Qui décide de l'autorité de la halakha ?
Sources and process

The development of halakha in the period before the Maccabees, which has been described as the formative period in the history of its development, is shrouded in obscurity. Historian Yitzhak Baer argued that there was little pure academic legal activity at this period and that many of the laws originating at this time were produced by a means of neighbourly good conduct rules in a similar way as carried out by Greeks in the age of Solon. For example, the first chapter of Bava Kamma, contains a formulation of the law of torts worded in the first person.

The boundaries of Jewish law are determined through the Halakhic process, a religious-ethical system of legal reasoning. Rabbis generally base their opinions on the primary sources of halakha as well as on precedent set by previous rabbinic opinions. The major sources and genre of halakha consulted include:

In antiquity, the Sanhedrin functioned essentially as the Supreme Court and legislature (in the US judicial system) for Judaism, and had the power to administer binding law, including both received law and its own rabbinic decrees, on all Jews—rulings of the Sanhedrin became halakha; see Oral law. That court ceased to function in its full mode in 40 CE. Today, the authoritative application of Jewish law is left to the local rabbi, and the local rabbinical courts, with only local applicability. In branches of Judaism that follow halakha, lay individuals make numerous ad-hoc decisions but are regarded as not having authority to decide certain issues definitively.

Since the days of the Sanhedrin, however, no body or authority has been generally regarded as having the authority to create universally recognized precedents. As a result, halakha has developed in a somewhat different fashion from Anglo-American legal systems with a Supreme Court able to provide universally accepted precedents. Generally, Halakhic arguments are effectively, yet unofficially, peer-reviewed. When a rabbinic posek ("he who makes a statement", "decisor") proposes an additional interpretation of a law, that interpretation may be considered binding for the posek's questioner or immediate community. Depending on the stature of the posek and the quality of the decision, an interpretation may also be gradually accepted by other rabbis and members of other Jewish communities.

Under this system there is a tension between the relevance of earlier and later authorities in constraining Halakhic interpretation and innovation. On the one hand, there is a principle in halakha not to overrule a specific law from an earlier era, after it is accepted by the community as a law or vow, unless supported by another, relevant earlier precedent; see list below. On the other hand, another principle recognizes the responsibility and authority of later authorities, and especially the posek handling a then-current question. In addition, the halakha embodies a wide range of principles that permit judicial discretion and deviation (Ben-Menahem).

Notwithstanding the potential for innovation, rabbis and Jewish communities differ greatly on how they make changes in halakha. Notably, poskim frequently extend the application of a law to new situations, but do not consider such applications as constituting a "change" in halakha. For example, many Orthodox rulings concerning electricity are derived from rulings concerning fire, as closing an electrical circuit may cause a spark. In contrast, Conservative poskim consider that switching on electrical equipment is physically and chemically more like turning on a water tap (which is permissible by halakha) than lighting a fire (which is not permissible), and therefore permitted on Shabbat. The reformative Judaism in some cases explicitly interprets halakha to take into account its view of contemporary society. For instance, most Conservative rabbis extend the application of certain Jewish obligations and permissible activities to women (see below).

Within certain Jewish communities, formal organized bodies do exist. Within Modern Orthodox Judaism, there is no one committee or leader, but Modern US-based Orthodox rabbis generally agree with the views set by consensus by the leaders of the Rabbinical Council of America. Within Conservative Judaism, the Rabbinical Assembly has an official Committee on Jewish Law and Standards.

Note that takkanot (plural of takkanah) in general do not affect or restrict observance of Torah mitzvot. (Sometimes takkanah refers to either gezeirot or takkanot.) However, the Talmud states that in exceptional cases, the Sages had the authority to "uproot matters from the Torah". In Talmudic and classical Halakhic literature, this authority refers to the authority to prohibit some things that would otherwise be Biblically sanctioned (shev v'al ta'aseh, "thou shall stay seated and not do"). Rabbis may rule that a specific mitzvah from the Torah should not be performed, e. g., blowing the shofar on Shabbat, or taking the lulav and etrog on Shabbat. These examples of takkanot which may be executed out of caution lest some might otherwise carry the mentioned items between home and the synagogue, thus inadvertently violating a Sabbath melakha. Another rare and limited form of takkanah involved overriding Torah prohibitions. In some cases, the Sages allowed the temporary violation of a prohibition in order to maintain the Jewish system as a whole. This was part of the basis for Esther 's relationship with Ahasuerus (Xeres). For general usage of takkanaot in Jewish history see the article Takkanah. For examples of this being used in Conservative Judaism, see Conservative halakha.
L'autorité rabbinique

Le leadership rabbinique, chargé de mettre en œuvre et d'interpréter la tradition, a considérablement évolué au fil des siècles, séparant le judaïsme orthodoxe du judaïsme prémoderne. Depuis la disparition des Géonim, qui ont dirigé le monde juif jusqu'en 1038, la halakha était jugée localement, et l'arbitre final était principalement le rabbin local, le Mara d'Athra (Maître de la Région). Il était responsable d'instruire judiciairement sa communauté. L'émancipation et les moyens modernes de transport et de communication ont rendu ce modèle insoutenable. Bien que les communautés orthodoxes, en particulier les plus conservatrices, aient des rabbins qui remplissent techniquement cette fonction, le public suit généralement des autorités plus largement reconnues, qui ne sont pas limitées par la géographie, et basées davantage sur la révérence et la pression sociale que sur la coercition. Il peut s'agir de professeurs populaires de académies talmudiques, de décisionnaires réputés, et, dans le monde hassidique, de rebbe héréditaires.

Leur influence varie considérablement : dans les cercles orthodoxes conservateurs, principalement Haredi, les rabbins possèdent une forte autorité et exercent souvent un leadership. Des organismes tels que le Conseil des Sages de la Torah, le Conseil des Luminaires de la Torah, le Congrès Rabbinique Central et le Conseil Orthodoxe de Jérusalem sont considérés comme les arbitres dans leurs communautés respectives. Dans les secteurs orthodoxes plus libéraux, les rabbins sont vénérés et consultés, mais exercent rarement un contrôle direct.
### Query ###
Qui décide de l'autorité de la halakha ?

### Main Text ###
Sources and process

The development of halakha in the period before the Maccabees, which has been described as the formative period in the history of its development, is shrouded in obscurity. Historian Yitzhak Baer argued that there was little pure academic legal activity at this period and that many of the laws originating at this time were produced by a means of neighbourly good conduct rules in a similar way as carried out by Greeks in the age of Solon. For example, the first chapter of Bava Kamma, contains a formulation of the law of torts worded in the first person.

The boundaries of Jewish law are determined through the Halakhic process, a religious-ethical system of legal reasoning. Rabbis generally base their opinions on the primary sources of halakha as well as on precedent set by previous rabbinic opinions. The major sources and genre of halakha consulted include:

In antiquity, the Sanhedrin functioned essentially as the Supreme Court and legislature (in the US judicial system) for Judaism, and had the power to administer binding law, including both received law and its own rabbinic decrees, on all Jews—rulings of the Sanhedrin became halakha; see Oral law. That court ceased to function in its full mode in 40 CE. Today, the authoritative application of Jewish law is left to the local rabbi, and the local rabbinical courts, with only local applicability. In branches of Judaism that follow halakha, lay individuals make numerous ad-hoc decisions but are regarded as not having authority to decide certain issues definitively.

Since the days of the Sanhedrin, however, no body or authority has been generally regarded as having the authority to create universally recognized precedents. As a result, halakha has developed in a somewhat different fashion from Anglo-American legal systems with a Supreme Court able to provide universally accepted precedents. Generally, Halakhic arguments are effectively, yet unofficially, peer-reviewed. When a rabbinic posek ("he who makes a statement", "decisor") proposes an additional interpretation of a law, that interpretation may be considered binding for the posek's questioner or immediate community. Depending on the stature of the posek and the quality of the decision, an interpretation may also be gradually accepted by other rabbis and members of other Jewish communities.

Under this system there is a tension between the relevance of earlier and later authorities in constraining Halakhic interpretation and innovation. On the one hand, there is a principle in halakha not to overrule a specific law from an earlier era, after it is accepted by the community as a law or vow, unless supported by another, relevant earlier precedent; see list below. On the other hand, another principle recognizes the responsibility and authority of later authorities, and especially the posek handling a then-current question. In addition, the halakha embodies a wide range of principles that permit judicial discretion and deviation (Ben-Menahem).

Notwithstanding the potential for innovation, rabbis and Jewish communities differ greatly on how they make changes in halakha. Notably, poskim frequently extend the application of a law to new situations, but do not consider such applications as constituting a "change" in halakha. For example, many Orthodox rulings concerning electricity are derived from rulings concerning fire, as closing an electrical circuit may cause a spark. In contrast, Conservative poskim consider that switching on electrical equipment is physically and chemically more like turning on a water tap (which is permissible by halakha) than lighting a fire (which is not permissible), and therefore permitted on Shabbat. The reformative Judaism in some cases explicitly interprets halakha to take into account its view of contemporary society. For instance, most Conservative rabbis extend the application of certain Jewish obligations and permissible activities to women (see below).

Within certain Jewish communities, formal organized bodies do exist. Within Modern Orthodox Judaism, there is no one committee or leader, but Modern US-based Orthodox rabbis generally agree with the views set by consensus by the leaders of the Rabbinical Council of America. Within Conservative Judaism, the Rabbinical Assembly has an official Committee on Jewish Law and Standards.

Note that takkanot (plural of takkanah) in general do not affect or restrict observance of Torah mitzvot. (Sometimes takkanah refers to either gezeirot or takkanot.) However, the Talmud states that in exceptional cases, the Sages had the authority to "uproot matters from the Torah". In Talmudic and classical Halakhic literature, this authority refers to the authority to prohibit some things that would otherwise be Biblically sanctioned (shev v'al ta'aseh, "thou shall stay seated and not do"). Rabbis may rule that a specific mitzvah from the Torah should not be performed, e. g., blowing the shofar on Shabbat, or taking the lulav and etrog on Shabbat. These examples of takkanot which may be executed out of caution lest some might otherwise carry the mentioned items between home and the synagogue, thus inadvertently violating a Sabbath melakha. Another rare and limited form of takkanah involved overriding Torah prohibitions. In some cases, the Sages allowed the temporary violation of a prohibition in order to maintain the Jewish system as a whole. This was part of the basis for Esther 's relationship with Ahasuerus (Xeres). For general usage of takkanaot in Jewish history see the article Takkanah. For examples of this being used in Conservative Judaism, see Conservative halakha.

### Supplementary Text ###
L'autorité rabbinique

Le leadership rabbinique, chargé de mettre en œuvre et d'interpréter la tradition, a considérablement évolué au fil des siècles, séparant le judaïsme orthodoxe du judaïsme prémoderne. Depuis la disparition des Géonim, qui ont dirigé le monde juif jusqu'en 1038, la halakha était jugée localement, et l'arbitre final était principalement le rabbin local, le Mara d'Athra (Maître de la Région). Il était responsable d'instruire judiciairement sa communauté. L'émancipation et les moyens modernes de transport et de communication ont rendu ce modèle insoutenable. Bien que les communautés orthodoxes, en particulier les plus conservatrices, aient des rabbins qui remplissent techniquement cette fonction, le public suit généralement des autorités plus largement reconnues, qui ne sont pas limitées par la géographie, et basées davantage sur la révérence et la pression sociale que sur la coercition. Il peut s'agir de professeurs populaires de académies talmudiques, de décisionnaires réputés, et, dans le monde hassidique, de rebbe héréditaires.

Leur influence varie considérablement : dans les cercles orthodoxes conservateurs, principalement Haredi, les rabbins possèdent une forte autorité et exercent souvent un leadership. Des organismes tels que le Conseil des Sages de la Torah, le Conseil des Luminaires de la Torah, le Congrès Rabbinique Central et le Conseil Orthodoxe de Jérusalem sont considérés comme les arbitres dans leurs communautés respectives. Dans les secteurs orthodoxes plus libéraux, les rabbins sont vénérés et consultés, mais exercent rarement un contrôle direct.

### Draft ###

### 1. Query Decomposition

"Qui décide de l'autorité de la halakha ?" 

→ Core question: authority hierarchy for Jewish law interpretation
→ Assumes centralized decision-making exists  
→ "décide" = who has final binding authority

※ Translation challenge: "autorité" implies institutional power vs. "influence"

### 2. Halakhic Authority Landscape

● No central supreme authority exists
◐ Multiple parallel decision-making streams
○ Authority gradients vary by community

**Traditional model**:
- Sanhedrin (ceased ~70 CE)
- Local rabbis + community courts
- Geographic jurisdiction

**Modern reality**:
- Rabbinic consensus through peer review
- Recognized decisors (posekim)
- Institutional bodies (limited scope)
- Geographic dispersion

### 3. Institutional Analysis

**Orthodox Judaism**:
- No formal hierarchy
- RCA influence in Modern Orthodox circles
- Haredi: local rabbinic authorities
- Ultra-Orthodox: specific movement leaders

**Conservative Judaism**:
- CJLS committee structure
- Official standards body exists
- More institutionalized process

**Reform/Reconstructionist**:
- Rabbinic discretion
- Community-specific authority

### 4. Decision-Making Process

⟨H≈0.8⟩ The halakhic web: thousands of rabbis spinning interpretations across centuries, no central loom weaving them into doctrine. Each posek's ruling carries weight proportional to learning depth, community respect, and precedent adherence. The system survives through informal peer review, communal acceptance, and gradual consensus rather than top-down authority...

**Mechanism**: 
- Posekim issue rulings (psak)
- Peer review through academic discourse  
- Community adoption (or rejection)
- Precedent accumulation
- Institutional codification (limited)

**Constraints**:
- Early authorities carry greater weight
- Community acceptance crucial
- Innovation within boundaries
- Practical vs. theoretical authority

### 5. Authority Sources

**Primary**:
- Torah (written/oral)
- Talmudic precedent  
- Classical commentaries

**Secondary**:
- Recognized posekim
- Academic rabbis
- Institutional bodies
- Community leaders

**Tertiary**:
- Popular rabbis
- Bloggers
- Social media influencers

### 6. Authority Gaps & Tensions

⚠ No mechanism for resolving conflicting rulings
⚠ Geographic/denominational fragmentation
⚠ Modern communication challenges

**Key tension**: Innovation vs. Tradition
- Later authorities can reinterpret earlier sources
- Community resistance to change
- Institutional conservatism

### 7. Practical Authority

∴ Authority exists on spectrum:
- Theoretical: who *could* decide
- Practical: who *actually* influences
- Local: who *locally* matters

**Factors determining authority**:
- Learning credentials
- Community size/influence  
- Precedent consistency
- Innovation acceptance
- Social networks
- Institutional backing

### 8. Synthesis

**Answer**: No single authority decides halakhic authority itself. System operates through:

1. **Decisional autonomy**: Individual posekim make rulings
2. **Peer validation**: Scholarly community evaluates rulings  
3. **Community acceptance**: Local communities adopt/reject
4. **Institutional guidance**: Formal bodies provide direction
5. **Precedent weight**: Earlier authorities carry more weight
6. **Social influence**: Recognized leaders gain authority through respect

**Result**: Distributed authority with informal hierarchies rather than centralized decision-making.

**Limitations**: System works best for traditional practices, creates tensions for modern applications, relies heavily on rabbinic integrity and community respect.

---

*Key insight*: Halakhic authority emerges organically through practice, precedent, and community acceptance rather than being formally determined or hierarchically structured.

### Answer###
L'autorité de la halakha ne repose pas sur une seule instance décisionnelle centrale, mais sur un système complexe d'autorités rabbiniques et de processus traditionnels.

Historiquement, le Sanhédrin fonctionnait comme la cour suprême et législateur pour le judaïsme, avec le pouvoir d'administrer des lois contraignantes. Ce système a cessé de fonctionner pleinement en l'an 40. Aujourd'hui, l'application autorisée de la loi juive est laissée aux rabbins locaux et aux tribunaux rabbiniques locaux, avec seulement une applicabilité locale.

Dans le judaïsme orthodoxe, il n'existe pas de comité formel unique ou de leader central. Les rabbins généralement d'accord avec les vues établies par consensus par les dirigeants du Conseil rabbinical d'Amérique. Le système fonctionne plutôt par reconnaissance informelle et influence sociale, où les rabbins locaux, les professeurs populaires d'académies talmudiques et les décisionnaires reconnus exercent une autorité basée sur le respect et la pression sociale plutôt que sur la coercition.

Le processus décisionnel implique un système de raisonnement juridique religieuse-éthique. Les rabbins se basent généralement sur les sources primaires de la halakha ainsi que sur les précédents établis par les opinions rabbiniques précédentes. Les arguments halakhiques sont effectivement, bien que non officiellement, évalués par les pairs.

Certaines communautés juives disposent d'organismes formels organisés. Dans le judaïsme conservateur, l'Assemblée rabbinique possède un Comité officiel sur la loi juive et les standards.

Il existe une tension fondamentale dans ce système entre la pertinence des autorités plus anciennes et plus récentes, et les limites de cette autorité restent débattues dans différentes branches du judaïsme.