Pourquoi Konoe a-t-il démissionné en octobre 1941 ?
Advocacy for preventive war

On June 1, 1940, Emperor Hirohito appointed Kōichi Kido, a leading " reform bureaucrat " as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, making him into the Emperor's leading political advisor and fixer. Kido had aided in the creation in the 1930s of an alliance between the "reform bureaucrats" and the Army's "Control" faction centered on Tojo and General Mutō Akira. Kido's appointment also favored the rise of his allies in the Control faction. On July 30, 1940, Tojo was appointed army minister in the second Fumimaro Konoe regime and remained in that post in the third Konoe cabinet. Prince Konoe had chosen Tojo, a man representative of both the Army's hardline views and the Control faction with whom he was considered reasonable to deal, to secure the Army's backing for his foreign policy. Tojo was a militant ultra-nationalist who was well respected for his work ethic and his ability to handle paperwork. He believed that the emperor was a living god and favored "direct imperial rule;" that ensured that he would faithfully follow any order from the emperor. Konoe favored having Germany mediate an end to the Sino-Japanese War, pressured Britain to end its economic and military support of China even at the risk of war, sought better relations with both Germany and the United States, and took advantage of the changes in the international order caused by Germany's victories in the spring of 1940 to make Japan a stronger power in Asia. Konoe wanted to make Japan the dominant power in East Asia, but he also believed it was possible to negotiate a modus vivendi with the United States under which the Americans would agree to recognize the " Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ".

By 1940, Konoe, who had started the war with China in 1937, no longer believed that a military solution to the "China Affair" was possible and instead favored having Germany mediate an end to the war that would presumably result in a pro-Japanese peace settlement, but would be less than he himself had outlined in the "Konoe programme" of January 1938. For this reason, Konoe wanted Tojo, a tough general whose ultra-nationalism was beyond question, to provide "cover" for his attempt to seek a diplomatic solution to the war with China. Tojo was a strong supporter of the Tripartite Pact between Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy. As the army minister, he continued to expand the war against China. After negotiations with Vichy France, Japan was given permission to place its troops in the southern part of French Indochina in July 1941. In spite of its formal recognition of the Vichy government, the United States retaliated against Japan by imposing economic sanctions in August, including a total embargo on oil and gasoline exports. On September 6, a deadline of early October was fixed in the Imperial Conference for resolving the situation diplomatically. On October 14, the deadline had passed with no progress. Prime Minister Konoe then held his last cabinet meeting in which Tojo did most of the talking:

For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations. Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked... The heart of the matter is the imposition on us of withdrawal from Indochina and China... If we yield to America's demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined.

The prevailing opinion within the Japanese Army at that time was that continued negotiations could be dangerous. However, Hirohito thought that he might be able to control extreme opinions in the army by using the charismatic and well-connected Tojo, who had expressed reservations regarding war with the West, but the emperor himself was skeptical that Tojo would be able to avoid conflict. On October 13, he declared to Kōichi Kido: "There seems little hope in the present situation for the Japan-U.S. negotiations. This time, if hostilities erupt, I have to issue a declaration of war." During the last cabinet meetings of the Konoe government, Tojo emerged as a hawkish voice, saying he did not want a war with the United States but portrayed the Americans as arrogant, bullying, white supremacists. He said that any compromise solution would only encourage them to make more extreme demands on Japan, in which case Japan might be better off choosing war to uphold national honor. Despite saying he favored peace, Tojo had often declared at cabinet meetings that any withdrawal from French Indochina and/or China would be damaging to military morale and might threaten the kokutai; the "China Incident" could not be resolved via diplomacy and required a military solution; and attempting to compromise with the Americans would be seen as weakness by them.

On October 16, Konoe, politically isolated and convinced that the emperor no longer trusted him, resigned. Later, he justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita:

Of course His Majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war is a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: "You were worried about it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much." Thus, gradually, he began to lean toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward war. In short, I felt the Emperor was telling me: "My prime minister does not understand military matters, I know much more." In short, the Emperor had absorbed the views of the army and navy high commands.
Le prince Fumimaro Konoe était un homme politique japonais qui a été Premier ministre du Japon de 1937 à 1939 et de 1940 à 1941. Il a présidé à l'invasion japonaise de la Chine en 1937 et à la détérioration des relations avec les États-Unis, qui a finalement conduit à l'entrée du Japon dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Il a également joué un rôle central dans la transformation de son pays en un État totalitaire en adoptant la loi sur la mobilisation générale de l'État et en fondant l'Association d'assistance au régime impérial tout en dissolvant tous les autres partis politiques. Né à Tokyo dans une famille aristocratique influente, Konoe a repris la place de son père à la Chambre des Pairs de la Diète impériale en 1916. Il était membre de la délégation japonaise à la Conférence de la paix de Paris. En 1933, Konoe a assumé la présidence de la Chambre des Pairs. En 1937, sur la recommandation de son mentor Saionji Kinmochi, Konoe a été nommé Premier ministre par l'empereur Hirohito. L'incident du pont Marco Polo a eu lieu un mois après sa nomination et s'est transformé en une guerre à grande échelle. Konoe a supervisé les victoires japonaises pendant la phase initiale de la Seconde guerre sino-japonaise et a fait adopter la loi sur la mobilisation générale de l'État, plaçant le pays en état de guerre. Konoe a démissionné de son poste de Premier ministre en 1939, alors que la résistance chinoise se poursuivait et que la guerre s'éternisait. Konoe a été président du Conseil privé jusqu'en 1940, date à laquelle il a été à nouveau nommé Premier ministre. L'Association d'assistance au régime impérial a été fondée plus tard cette année-là, alors que le Japon concluait le Pacte tripartite avec l'Allemagne nazie et l'Italie fasciste, lançait une invasion de l'Indochine française et reconnaissait formellement le gouvernement de Wang Jingwei à Nankin. En 1941, le Japon a conclu le pacte de neutralité soviéto-japonais. Malgré les tentatives de Konoe pour résoudre les tensions avec les États-Unis, le calendrier rigide imposé aux négociations par l'armée et l'inflexibilité de sa propre administration ont mis le Japon sur la voie de la guerre. Politiquement isolé, Konoe a démissionné de son poste de Premier ministre en octobre 1941 et a été remplacé par Hideki Tojo. Six semaines plus tard, la guerre du Pacifique a éclaté à la suite de l'attaque japonaise sur Pearl Harbor. Konoe est resté un conseiller proche d'Hirohito jusqu'à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et a joué un rôle clé dans la chute du cabinet Tojo en 1944. Au début de l'occupation alliée du Japon, il a siégé au cabinet du prince Naruhiko Higashikuni. Après avoir été soupçonné de crimes de guerre, Konoe s'est suicidé en décembre 1945, à l'âge de 54 ans, en ingérant du cyanure.
### Query ###
Pourquoi Konoe a-t-il démissionné en octobre 1941 ?

### Main Text ###
Advocacy for preventive war

On June 1, 1940, Emperor Hirohito appointed Kōichi Kido, a leading " reform bureaucrat " as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, making him into the Emperor's leading political advisor and fixer. Kido had aided in the creation in the 1930s of an alliance between the "reform bureaucrats" and the Army's "Control" faction centered on Tojo and General Mutō Akira. Kido's appointment also favored the rise of his allies in the Control faction. On July 30, 1940, Tojo was appointed army minister in the second Fumimaro Konoe regime and remained in that post in the third Konoe cabinet. Prince Konoe had chosen Tojo, a man representative of both the Army's hardline views and the Control faction with whom he was considered reasonable to deal, to secure the Army's backing for his foreign policy. Tojo was a militant ultra-nationalist who was well respected for his work ethic and his ability to handle paperwork. He believed that the emperor was a living god and favored "direct imperial rule;" that ensured that he would faithfully follow any order from the emperor. Konoe favored having Germany mediate an end to the Sino-Japanese War, pressured Britain to end its economic and military support of China even at the risk of war, sought better relations with both Germany and the United States, and took advantage of the changes in the international order caused by Germany's victories in the spring of 1940 to make Japan a stronger power in Asia. Konoe wanted to make Japan the dominant power in East Asia, but he also believed it was possible to negotiate a modus vivendi with the United States under which the Americans would agree to recognize the " Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ".

By 1940, Konoe, who had started the war with China in 1937, no longer believed that a military solution to the "China Affair" was possible and instead favored having Germany mediate an end to the war that would presumably result in a pro-Japanese peace settlement, but would be less than he himself had outlined in the "Konoe programme" of January 1938. For this reason, Konoe wanted Tojo, a tough general whose ultra-nationalism was beyond question, to provide "cover" for his attempt to seek a diplomatic solution to the war with China. Tojo was a strong supporter of the Tripartite Pact between Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy. As the army minister, he continued to expand the war against China. After negotiations with Vichy France, Japan was given permission to place its troops in the southern part of French Indochina in July 1941. In spite of its formal recognition of the Vichy government, the United States retaliated against Japan by imposing economic sanctions in August, including a total embargo on oil and gasoline exports. On September 6, a deadline of early October was fixed in the Imperial Conference for resolving the situation diplomatically. On October 14, the deadline had passed with no progress. Prime Minister Konoe then held his last cabinet meeting in which Tojo did most of the talking:

For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations. Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked... The heart of the matter is the imposition on us of withdrawal from Indochina and China... If we yield to America's demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined.

The prevailing opinion within the Japanese Army at that time was that continued negotiations could be dangerous. However, Hirohito thought that he might be able to control extreme opinions in the army by using the charismatic and well-connected Tojo, who had expressed reservations regarding war with the West, but the emperor himself was skeptical that Tojo would be able to avoid conflict. On October 13, he declared to Kōichi Kido: "There seems little hope in the present situation for the Japan-U.S. negotiations. This time, if hostilities erupt, I have to issue a declaration of war." During the last cabinet meetings of the Konoe government, Tojo emerged as a hawkish voice, saying he did not want a war with the United States but portrayed the Americans as arrogant, bullying, white supremacists. He said that any compromise solution would only encourage them to make more extreme demands on Japan, in which case Japan might be better off choosing war to uphold national honor. Despite saying he favored peace, Tojo had often declared at cabinet meetings that any withdrawal from French Indochina and/or China would be damaging to military morale and might threaten the kokutai; the "China Incident" could not be resolved via diplomacy and required a military solution; and attempting to compromise with the Americans would be seen as weakness by them.

On October 16, Konoe, politically isolated and convinced that the emperor no longer trusted him, resigned. Later, he justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita:

Of course His Majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war is a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: "You were worried about it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much." Thus, gradually, he began to lean toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward war. In short, I felt the Emperor was telling me: "My prime minister does not understand military matters, I know much more." In short, the Emperor had absorbed the views of the army and navy high commands.

### Supplementary Text ###
Le prince Fumimaro Konoe était un homme politique japonais qui a été Premier ministre du Japon de 1937 à 1939 et de 1940 à 1941. Il a présidé à l'invasion japonaise de la Chine en 1937 et à la détérioration des relations avec les États-Unis, qui a finalement conduit à l'entrée du Japon dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Il a également joué un rôle central dans la transformation de son pays en un État totalitaire en adoptant la loi sur la mobilisation générale de l'État et en fondant l'Association d'assistance au régime impérial tout en dissolvant tous les autres partis politiques. Né à Tokyo dans une famille aristocratique influente, Konoe a repris la place de son père à la Chambre des Pairs de la Diète impériale en 1916. Il était membre de la délégation japonaise à la Conférence de la paix de Paris. En 1933, Konoe a assumé la présidence de la Chambre des Pairs. En 1937, sur la recommandation de son mentor Saionji Kinmochi, Konoe a été nommé Premier ministre par l'empereur Hirohito. L'incident du pont Marco Polo a eu lieu un mois après sa nomination et s'est transformé en une guerre à grande échelle. Konoe a supervisé les victoires japonaises pendant la phase initiale de la Seconde guerre sino-japonaise et a fait adopter la loi sur la mobilisation générale de l'État, plaçant le pays en état de guerre. Konoe a démissionné de son poste de Premier ministre en 1939, alors que la résistance chinoise se poursuivait et que la guerre s'éternisait. Konoe a été président du Conseil privé jusqu'en 1940, date à laquelle il a été à nouveau nommé Premier ministre. L'Association d'assistance au régime impérial a été fondée plus tard cette année-là, alors que le Japon concluait le Pacte tripartite avec l'Allemagne nazie et l'Italie fasciste, lançait une invasion de l'Indochine française et reconnaissait formellement le gouvernement de Wang Jingwei à Nankin. En 1941, le Japon a conclu le pacte de neutralité soviéto-japonais. Malgré les tentatives de Konoe pour résoudre les tensions avec les États-Unis, le calendrier rigide imposé aux négociations par l'armée et l'inflexibilité de sa propre administration ont mis le Japon sur la voie de la guerre. Politiquement isolé, Konoe a démissionné de son poste de Premier ministre en octobre 1941 et a été remplacé par Hideki Tojo. Six semaines plus tard, la guerre du Pacifique a éclaté à la suite de l'attaque japonaise sur Pearl Harbor. Konoe est resté un conseiller proche d'Hirohito jusqu'à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et a joué un rôle clé dans la chute du cabinet Tojo en 1944. Au début de l'occupation alliée du Japon, il a siégé au cabinet du prince Naruhiko Higashikuni. Après avoir été soupçonné de crimes de guerre, Konoe s'est suicidé en décembre 1945, à l'âge de 54 ans, en ingérant du cyanure.

### Draft ###

Query: "Pourquoi Konoe a-t-il démissionné en octobre 1941?"

Translation check: "Why did Konoe resign in October 1941?" → Simple factual query about Japanese political history.

Domain boundaries: 
- Japanese internal politics, 1941
- Pacific War origins 
- Personality/institutional dynamics
- Imperial system constraints

? Core question: Was resignation voluntary/forced?

### 1. Contextual positioning

Konoe Fumimaro. Third term PM. October 1941 = critical inflection point. 
→ Oil embargo crisis escalating
→ US-Japan negotiations failing  
→ Military pressure mounting

※ Key constraint: Japanese system = emperor-centered, not democratic. PM = imperial servant, not independent leader.

### 2. Causal chain analysis

October 1941 timeline:
- Early October: Oil embargo response to Indochina expansion
- October 14: Diplomatic deadline passes
- October 16: Final resignation

● Military pressure: Army/navy demanding "decisive action"
◐ Emperor Hirohito: Gradual shift toward military consensus
○ Cabinet division: Some supporting continuation

### 3. Key factors triangulation

**Military constraint analysis:**
- Army control of strategic decisions
- "Patriotic" pressure vs diplomatic options
- Tojo's hawkish influence in final cabinet

**Imperial dynamics:**
- Hirohito's "deliberative" style → appears passive but decisive
- Konoe's own account: emperor "gradually leaned toward war"
- October 13: Direct imperial statement about inevitability

**Personal/political factors:**
- Konoe's diplomatic orientation vs military realities
- Cabinet isolation by October
- ∴ Voluntarily stepping aside rather than forced removal

### 4. Synthesis verification

⟨H≈0.8⟩ The resignation wasn't single-cause but constellation collapse. Konoe finding himself simultaneously: squeezed by military hawks, losing imperial confidence, realizing diplomatic path blocked. Emperor's gradual pivot → "there seems little hope" → direct war declaration language. Cabinet becoming chorus of military voices. October 14 deadline = final diplomatic death. Resignation = recognition of institutional impossibility, not failure of policy.

**Answer structure:**
1. Military pressure intensification ●
2. Imperial system constraints ●  
3. Personal political isolation ●
4. Recognition of diplomatic impossibility ●

∴ Konoe resigned October 1941 due to: military pressure, imperial system constraints, personal isolation, and recognition that war was inevitable/preferred by key decision-makers.

**Confidence assessment:**
- Timeline/dates: ● High
- Causal factors: ● High  
- Internal Japanese politics: ◐ Partial (limited primary sources)
- Personal motivations: ○ Moderate

**Physical constraints verify answer:**
- October oil embargo = real constraint
- Japanese domestic system = emperor-centered (not democratic)
- Military institutional power = dominant factor
- Timeline progression = logical

☑ Answer addresses "pourquoi" (why)
☑ Explains October 1941 timing  
☑ Contextualizes within Pacific War origins

### Answer###
Konoe a démissionné en octobre 1941 pour plusieurs raisons convergentes qui illustrent les pressions croissantes qu'il a subies. Politiquement isolé et convaincu que l'empereur Hirohito ne lui faisait plus confiance, Konoe a remis sa démission le 16 octobre.

Les facteurs clés de sa chute comprenaient l'intensification de la pression militaire et les sanctions économiques imposées par les États-Unis. Après l'embargo total sur les exportations de pétrole et d'essence suite à l'expansion japonaise en Indochine française en juillet 1941, le Japon se trouvait dans une situation économique critique. L'opinion prédominante au sein de l'armée japonaise était que les négociations diplomatiques pouvaient être dangereuses.

Lors des derniers conseils des ministres du gouvernement Konoe, le ministre de la guerre Tojo a émergé comme une voix belliciste, arguant que toute solution de compromis ne ferait que pousser les Américains à faire des demandes encore plus extrêmes. Cette influence militariste s'est accompagnée d'une évolution graduelle de l'empereur Hirohito, qui semblait "pencher progressivement vers la guerre" selon les propres mots de Konoe.

Le 13 octobre, l'empereur a déclaré : "Il semble y avoir peu d'espoir dans la situation actuelle pour les négociations Japon-États-Unis. Cette fois, si les hostilités éclatent, je dois décréter une déclaration de guerre." Face à cette pression militaire croissante et à l'isolement politique, Konoe a préféré démissionner plutôt que de poursuivre une politique qu'il jugeait de plus en plus impossible à maintenir.