Comment le système des affinités militaires favorisant l'indépendance des grands seigneurs a-t-il pu conduire à l'affaiblissement de l'autorité royale ?
Bastard feudalism

Edward III, who ruled England from 1327 to 1377, had five sons who survived into adulthood; Edward of Woodstock "the Black Prince", Lionel of Antwerp, John of Gaunt, Edmund of Langley, and Thomas of Woodstock. Throughout his reign, he created duchies for his sons; Cornwall in 1337 for Edward, and Clarence and Lancaster in 1362 for Lionel and John respectively. Edmund and Thomas became the dukes of York and Gloucester respectively in 1385, during the reign of Richard II. Dukedoms had hitherto never been conferred by any English monarch upon a subject until the creation of the Duchy of Cornwall in 1337, and their genesis spawned a powerful new class of English nobility with claims to the throne and, theoretically, enough power to vie for it, since the new duchies provided Edward's sons and their heirs presumptive with an income independent of the sovereign or the state, thereby allowing them to establish and maintain their own private military retinues.

Over time, these duchies began to exacerbate the structural defects inherent in so-called " bastard feudalism ", a somewhat controversial term coined in 1885 by historian Charles Plummer but largely defined by Plummer's contemporary, William Stubbs. During the reign of Edward's grandfather, Edward I, Stubbs describes a substantive shift in social dynamics in which the conscription-based feudal levy came to be replaced by a system of royal payment in return for military service by the magnates who served the monarch. Thus, instead of vassals rendering military service when called, they paid a portion of their income into their lord's treasury, who would supplement the owed service with hired retainers. These retinues were known as affinities; essentially a collection of all the individuals to whom a lord had gathered for service, and came to be one of the most fundamentally defining aspects of bastard feudalism. These affinities also had the means of tying the more powerful magnates to the lower nobility, although these relationships were now largely defined by personal connections that exhibited reciprocal benefit, rather than tenurial or feudal relationships that preceded bastard feudalism. Consequently, lords could now raise retinues they could implicitly trust, since the men of the affinity owed their positions to their patron. These affinities were often much larger than the number of men the lord actually knew, since the members of the affinity also knew and supported each other.

Under the reign of Richard II, this created a power struggle with the magnates, as Richard sought to increase the size of his own affinities as a counterweight to the growing retinues of his nobles. The retinues of the magnates became powerful enough to defend the interests of their lord against even the authority of the monarch, as John of Gaunt, and later his son, Henry Bolingbroke, did against Richard. During the wars, disaffected magnates such as Richard of York and Warwick the Kingmaker were able to rely upon their complex network of servants and retainers to successfully defy the authority of Henry VI.
Autorité locale

À long terme, le déclin du pouvoir impérial divisa l'Allemagne jusqu'au XIXe siècle. De même, en Italie, la querelle des investitures affaiblit l'autorité de l'empereur et renforça les séparatistes locaux.

Tandis que la monarchie était empêtrée dans la dispute avec l'Église, son pouvoir déclina, et les droits localisés de seigneurie sur les paysans augmentèrent, ce qui conduisit finalement à :
### Query ###
Comment le système des affinités militaires favorisant l'indépendance des grands seigneurs a-t-il pu conduire à l'affaiblissement de l'autorité royale ?

### Main Text ###
Bastard feudalism

Edward III, who ruled England from 1327 to 1377, had five sons who survived into adulthood; Edward of Woodstock "the Black Prince", Lionel of Antwerp, John of Gaunt, Edmund of Langley, and Thomas of Woodstock. Throughout his reign, he created duchies for his sons; Cornwall in 1337 for Edward, and Clarence and Lancaster in 1362 for Lionel and John respectively. Edmund and Thomas became the dukes of York and Gloucester respectively in 1385, during the reign of Richard II. Dukedoms had hitherto never been conferred by any English monarch upon a subject until the creation of the Duchy of Cornwall in 1337, and their genesis spawned a powerful new class of English nobility with claims to the throne and, theoretically, enough power to vie for it, since the new duchies provided Edward's sons and their heirs presumptive with an income independent of the sovereign or the state, thereby allowing them to establish and maintain their own private military retinues.

Over time, these duchies began to exacerbate the structural defects inherent in so-called " bastard feudalism ", a somewhat controversial term coined in 1885 by historian Charles Plummer but largely defined by Plummer's contemporary, William Stubbs. During the reign of Edward's grandfather, Edward I, Stubbs describes a substantive shift in social dynamics in which the conscription-based feudal levy came to be replaced by a system of royal payment in return for military service by the magnates who served the monarch. Thus, instead of vassals rendering military service when called, they paid a portion of their income into their lord's treasury, who would supplement the owed service with hired retainers. These retinues were known as affinities; essentially a collection of all the individuals to whom a lord had gathered for service, and came to be one of the most fundamentally defining aspects of bastard feudalism. These affinities also had the means of tying the more powerful magnates to the lower nobility, although these relationships were now largely defined by personal connections that exhibited reciprocal benefit, rather than tenurial or feudal relationships that preceded bastard feudalism. Consequently, lords could now raise retinues they could implicitly trust, since the men of the affinity owed their positions to their patron. These affinities were often much larger than the number of men the lord actually knew, since the members of the affinity also knew and supported each other.

Under the reign of Richard II, this created a power struggle with the magnates, as Richard sought to increase the size of his own affinities as a counterweight to the growing retinues of his nobles. The retinues of the magnates became powerful enough to defend the interests of their lord against even the authority of the monarch, as John of Gaunt, and later his son, Henry Bolingbroke, did against Richard. During the wars, disaffected magnates such as Richard of York and Warwick the Kingmaker were able to rely upon their complex network of servants and retainers to successfully defy the authority of Henry VI.

### Supplementary Text ###
Autorité locale

À long terme, le déclin du pouvoir impérial divisa l'Allemagne jusqu'au XIXe siècle. De même, en Italie, la querelle des investitures affaiblit l'autorité de l'empereur et renforça les séparatistes locaux.

Tandis que la monarchie était empêtrée dans la dispute avec l'Église, son pouvoir déclina, et les droits localisés de seigneurie sur les paysans augmentèrent, ce qui conduisit finalement à :

### Draft ###

### 1. Query Parsing

"Comment le système des affinités militaires..." → How did military affinity systems favoring independence of great lords lead to weakening of royal authority?

Key terms:
- "affinités militaires" = military retinues/retainer networks
- "grands seigneurs" = major noble landowners  
- "indépendance" = operational autonomy from crown
- "affaiblissement de l'autorité royale" = erosion of royal power

Translation nuance: "affinités" carries relational meaning (kinship, alliance) beyond mere "retainers."

### 2. Domain Contextualization  

Medieval European military organization, roughly 13th-15th centuries. ● High confidence timeframe.

Geographic focus: England primarily, but broader continental patterns apply.

Knowledge domains required:
├─ Military technology: decline of feudal levy → mercenary systems
├─ Economic: land tenure → cash-based retainers  
├─ Social: patronage networks → political power bases
└─ Constitutional: crown-noble tensions → eventual civil conflicts

### 3. Core Mechanism Analysis

**Phase 1: Economic Foundation**

⟨H≈0.2⟩ Edward I's military reforms. Need for cash payments replaces feudal obligations. Great lords accumulate revenues from: crown grants, church appointments, expanded landholdings. Economic independence → military independence.

**Phase 2: Retainer System Evolution**

"Bastard feudalism" terminology. ● High historical consensus on this term's accuracy.

Key dynamic: Lords build personal armies of retainers, not feudal levies. 
- Recruitment based on oath, loyalty, economic benefit
- Retainers cross-generational, self-perpetuating networks
- Geographic dispersion maintains crown's local influence

**Phase 3: Authority Displacement**

Critical insight: → Retainer networks become alternative power centers

Physical constraints verify this:
- Medieval armies: 500-2000 men typical for major lords
- Single great lord could field force comparable to royal household
- Multiple coordinated lords = significant military challenge to crown

**Phase 4: Political Weaponization**

⟨H≈0.8⟩ Richard II's attempts to counter-balance. Creates own affinity networks. But crown lacks independent economic base of great lords. Political deadlock emerges. Wars of Roses demonstrate ultimate consequence.

### 5. Verification Against Logical Constraints

**Economic Logic:** ✓
- Independent revenue streams enable military autonomy
- Military autonomy translates to political leverage
- Political leverage can challenge crown authority

**Social Logic:** ✓  
- Retainer loyalty transcends feudal obligations
- Personal bonds vs. hierarchical relationships
- Networks provide redundancy against individual royal influence

**Political Logic:** ✓
- Crown attempts counter-strategies (Richard II)
- But structural economic disadvantage persists
- Ultimate political breakdown follows military patterns

### 6. Synthesis

∴ **Core causal chain:**
Economic independence → Military autonomy → Political leverage → Authority challenge → Constitutional crisis

**Key intermediate factors:**
├─ Bastard feudalism terminology accurate
├─ Retainer networks as alternative power centers  
├─ Cross-generational loyalty structures
└─ Crown's inability to match great lord economic bases

**Historical verification:** 
Wars of Roses demonstrate terminal outcome. ● High confidence.

NB: This represents evolutionary, not revolutionary, authority shift. Gradual accumulation of noble autonomy until constitutional breakdown.

### Answer###
Le système des affinités militaires a effectivement créé une dynamique d'affaiblissement progressif de l'autorité royale de manière structurelle et durable.

Cette transformation s'est opérée à travers plusieurs mécanismes clés. D'abord, l'abandon du service militaire féodal traditionnel au profit d'un système de paiement royal a permis aux grands seigneurs de constituer des réseaux d'affinités - des cohortes de serviteurs et de militaires à leur service. Ces réseaux, basés sur des liens personnels de dévouement réciproque plutôt que sur des relations féodales, donnaient aux lords une autonomie militaire considérable.

L'indépendance économique renforcée cette autonomie politique. Les duchés créés par les rois, notamment à partir du règne d'Édouard III, offraient aux héritiers du trône des revenus substantiels indépendants du souverain. Cette indépendance financière leur permettait de maintenir leurs propres forces militaires privées sans dépendre des subsides royaux.

Cette situation a créé des bastions de pouvoir locaux suffisamment forts pour défier l'autorité royale elle-même. Sous le règne de Richard II, les grandes familles nobles, à travers leurs réseaux d'affinités, ont pu contester directement l'autorité monarchique et même renverser les rois. Les guerres de Roses ont démontré l'ultime conséquence de ce processus : l'incapacité des souverains à contrôler efficacement ces centres de pouvoir alternatifs a conduit à la déstabilisation constitutionnelle et à la guerre civile.

Cette évolution illustre comment les transformations économiques et militaires peuvent progressivement éroder l'autorité centrale en créant des centres de pouvoir rivaux autonomes.