vague phrase 'A National Home for the Jewish People' might be considered sufficiently unalarming... But the vagueness of the phrase cited has been a cause of trouble from the commencement. Various persons in high positions have used language of the loosest kind calculated to convey a very different impression to the more moderate interpretation which can be put upon the words. President Wilson brushed away all doubts as to what was intended from his point of view when, in March 1919, he said to the Jewish leaders in America, 'I am moreover persuaded that the allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own Government and people are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth.' The late President Roosevelt declared that one of the Allies peace conditions should be that 'Palestine must be made a Jewish State.' Mr. Winston Churchill has spoken of a 'Jewish State' and Mr. Bonar Law has talked in Parliament of 'restoring Palestine to the Jews'."

Report of the Palin Commission, August 1920

The term "national home" was intentionally ambiguous, having no legal value or precedent in international law, such that its meaning was unclear when compared to other terms such as "state". The term was intentionally used instead of "state" because of opposition to the Zionist program within the British Cabinet. According to historian Norman Rose, the chief architects of the declaration contemplated that a Jewish State would emerge in time while the Palestine Royal Commission concluded that the wording was "the outcome of a compromise between those Ministers who contemplated the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State and those who did not."

Interpretation of the wording has been sought in the correspondence leading to the final version of the declaration. An official report to the War Cabinet sent by Sykes on 22 September said that the Zionists did not want "to set up a Jewish Republic or any other form of state in Palestine or in any part of Palestine" but rather preferred some form of protectorate as provided in the Palestine Mandate. A month later, Curzon produced a memorandum circulated on 26 October 1917 where he addressed two questions, the first concerning the meaning of the phrase "a National Home for the Jewish race in Palestine"; he noted that there were different opinions ranging from a fully fledged state to a merely spiritual centre for the Jews.

Sections of the British press assumed that a Jewish state was intended even before the Declaration was finalized. In the United States the press began using the terms "Jewish National Home", "Jewish State", "Jewish republic" and "Jewish Commonwealth" interchangeably.

Treaty expert David Hunter Miller, who was at the conference and subsequently compiled a 22 volume compendium of documents, provides a report of the Intelligence Section of the American Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 which recommended that "there be established a separate state in Palestine," and that "it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a Jewish state, as soon as it is a Jewish state in fact." The report further advised that an independent Palestinian state under a British League of Nations mandate be created. Jewish settlement would be allowed and encouraged in this state and this state's holy sites would be under the control of the League of Nations. Indeed, the Inquiry spoke positively about the possibility of a Jewish state eventually being created in Palestine if the necessary demographics for this were to exist.

Historian Matthew Jacobs later wrote that the US approach was hampered by the "general absence of specialist knowledge about the region" and that "like much of the Inquiry's work on the Middle East, the reports on Palestine were deeply flawed" and "presupposed a particular outcome of the conflict". He quotes Miller, writing about one report on the history and impact of Zionism, "absolutely inadequate from any standpoint and must be regarded as nothing more than material for a future report".

Lord Robert Cecil on 2 December 1917, assured an audience that the government fully intended that "Judea for the Jews." Yair Auron opines that Cecil, then a deputy Foreign Secretary representing the British Government at a celebratory gathering of the English Zionist Federation, "possibly went beyond his official brief" in saying (he cites Stein) "Our wish is that Arabian countries shall be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians and Judaea for the Jews".

The following October Neville Chamberlain, while chairing a Zionist meeting, discussed a "new Jewish State." At the time, Chamberlain was a Member of Parliament for Ladywood, Birmingham; recalling the event in 1939, just after Chamberlain had approved the 1939 White Paper, the Jewish Telegraph Agency noted that the Prime Minister had "experienced a pronounced change of mind in the 21 years intervening" A year later, on the Declaration's second anniversary, General Jan Smuts said that Britain "would redeem her pledge... and a great Jewish state would ultimately rise." In similar vein, Churchill a few months later stated:

If, as may well happen, there should be created in our own lifetime by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of the British Crown which might comprise three or four millions of Jews, an event will have occurred in the history of the world which would from every point of view be beneficial.

At the 22 June 1921 meeting of the Imperial Cabinet, Churchill was asked by Arthur Meighen, the Canadian Prime Minister, about the meaning of the national home. Churchill said "If in the course of many years they become a majority in the country, they naturally would take it over... pro rata with the Arab. We made an equal pledge that we would not turn the Arab off his land or invade his political and social rights".

Responding to Curzon in January 1919, Balfour wrote "Weizmann has never put forward a claim for the Jewish Government of Palestine. Such a claim in my opinion is clearly inadmissible and personally I do not think we should go further than the original declaration which I made to Lord Rothschild".

In February 1919, France issued a statement that it would not oppose putting Palestine under British trusteeship and the formation of a Jewish State. Friedman further notes that France's attitude went on to change; Yehuda Blum, while discussing France's "unfriendly attitude towards the Jewish national movement", notes the content of a report made by Robert Vansittart (a leading member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference) to Curzon in November 1920 which said:

had agreed to a Jewish National Home, not a Jewish State. They considered we were steering straight upon the latter, and the very last thing they would do was to enlarge that State for they totally disapproved our policy.

Greece's Foreign Minister told the editor of the Salonica Jewish organ Pro-Israel that "the establishment of a Jewish State meets in Greece with full and sincere sympathy... A Jewish Palestine would become an ally of Greece." In Switzerland, a number of noted historians including professors Tobler, Forel-Yvorne, and Rogaz, supported the idea of establishing a Jewish state, with one referring to it as "a sacred right of the Jews." While in Germany, officials and most of the press took the Declaration to mean a British sponsored state for the Jews.

The British government, including Churchill, made it clear that the Declaration did not intend for the whole of Palestine to be converted into a Jewish National Home, "but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine." Emir Faisal, King of Syria and Iraq, made a formal written agreement with Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, which was drafted by T. E. Lawrence, whereby they would try to establish a peaceful relationship between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The 3 January 1919 Faisal–Weizmann Agreement was a short-lived agreement for Arab–Jewish cooperation on the development of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Faisal did treat Palestine differently in his presentation to the Peace Conference on 6 February 1919 saying "Palestine, for its universal character, left on one side for the mutual consideration of all parties concerned". The agreement was never implemented. In a subsequent letter written in English by Lawrence for Faisal's signature, he explained:

We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, suffering similar oppression at the hands of powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step toward the attainment of their national ideals together. We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement... We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through; we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.

When the letter was tabled at the Shaw Commission in 1929, Rustam Haidar spoke to Faisal in Baghdad and cabled that Faisal had "no recollection that he wrote anything of the sort". In January 1930, Haidar wrote to a newspaper in Baghdad that Faisal: "finds it exceedingly strange that such a matter is attributed to him as he at no time would consider allowing any foreign nation to share in an Arab country". Awni Abd al-Hadi, Faisal's secretary, wrote in his memoirs that he was not aware that a meeting between Frankfurter and Faisal took place and that: "I believe that this letter, assuming that it is authentic, was written by Lawrence, and that Lawrence signed it in English on behalf of Faisal. I believe this letter is part of the false claims made by Chaim Weizmann and Lawrence to lead astray public opinion." According to Allawi, the most likely explanation for the Frankfurter letter is that a meeting took place, a letter was drafted in English by Lawrence, but that its "contents were not entirely made clear to Faisal. He then may or may not have been induced to sign it", since it ran counter to Faisal's other public and private statements at the time. A 1 March interview by Le Matin quoted Faisal as saying:

This feeling of respect for other religions dictates my opinion about Palestine, our neighbor. That the unhappy Jews come to reside there and behave as good citizens of this country, our humanity rejoices given that they are placed under a Muslim or Christian government mandated by The League of Nations. If they want to constitute a state and claim sovereign rights in this region, I foresee very serious dangers. It is to be feared that there will be a conflict between them and the other races.

Referring to his 1922 White Paper, Churchill later wrote that "there is nothing in it to prohibit the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State." And in private, many British officials agreed with the Zionists' interpretation that a state would be established when a Jewish majority was achieved.

When Chaim Weizmann met with Churchill, Lloyd George and Balfour at Balfour's home in London on 21 July 1921, Lloyd George and Balfour assured Weizmann "that by the Declaration they had always meant an eventual Jewish State," according to Weizmann minutes of that meeting. Lloyd George stated in 1937 that it was intended that Palestine would become a Jewish Commonwealth if and when Jews "had become a definite majority of the inhabitants", and Leo Amery echoed the same position in 1946. In the UNSCOP report of 1947, the issue of home versus state was subjected to scrutiny arriving at a similar conclusion to that of Lloyd George.

### Supplementary Text ###
La Déclaration Balfour était une déclaration publique émise par le gouvernement britannique en 1917 pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, annonçant son soutien à l'établissement d'un « foyer national pour le peuple juif » en Palestine, alors une région ottomane avec une petite minorité de population juive. La déclaration était contenue dans une lettre datée du 2 novembre 1917 du secrétaire d'État britannique aux Affaires étrangères, Arthur Balfour, à Lord Rothschild, un dirigeant de la communauté juive britannique, pour transmission à la Fédération sioniste de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande. Le texte de la déclaration a été publié dans la presse le 9 novembre 1917.

Immédiatement après la déclaration de guerre de la Grande-Bretagne contre l'Empire ottoman en novembre 1914, elle a commencé à envisager l'avenir de la Palestine. Dans les deux mois qui ont suivi, une note a été diffusée au War Cabinet par un membre sioniste, Herbert Samuel, proposant le soutien aux ambitions sionistes afin de rallier le soutien des Juifs à l'effort de guerre plus large. Un comité a été créé en avril 1915 par le Premier ministre britannique H. H. Asquith pour déterminer sa politique à l'égard de l'Empire ottoman, y compris la Palestine. Asquith, qui avait favorisé une réforme de l'Empire ottoman après la guerre, a démissionné en décembre 1916 ; son successeur, David Lloyd George, était favorable à la partition de l'Empire. Les premières négociations entre les Britanniques et les sionistes ont eu lieu lors d'une conférence le 7 février 1917, qui comprenait Sir Mark Sykes et la direction sioniste. Les discussions ultérieures ont conduit à la demande de Balfour, le 19 juin, à Rothschild et Chaim Weizmann de soumettre un projet de déclaration publique. D'autres projets ont été discutés par le Cabinet britannique en septembre et octobre, avec la participation de Juifs sionistes et anti-sionistes, mais sans représentation de la population locale en Palestine.

Fin 1917, à l'approche de la Déclaration Balfour, la guerre s'était enlisée, deux alliés de la Grande-Bretagne n'étant pas pleinement engagés : les États-Unis n'avaient pas encore subi de victimes, et les Russes étaient en pleine révolution, les bolcheviks prenant le pouvoir. L'impasse dans le sud de la Palestine a été brisée par la bataille de Beer-Sheva le 31 octobre 1917. La publication de la déclaration finale a été autorisée le 31 octobre ; la discussion ministérielle précédente avait fait référence aux avantages perçus en matière de propagande au sein de la communauté juive mondiale pour l'effort de guerre allié.

Les premières phrases de la déclaration représentaient la première expression publique de soutien au sionisme par une grande puissance politique. Le terme « foyer national » n'avait aucun précédent au regard du droit international, et était intentionnellement vague quant à la question de savoir si un État juif était envisagé. Les limites prévues de la Palestine n'étaient pas spécifiées, et le gouvernement britannique a confirmé plus tard que les mots « en Palestine » signifiaient que le foyer national juif n'était pas destiné à couvrir toute la Palestine. La deuxième partie de la déclaration a été ajoutée pour satisfaire les opposants à cette politique, qui avaient fait valoir qu'elle nuirait autrement à la situation de la population locale de Palestine et encouragerait l'antisémitisme dans le monde entier en « estampillant les Juifs comme des étrangers dans leurs terres natales ». La déclaration appelait à la sauvegarde des droits civils et religieux des Arabes palestiniens, qui constituaient la grande majorité de la population locale, ainsi qu'aux droits et au statut politique des communautés juives dans d'autres pays en dehors de la Palestine. Le gouvernement britannique a reconnu en 1939 que les souhaits et les intérêts de la population locale auraient dû être pris en compte, et a reconnu en 2017 que la déclaration aurait dû appeler à la protection des droits politiques des Palestiniens.

La déclaration a eu de nombreuses conséquences durables. Elle a considérablement accru le soutien populaire au sionisme au sein des communautés juives du monde entier, et est devenue un élément essentiel du Mandat britannique pour la Palestine, le document fondateur de la Palestine mandataire. Elle a indirectement conduit à l'émergence de l'État d'Israël et est considérée comme une cause principale du conflit israélo-palestinien en cours, souvent décrit comme le plus insoluble du monde. Des controverses subsistent sur un certain nombre de points, tels que la question de savoir si la déclaration contredisait les promesses antérieures que la Grande-Bretagne avait faites au Sharif de La Mecque dans la correspondance McMahon-Hussein.

### Draft ###

### 1. Query Parsing

"Est-ce que la déclaration Balfour voulait vraiment dire un pays juif ou juste une maison pour les juifs ?"

→ Semantic tension: "vraiment dire" = authentic intent vs. face value
→ Binary opposition: pays juif (Jewish state) vs maison (home/dwelling)
→ Implies strategic ambiguity hypothesis

### 2. Historical Context Retrieval

⟨H≈0.3⟩ Balfour Declaration 1917... vague language by design... British cabinet tensions... Zionists pushing for statehood vs. non-Zionist ministers... Lloyd George's flexible interpretation... "national home" as compromise term...

● Key date: November 2, 1917
● Key actors: Balfour, Weizmann, British War Cabinet
◐ Archive evidence: partial, diplomatic correspondence incomplete

### 3. Intent vs. Interpretation Analysis

**Balfour's Intent** ◐
- "National home for Jewish people" vs "Jewish state" 
- Cabinet compromise → deliberate ambiguity
- ~6 months negotiation process (Feb-Nov 1917)

**Interpretation Evolution** ●
- 1917-1918: Zionists interpret as state trajectory
- 1919: President Wilson "Jewish Commonwealth" 
- 1921: Churchill "Jewish State"
- 1922: British clarification (White Paper)

### 4. Evidence Synthesis

**Textual Evidence** ◐
"Maison nationale pour le peuple juif" = ambiguous legal status
No specification of territorial limits
No mention of Arab rights (added later)

**Correspondence Analysis** ●
Sykes report Sept 22, 1917: Zionists "not set up Jewish Republic"
Curzon memo Oct 26: "different opinions from fully fledged state to purely spiritual center"

**Declarations Analysis** ●
Wilson 1919: "foundations of Jewish Commonwealth"
Churchill 1921: "Jewish State"
Lloyd George 1921: "will become Jewish State if Jews become majority"

### 5. Logical Resolution

∴ **Strategic ambiguity thesis confirmed**

Evidence convergence:
├─ Negotiated language ("national home" = compromise)
├─ Interpretive evolution (British officials → state language)  
└─ Contemporary reactions (Wilson, Churchill → state interpretation)

**Answer framework**: 
- Balfour = intentional ambiguity (cabinet politics)
- Interpretation = spectrum of meanings
- Evidence = both directions present
- "Jewish state" = long-term goal for key architects

⚠ **Bias note**: Zionist historiography may overemphasize state intentions vs. British constraints

### 6. Synthesis

**Response structure**:
1. Acknowledge definitional ambiguity
2. Historical context → cabinet tensions
3. Evidence for both interpretations 
4. Conclusion: strategic compromise with dual trajectory

**Key insight**: "National home" was legally defensible ambiguity allowing British flexibility while satisfying Zionist aspirations.

### Answer###
La Déclaration Balfour de 1917 utilisait délibérément un langage ambigu pour éviter de préciser si elle visait réellement un "pays juif" ou simplement une "maison pour les juifs". Le terme "foyer national" n'avait aucun précédent au regard du droit international et était intentionnellement vague sur la question de savoir si un État juif était envisagé.

Les architectes britanniques de la déclaration ont choisi cette ambiguïté parce qu'elle reflétait un compromis entre les ministres qui envisageaient l'établissement éventuel d'un État juif et ceux qui ne le faisaient pas. Le cabinet britannique était divisé sur cette question dès le départ.

Cependant, l'interprétation du texte a rapidement évolué vers une lecture plus proche d'un État juif. Dès 1917, la presse britannique et américaine utilisait les termes "foyer national juif", "État juif", "république juive" et "Commonwealth juif" de manière interchangeable. Des dirigeants politiques britanniques comme Winston Churchill parlaient ouvertement d'un "État juif" dès 1921, et David Lloyd George déclarait en 1937 que la Palestine deviendrait un "Commonwealth juif" si les Juifs devenaient une majorité.

Les échanges de correspondance internes britanniques révèlent que les architectes de la déclaration eux-mêmes envisageaient un État juif à long terme. En septembre 1917, un rapport officiel disait que les sionistes ne souhaitaient pas "établir une République juive ou toute autre forme d'État en Palestine", mais préféraient plutôt une forme de protectorat. Parallèlement, le Premier ministre britannique Lloyd George avait déclaré en 1921 que la Grande-Bretagne ne "tournerait pas les Arabes de leurs terres" et qu'ils resteraient "pro rata avec les Arabes".

Il semble donc que la déclaration ait été intentionnellement écrite pour permettre une interprétation flexible qui, dans l'esprit de ses concepteurs, évoluerait vers un État juif dans le temps, tout en maintenant une certaine ambiguïté pour satisfaire les différentes factions au sein du gouvernement britannique.